This item is on the agenda for the day reserved for the Modem group, which we will examine in commission next Wednesday, February 25th. I accept the candidacy of Mr. Jean-Paul Matéi. I see no opposition, so it is decided.
How? There is an opposition? Oh really? Alright. Sorry. There we go. We agree.
We are receiving this morning the Governor of the Bank of France, Mr. François Villeroy de Galhau. This is the fifth hearing of the Governor of the Bank of France by our commission since 2022, and perhaps the last. I say 'perhaps' because we have until June. It is without doubt the last, given the recent announcement of your early departure before the natural end of your current term at the head of this institution. I am therefore very pleased to welcome you.
Today, Mr. Governor, the Bank of France published its monthly economic survey a week ago. It shows a dynamic for the French economy deemed compatible with a quarterly growth rate between 0.2% and 0.3% for the year 2026. This follows a year 2025 during which GDP growth stood at 0.9% according to the latest INSEE figures published at the end of January. But beyond these cyclical aspects, our commission will undoubtedly want to question you, Mr. Governor, on more structural points, as well as on the issues addressed by the High Council for Financial Stability. Without further ado, I give you the floor.
Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. General Rapporteur, ladies and gentlemen deputies. I thank you for receiving me today, especially since, as you said in this personal note, I have announced my intention to leave my position in early June to succeed Jean-Marc Savé at the head of the Fondation Apprentis d'Auteuil. This is a personal decision that has a deep meaning for me: to take on another and beautiful mission in the service of the general interest, specifically social aid for children and the training of young people in difficulty.
However, as I wrote to you, Mr. President, Mr. General Rapporteur, the dialogue I have had with your finance commission, and the trust I believe you have shown me and the Bank of France, will remain of great value to me. I don't know if this is the last hearing; the decision is in your hands. But I remain at your disposal every day until early June. And in this spirit, I would like to first discuss the adaptation of our monetary policy in the face of an uncertain international environment, and then, in this introductory statement, address the strengthening of our French and European economic potential. You alluded to it.
On monetary policy and the international environment, I would first note that with inflation below 2% in the euro area—1.7% in January—we have won the battle against inflation. In France, and this was confirmed this morning by INSEE, inflation is even significantly lower at 0.4% on the European harmonized index. However, this French inflation is partly due to temporary factors. I will cite two: the 15% drop in electricity prices on February 1, 2025, which will disappear from the base effect this month, and also the 18 public holidays in January compared to 13 last year. You see that when I talk about holidays, the Bank of France does more than just macroeconomics.
These figures may have raised two questions. First, is inflation too low in France? We do not believe so, as French inflation should gradually rise while remaining limited. I take this opportunity to inform you that we expect it to be a little over 1% on average this year, so more than the 0.4% but a little less, I say this morning, than our December forecasts which were 1.3%. This lower inflation for the moment is generally good news for our country. It supports the purchasing power of our citizens, which we expect to be nearly +1% on average this year. And it is accompanied by wage moderation. Wage growth is still expected to average around 2% in 2026. This contributes to improving the competitiveness of our economy. To highlight perhaps under-emphasized figures: since the end of 2019, the increase in unit labor costs in the market sector in France has been 10 percentage points lower than in Germany and 6 points lower than in the euro area as a whole.
However, I would like to point out, regarding the aftermath of past inflation, that we remain vigilant and mobilized against the rise in over-indebtedness over the past two years, at about +10% per year, and particularly among young people. We will undoubtedly return to this in our exchange.
The second question sometimes raised is whether our monetary policy has become too restrictive. Well, with the Governing Council in early February, we unanimously decided to maintain our interest rates at 2%. I note that after 8 cuts, the ECB's key interest rate is thus significantly lower than US rates at 3.64% or British rates at 3.75%. But if our monetary policy is well positioned, it cannot and must not be static. I remain very attached, as you know, to what I call agile pragmatism, fed by data and forecasts.
In this regard, there may be certain upside risks to inflation, but my conviction remains that downside risks are more significant. And I would like to highlight two points of attention this morning. First, the evolution of the exchange rate. The European Central Bank does not have an exchange rate target, but it is obviously important for inflation and activity prospects. The current situation reflects more the weakening of the dollar than a specific appreciation of the euro. And at $1.18 for €1, the euro is at a level practically at its historical average since its creation in 1999. However, our Governing Council will remain very vigilant on trends, and I insist more on trends than on levels. Financial markets have good reasons to have less confidence in dollar assets given the inconsistencies and unpredictability of the new US policy. And the probable nomination of Kevin Warsh to head the Federal Reserve fortunately lifts some doubts about its independence, but does not lift the burden on the monetary policy it will lead.
Secondly, another downside risk: we are closely monitoring the evolution of Chinese imports, which are likely to exert disinflationary effects. I will give you two figures: over the last six months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024, Chinese imports in the euro area increased by more than 11% in volume, while their prices fell by more than 10%, partly due to the exchange rate. And of course, these two effects add up: the volume effect and the price drop effect. To conclude on this first point, I will simply say it: today, monetary policy is not, or is no longer, the essential issue of economic policy. The issue is to durably strengthen our economic potential. And that brings me to my second point.
I will start, Mr. President, with the economic outlook. In France, economic activity is resilient but not sufficient. Positive economic growth in 2025 at 0.9% dispelled initial fears of a recession. Remember, GDP should grow by at least 1% in 2026. And indeed, our latest monthly economic survey shows strengthened economic activity in January. And what is quite new, because generally when the survey looks ahead it is more pessimistic, here activity is expected to be well-oriented for February, particularly in industry, where it is driven by the defense and aerospace sectors. I note in passing that there is a rather favorable French industrial specialization. This economic resilience is first and foremost due to the courage of entrepreneurs and the work of the French.
The employment rate for 15-64 year-olds remains at a historically high level of almost 70% and is not declining. However, I want to say a word about the recent rise in the unemployment rate: +0.2 percentage points in the last quarter. It is concentrated, as you saw, on the 15-24 age group and is rather due to increased participation of young people in the labor market. There are, however, fewer hires by companies, explained in part only by the quite justified reduction in certain budget subsidies for apprenticeship. This is a recent alert, but it should not obscure the lasting progress in employment in France since 2014. We have collectively succeeded—it is truly a collective French success—in creating 3.2 million net jobs and reducing the unemployment rate from over 10% to 7.9% today.
