From tomorrow, these US assets would not be available if NATO's defense plans were activated? Or is it over a longer time to give the Europeans the ability to replace them? And if there is a war, you just said that the US will have a lesser role in the defense plans. Do you not expect the US to come all in in Europe if there's a war with Russia?
Again, let me start by saying this is not about where forces and assets are currently located. It's about who would do what if our defense plans were activated. So, let's say in case of an Article 5 situation. And what the Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR, has said is that when it comes to the capabilities, the United States will no longer pledge capabilities that other allies already have or will have in the near future. And we have already seen that as the United States has adjusted its pledged contributions, all the allies have stepped up to contribute more. In some cases, completely. In some cases, nearly. But there are also areas that require more work. But the overall picture is looking good.
Okay. Next question. Let's go here. Third row, second one in.
Hello, Secretary General. Melike Pala, Anadolu Turkish News Agency. I have a question about the Strait of Hormuz. Two days ago, during his meeting with Trump, French President Macron offered to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz if requested by regional actors, including the United States, and said that European forces could be rapidly deployed to the area. What is NATO's vision and position in this regard?
Well, of course this is literally speaking outside NATO territory, but it is absolutely clear that in that case, the United Kingdom and France are coordinating all of this. We are really seeing massive pre-deployment of assets over the last two months by European allies and others, close to theater, particularly when it comes to demining, radar, and other technologies necessary. And as I understand it, what I'm hearing from the G7 is that this was discussed. So, what could this UK-French led initiative, with so many countries involved, do post this deal which has been struck between the United States and Iran, to make sure they help deliver on this commitment of restoring the freedom of navigation? But this is all in the making. The good news is that these discussions are ongoing. Whether NATO plays a role there, yes or no — if helpful, of course we will play a role, but if they can do it without us, also okay. We are always ready to help if so wanted.
Okay. Coming here, third row in, towards the center, Politico.
Hi, Victor Jack from Politico. Thanks for the press conference. I have a question on defense spending. Some allies' defense spending is set to flatline this year, while others — Czechia, Slovenia, Hungary, for example — are actually likely to fall below 2% of GDP this year. What's your message to these allies, given the commitments they made last year?
Well, again, when you look at the increases, they are really staggering. In total, this is over 90 billion in one year — 2025, 90 billion more spent on defense than the year before. When you look at the 2% target, almost all allies are on 2%. Last year Albania, Czechia, and Slovenia were not, but they have clearly committed to reach more than 2% this year. So when you look at the overall picture, it is a really small number. It is 800 million. They are not spending the full 2% compared to a total defense spend of 571 billion US dollars. So 800 million — less than 1 billion US dollars — compared to 571 billion US dollars, including this over 90 billion increase, almost 20%. So this is really great news, and what we are getting in is reports from all allies that they are really ramping up. We have seen so many already on the 5%, the 3.5%, the Germans reaching it in 2029, having doubled their defense spending compared to 2021, over 150 billion. So this picture really looks good. And it is necessary because we have to defend ourselves.
Okay. Second row, Reuters.
Thank you. Secretary General, you actually dodged Mark Max's question on whether the reductions in US commitments to NATO's defense plans are effective immediately. Could you tell us whether these reductions are in fact happening as we speak?
On that specific question, it is very difficult to answer with a yes or no, because this is about the what and the when if Article 5 will be triggered. So that means that the US saying we have adjusted our contributions to the NATO force model — that means other allies have to step up. And there we see the picture positive generally: some already filled, some nearly, some still requiring more work. But it is not something you can answer with a yes or no. It's clear that the US has adjusted its commitment to the NATO force model, but in technical terms, it is not a yes or no.
And on those allies that you mentioned are stepping up right now, are you confident that all these capabilities that have been reduced by the US will be backfilled by the Ankara summit?
Again, it's a very technically complicated issue, but what we are working on is to make sure that what the US has been providing so far will be filled. That we fill that gap. And again, that looks very good. A lot of it done, some of it nearly, and some of it requiring more debate and discussion.
Okay. Coming over here, second row on the aisle.
Hi, Isabel Schiefer, ZDF German TV. Just one short question on clarification: you said that the USA no longer provides capabilities that European allies can provide. Did they consult beforehand? Did they ask the allies what capabilities they have, so they know which ones to take out? Or was it a list that was just presented? And then my main question on the Strait of Hormuz: do you have any indications what the US actually requests from NATO allies, and whether this French-UK initiative will be enough and quick enough?
Yes, on the first question, at a technical level, these discussions have been going on for some time now. It's one of the reasons why, as an alliance, we have committed to reach 3.5% core defense spending as part of the overall 5% defense spending target. Because it is fair that where the United States has to take care of multiple theaters — not only Europe but also, for example, the Indo-Pacific — and knowing that in case of a situation where they need assets in both theaters, the assets would be spread too thinly. It's only fair that the Europeans take on a bigger share of the burden when it comes to the defense of Europe. As I said before, we have 600 million people living here. To defend ourselves against a country with 140 million people led by somebody who is an adversary of NATO and of Europe and the whole of NATO territory. And it's a bit strange that we still need so much help from another country, flying eight hours on a plane, with 350 million people, to defend ourselves against 140 million. So, over time — the US stays involved conventionally and of course when it comes to the nuclear umbrella — but over time, when it comes to these contributions to the NATO force model, that the Europeans take over a bigger share of the burden is totally right. This is part of the bigger discussion of the 5% which we decided on in The Hague, which equalizes the defense spending in Europe with the defense spending in the United States, taking out this big pebble in the shoe of irritants on the US side. Since Eisenhower, it has been solved by President Trump and by the other 31 allies. When it comes to your second question, the French and the Brits are leading this coalition. The discussions are ongoing as far as I understand, but obviously this is not NATO leading it. It's very much a French-British led initiative with, I think, over 40 countries now participating to help make sure that the freedom of navigation is restored. And that discussion is ongoing. It has been discussed in the G7, as you have seen. And my understanding is that to a big part this is about demining, because this is one of the big issues — the mines there. And the Europeans are sitting on a lot of demining capacities which the US is lacking to that extent. So that is one of the areas where Europe has more than the United States. So, I guess going forward, we will see that discussion further evolving. But obviously, I know what's happening, we are listening in. But we are not leading it. This is really led by the French and the British with the Americans.
