I started in my introduction looking at history. You're talking about in really dramatic terms defense industrial revolution NATO 3.0, and we have to remember 1.0 was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. And so I wonder if you could first start with the broad sweep of history. The Atlantic Council's been around for 65 years, this 250th anniversary for the United States this year. How crucial in your view is the current moment and why is it absolutely crucial that we really meet this moment? So NATO 1.0 was the NATO I was born in in the Netherlands, absolutely realizing that without the United States, the Netherlands would probably never have been liberated. And of course the Canadians and the Poles and others being very much involved, the Brits, but the US really being crucial here, and NATO being there to defend ourselves collectively—the US, Canada, and Europeans—against the communist Soviet Union. Then we had NATO 2.0, which basically was a period of lowering investment, less spent on defense, but also NATO which tried after 9/11 to do whatever was necessary, for example in Afghanistan, but it was generally speaking a period of lesser defense investments. And then since a couple of years, there is this new realization, and of course the full onslaught of Russia and Ukraine has really triggered this. But even after that, we have not seen the money spent in Europe really go up; it was a little bit more but not enough. And I would credit also President Trump for again pushing the Europeans and Canada to do more. And what we are now seeing are numbers of investments which are incredible. So NATO 3.0 is outspending more; it is about a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. Don't forget Europe: Europe is 600 million people. European NATO territory is 600 million people, very rich countries defending themselves against Russia, and being still overly dependent on the United States, which is 350 million people. But as last time I flew from Europe to the US, it's about 8 hours flight, so why are we so overly dependent? But we need as US and Europe to stay together because this is also about the defense of the United States, preventing these nuclear submarines from Russia ending up at the shores here. Europe being a platform of power production for the United States—look at Epic Fury, between four and 5,000 flights taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury, the action, the war against Iran. And of course, it provides the US with industrial depth, the fact that we work together. So, we all have an invested interest. This is NATO 3.0: more European, equalizing defense spending, but still with the US firmly rooted in NATO.
Thank you so much for that. As you know, Mr. Secretary General, the Atlantic Council was in Brussels recently with the delegation. Thank you for your compliment of our work reimagining European defense initiative. Tori Taiki here at the Atlantic Council, our Transatlantic Security Initiative, which is hosting this event, is the leader of that with General Chris Kaboli as the co-chair with Minister Lens Bergus as his co-chair, and we really want to contribute. In Brussels, I know Europe pretty well, I lived there for 25 years. And I did not expect the level of tension I felt when I was there, where the Hague was a high point. But you have President Trump, as you know, very unhappy despite what you said about the flights, very unhappy with several European allies and what they did not offer or give with Iran. And I think some of that was also some of the rhetoric. Europeans unhappy after Greenland, after tariffs, some of the defense reductions. So you're talking about a revolutionary vision to bring the Atlantic Alliance perhaps to its strongest point yet. How do you do it in this atmosphere? And am I right that I'm seeing also some tricky tensions? So you sometimes have to be a marriage counselor.
No, it's not that. But I see your analysis and listen, when an organization like NATO, our collective transatlantic alliance, go through a transformation like this, you will have some debates. You will have some discussions. You will have some tensions. These are democracies working together. It would be strange if it would not be the case. And the President of the United States being disappointed with, as he sees it, lack of European support when it comes to Epic Fury, I understand it. But I said also yesterday in the White House, you saw this in the public remarks, these are isolated cases. When you look at the whole picture of Europe, all these European nations living up to their bilateral agreements with the United States when it comes to the use of bases and other support for the United States, this number of between 4,000 and 5,000 US planes taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury, this was crucial and important for the US to be able to conduct that whole operation, and this is one of the reasons why we have this transatlantic cooperation. This is not strictly speaking NATO but these are all NATO allies. So that means that of course the NATO name is involved here, even despite the fact that these are individual agreements. And then when countries have to really step up their defense spending, yes, of course, there will be discussions. Look at the United Kingdom, look at Italy, look at the Netherlands, look at all countries in NATO because you have to maybe find the money elsewhere or you have to make savings to be able to spend on defense. But this is the first task of every government to keep the nation safe. So in the end it happens and all the big economies now have reached that 2%, including Belgium, Italy, Spain, Canada, who were not on 2% all of them before the NATO summit in the Hague reached the 2% target from Wales, which they were far from at the beginning of last year.