But what is needed now is to strengthen growth. Strengthen growth in France as in Europe. I will summarize our common challenge very simply. At the beginning of this century, our potential growth, the cruising speed of the economy, was 2% per year. In one generation, it has decreased by nearly half to 1.1% in France, while it stands at 2.2% in the United States. We have often discussed this. I reiterate a conviction: the key to this growth is not fiscal stimulus. France has the highest public spending in Europe, the highest deficit in the euro area, and public debt that continues to increase the fastest there. The effect is now even the opposite. Anything that reduces fiscal and budget uncertainty by credibly and predictably bringing us back towards the 3% deficit threshold by 2029 will improve the confidence of entrepreneurs and households.
I will therefore say nothing new today about the French budget, at least in my introductory remarks, but I will rather speak of strengthening and European economic sovereignty. I will just point out a rather deplorable paradox. I believe we all notice it. Our country is weakened by its divisions and its loss of budget credibility at the very moment when, on this European autonomy, long-standing French ideas since General de Gaulle are gaining ground with our partners.
So if I have to summarize the current challenge: more than 25 years ago, Europe conquered its monetary sovereignty with the formidable success of the euro, today supported by 76% of the French. The time has come for economic and financial sovereignty. And if there is one lesson to learn from the Trump administration, it is that we must act faster, stronger, and more clearly. European leaders met last Thursday on the implementation of the Draghi and Letta reports. But to make our Europe much more than a market, it will take much more than words, determination, and rapid execution from the March European Council. We now need a clear timetable. I will outline a few contents: continue simplification, establish a 28th regime by 2028—this double 28 is a friend of memory—accelerate the savings and investment union to strengthen equity financing.
This demand for sovereignty applies in particular to money and payments. Let us dare to innovate in public-private partnerships to adapt our monetary sovereignty to the rise of tokenization. Sorry, I have no translation for this barbaric word. I will point out that Europe has nothing to be ashamed of here. On the side of financial and interbank transactions, this year will see a first central bank digital currency and, I hope, first tokenized commercial currencies in euros, whether tokenized bank deposits or stablecoins. For the general public, it will be the digital euro combined, I emphasize, combined with one or more private payment schemes like Wero or EPI. We will undoubtedly return to this.
I conclude with these words from the philosopher Alain, whom you know: 'Pessimism is a mood, optimism is a will.' I am always cautious with this word optimism, but I believe, like you, in will. Our individual game, as French people, remains excellent. Our economic resilience is proof of it. But it is our collective game that is very perfectible. Our history is dotted with unexpected comebacks. Our economic recovery is necessary and it is possible, I am convinced. It now passes through European economic sovereignty. If you allow me to summarize all this in one sentence: our destiny is above all in our hands, much more than in those of the American administration, if and only if we want it. I thank you for your attention.
Thank you, Mr. Governor. I have three series of questions to ask you. First, the savings rate is decreasing slightly according to figures published last Friday by the Bank of France. It remains at 18% at the end of the third quarter of 2025, while its average over the two decades preceding the pandemic was about 14.5%. Last year, you described savings as, I quote, 'an important growth reserve' and advocated directing it more towards companies' equity and innovation, as well as ensuring they serve European investments more. You said, I still quote you, about 300 billion euros per year finance investments outside Europe, notably in the United States. So what concrete action would you recommend today to achieve these objectives? Would these investments not risk being too little or at least insufficient if they focus solely on defense and competitiveness to the detriment, notably, of the ecological transition? Do you find credible the announcements of the President of the Republic on February 10th regarding a common European borrowing capacity? Could these potential European funds, which will have to be repaid by states and therefore taxpayers, not risk serving as blackmail to impose neoliberal reforms, as was the case with the COVID recovery plan? That is the first series of questions.
Next, I would like to question you on the latest financial stability report. In this report, the Bank of France mentions France's ability to finance its public debt. We know we are financing this debt without problem currently and we are far from a financing crisis. However, it is noted that this debt is less and less financed by the central bank and more and more by foreign speculative funds based in tax havens. This trend is not without risk. Seeking profit at all costs, these funds will sell government bonds urgently at the first sign of market nervousness, which would degrade financing conditions. However, it is difficult to assess this risk since, as the Bank of France notes, the weight of speculative funds in total bond holdings remains difficult to estimate. So, could you tell us how this risk could be better known? Would it not be necessary to have a clear and exhaustive census of bondholders? Does this growing phenomenon not call for taking debt out of the hands of financial markets, or at least in part, as we did during the COVID debt? Finally, last series of questions. I would like to address the issue of access to cash. As the Bank of France recalled this summer, the revenues of the main French banks are historically high, with over 35 billion in cumulative profits. The year 2025 was exceptional for the major French banks. Yet, they decide to close bank branches in rural areas. In 5 years, nearly 8,000 ATMs have disappeared. This is all the more unacceptable as banks charge their customers high banking fees that are supposed to finance this type of service. Two proposals were recently examined by Parliament to ensure a minimum presence of ATMs and fight against these dynamics. Since the only reason for these disappearances is the banks' desire for short-term profitability, it seems necessary to correct these market failures and regulate these services of general interest. What could be the role of the Bank of France to ensure sufficient coverage? And I will immediately pass the floor to the General Rapporteur, and I will then invite you to answer these first two series of questions from the rapporteur and myself. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Governor. First, I wanted to pay tribute to your action both at the Bank of France and on the Governing Council, thanks to which credit and the economy were supported. And as you said in your introductory remarks, the battle against inflation was won thanks to the efforts of the French, entrepreneurs, but also of course thanks to the policies you led. I have three or four questions to ask you. The first is on the issue of interest rates. You mentioned upside risks, downside risks. You highlighted the fact that downside risks were underestimated in the debate, and I would like to hear your thoughts on this subject. The second question concerns global risks. Beyond the traditional risks in all economies, wars, major instability movements, there are three risks today that are perhaps more current: the risk of a crisis in the private debt market. We have had a few examples of banks that have already suffered, not only in the United States as was said, but also in Europe. The question of cryptocurrencies: is there a cryptocurrency bubble? And we can easily imagine what would happen in the event of an explosion of this cryptocurrency bubble through a cascade effect. And perhaps a third risk is the question of artificial intelligence, the considerable investments being devoted to it, and the risk perhaps of seeing investors one day question the profitability of their investments. These three risks—cryptocurrencies, private credit, and AI investment—how do you evaluate them? What measures do you think should be taken now to avoid finding ourselves in great difficulty if it were to happen? Next question on real estate prudential rules: the council maintains its recommendations. No more than 25% of your income for mortgage credit, 35% of your income, no more than 25 years. Do you think it is possible to relax these measures, which would probably have a positive effect on the economy if the real estate market picks up? You know that the Assembly and the Senate have adopted, and the government more exactly by way of 49.3, a provision known as the 'private landlord' aimed at encouraging investment. Is it possible to ease the measures I just cited? And finally, last point, perhaps more personally, with the experience you have acquired, with also the history you lived through at your appointment where some at the time said that perhaps the appointment of someone from the Bank of France's own ranks would have been preferable, and the fact that in reality, through the work you accomplished, the energy you deployed, they were finally proven wrong. What advice would you give on the profile of your successor? Go ahead, Mr. Governor, these series of questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. President, Mr. General Rapporteur. These are obviously quite rich questions. President, you always watch the length of my answers, but it's the richness of your questions. Well, on the question of the savings rate and the European budget capacity you added to it. Indeed, the savings rate is much higher, as you noted, than before the Covid. It constitutes a growth reserve. I believe the main determinant remains the feeling of uncertainty. And there is a savings rate that has risen everywhere in Europe because there is international uncertainty. It has risen relatively more in France because national uncertainty is added to it. And so I said, anything that would reduce budget and fiscal uncertainty and go in the direction of stability, predictability would be welcome.
