Lorie Logan11:24
Good morning. Thank you Emily for the very kind introduction and I just want to take a moment just to express my deep gratitude for Emily for her leadership here at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. She's an incredible leader and we are so fortunate to have her. I also just want to extend my thanks to all of you who are joining us for our third annual 11th District Banking Conference. I'm really excited by the opportunity to gather both bankers, regulators, and supervisors all in one room to talk about banking conditions and risks. And it's a particular pleasure for me to be able to partner in this event with the Texas Department of Banking and a very great honor to be joined by Vice Chairman Bowman with us for today's event. We have all kinds of banks here in the 11th district and represented today at this conference. From large nationwide institutions to community banks that each serve their towns out of a single office. Your banks all make important contributions to our economy. But more than that, the diversity of the banking ecosystem strengthens our economy. Families and businesses can find banks that best meet their needs, whatever those needs may be. Community banks know what makes their towns tick. Growing up in a small town, Versailles, Kentucky, I saw firsthand how community banks serve their neighbors. Meanwhile, larger banks bring the scale and the scope of services that some customers require. And competition drives all banks to find ways to serve the economy better. Promoting a vibrant banking ecosystem is top of mind for me and for all of our team here at the Dallas Fed. Now, the Fed too is a bank. We don't take deposits or make loans to Main Street families and businesses, but as your nation's central bank, we serve the banking needs of commercial banks, which allows you to better serve your customers. Now, when it comes to size, the Fed is at the high end. We are the biggest bank in the country. In fact, with $6.7 trillion in assets, that represents 21% of US GDP. Now, that's down from a post-pandemic peak of 35%. But it's still above the pre-pandemic trough even though the FOMC recently completed the process of normalizing our balance sheet by running off assets that we purchased during the pandemic. The growth of the Fed's balance sheet has prompted a lot of discussion. That's been discussion about whether the balance sheet is too big and if so, how we should shrink it. So today, I'd like to give you my take on those questions. Of course, these are my views and not necessarily those of my FOMC colleagues. So, here's how I see it. With the balance sheet, as with everything the Fed does, the focus needs to be on how we can best serve the public and support a strong economy and financial system. We should use our balance sheet efficiently and effectively to advance those goals. Balance sheet growth isn't bad if it serves the public, but neither should we waste balance sheet space and let it become a distraction from our mission. The minimum size of the Fed's balance sheet is determined by demand for our liabilities, such as currency or bank reserves. We can always offer more liquidity than the economy demands, but if we don't meet the demand, financial pressures will arise. This chart shows the current composition of our liabilities, including about $2.4 trillion in currency, $3 trillion in bank reserves, and approaching $1 trillion in the Treasury General Account, which is the government's checking account. As you can see, currency has trended up smoothly with GDP, but reserves and the Treasury General Account are larger as a share of GDP than before the pandemic. And much larger than before the global financial crisis. In an essay we published this morning, my colleague Sam Schulhofer-Wohl and I examine the Fed's liabilities, how efficiently and effectively they serve the public, and the policy options and trade-offs that would arise in shrinking them. There's a wide range of considerations corresponding to the diversity of ways the balance sheet serves our economy, but I came away from the analysis with a couple of main takeaways and they relate to the Fed liability that's most relevant to you as bankers: bank reserves. Now, before I describe my key takeaways, I want to take a step back and explain how we supply reserves. Since 2008, we have implemented monetary policy with ample reserves. That means we pay interest on reserve balances at close to market rates and we supply enough reserves to meet banks' demand at those rates. When the FOMC changes our monetary policy target, we move market rates to match the new target by changing the interest rate on reserves and other administered rates. Before 2008, we used a different system. That system was scarce reserves. And in that system, reserves earned no interest. We moved market rates by changing the supply of reserves. Market rates were typically hundreds of basis points above zero. The spread made it costly for banks to hold reserves. So, you tried to economize on holding them and hence the name scarce. So, returning to the question of the Fed's balance sheet size, there are two basic ways to reduce the $3 trillion of reserves that the Fed currently supplies. Policymakers could take steps to reduce banks' need for reserves. Then, a smaller quantity of reserves would meet banks' demand with market rates near interest on reserve balances. Our economists would call that shifting the demand curve inward or shifting the demand curve to the left. Now, alternatively, the Fed could return to a scarce reserves regime, and that would mean reducing reserve supply to a level at which market rates meaningfully exceed the interest rate we pay on a bank's marginal dollar of reserves. Economists would call that running up the demand curve. So, this chart compares these two approaches. The chart traces out banks' demand for reserves as a function of interest rates. If we reduce banks' need for reserves so that banks shift the demand curve inward or to the left as in the chart on the left, we're still meeting banks' demand. But