If you're an entrepreneur in France and you look at all this, and you look at the atmosphere and the fact that we're celebrating having put a regulation on the AI Act back in early 2024, and you say, 'I'm going to go to the United States,' and that's what's happening. They go to the United States. You have investors who say, 'No, but Europe has lost anyway, it regulates too much.' And you have a whole narrative that is widely used by the United States, which says Europe loses because it's just bureaucrats in Brussels who are regulating because they don't know how to do anything, they don't know how to innovate. And in fact, it's a destructive narrative because it's also internalized by Europeans. So it's a form of colonialism, if you will. But the point is that we need to reverse this narrative. To reverse this narrative, we also need to think about having regulations that are simpler, more unified, and that allow us to go faster.
Today, some figures: we have 1,000 employees, a valuation of 12 billion euros, and 1 billion euros in revenue targeted by the end of the year. Our clients are enterprise clients, clients in the public sector. To name a few in France, we have the DINUM, the Caisse des Dépôts, France Travail. In the private sector, it's CMA CGM, Stellantis, TotalEnergies, BNP Paribas, etc. We do about 30% of our revenue in France, 70% abroad, and about three-quarters of our revenue in Europe. To give you an idea of where we are, we are fundamentally a technology exporter, both to the United States and to Asia as well.
So what you need to understand about generative artificial intelligence, and fundamentally about what we call AI today, is that it's a model that consists of transforming energy into intelligence, into the generation of tokens that are then used to delegate tasks, to do research in mathematics, to operate logistics chains, to improve tools, to deploy embedded systems in robots, in drones, etc. So we are in a business where we transform electricity into token generation. And it's fundamentally something that needs to be treated more or less like a natural resource. That is to say, we need to think about intelligence the way we think about energy. So our goal is to provide intelligence that is cheap, affordable, let's say in English, that is secure in terms of supply, meaning we don't need to go get it from Americans, for example, and that is also sustainable because it transforms energy that is less carbon-intensive than elsewhere, because we use in particular French energy.
I think we don't think about it enough in this way. Intelligence is like electricity, it's like energy. And moreover, we have this tendency, which in my opinion is a rather false one, of separating digital services from artificial intelligence. Today, the cloud is artificial intelligence. The growth of the cloud is artificial intelligence. High value-added services, with high margins that allow for R&D, that's artificial intelligence. So in fact, everything else, from the moment we gain in artificial intelligence, we can build all the rest of the cloud services, which are essentially commodities today, and which essentially consist of knowing how to operate open-source software because it has become the global infrastructure.
Our goal is obviously to anchor ourselves in this value chain. So this, I would say, our position in the value chain is between the operation of clusters and the operation of servers up to the creation of business applications. And I think it's an atomic unit of the value chain that goes from the construction of semiconductors, so from ASML, for example, this company that does lithography, all the way to deployment in companies. We need to stop thinking about sovereignty as isolationism. We need to think about it the way business people think about it. That is to say, we need to think about sovereignty as a leverage issue.
In a world where you import all your digital services from the United States, you have no leverage over the United States. In a world where you create part of your services, and possibly export them, you have additional leverage. In a world where you sell goods to the United States, you have leverage over them. We see this in European Union negotiations; we export a certain number of things. That gives us arguments and cards to play when we're at the negotiating table. If we don't have this capacity to not import all our digital services from the United States, we have a real problem.
The problem that's coming, in fact, is that the total market we're talking about needs to be compared to the payroll. Today, at Mistral, our consumption of artificial intelligence for our employees is 10% of our payroll. Now, we make this technology, so we adopt it a bit faster than elsewhere. But if you extrapolate, in 3 to 4 years, if all of Europe uses artificial intelligence for 10% of its payroll, 10% of Europe's payroll is about one trillion. One trillion, that's digital services because you have to generate the tokens, etc. It's one trillion if we use non-European technology, it's a one trillion trade deficit to add to our existing trade deficit on digital services. It's a trillion that goes elsewhere to be invested in R&D and is not reinvested in R&D in France or in Europe.
So I think that's a very important point, that we need to think about this sovereignty issue from a macroeconomic perspective. It's an essential macroeconomic issue, and I think we don't realize its magnitude. So that's a first issue. On the issue of time, I would say we don't have time. I think, especially because it's linked to physical constraints. We're talking about natural resources. Here, we're talking about using natural resources to transform electricity into tokens. There isn't infinite electricity in the world. The United States is saturating its electricity to transform it into artificial intelligence. They are deploying a trillion dollars next year. When they deploy a trillion dollars, it means they want two trillion dollars in return. So they see well that there's an immense market being created, and they see that whoever possesses the resource, whoever supplies the chips, whoever possesses the electrons, whoever possesses the power plants or has access to energy on a massive scale, that's who wins.
So that means that today, you have 9 GW, that's 90 TWh per year, available in France. Well, there are plenty of things we can do with it, in part. We're going to do some artificial intelligence. You have actors with enormous balance sheets who have plenty of money to put on the table before seeing the demand to transform electrons into intelligence. But they're going to do it in the next two years. Once they've done it, well, you have no more electricity. That is to say, you have to wait for power plants, you have to create new ones, etc. So you have a form of monopolization of the European energy resource that is underway, that is accelerating at a crazy speed, and of which we are not aware, and it's really irremediable.