How can we use this French and European savings more for equity? You cited the figure of a net investment surplus for the European Union each year of 300 billion. It's even 400 billion now. Perhaps two things on this. First, it must serve not only for defense but also, as we have always highlighted, for at least two other causes: climate, or rather the energy transition, and digital. And the estimates in the Draghi report put the needs at several hundred billion. And secondly, Europe's innovation lag is largely, not exclusively but largely, due to a lag in equity. I recall a little-known but essential figure: the equity of American companies relative to US GDP is 220%. The equity of European companies is between 80% and 90%. Less than half. Now, when you have less equity, you take less risk. On the way to do it, I have had the opportunity to detail a number of proposals, it is linked to the famous savings and investment union. I believe that harmonized European supervision of financial markets would help scale up to the European level, that obviously anything that would develop retail products towards equity, including with pension savings, would help, that we need to push for much larger European venture capital funds. I recall that the first European venture capital fund, which is Swedish and outside the euro area, is smaller than the 10th American fund. We have there one of the great explanations of our difficulty in supporting the growth of startups.
Finally, on the European borrowing capacity, I will not comment, I never do, on the remarks of the President of the Republic. I simply note that it is essential to clear up a misunderstanding with our partners, which is that a European borrowing capacity is not a way to pass on, sorry, I will use a correct word. Yes, the General Rapporteur says 'pass on' our national budget problem. You know that this ambiguity weighs heavily. However, I believe that European borrowing, for example for new initiatives in defense, could be justified. I refer to an excellent paper by three economists including Hélène Rey.
On the financial stability report, you are quite right about the growing weight of funds. We have a small translation problem because they are called Hedge Funds in English. You translated it as speculative funds. Hedge funds are rather funds that take more risk. But there, this translation problem is not totally neutral. The phenomenon is general. Not only in France, I emphasize, these hedge funds play an increasingly important role in sovereign debt and indeed we lack knowledge. So I believe this must be one of the priority tasks which can only be conceived on an international scale, in particular within the Financial Stability Council. They can be like the language of the Oapes, the best and the worst of things. That is, when they come to invest, they contribute to the liquidity of public debt and they are obviously lenders among others. This has also contributed to the very good liquidity of French debt which has relatively protected us for 2 years. However, they are much more volatile and so I believe it is important to keep long-term investors like life insurers.
On the access of the French to cash. I believe it is indeed an important subject. I will nuance a bit what you said about the high profits of French banks. When you compare them today to European banks or international banks, we have pulled ahead a bit. The cycle of bank profits is largely linked to the interest rate cycle, but notably given the share of fixed rates in the French economy, which is rather a good thing, French banks have benefited much less from the interest rate cycle than European banks. It is obviously important that we remain powerful and competitive in the financial sector. By the way, it is still one of the strengths of the French economy in Europe. The largest French banks or the largest French insurers are at the forefront in Europe.
We must be very attentive to the presence of ATMs. You know, it is something we follow closely. We publish a report on it every year in July. On the recent decline you cited, in any case, over the very last years, it is a bit more in cities than in rural towns and that seems to us a point to monitor. If in a medium-sized town or a city like Paris, a certain number of ATMs are removed, which cost, I believe there is no reduction in access for the French, but we are monitoring this closely. Do we need to go as far as bills and a central role for the Bank of France in this matter? You know, Mr. President, our prudence or our modesty in this area. Nevertheless, I reiterate here that the Bank of France will never abandon cash and that we have committed to maintaining a network of cash offices, at least one per region, for the coming decade. And it was not a totally obvious choice because the use of cash by the French is declining. But access to cash is a central right of our citizens. And why? It is a central element of confidence in money.
Mr. General Rapporteur, thank you for your personal words which led to a rather personal question at the end. It didn't totally surprise me because I was expecting it from you this morning. I will get to it. On interest rates and downside risks, I didn't say exactly that they were underestimated. I said that they seemed more important to me than upside risks. Sorry, that's my central banker's precision. I cited two on the exchange rate and Chinese imports. I believe we must monitor them very closely. I will cite a third which will make the transition with your totally justified question on global risks. If we find ourselves facing a major financial instability episode, to put it a bit brutally, facing a financial crisis probably of American origin, that is obviously a major risk on economic activity and a deflationary or disinflationary risk. Or, that is the meaning of our financial stability report which the President also cited. There are today serious risks and the different risks you cited all exist.
They do not offset each other, on the contrary, they can accumulate and I will not pretend to say here where a possible financial crisis might start. History simply teaches us that geographically, it usually starts in the United States and the deregulation attempts today from this point of view are not reassuring.
There is the private debt market, there is what you called cryptocurrencies. You will not be surprised that I react because cryptos are not and will never be currencies in our eyes. But I make a simple distinction. I believe that in crypto you meant Bitcoin and its cousins. There we have very speculative assets, indeed a strong decline since last October. With the same technology, that is to say tokenization and blockchain, we also have a product which is I believe much more interesting which is stablecoins. We may come back to this regarding the tokenization revolution, but there was a crypto bubble and I reiterate what I have always said, whatever the price of Bitcoin, these are very speculative assets. You can of course invest in them but it is reserved for savvy investors at their own risk and peril. And those who told us that trees could grow to the sky and that crypto was a risk-free, high-return investment were telling stories. Financial history told us so and what has been happening since October confirms it.
On the measures to take now, I emphasize that these three risk zones you cited are today much more important in the United States than in Europe. First, in Europe, regulation seems more solid and the development of private debt, cryptocurrencies, unfortunately AI is less important. But we must hold to the great principle of international regulation starting with Basel 3. This does not prevent simplifying certain financial regulations, but it is not at all about letting go of the reins at the risk of instability.