if we run up the demand curve, as is shown in the chart on the right and return to scarce reserves, we're pushing up market rates relative to interest on reserve balances and we're putting a price on reserves that banks don't face today. So my first takeaway from our analysis is that shifting the demand curve inward or to the left by reducing banks' need for reserves is a better approach than returning to scarce reserves. US dollar reserves are the safest, most liquid asset in the world. They help banks manage liquidity risk and process payments safely and efficiently. And it costs the Fed little, if anything, to meet banks' reserve demand because the interest we earn on the assets backing reserves matches the interest we pay over time. So overall, the ample reserves framework is efficient and effective. Over nearly two decades now, it has proven its ability to keep money market rates in our FOMC's target range, and it doesn't penalize banks for making smart risk-management decisions by holding the safest, most liquid asset that there is. It would be inefficient to make banks pay a cost, the spread between market rates and the interest on reserve balances, to obtain an asset the Fed can provide so cheaply. Pressing banks to economize on reserves would only increase risk in the financial system. So moving up the demand curve would also present logistical problems and risk undermining the diversity and vibrancy of our banking system. If we stopped paying interest on reserves, banks might try too hard to then again economize that it become difficult to predict reserve demand and control rates. It could also become very costly for banks to meet their legitimate reserve needs and making reserves scarce could gum up the flow of payments. So to avoid these challenges, there have been a number of proposals recently to give every bank a quota on reserves and pay interest only up to that quota. That would stabilize demand. It would help control rates and it would reduce the cost to banks. But quotas are a form of central planning. The government would be allocating a valuable resource among private firms instead of letting the free market speak. And I don't think I need to explain to this audience the drawbacks that could have for innovation, for growth, and for competition. So I favor an approach that reduces banks' need for reserves and shifts the demand curve inward. But my second takeaway is that the precise method of shifting the demand curve inward matters because some methods would be more efficient and effective than others. For example, banks often hold additional reserves to satisfy liquidity regulations or supervisory expectations beyond the reserves they would choose to hold on their own. High-quality regulation and supervision make the banking system safer. In the case of liquidity, supervision and regulation help ensure banks account for the systemic consequences of the liquidity risks that they take like the potential for contagious bank runs. Reserve holdings that make the banking system safer represent an efficient and effective use of our balance sheet and I wouldn't want to discourage that. On the other hand, some liquidity regulations can push banks to hold reserve buffers but then discourage banks from putting those buffers to use in a crisis. Regulations like that might boost reserve holdings without necessarily making the financial system safer. That's an inefficient use of our balance sheet and one we could do without. Vice Chair for Supervision Mickey Bowman recently described options for making liquidity rules more efficient. I look forward to seeing how that work progresses and hearing from her at lunch today. Another way to shift reserve demand inward would be to make the Fed's liquidity tools more accessible. We offer liquidity to banks through the discount window, through intraday credit, and through standing repo operations. If banks are confident they can monetize assets through the Fed when needed, they could choose most of the time to hold fewer reserves and more non-reserve assets such as loans, which are so important to your communities. The Fed has already taken substantial steps to smooth access to these tools. Our discount window direct service lets banks request loans online. We've reduced timelines for completing documentation. And the 12 Federal Reserve banks are working together to simplify the process of pledging and valuing collateral. The New York Fed's trading desk added a second daily standing repo operation to provide funding early in the morning. And the FOMC removed the aggregate cap on standing repo operation usage. The reserve banks are also working with the federal home loan banks to enhance interoperability with the window. Our essay that we published this morning describes a number of additional measures that could further enhance accessibility like central clearing of the standing repo operations or daily discount window auctions. I welcome your ongoing feedback on what more we might do. So, I believe that shifting the demand curve inward through steps like these hold substantial promise for reducing reserves while maintaining the benefits of our ample reserves framework. There are many elements to the Fed's balance sheet beyond those I've mentioned in these remarks and many details to the trade-offs. I want to emphasize that any changes in the balance sheet should be gradual and planned carefully. I hope you'll read the full analysis which is available on the Dallas Fed website. And with that, I'm delighted to turn to my conversation with Robert Hulsey. Robert is CEO of American National Bank in Terrell, Texas, a fifth generation community banker. We're honored to have him on our board of directors. His advice and guidance on the economy, leadership, and our operations, and the importance of community banking enhance our work in so many ways. Now, I focused today on the details of the balance sheet, but I know Robert, and I know he's going to get straight to community banking and the FOMC and our economic policy decisions ahead. So, Robert, I trust you to get us started.