So, obviously, this needs to be put into the context of the international situation. These are the years following the second oil shock of 1979, with external factors such as interest rates, oil prices, and all that was very strong. And from the moment I arrived in the finance department, I could already see the vulnerabilities we were going to face. I was part of a government that was still political, where there were very strong traditional political parties. I started to test the waters a little, but I saw that there was a certain reluctance to follow me, even in the painful solutions I was calling for. So time has proven me a little bit right.
In early February 1983, I remember very well, I was in my office and I had with me the vice-governor of the central bank and my assistant told me the director of the foreign department who is in charge of managing the kingdom's foreign exchange reserves wants to see you both. In fact, he was a former colleague since I spent part of my professional life there, I knew him very well. He came into my office, looked miserable, and told me we had no more foreign currency. It was for me, I say, more currency. I have more currency available at the moment. I told the vice-governor, listen, everyone, we're going to think about this from our own perspective. I started to think a little bit, I said to myself, well obviously such news must be brought to the highest level, to the head of state. I called the governor and said, 'Listen, you and I need to have an appointment with His Majesty right away so we can talk to him a little about the situation we are experiencing. We are heading to Fez and obviously we will speak to the director of protocol and say it is urgent.' And he was a general I knew. But when he arrived in his suite at the hotel, he said to me, 'What's going on? Urgent wanted to see His Majesty.' I told him, 'Listen, maybe tomorrow the light you have in this suite won't work anymore.' 'What? The light won't be there anymore?' 'Yes, yes, yes, yes, we're in a situation where maybe tomorrow you won't have your light.' And so the next day, he called me back and said, 'His Majesty, on time, but all alone, without the governor.' So I went very quickly the next day, I was received by the king, I remember, I have this image of myself in a shirt sitting behind him, there was a wrought iron window. He said 'But what the heck is going on?' I said 'Majesty, here I am in my office, and the woman told me we have no more quotes,' and she said, 'What do you propose?' I'm saying this is a completely new situation for me, you know. Now what I propose is that you give me 48 hours, I will ask the team at the International Monetary Fund and obviously through my interlocutor who was the one with whom I was already negotiating in the background usually under Article 4. Indeed, I arrive in Washington but it was at that moment that I understood what the Paris Club, the London Club, the program with the International Monetary Fund and so on were. This is the starting point. You can see that it was with the back team. It's with the back team. Well, I came back and explained all of this to His Majesty. So, what do you recommend in terms of operations? So what I am proposing is a commission that will consider an amending finance law. What do you suggest? I said the sovereign budget, national defense. He told me, 'That's between you and me, I'm the head of the defense, it's between you and me.' And he told me, 'I'm going to put you in conclave for two days.' While comfortably at my secondary residence in Fez, I will send you lunch and dinner, and as with the election of the Pope, you will only speak when you have finalized what you are going to propose as a corrective law. And that's how it happened. And I remember, it was April 30th and May 1st. We'll finalize that, I'll come back to His Majesty and say the program is ready. He told me about the cabinet meeting that same evening, which I was chairing, and I'm going to tell you a little bit in French about what he said in his introduction to the cabinet meeting. He said, 'My ancestors of the dynasty, when the country was in difficulty, they would, I would say, go on conquest. Harka in Arabic. Well, me too, in these circumstances that Morocco is experiencing, which are obviously very difficult, well, I myself am going to go into battle a little bit. Those who want to follow me will obviously be welcome. But those who don't want to follow me and who feel that the situation is too difficult, well, I won't hold it against them. Well, we'll leave them alone.' Obviously, around the table, everyone started saying, 'Not at all, Your Majesty, we are behind you, we will follow you, and so on.' Then, he turns to me. 'So now, tell them what's in store for them.' So, that's how we got into the structural adjustment program.
Listen, I'll tell you now about how the program unfolded. I admit they showed intelligence and relative flexibility because at the time the rules were very strict, you know. I remember we had a double ceiling, a ceiling for government spending, a ceiling for bank credit, and so on. But as I recall, we never met the criteria 100%. We were always around 95%. And that's where I found that the Fund and its structures, that is, the Council, demonstrated both intelligence and, I would say, understanding within the framework of what we were doing.
That is to say, when it was convinced of the arguments, it didn't have a dogmatic position, even if it was, let's say, both from partners like the World Bank, which is on the other side, but also the London club, which still represented private sector players, but who are developed countries, and so on. He didn't have a dogmatic position. When he was convinced of the argument, well, he took the side that he could help as much as possible. Well, I remember these two cases that I wanted to mention briefly during this somewhat difficult period when we entered into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. Yes, that was in the 80s. Well, later.