On mortgage credit and the HCSF standard, I believe it was designed to avoid the risk of household over-indebtedness. And that is not a theoretical risk. I cited figures earlier. I note that these common-sense standards, that is to say no more than 25 years and no more than 35% debt-to-income ratio, are accompanied by a 20% flexibility margin which is far from being saturated today. We are between 16 and 17% and each of the six major French banks has room to lend more. So I believe there is no reason today to relax this standard since the flexibility margin is the good answer to your question.
Can I share with the finance commission a remark on housing and the central question of real estate financing? Please. No, but we all share this concern, but I don't think I have already made this remark here. I am struck by the fact that in France, as in almost all advanced countries, there has been very significant financing for real estate. When you look at the evolution of mortgage credit in France, for example, it has been much faster than GDP. We published at the beginning of the week the household debt ratio or the corporate debt ratio for that matter, but this household debt ratio has increased a lot and almost everywhere, there has been a lot of mortgage credit, especially during the period of unconventional monetary policy. Furthermore, when you look at public financing, it is less important than private financing, but it is relatively high in France compared to other countries. What we see almost everywhere, not only in France, is that for two decades, this mass of financing has led to an increase in real estate prices and not in volumes. And there, I believe there is a question shared across all ranks of the commission. It can refer to certain standards, it can refer to the problem of land supply. It is not just French. But I am struck by this phenomenon and by the fact that it is not generally posed in such a simple way. That, I believe, is really a subject on which we need to work.
So, I have managed so far not to answer the more personal question, but I'm getting there. Good, thank you for what you said about 2015 and its aftermath. So, on my successor or successor, I know it can be a man or a woman, you will have, Mr. President, Mr. General Rapporteur, ladies and gentlemen deputies, much more power than I will because he or she will have the honor of coming before your commission. I do not intervene in the process, I do not believe I have to draw an ideal profile.
What I would have... No, but I am respectful of the Constitution and the law of the Republic. I am not a party to the nomination process. Can I just say one or two things? No one. No, you will see. I'm afraid of disappointing you but I will be very sincere. First, I would say bravo and good luck because I will say it very simply with a tiny bit of emotion. I have a long public career. The Bank of France has been the most beautiful mission of my life because it combines many things. And then, obviously, you need competence, you need the independence that underpins credibility and expertise, and independence has several dimensions. Indeed, in 2015, my economic independence was questioned.
Allow me just a memory. I don't know if some of you were there on September 29, 2015. I remember every time I come here of that day. I had made a commitment, Mr. President, sorry, it's a personal question, I had made a commitment to your commission, which is to serve as an upright and free man. If I have a little pride, and sorry, I will close it very quickly, it is that after that, no one ever questioned this commitment again. So independence, and then I believe you must be anchored in Europe since the framework for the Bank of France's action lies in the treaties and of course in the euro, which is a formidable collective success.
Well, Charles de Courson having abstained, I'm not sure there was anyone here in 2015 among us. If I was there... there, two people. So they can testify. But you have... I never knew the secret of the vote, but you noted it. You noted it. It's good because your successor will come before this commission. I think it should be extended to all financial institutions. No one. We don't see what you're talking about. Alright, the National Rally. Mr. Tangui, perhaps. Go ahead.
Yes, thank you, Mr. President. Hello, Mr. Governor. You will already convey our our friendships, our concerns to the Minister of Justice who is also visibly a victim of an epidemic of resignations whose cause is visibly Emmanuel Macron, a pathogenic agent indeed very problematic. So you talked about many things today but not much about monetary policy. First, the strong euro, you say the euro is at its average rate. That's not true. According to the effective exchange rate since 1994, the euro is at its highest level. Highest level among all other currencies. It is overvalued by 20 to 25% compared to an overvaluation of 10% against the dollar since April 2022. It is 15% higher than its average rate. So why did you say that? And especially the strong euro causes enormous problems because from the moment you say we need more competitiveness, for example, all the wage efforts you make because you spoke of a one-point difference between next year's inflation and this year's wage increases, well if you have a one-point effort on wages that is crushed by a monetary inflation, finally artificially a currency war of 10% against the dollar and 20% against the... well we won't do 20 years of wage moderation. Anyway, good luck telling that to the French people. So I don't know why you took this position. I would like more explanations on the strong euro policy assumed by the ECB. You say it's not in the mandate but you congratulate yourself. In any case, many governors of other countries congratulate themselves. It's not very logical. You said nothing about the extremely grave decision of the Minister of Justice and I think if you said nothing, it's because it is extremely grave to grant credit lines of 50 billion euros to any foreign central bank, including on the continent, without conditions or almost, only to provide collateral and notably collateral of eurozone member debt. So in fact the guarantee will be our own debt. It's very interesting. So why did you say nothing about this new policy of Ms. Lagarde? Why was this decision taken 3 days before resigning? And why is the European Central Bank getting involved in making available worldwide liquidity for foreign central banks without conditions, once again? It had been done during Covid for European continent member countries. But then there, it is visibly, according to echoes, without conditions. And what can you tell us about the chosen mechanism of freed pension? I would like to know your opinion on this mechanism which is still very worrying. Another question on the inflation target. So you say since we were elected, well there you said it's... so the target is 2%. When it's going to be 0.4%, so a factor of 5, it's not serious and it's not our fault. When it's 1%, factor of 2, it's not serious and it's not our fault. And then when it was also an over-inflation of 6%, it wasn't serious and it wasn't your fault either. So in fact from the moment your only mandate is to maintain inflation at 2%, what are you useful for? So my collective policy, not you personally obviously, my opinion is that the European Central Bank in fact is useless and in fact doesn't know what it's doing and that you live on the peregrinations of the Fed's decisions. But there, from the moment you constantly failed on your inflation target, except by chance. So a clock shows the right time twice even when it's broken. So it happens that by chance inflation is 1.8, 2.2 because it falls that way. But otherwise it's not at all on your inflation target. So there is a moment we can say it's populist, it's mean, it's not nice, it's not kind, we are among very well-mannered people. I would like to know why when an inflation target and it is constantly failing again this year, factor of 5 this year, factor of 2 next year for France. It's normal, it's not serious, it's not our fault.
Thank you. No, it's my fault. Mr. Rapporteur, Mr. Governor, Mr. Governor, sorry, excuse me, I had a blank because I skipped on the stopwatch and I am sorry.
So, Mr. Tangui, I read a rumor concerning the Minister of Justice. I discovered it, it does not seem to me to be information and I leave the B to comment. It's a rumor, it seems to me. As for me, I reiterate that it is a personal decision as a free man. I simply ask that it be respected. No one asked me to leave and all those who know me know that if they had asked me, I would have refused. There, I have nothing to add but I ask that my personal decision be respected.