What's most important at this period of time to navigate these tensions to this incredibly positive outcome that I think we all know we could achieve right now if the European allies really come up to 3.5 to 5%, if the US really does stay devoted as a leader of NATO, then NATO turns out to be stronger than ever before, but there's another scenario as well. What does each side have to do to get to the scenario that you hope we would be able to reach?
Well, first of all, don't be afraid of some discussions and sometimes some tensions. I'm never afraid of those because from these tensions and discussions good things evolve and come from that. So let's not be too scared if hey sometimes we fight each other a bit; that's normal. We are democracies again. This is a difference between us and authoritarian dictatorships—they give the impression that everybody agrees, well they don't, we know this, but because of the total control of the media in Russia or North Korea you will never see this. This is the strength of NATO. We are a defensive alliance but also an alliance of values where we have democracies, the free media, we have parliamentary debates, we fight each other sometimes at the top of our lungs and then in the end we always come together for 77 years now and now we go through this transformation. And one of the things I'm constantly reminding my American family, my American friends here is NATO is not only there to protect Europe, NATO is also there to help to protect the US mainland and to make sure that the United States can play its impressive crucial role on the world stage in terms of projecting American power which is so crucial to keep the whole world safe. So do you think I was impressed by your meeting with President Trump yesterday, the charts, the statistics about the flights for Epic Fury, the charts showing the new investments in Europe, which I don't think are entirely appreciated in the United States? Do you think that there are some misconceptions that need to be corrected not just across the United States but perhaps inside the administration about the value of the alliance for Americans?
Well, I think the administration realizes this, but what I tried to do yesterday is directly also address the American people and say, 'Hey, I know you guys in the United States sometimes think it's not a fair deal that Europeans being so rich do not spend the same on defense as you are spending in the United States.' But guess what? We are going to, and we are on a trajectory. Look, we are now at the max you can spend extra in one year, growing by almost 20% in Canada and Europe, you're really at the max absorption capacity because you need to hire the men and women in uniform, you have to make sure the defense industrial output is there, so there's a max on what you can do year on year. But it also shows you that we will get there. That's one. Then when it comes to inside the alliance, the fact that Europeans are taking over the combatant commands air, land, and sea over the next 12 to 18 months is again evidence of Europe stepping up. Europe now paying the bill when it comes to crucial industrial output and defense industrial support for Ukraine, like the PAC-3 interceptors. Still US supplying this, Europeans and Canadians paying for this. Again, Europe, Canada stepping up. So this is my message: the deal is fair. NATO is also there for the United States itself, not only to protect Europe but again also to protect this country and to make sure that the US can play its role worldwide.
NATO 3.0—so many people in this audience will know this term, but a lot of people in our broader worldwide audience, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, you know what does this all mean? A senior Pentagon official gave the speech that introduced this term, Elbridge Colby, and I was really encouraged to talk to many of my own contacts in Europe who were very encouraged by that speech. You've now adopted this language as well, NATO 3.0. In short, what does it mean? And then is the concept that's growing out of the Pentagon, the Trump administration identical to the concept as it's emerging in Europe and in NATO, or where do you see that there might be some differences that need to be sorted out?
NATO 3.0, as I said, is that the Europeans really stepping up, taking more responsibility for the collective defense, particularly when it comes to the conventional defense of Europe with the US still having a conventional presence long-term in Europe, of course providing the nuclear umbrella as the ultimate guarantor of our freedom. It means Europeans when it comes to the crucial roles taking more responsibility, when it comes to the support for Ukraine really stepping up on all these fronts, creating a NATO which is a fair deal across the transatlantic community and family. And when it comes to the administration, this is what President Trump has argued for when he was Trump 45 and he was Trump 47. And this is what I showed yesterday that under his leadership, all the extra spending coming in from Canada and Europe now reaching basically going over 1.2 trillion. It was about 50 trillion between 14 and 50 trillion in 2018 and now it is over 1.2 trillion. It is a staggering amount of extra money spent. This year and last year combined will be about $250 billion extra spent on defense by Europeans and Canadians. In nominal terms, it is staggering.
