Welcome to Inflection Points. I'm your host, Fred Kemp, president and CEO of the Atlantic Council. In this new series, I sit down with some of the world's most intriguing and influential people to go beyond the headlines and explore the forces shaping our world. For this episode, I sat down with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Atlantic Council's headquarters in Washington, following his meetings with President Trump at the White House and with leaders on Capitol Hill, and ahead of the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara. Rutte has served as Secretary General since October 2024, having previously been prime minister of the Netherlands for 14 years, and I've known him and followed his leadership for most of this time. He is presiding over the alliance at one of the most crucial and potentially dangerous moments in NATO's 77-year history. At this pivotal moment for the alliance, we discuss the historic importance of the Ankara summit, why NATO needs a defense industrial revolution—and those are his words—and how best to manage transatlantic tensions in the context of a fragile peace in Iran, war in Ukraine, and geopolitical uncertainties across the planet. I hope you'll agree this conversation demonstrates Secretary General Rutte's profound understanding for both the perils of our moment and how best to navigate them. I wonder if you could first start with the broad sweep of history. The Atlantic Council has been around for 65 years. It's the 250th anniversary for the United States this year. How crucial, in your view, is the current moment, and why?
It's absolutely crucial and we have to really meet this moment. So NATO 1.0 was the NATO I was born in, in the Netherlands, absolutely realizing that without the United States, the Netherlands would probably never have been liberated—and of course the Canadians and the Poles and others being very much involved, the Brits, but the US really being crucial here. NATO being there to defend ourselves collectively—the US and Canada and Europeans—against the communist Soviet Union. Then we had NATO 2.0, which basically was a period of lowering investment, less spent on defense, but also NATO which tried after 9/11 to do whatever was necessary, for example in Afghanistan, but it was generally speaking a period of lesser defense investments. And then since a couple of years there is this new realization, and of course the full onslaught of Russia on Ukraine has really triggered this, but even after that we have not seen the money spent in Europe really go up. It was a little bit more but not enough. And I would credit also President Trump for again pushing the Europeans and Canada to do more. And what we are now seeing are numbers of investments which are incredible. So NATO 3.0 is about spending more. It is about a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. Don't forget Europe—Europe is 600 million people, European NATO territories, 600 million people, very rich countries defending themselves against Russia and being still overly dependent on the United States, which is 350 million people. But as last time I flew from Europe to the US, it's about eight hours flight, so why are we so overly dependent? But we need, as US and Europe, to stay together because this is also about the defense of the United States, preventing these nuclear submarines from Russia ending up at the shores here. Europe being a platform of power production for the United States—look at Epic Fury, between 4,000 and 5,000 flights taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury, the action, the war against Iran. And of course it provides the US with industrial depth, the fact that we work together. So we all have invested interests. This is NATO 3.0: more European, equalizing defense spending, but still with the US firmly rooted in NATO.
In Brussels though, I know Europe pretty well, and I lived there for 20, 25 years. And I did not expect the level of tension I felt when I was there, where the Hague was a high point. But you have President Trump, as you know, very unhappy—despite what you said about the flights—very unhappy with several European allies and what they did not offer or give with Iran. And I think some of that was also some of the rhetoric. Europeans unhappy after Greenland, after tariffs, some of the defense reductions. So you're talking about a revolutionary vision to bring the Atlantic Alliance perhaps to its strongest point yet. How do you do it in this atmosphere? And am I right that I'm seeing also some tricky tensions, where you sometimes have to be a marriage counselor?
No, no, it's not that. But I mean, I see your analysis and listen, when an organization like NATO, our collective transatlantic alliance, goes through a transformation like this, you will have some debates, you will have some discussions, you will have some tensions. These are democracies working together. It would be strange if it would not be the case. And the president of the United States being disappointed with, as he sees it, lack of European support when it comes to Epic Fury—I said I understand it. But I said also yesterday in the White House, you saw this in the public remarks—these are isolated cases when you look at the whole picture of Europe, all these European nations living up to their bilateral agreements with the United States when it comes to the use of bases and other support for the United States. This number of between 4,000 and 5,000 US planes taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury—this was crucial and important for the US to be able to conduct that whole operation, and this is one of the reasons why we have this transatlantic cooperation. This is not strictly speaking NATO, but these are all NATO allies. So that means that of course the NATO name is involved here, even despite the fact that these are individual agreements. And then when countries have to really step up their defense spending, yes, of course there will be discussions. Look at the United Kingdom, look at Italy, look at the Netherlands, look at all countries in NATO, because you have to maybe find the money elsewhere or you have to make savings to be able to spend on defense. But this is the first task of every government: to keep the nation safe. So in the end it happens, and all the big economies now have reached that 2%, including Belgium, Italy, Spain, Canada, who were not on 2%—all of them reached the 2% target from Wales before the NATO summit in the Hague, which they were far from at the beginning of last year.
What's most important at this period of time to navigate these tensions to this incredibly positive outcome that I think we all know we could achieve right now? If the European allies really come up to 3.5 to 5%, if the US really does stay devoted as a leader of NATO, then NATO turns out to be stronger than ever before. But there's another scenario as well. What does each side have to do to get to the scenario that you hope we would be able to reach?