On the questions you asked about monetary policy. The rate I cited, Mr. Deputy, is the nominal euro-dollar parity. I did not claim to cite anything else. It happens that it is today at its historical average at 1.18. But you are right, we must also monitor the effective exchange rate. I have never advocated a policy of the strong euro that you cited, there can be a diversity of opinions. I hope you will acknowledge that I have always been among those who highlighted the sensitivity of the exchange rate. And when I say that our policy must not be static, when I say that downside risks on inflation seem to us today more important than upside risks, I believe I am showing a pragmatism and a potential agility that is quite significant.
So, I take this opportunity perhaps to come back to these loans to foreign central banks, but I take this opportunity to come back to the question regarding the inflation target and whether the ECB is useful. Well, first, I allow myself to recall that the euro has the support of a very, very large majority of the French at 76% across the entire political spectrum. So I have the impression that the French are quite attached to the euro and to the institution that ensures its proper functioning. We have, it's true, a 2% inflation target for the entire euro area. And we appreciate this for the entire euro area. And compared to that, you will allow me to say without self-satisfaction that since last May, month after month, we have been extremely close to this 2%. So indeed, the European Central Bank is at its target. Sometimes people say yes but compared to inflation in France today, interest rates would be too high.
I will highlight two points on this. The first is that fortunately we look at the euro area as a whole because when you look at the inflationary episode, there were moments, remember, when inflation in Germany or elsewhere was much higher than in France. And if we had looked at the situation in this or that other country, we would have been led to raise interest rates too much. And then especially when you assess the appropriate level of rates and what is called the real rate, that is to say nominal rates...
To have lower inflation in the coming years, we must not look at instantaneous inflation, but at forecast inflation in the coming years in France. Forecast inflation brings us back towards the 2% target over a horizon of about 2 years. So over the next 10 years, the real interest rate in France is not at all inappropriate.
Regarding the question you asked about loans to foreign central banks, I believe I can reassure you. It uses the repo mechanism, which is very secure since we require collateral deposits in high-quality euro securities, so there is no risk of default. There is another, riskier mechanism, which is the swap mechanism, exchanging euros for the currency of the foreign central bank in question. Those can be of lower quality. But the repo mechanism seems very secure. It contributes to the international development of the euro, which I believe everyone here can welcome. I note that other major foreign central banks, starting with the US Federal Reserve, have similar mechanisms, sometimes even less secure because they involve more swaps and less repos, but I believe this is a decision that goes in the right direction. It is not, by the way, only Madame Lagarde's decision, it is that of the Governing Council.
Thank you. We will now move to Jean-René Casnov for the Ensemble pour la République group.
Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. I first want to react to the previous question from Mr. Tangui. We have a fine illustration here that in terms of verbal violence, the National Rally has nothing to envy of La France Insoumise. Mr. Governor, I frankly want to pay tribute to your action. I had the great pleasure of working with you when I was general rapporteur. I want to salute your independence, your humility, your vision, and your humor. It is also to your credit to leave this magnificent post for a magnificent association, the Fondation des Apprentis d'Auteuil, and I am certain you will have an extremely rich experience. I want to return to two points that have already been discussed. The first is the European loan. You said it today, our competitors are China and the United States. We have a problem with foreign trade, imports, and the balance of payments. The response to China and the United States can only be made at the European level. So, I would like to know more about this European loan. You said, and you are right, that French public spending was quite limited and was not an additional lever. Second point and last question, you highlighted the resilience of the French economy. We are in the budgetary phase you know. We have raised taxes on large companies. Large companies are those in international competition. Don't we run the risk, I know you don't like commenting on the budget, but don't we run the risk of weakening our companies and our country at a time when these commercial issues are so important? Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.
Mr. Governor. Mr. Governor, I will take that as a compliment. You can see the quality of our general rapporteur, there is no problem. Well, I await the general rapporteur next time. I am more amiable than some. Go ahead.
Well, Mr. Deputy, thank you for your personal words. You will allow me, however, to express a wish. It is that my personal decision and the independence of the Bank of France are never an object of political polemic in this commission. The Bank of France serves all the French people with full independence and it will remain so. Now, regarding the European loan, I will perhaps complete or extend what I said to the president earlier. I believe a European loan can make sense, but it is not the only answer. It can make sense under two conditions: it must never be seen as a way to transfer our debt problem. It is probably obvious here, you know as well as I do the considerable suspicion that exists elsewhere in Europe, and not only in Germany. The second condition is that this European loan serves a European offer, a European policy. If we take the example of defense, we all measure the difficulty of creating a European offer given established national capacities, which are fortunately not negligible in France. That is where I cited the Elsberg paper, which proposes to do this in new areas where Europe is lagging, for example drones and satellites. I am not a specialist in the subject, but I believe a European loan only makes sense if it allows for the emergence of a European industrial policy, and that is probably easier in innovative areas.
Regarding resilience and budgetary and fiscal decisions in the face of the international context. Yes, I said I would not talk about the budget today. I believe we had to face contradictory injunctions: how can we reduce the deficit, which seems essential to finally address the debt problem and restore the confidence of the French people, while having appropriate control of spending and finding some fiscal measures. I will not pretend to comment on the details of the measures. If I had to summarize, but I am not the budgetary authority, we are not, I would wish for a form of volume stabilization of spending. I have already said it before this commission, of total public spending, meaning state plus local authorities plus social spending. You know that in the 2026 budget, there is a slowdown, but we still have a volume increase of about 1%. And then a form of fiscal stabilization. The corporate tax surcharge existed the previous year, it was kept. I am not saying it is an ideal remedy, but it is not a new tax. There you go.
Thank you, Aurélien Leco, for La France.
Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Governor. I will return to the question of the budget's impact, which was passed by force using Article 49.3. This budget represents about 35 billion euros in budget cuts in trend terms, taking inflation into account. Before its adoption, the OFCE indicated that a budget of this level of cuts and effort should halve growth. They estimated growth at a maximum of 0.7%. Today, you tell us growth will be 1%, like the government. And even though the same OFCE indicated that the budget would cost us 0.38 points of growth, 0.4 points per unit of consumption, and 1.6 points of business investment, with an increase in unemployment. I would like to ask you, what is the cost in terms of growth of the budget as adopted? I now come to a second question concerning the management of the Bank of France. Hervé Gonçalves, the director general of economic and network services at the Bank of France, former HR director and member of the executive committee, was denounced by unions for sharing on his institutional account, directly linked to the Bank of France, extreme-right, racist, sexist content promoting a clash of civilizations. This content represented up to 30% of his publications. An investigation has been opened within the Bank of France. I would like to know, Mr. Governor, if the investigation is accompanied by a disciplinary procedure and why no precautionary suspension measure was taken, given that these acts tarnish the institution's image and violate its rules. Furthermore, Mr. Gonçalves was the HR director responsible for a 25% reduction in staff in recent years, which, as I had pointed out to you the last time you came to our commission, led to three suicides. You told me they were personal tragedies. However, the Technologia firm mandated to work on the Bank of France identified 38 proven cases of psychosocial risks, and your internal reports raised the risk level from low in 2015 to major today. Mr. Governor.