That is to say, once it's done, we already have a demand problem. Because the Americans arrived earlier on the cloud, they are the ones who provide the entire European industry, they provide, if you will, the French state, obviously, the market share of the cloud and artificial intelligence tends to compress for non-American actors. That is to say, not only do they grow with the market, but on top of that, their share increases. So I think this is something that can be reversed with artificial intelligence, and what we're starting to see with our clients, with our revenue, with our growth. But the problem is that even if you solve the demand problem, you have a supply problem, because once the supply is monopolized by American actors, well, suddenly we have no more supply, and we can no longer transform electrons into tokens. And this is happening in the next two years.
That is to say, what needs to be put on the table today in terms of investment is tens, hundreds of billions of dollars. And to do that, you need visibility on the market. And the visibility on the market must be indicated by European actors, by European states. Today, it's not indicated massively enough for us to take the risk of deploying 100 billion dollars.
Finally, one of the regulatory problems in Europe is that fundamentally, every time you enter a European country, you have to open a new entity, you have to understand a new stock option regime, you have to understand a labor regulation that is different. And so, that means you need a team on the ground fairly quickly. That is to say, I have signed hundreds of documents to open entities in about ten countries in Europe. I've opened dozens of bank accounts because generally you need an associated bank account. You have a whole bunch of regulations that are national regulations that are not unified. You have a tax system, obviously, that is not unified, whereas it absolutely should be unified if you want to have employee incentive systems that make sense.
So we try to patch things, we try to do things as fairly as possible, but we end up with tax situations that are frankly disparate between countries. So that's relatively catastrophic. In fact, you can't have a unified market if you don't have a form of unified taxation, a form of unified social law, etc. So that's the first thing, I would say it's the main burden. Then you have a whole stack of regulations that are more or less consistent with each other and that force us to document a lot of things. So you have the GDPR, you have all the laws on copyright and text and data mining. You have the AI Act now, which isn't implemented yet but will be from August. All these things say more or less similar things. It touches on data, personal data, what's on the internet, and in fact, it doesn't say exactly the same thing. It requires different documentation.
It's implemented by 27 different implementation bodies in Europe that are more or less zealous depending on the country. And so we end up, I end up with a compliance team of five people. Which is manageable for us today because we're big enough, but if you're a new entrepreneur in France and you look at all this, and you look at the atmosphere and the fact that we're celebrating having put a regulation on the AI Act back in early 2024, and you say, 'I'm going to go to the United States,' and that's what's happening. They go to the United States. So we've overcome this aspect because we're big enough. It goes into overhead costs, it remains very painful, but it's especially that you lose a lot of entrepreneurs who go elsewhere because they're afraid.
You have investors who say, 'No, but Europe has lost anyway, it regulates too much.' And you have a whole narrative that is widely used by the United States, which says Europe loses because it's just bureaucrats in Brussels who are regulating because they don't know how to do anything, they don't know how to innovate. And in fact, it's a destructive narrative because it's also internalized by Europeans. So it's a form of colonialism, if you will. But the point is that we need to reverse this narrative. To reverse this narrative, we also need to think about having regulations that are simpler, more unified, and that allow us to go faster.
We have a lot of micro studies with our clients who give feedback that is largely superior to what they spend today on artificial intelligence with us. So cases where use cases where people make 50 million in investment resources because the machines work better. You have productivity gains of a factor of 5 in customer service. A factor of 5 means it's 20% of the time needed to perform a task compared to before artificial intelligence. So it's very significant.
Macro studies, I think there aren't many yet because we lack perspective. This is a technology. The task delegation aspect, I let my agent work for me all day, that's only been working for 6 months. So you don't have enough perspective to see that. On the other hand, what we can see is that, as I was telling you, it's about 10% of our payroll to equip our people. The productivity gain we make, I would say it's about a factor of 2 compared to 6 months ago. So it's not a macroeconomic study, but that's what we're talking about. That is to say, we're talking about 10%, 20% of OPEX and payroll. I think we need to keep that in mind. It's not necessarily 20% growth, it's part growth, part job destruction. And in any case, destruction or modification of existing jobs.
And I think something we don't... to perhaps get back to the more macro topics, you're in a situation where you have certain jobs that are almost disappearing. And so people adapt, they adapt quite quickly. I think it should pass. We haven't ruled out that there might still be an increase in unemployment in certain areas and in a certain way a shift in value from labor to capital, and capital that is for the moment largely not European capital. And so you have this situation which I think is quite explosive: on one hand, you have perhaps job destructions or in any case very, very rapid modifications of the employment structure in Europe.
You have a situation where everyone wants electricity and there isn't enough electricity. So you have usage conflicts. Usage conflicts mean inflation. So you have potential inflation due to artificial intelligence. And then a third element, I talked about it earlier, you have a trade deficit that's exploding. That is to say, on the services side, it's multiplied by 5 in the next five years. A situation like that is relatively... well, it's revolutionary. So we need to take it into account, I think. We need to talk about it more. We need to have a longer-term view of what it means for the economy, what it means for society, what it means for geopolitical balances. And if we don't do it quickly enough, to get back to your question, we'll find ourselves in a situation where we have no choice. And that's a situation we wouldn't want to see happen.