Okay. Staying in the second row, third one in.
Good morning, Secretary General. My name is Ruslana Bryanska, Hromadske Radio, Kyiv. What can Ukraine expect from the NATO summit in Ankara? And is Ukraine likely to receive the proposed 70 billion euros in support?
Well, you already saw some very positive statements coming out of the G7 yesterday. I think what the G7 agreed on Ukraine was extremely important. And let's welcome that. I at least would very much welcome what the leaders agreed on. And when it comes to Ankara, but also the defense ministers tomorrow, we will focus particularly on what Ukraine needs to maintain the fight. And that is all the crucial flow of equipment into Ukraine. That's coming from Europeans, but also this flow of essential stuff which only the US is able to provide. For example, the interceptors for the Patriot systems, which are so crucial to defend your cities and your crucial infrastructure. And there is a big commitment on the US side, on the American, on the European side to keep that flow going, to make sure the money is there. This is this famous PEARL program. We will have now the Ukraine support loan on the EU side kicking into gear. So, that will help. I'm not going to give you numbers at this moment, but I'm pretty confident that collectively we'll make sure you have what you need, as far as the Europeans and Americans can help you defend yourself.
All right. Fourth row in the very center.
Thank you. And a very good morning.
News agency Interfax Ukraine, Iryna Solomko. Actually, a follow-up to my colleague's question regarding the Ankara summit. Can we expect a NATO-Ukraine Council? We know that Zelenskyy is invited already, but how about the Council? And if yes, at which level? And by the way, why don't we have a Council during this ministerial?
Yes, well, during this ministerial we already have a Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting. We also have an NPG, so a Nuclear Planning Group meeting. So the program is already packed. And we had a NATO-Ukraine Council in Kyiv only two weeks ago at the level of the ambassadors, which was an impressive visit with the Ukrainian president being there and addressing all the questions and issues ambassadors raised. It was a moving experience to have that meeting in the presidential palace in Kyiv. We assume for the Ukrainian president during the NATO summit to have a program similar to what we had last year in The Hague. So, many meetings, but no sit-down with all the 32 leaders, because we will have one session with the 32, which is at the level of the 32.
Okay. Coming here, third row, Lithuanian public broadcaster.
Thank you. Good morning. Milda Vitenkytė from Lithuanian public broadcaster. I have a short follow-up to what my colleague from Politico asked about spending. We heard Czechia's Prime Minister Babiš saying that his country will miss 2% this year, but he doesn't see any problem because he's in a good relationship with Donald Trump. So I want to ask you: do you think it is enough to have a good relationship with Donald Trump not to reach what was agreed? And I have a question on nuclear deterrent: we know that already nine countries joined France's initiative of a nuclear umbrella. Would you say that this initiative is an ambition to one day be able to replace the United States with nuclear weapons, or could it be an addition to what we already have?
Well, that's not the ambition of the French initiative. So, I very much welcome the French initiative. It creates an additional strategic dilemma to the Russians. But it's not to replace the nuclear umbrella from the United States, which is the ultimate guarantor of our freedom in Europe. So that will stay in place. But the French nuclear capability is of course important. And not being formally part of the NPT process, because the French have decided to stay out of that. But of course we regularly update, we know what's happening. And this latest initiative by the French president, I think it's welcomed by all the countries involved, including the United States. And also the French made clear this has nothing to do with replacing the US nuclear umbrella. When it comes to your first question, without commenting on individual leaders, I have a very good relationship with Andrej Babiš. We know each other for many years. And I know that the Czech Republic is as committed as everyone to what we decided in The Hague. Czechia did not reach the 2% last year, but I know that the Czech government is working very hard to make sure that when it comes to a credible trajectory, it will be there.
Okay, we're going to go to the back now. Thanks a lot. Thomas Gutschker with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, up here.
Yes, hi. A question on deep precision air strikes. It appears that with the US decommitments to the NATO force model, this issue becomes front and center of discussions among member states. Yet, two years ago in Washington, an initiative was already started by four countries, meanwhile six. So far, we have seen nothing concrete from that — ELSA, it was called. So I'm wondering, does it need more steering from NATO? And what is your thinking about the precision strike capabilities? How important is this? And what kind of capabilities does NATO need to develop, or European allies need to develop, to replace some of the US effects?
Thank you for that question. When it comes to the NATO force model, I've seen some reporting on numbers and all that. As you know, we never comment on that, because we will never make our enemies wiser on what we are doing. So all that reporting, of course, that's the media. You can do that, but we will never comment on that, because we want to make sure that we keep a maximum of secrecy when it comes to concrete numbers. When it comes to deep precision strikes, of course that is an important part of your overall portfolio of systems and weapons we have at our disposal as NATO. And there's always, when it comes to all these systems, a division of labor — who is doing what. I know the ELSA initiative. I know what the previous US administration agreed with Germany. So, of course, we are looking very much into that, trying to wherever we can be helpful to participate in those discussions. But also there, I have to tell you that I have to do that with a little bit of holding back on telling you everything we are doing, because also here, this press conference might also be listened in by the people to whom this might be directed, if necessary, when we have to defend ourselves.