So, Mr. Leco, on the budget's impact on growth, I answered a bit in my introductory remarks. Our analysis is that it is globally neutral. I will explain: there is a traditional Keynesian effect. The OFCE's figure of 0.7 seems high to us. But this effect exists, and it is compensated, in our view today, by the uncertainty effect, or more positively, by the reduction of uncertainty from reducing the deficit. The best proof is that when we had to make our forecasts in December 2025, just like in December 2024, we did not yet know what the budget for the following year would be for calendar reasons you know. We said we were making an assumption about the budget. We made the same assumption each time: the draft budget submitted by the government. The final budget was quite different, but we did not consider that the final deficit level would change the growth assumption because the two effects I just cited compensate each other. I believe reality has proven us right. Our forecast for 2025 proved accurate. We even had to lower it at the beginning of the year and then raise it again in the second half. We are today confident about 1% growth for 2026, but we are obviously monitoring things closely.
Regarding the internal question at the Bank of France, we were totally transparent yesterday, but I will say it again before the commission. The bank's management was informed of likes on LinkedIn by a senior executive who apparently failed in his duty of reserve and neutrality that all bank employees must respect. We therefore decided to open an investigation without delay. The executive in question obviously immediately stopped this practice and also removed the concerned messages. I want to clarify a little what is at stake, because I do not want the independence of the Bank of France to be caught up in political polemics. What is at stake is not the private opinions of each person and their diversity. It is the fact of expressing them publicly on a professional social network. The Bank of France serves all the French people and carefully ensures it exercises its missions with full political independence. Our code of conduct is therefore not political, it is deontological. It is the purpose of the investigation to determine the scope of an individual breach, respecting the law and procedures. The trade unions of the Bank of France are the first to be legitimately concerned, respecting the law and procedures. We must now await the results to judge the consequences. The Bank of France also reminded all its employees yesterday of the applicable rules of conduct. I can possibly give you a reading of what we published yesterday. But I will respect your time. Mr. Deputy, regarding the link between staff reductions and suicides, I have already had the opportunity to say what I think of this false link.
Estelle Mercier for the Socialist group.
Thank you, Mr. President, dear colleagues, Mr. Governor. In the monthly business survey, we see several interesting things to analyze. In several sectors, companies describe short order books and low visibility. Cash flow situations are very low compared to their 10-year average, particularly in market services. The uncertainty indicator is very interesting to look at. The François Bayrou effect, with his dramatization of the debt, created a huge peak of uncertainty in July 2025, and the political instability that followed until October. We see very high peaks of uncertainty, now decreasing. We cannot really say that the policies of successive governments have worked to restore the confidence you spoke of. We also see that in industry, the capacity utilization rate is still below its 15-year average. And as someone from Lorraine, you have undoubtedly noticed, like me, the many closures of our Lorraine companies, the deindustrialization of our territories, notably with the recent liquidation of Escometal Novasco and the loss of 650 jobs. For SMEs, the barometers indicate that the main brake remains weak demand and structurally low order books compared to their historical average. Added to this is a tightening of credit access, which jointly disrupts investment by these companies. Mr. Governor, you mentioned not believing in budgetary stimulus, so demand-side stimulus. In my introduction, I take the liberty of reacting. We are forced to observe that supply-side policy is not producing the expected results for our companies, especially SMEs in our territories. Given these still-low order books, what would be your analysis and recommendations to address this demand deficit, and how has the interest rate sequence created a tightening of financing, especially for our small businesses, hindering their development in our territories? Thank you.
Madame Deputy, indeed, the monthly business survey shows month after month short order books and high uncertainty. It is linked to the international and national context you mentioned. I don't know if I will use François Bayrou's expression. The reality of the debt is there, and the French people know it. Moreover, when you look at opinion polls, we look at them too. The French people's awareness of the debt dates rather to the beginning of 2024, with the very bad news about our results. We remain, however, very sensitive, as you are, to companies in difficulty, and you will allow me this geographical complicity, particularly in Lorraine. If I may have one last personal note. I discovered this morning in L'Est Républicain a sympathetic portrait under the title 'Lorraine as a refuge,' but I am attached to all of France. More seriously and more generally, on the number of business failures, it is the Bank of France that publishes it. We are on a high plateau for several months, about 68,500 business failures. Business failures are an important indicator. They do not tell the whole story of the French economy because there are business creations in return. And there was partly a catch-up phenomenon with these 68,500, due to the deep trough during Covid. I believe, however, that we must remain very mobilized. I repeat, and it seems important for all your territories, that the Bank of France is available through the national credit mediation, which is often seized too late. We have relatively few referrals to credit mediation, even though we have a 64% success rate. We also contributed to a trust charter signed last week with Bpifrance and a number of professional organizations, so that entrepreneurs increasingly know who to contact and to do so early. I insist strongly on this dimension. An entrepreneur in difficulty sometimes has difficulties, modesty, fear before sharing their difficulties. Very often it is too late, and unfortunately these two words summarize many of the problems of economic policy. I always tend to go beyond the opposition between supply-side and demand-side policy. I note, however, when I look at the Draghi report and the situation of our European partners, that it is Europe globally that has a lag in productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. I do not identify supply-side policy solely with tax cuts for companies. I believe that is a simplification I do not like any more than you do. But the idea that we really need to strengthen our productive capacity seems to me to be the core of the challenge. We tend today in France, perhaps it is our national genius, to paint our economic picture very darkly. We still have a lot of strength, and I highlighted that in industry, our specialization today in defense and aerospace is rather an asset. However, we must obviously help with employee training. I will say some things. A great truism, but a strengthening policy is not just a tax cut policy, or not primarily. It is employee training, artificial intelligence, strengthening equity. I believe all of that must constitute the core of our response. That is the collective response, and individual support, I have insisted on that, being attentive to each company in difficulty.
Thank you, Marie-Christine Dalloz, for Les RĂ©publicains.