Today, engineers at Mistral no longer write lines of code. So you have a way of working in software development that has profoundly changed in the last 6 months. That is to say, before it was more of a craft if you were an individual contributor. You wrote your code. Besides, people liked this craft. I come from there, I liked this craft. Today, you're no longer a craftsman, you're a manager, and so you ask agents to write the code for you. So in fact, you give the specifications, you're a project manager, it's a pretty profound change. And it comes with very, very significant productivity gains when you're alone. When you're alone, you can go 10, 20 times faster. When you're 5, it decreases because you still have communication issues that come back. When you're a very large company, suddenly you're in a lot of organizational bottlenecks. So that's what needs to be lifted to have the productivity gains we dream of.
And in terms of order of magnitude, how many tokens does an employee use? Well, I can tell you I count more in megawatts, but... How many milliwatts? It's 1 kW per employee, if you will. That's the order of magnitude. 1 kW per employee is half a GPU. There you go.
How much in euros? Because most people... in euros, well, it's 10,000 euros per year. The lines of code, it's 10,000 euros for the line. Yeah, it's about 10,000 euros per year. If you do 10,000 euros per year per person. So that's what you have to count. But that's why when I tell you it's 10% of the payroll, it's 10,000 euros per year. And 10,000 euros per year, well, at the European level, well, you have 400 million people, it's 8 trillion.
Next, on the bubble issue, I think for a long time people said there was a bubble. In fact, there isn't much of a bubble. Here, there's a real problem of... a bubble is when you overestimate demand. Today, when we see the demand for tokens, all the people who come to see us saying, 'But I need more tokens than I planned.' But in fact, the problem is rather a supply problem. That is to say, there aren't enough logic chips, there isn't enough memory, there aren't enough hard drives, there isn't enough helium, if you will. On the semiconductor side, there aren't enough electrons. So in fact, the entire semiconductor chain and the entire chemical chain today is under pressure from artificial intelligence. So there's rather a supply issue than a demand issue today.
Next, obviously, for the economic model to work, well, when you invest 50 billion to build 1 GW and you're a technology company, well, you want to leave with 100 billion. If you leave with 100 billion, it means you have to create 200 billion in value for your client. Are we close to these equilibriums? I'd say not completely, because obviously we put money on the table at the beginning because we know that when we've captured everything, when we've captured demand and supply, well, then we can raise prices, we can raise margins. And so the risk we have today is what I mentioned earlier: if you don't deploy fast enough, you won't capture enough market share, and behind that, oligopolies form and they will find their footing again. You don't have the entire American economy putting a trillion on the table per year if they don't think they're going to leave with a trillion. I'm not worried about them. I'm more worried about us.
Thank you, Arnaud Saint-Martin. Could the Americans buy Mistral tomorrow? Well, they obviously... the Americans, you have some in the capital, it's less than 30% of our capital. Once again, we had to be happy to take Europeans. There weren't enough Europeans. So at some point, we lose a certain number, we lose economically, that is to say, the return on investment in Mistral, a part goes back, a part is the general partner part that goes back to the United States on American funds, and then you have the LP part which generally American funds raise themselves around the world. So in fact, a part goes back even to Europe from this point of view. So we lose a certain number, we lose return, it's a shame, but we lose return because we don't have the entire ecosystem. That's how it is.
Next, our goal is to remain independent. If you will, obviously, there are people who ask us if they can buy us. We say no because it's not our mission, and our mission is to be independent and our mission is to go towards an IPO and to make sure to provide this alternative. There you go. Next, obviously, it's linked to the fact that if you succeed, you don't get bought. If you get bought, if you... in a way, you've failed. So in any case, that's how we should think about it, because indeed, there's a lot of entrepreneurship in Europe that thinks about exit strategies that are rather acquisitions by American companies. Well, that's a losing strategy. That's a strategy that, macroeconomically, is really damaging. So we need to think about it this way: create European champions that are independent, and that's why we're working on it. We haven't won yet, but we're working on it.
I don't know if you had any other remarks you'd like to add following this hearing. No, I think we've covered quite a few points. I would say one of the issues, we really need to be careful about this, of not distinguishing the cloud and saying, 'We lost the cloud battle, we need to get back on the cloud.' To get back on the cloud, you need to go through high value-added. The high value-added, the one that drives growth, is artificial intelligence. From there, everything else in the cloud can follow. But we need to focus efforts where we are strong. It happens that we have this chance to be relatively strong in artificial intelligence. It happens that we have this chance to have electrical capacity. If we combine the two, we can regain a market share that is sustainable, and we absolutely must do it because otherwise we're going to become a vassal state.
Thank you. Not necessarily for the last remarks, but thank you for the hearing. We clearly understood the... thank you very much for listening to me. I hope we clearly understood the final message and what we'll need to be able to do at the National Assembly. And what do you think? Tell us in the comments.