Well, first of all, don't be afraid of some discussions and sometimes some tensions. I'm never afraid of those because from these tensions and discussions good things evolve and come from that. So let's not be too scared if, hey, sometimes we fight each other a bit—that's normal. We are democracies, again. This is a difference between us and authoritarian dictatorships. They give the impression that everybody agrees—well, they don't, we know this—but because of the total control of the media in Russia or North Korea, you will never see this. This is the strength of NATO. We are an alliance, of course a defensive alliance, but also an alliance of values where we have democracies, the free media, we have parliamentary debates, we fight each other sometimes at the top of our lungs, and then in the end we always come together—for 77 years now. And now we go through this transformation, and one of the things I'm constantly reminding my American family, my American friends here, is: NATO is not only there to protect Europe. NATO is also there to help protect the US mainland and to make sure that the United States can play its impressive, crucial role on the world stage in terms of projecting American power, which is so crucial to keep the whole world safe.
So, I was impressed by your meeting with President Trump yesterday—the charts, the statistics about the flights for Epic Fury, the charts showing the new investments in Europe, which I don't think are entirely appreciated in the United States. Do you think there are some misconceptions that need to be corrected, not just across the United States but perhaps inside the administration, about the value of the alliance for Americans?
I think the administration realizes this, but what I tried to do yesterday is directly also address the American people and say: 'Hey, I know you guys in the United States feel sometimes that it's not a fair deal that Europeans, being so rich, do not spend the same on defense as you are spending in the United States.' Hey, guess what? We are going to, and we are on a trajectory—and look, we are now at the max you can spend extra in one year, growing by almost 20% in Canada and Europe. You're really at the max absorption capacity because you need to hire the men and women in uniform, you have to make sure the defense industrial output is there. So there's a max on what you can do year on year, but it also shows you that we will get there. That's one. Then when it comes to, for example, inside the alliance, the fact that Europeans are taking over the combatant commands—air, land, and sea—over the next 12 to 18 months is again evidence of Europe stepping up. Europe now paying the bill when it comes to crucial industrial output and defense industrial support for Ukraine, like the PAC-3 interceptors—still US supplying this, Europeans and Canadians paying for this. Again, Europe, Canada stepping up. So this is my message: the deal is fair. NATO is also there for the United States itself, not only to protect Europe, but again also to protect this country and to make sure that the US can play its role worldwide.
NATO 3.0—so many people in this audience will know this term, but a lot of people in our broader worldwide audience: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, you know, what does this all mean? A senior Pentagon official gave the speech that introduced this term—Elbridge Colby—and I was really encouraged to talk to many of my own contacts in Europe who were very encouraged by that speech. You've now adopted this language as well, NATO 3.0. In short, what does it mean? And is the concept that's growing out of the Pentagon, the Trump administration, identical to the concept as it's emerging in Europe and in NATO, or where do you see that there might be some differences that need to be sorted out?
NATO 3.0, as I said, is the Europeans really stepping up, taking more responsibility for the collective defense, particularly when it comes to the conventional defense of Europe—with the US still having a conventional presence long-term in Europe, of course providing the nuclear umbrella as the ultimate guarantor of our freedom. It means Europeans, when it comes to the crucial roles, taking more responsibility. When it comes to the support for Ukraine, really stepping up on all these fronts, creating a NATO which is a fair deal across the transatlantic community and family. And when it comes to the administration, this is what President Trump has argued for when he was Trump 45 and he was Trump 47, and this is what I showed yesterday—that under his leadership, all the extra spending coming in from Canada and Europe now reaching over 1.2 trillion. It was about between 40 and 50 billion in 2018, and now it is over 1.2 trillion. It is a staggering amount of extra money spent. This year and last year combined will be about $250 billion extra spent on defense by Europeans and Canadians. In nominal terms, it is staggering.
So, as I pick up this—and obviously you know much more about 3.0 than I do—Europeans worry that the US will stop providing things like Patriot air defenses, tankers, long-range fires before they're ready to fill in. This is called simultaneity. Americans are fearful that the Europeans will move so slowly that they'll have to put more and more pressure on because they won't actually fill the gaps that they really need to fill as quickly as they need to fill it. Does that describe a little bit the tension right now in trying to achieve that?
Well, I think it is a way to describe it. I would argue that when you look at the numbers, Europeans are really now stepping up. So from an American perspective, the success is there. This was argued since Eisenhower that this needed to happen, and now it is happening. And the numbers are such that there is a max to what you can invest in one year extra—this is the almost 20% extra defense spending—because you also have to spend it. You have to find the people, you have to find the defense industrial output, etc. So that's there. And at the same time, of course, nobody should be naive. We always have to keep each other to account. But when I look at the numbers, I would think: keep the pressure on. But there is a limit because at the moment, you could argue that the Europeans are delivering—this NATO 3.0—are delivering a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. This is exactly what the American administration wanted. And I'm also convinced that long-term, next to the nuclear, the conventional presence of the United States in Europe is essential. But listen—the US has to take care of more than one theater. There's also the Indo-Pacific and other interests the US has to take into account. And that means that when it comes to spreading US resources and the risk that they are spread too thinly, it's only right that Europeans take over some of those responsibilities. We have to do it in a way that no gaps emerge, that the deterrence and defense stay strong, and this is the sort of structured process we are working on.