Yes, thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Governor. I confirm, I was present in 2015 in this finance commission, and I remember very well your commitment, which you honored, and the controversies of that time did not have the flavor or the height, unfortunately, of today's controversies. Three quick questions. First, on inflation. You said one of the reasons inflation was maintained was the drop in electricity prices. However, you know there is a forthcoming change. Can you tell us what the impact of the electricity price increase would be on the level of inflation for households and businesses? A very general question, but there it is. Second question, you mentioned earlier two sectors in the French economy that were dynamic, aerospace and armaments. In the failures you just cited, and it is linked to the previous question, do you have a vision of sectors that are today more fragile, weaker, especially in business failures? Which sectors could we push with future investments or support for future projects? Third question, and it will be my last. You spoke of the need to move towards economic and financial sovereignty at the European level. What tools, besides the financial tools you master well, could support this economic sovereignty, especially for all European countries? And in conclusion, I want to tell you very sincerely, I wish you at the Fondation des Apprentis d'Auteuil a beautiful future, pleasure, and success.
Mr. Governor. Thank you also for your personal words. On the three questions, on electricity prices. Pardon if I was not clear. What I was referring to is the base effect we will see. That is, there was a 15% drop in February 2025 which contributes in the following 11 months to lowering inflation and which will disappear by definition when we include February 2026 and February 2025 drops out of the calculation. On the future evolution of electricity prices, I admit I have no particular insight. I don't know if there will be increases or decreases. On your second question, regarding sectors that are more fragile today in failures, we probably need to look a bit more closely. My first-order answer is that we do not see today any sector that is more particularly affected than others. It is possible that the retail trade sector or the accommodation and catering sector, which has had ups and downs, a low during Covid, a very high afterwards as you know, might be a bit more affected today, but I say this with great caution. In any case, we do not see major sectoral differences. Finally, on European sovereignty tools, beyond financial tools, by definition, I am less competent. I don't know, Madame Deputy, if you were thinking of a particular tool, notably everything related to military and diplomatic sovereignty. I can only agree, but at the same time, I reach my limit. But I don't know if I fully grasped your question. There is obviously a debate that goes beyond me, which is to what extent economic sovereignty, military power, and diplomatic capacity are separable or not. The word geopolitics has returned considerably, including in economic debates, including in corporate executive committees. I believe this shows this interconnection, but the Bank of France does not claim to have particular expertise in this area.
Thank you, Eve, ecologist.
Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Governor, in 2026, the ECB must review its operational framework for monetary policy, and my first question will be on the Eurosystem's collateral framework. It will soon be updated to take climate risks into account. This update is particularly awaited given the ECB's promises in this area since 2021. The addition of a climate factor is excellent news, but we have reservations on certain points. First, the measure implemented must be calibrated to ensure that assets contrary to the transition, such as corporate assets developing new fossil projects, are penalized, regardless of the maturity of the securities in question. The published guidelines seem to indicate this will not be the case. Can you explain why the chosen methodology seems to ignore the inherently problematic nature of brown assets? Furthermore, the addition of a climate factor only applies to a very small part of eligible assets: negotiable assets on markets issued by non-financial companies. Mr. Governor, do you envisage extending the consideration of the climate factor to other types of assets? My second question will be on differentiated rates. During the implementation of the new operational framework in 2024, the ECB had mentioned the possibility of integrating climate issues into future structural refinancing programs. Differentiated rates in the form of long-term green refinancing rates could fall within this framework. I would therefore like to know, Mr. Governor, if differentiated rates are on the agenda of the Governing Council's discussions or if other mechanisms are envisaged to support the transition within this review. And a final question to broaden the subject. French savings have never been higher. 6,500 billion in financial wealth, 50% more than 10 years ago. You said this savings must be mobilized for the ecological transition. What tools would you recommend to do so? Thank you, Mr. Governor.
Madame Deputy, first, thank you for following the operational framework for monetary policy and the climate factor so closely. You will allow me to say that the introduction of this climate factor is really the result of the Bank of France's action. We vigorously and successfully advocated for its introduction. I take this opportunity to recall, another source of pride, but this one is collective, that the Bank of France was recognized for the third consecutive time as the greenest central bank in the G20 by an international panel of NGOs. You raised a number of reservations. I will perhaps not go into technical detail, we can continue that bilaterally. We tried to base ourselves as much as possible on the financial analysis of climate risks, because the great message we carried successfully is that climate risk is also part of financial risks. The most open question is the one you asked at the end, I am very sensitive to it, which is that we start with negotiable assets. Why? Because we have more information on the companies involved. But the question can indeed arise of extending this to other categories of collateral, meaning bank loans. It is more complicated because we have less information to harmonize, but in our view, it is an open question. On differentiated rates, we had already had the opportunity to discuss them in this commission, and I will answer with the same caution. I believe the role of the central bank is not to choose between sectors, and if there are to be subsidized rates for a particular category, it can be a matter of budgetary intervention. We have had that in France from time to time through certain national policies, but the central bank provides liquidity at an adequate overall price because we are on the technical side of macroeconomics or global economic regulation. I simply note, and I believe it is a very important contribution to the climate transition, that when the central bank successfully fights inflation, when it is credible and thus contributes to lower long-term rates, this is a decisive contribution to the good financing of investment. On the mobilization of savings. First, I want to dispel an ambiguity because it has sometimes existed. When we talk about mobilizing savings, obviously the French will remain free to choose their savings. I say this because I have sometimes seen this concern. Obviously, it is everyone's free choice. I believe what would be important is to be able to offer them, as much as possible, products that are more long-term because that goes more towards equity and allows financing a certain number of transition investments the president was referring to earlier, whether it is the energy transition, digital, or why not, defense. I mentioned a number of instruments earlier. I note, by the way, that when you look at the evolution of the financial wealth of the French, slowly but surely, there is still an increase in the share of equity products, so probably more geared towards productive investment. But I believe it is much associated with the development of long-term savings. I note, by the way, that in the label launched by France last year, which I believe is called Retail Europe, with a number of European countries to help with the transition or digital, there is, it seems to me, a very interesting initiative. Savers must not be, they must have total freedom of choice towards the livret, life insurance, etc., but they must also have access to longer, more remunerative products over time and more geared towards equity. This label can help.
Thank you, Jean-Paul Mathieu, for Les DĂ©mocrates.
Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you very much, Mr. Governor. First, I wanted to say that we really appreciated your availability and especially your freedom of thought and your statements, which showed a certain independence and did good in a sometimes overly conventional concert with a form of groupthink, and I think it was necessary. I want to build on what you just said about equity. Earlier, in your introductory remarks, you said that French companies had little equity compared to other countries. How do you explain that? Does it mean there is a culture less oriented towards investment in companies, or is it linked to a fiscal policy that would encourage distributing rather than retaining liquidity in the company, or finally, do LBO operations with sometimes a bit risky multiples tend to impoverish companies' equity with the problems of senior debt? Next, I wanted to ask you about the PGE. I have already had the opportunity to question you in previous years about the management of the PGE. We saw that during the health crisis, paradoxically, there was a decrease in business failures and then a rebound effect afterwards. And why do the PGE have this effect of tending to fragilize these companies that were perhaps under artificial assistance during this health crisis? And finally, a question on financial education. You know, financial education is a major issue for us. However, your latest financial inclusion barometer highlights a 10.2% increase in the number of over-indebtedness files filed in January 2026 compared to January 2025. What recommendations do you formulate to address this worrying trend? Furthermore, what do you think about the hypothesis of generalizing financial education in the school curriculum, through the use of existing devices like the CFI passport? There is a transmission of thought because the governor dreamed you would ask this question. I can. No, not exactly this question, but I wanted to speak before the commission about over-indebtedness, so thank you for having mentioned it.
I will return to your first two questions on the reason for the weakness of equity. First, I insist on the fact that it is not a specifically French phenomenon, it is a European phenomenon. We find roughly the same rate everywhere. The various factors you cited, fiscal, LBOs, etc., can play a role. I believe there is a more general issue of risk culture on both sides of the Atlantic. It must also be said that the development of long-term savings, and notably retirement savings, is stronger in the United States than in many European countries, including ours. But I believe it is important, and it echoes Madame Sas's question just now, to develop a number of products that allow savers, over the long term and with controlled risks, to access equity. I will be completely honest in answering the question. As always, to develop a company's equity, it takes two. That is, you need more investors, we just talked about it. You also need company bosses to be willing to open their table, and that is sometimes more difficult than taking out a bank loan. And there too, it is a free decision. But Bpifrance in particular has done very good work in this area, but it is a heavier decision for a company boss, and many of them prefer to keep a purely family management. I am the first defender of the family business, but there are undoubtedly somewhat cultural and very respectable issues on both sides.
On the PGE, you are indeed attentive to this point. We do not feel that the repayment of PGE plays a central role in failures. The PGE, I believe you heard the director of companies at the Bank of France yesterday, are today being repaid. I will give an order of magnitude, about three-quarters, and repayment continues almost normally. There are a number of failures, but it is not higher than what we predicted. I simply repeat that in PGE, the P stands for loan, and a loan is meant to be repaid, and it is not because it is 90% guaranteed by the State that it could be canceled just like that, it would increase public debt by that much.
On the central question of financial education and over-indebtedness, I will start with over-indebtedness since I expressed a concern earlier, and I believe it is shared across all sides of this commission. If I look at the long term since 2014, we have a collective French success because there has been a 32% decrease if I take the 2025 files compared to the 2014 files in the number of over-indebtedness files. But on the recent period, a significant increase. So we are fully mobilized for this. We have put in place Bank of France teams. We are also investing, including with artificial intelligence, to better process files. If we try to look at the causes, I do not claim we are at the end of the analysis, but I will cite two. The first is that there is very probably a delayed effect of the inflation wave that put a number of households in difficulty in 2022-2023. And many households who come to the over-indebtedness commission report financial difficulties that are not recent but date back 2 or 3 years. So we can hope that this effect will gradually dissipate. There is a second effect, I do not claim to put forward all the causes, but on which we drew attention yesterday during a public presentation of the typology of over-indebtedness, which is that we see a very significant rise in over-indebtedness among young people. I will cite two figures. I cited the +10% total increase in 2025, but if I look at the 18-29 year olds, we are at a 36% increase in files. And if I look, worse still, at the 18-25 year olds, the youngest, we are at a 65% increase. So these are not huge numbers, but the trend obviously calls for vigilance. We cannot help but link this to the development of what are called mini-credits or split payments, which are easy credits by SMS, etc., often for small amounts that have not been subject until now to the same control rules. There is no display of the overall rate, there is no mandatory consultation of the file. You will see before your assembly, before the Senate, the transposition of the European directive in this area, which is already a significant progress. But I would like, I have already had the opportunity to say it, that this transposition could include mandatory consultation of files, even for small-amount credits, because, to state the obvious, 10 mini-credits of 200 euros can make 2,000 euros of over-indebtedness. So there, I believe there is a real concern and that, I will use a slightly excessive image, but from time to time, these mini-credits can be a form of soft drug whose effects we see in the increase in young people's indebtedness.
On financial education, we are indeed developing it a lot for 10 years since this role of national operator was entrusted to us in 2016. We work enormously with the Ministry of Education. Thank you for citing the CFI passport, which now reaches half of 9th-grade classes. We will probably develop other initiatives. There may be things perhaps in 10th grade. I also highlight the success of the Citéo museum, which for the second consecutive year passed the 100,000 visitors mark. And if you allow me, a colorful page. There is currently an exhibition on the mysteries of money that is wonderful for young people. And we hope to bring together in the coming weeks a new strategic committee co-chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance and the Minister of Education to continue advancing financial education. So I believe financial education in prevention and over-indebtedness treatment are two pillars on which the Bank of France is extremely mobilized in the face of a subject that remains a subject of concern.
François Jolivet.
Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Governor, I will address the president of the High Council for Financial Stability. Answering our general budget rapporteur earlier, you indicated that the debt ratio per household should not exceed 35% and that loans should not exceed 25 years, and that banks had a 20% derogation possibility. I have met with bank risk directors, it would be quite interesting if they told you how many times they derogate, because I believe it is not much, that the management rules in the agencies mean they do not derogate at all. I will also tell you, and I think your answer did not go all the way, that the measure you took in the appendix of a deliberation of the High Council, which many finance ministers who succeeded each other tried to get you to remove, and you held firm, your freedom had the effect of blocking all private investments by owner-occupiers, since banks consider that when you invest in housing, you have no rent. The rent being uncertain, I will remind you and you will remind that the rate of non-payment in the private sector is less than 2%. Between -2% on rent and 0, there is a real difference. And I am glad you were able to say earlier that you were questioning the rise of real estate in France, but you organized its scarcity. And I will share this contradiction and my incomprehension with you. And you did not answer my colleague Marie-Christine Dalloz earlier on the sectors that are collapsing. Well, there are some you know well, it is the construction sector, the housing production chain, since we lost 100,000 jobs in a year and a half, and today you have 30% of factories that manufacture materials that are on partial unemployment and resort to this type of device. And you also, earlier, and there I completely agree with you, recalled that monetary policy must serve major public policies. And there I would like to know your feeling after having spent many years at the Bank of France and in your capacity as president of the High Council for Financial Stability, if you think you have succeeded in the field of housing, knowing that at the moment I am speaking to you, there are 2.9 million housing applicants in our country. Thank you, Mr. Governor.