So as I pick up this and obviously you know much more about 3.0 than I do. Europeans worry that the US will stop providing things like patriot air defenses, tankers, long-range fires before they're ready to fill in. This is called simultaneity. Americans are fearful that the Europeans will move so slowly that they'll have to put more and more pressure on because they won't actually fill the gaps that they really need to fill as quickly as they need to fill it. Is does that describe a little bit the tension right now in trying to achieve that?
Well, yeah, I think it is a way to describe it. I would argue that when you look at the numbers, Europeans are really now stepping up. So from an American perspective, that success is there; this was argued since Eisenhower that this needed to happen and now it is happening. And the numbers are such that there is a max to what you can invest in one year extra—this is the almost 20% extra defense spending because you also have to spend it, so you have to find the people, you have to find the defense industrial output, etc. So that's there. And at the same time, of course, we all have—we nobody should be naive, so we always have to keep each other to account. But when I look at the numbers, I would think, hey, keep the pressure on, but there's a limit because at the moment you could argue that the Europeans are delivering this NATO 3.0, are delivering a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. This is exactly what the American administration wanted, and I'm also convinced that long-term next to the nuclear, the conventional presence of the United States in Europe is essential. But hey, listen, the US has to take care of more than one theater. There's also the Indo-Pacific and other interests the US has to take into account, and that means that when it comes to spreading the US resources and the risk that they are spread too thinly, it's only right that Europeans take over some of those responsibilities. We have to do it in a way that no gaps emerge, that the deterrence and defense stay strong, and this is the sort of structured process we are working on.
Thank you for that excellent answer. So two more quick questions for me then I'll turn to the audience. Ukraine. The President's comments on Zelensky, President Zelensky in Ukraine yesterday were a long way from February 2025 where Zelensky was in the Oval Office with no cards. And I just wonder how important—give us your assessment. Obviously, the Ukrainians are making gains. President Putin is in some trouble. How big of a shift are we seeing? And how should both the US, its North American allies, Canada's European allies, should we be ramping up even more than we're doing right now for Ukraine because of this historic moment?
Well, first of all, I have no complaints about the US because you guys are still providing this essential anti-ballistic missile equipment, particularly the PAC-3 missiles for the Patriot system, but also other essential gear only the US can provide. I think it's only just that the Canadians and the Europeans are paying for it and all the support the US is still providing. And it is true that Ukraine is doing well. It is doing extremely well. They are still ahead of the Russians when it comes to innovation, for example in the drone and counter-drone technology. They are more and more successful in hitting essential energy infrastructure in Russia, defense-supporting infrastructure in Russia. We see the overall output from refineries in Russia down by a third, which is massive. We know that Russia is in severe economic difficulties. Their state fund is getting depleted. They spend now over 40% on defense, even close to 50%, which means that about more than 70% of the tax intake in Russia is now spent on defense. So that's not sustainable. In Europe, we really have to make sure that there is fair burden sharing because when it comes to all the support, it now comes down to a couple of countries who are really doing the heavy lifting. It's Canada outside Europe, and in Europe it is the Germans, the Dutch, the Swedes, the Danes, and the Norwegians are really doing the heavy lifting and then a lot of other countries also helping but really to a lesser extent. So we need better burden sharing within Europe. That's really crucial. But I'm really impressed with the Ukrainians, and the President yesterday in the public part of the meeting was acknowledging that because he is fair. He says, 'Hey, this guy there, my colleague, President Zelensky of Ukraine, he's doing well. He is courageous and he is important, but their main issue is to prevent their vital infrastructure and cities coming under attack again from Russian ballistic missiles and generally from drones and whatever from Russia.' So that's why we need to support them with all the air defense systems we can give them.
Yeah, no, you're right. I thought the President's comments were very important yesterday. My last question, and then others will chime in. I've always wanted to ask you this question: Coalition politics is tough in the Netherlands. Coalition politics in NATO is pretty challenging as well. And then you add to that China, Russia, North Korea, Iran. How are the jobs different?
I mean in that sense it is all about coalitions. It's always about coalitions in the world. Even if you have systems like in the US or in the UK where one party is governing, then these big parties are by themselves coalitions. We know this. So either you have coalitions of smaller parties which are more single-focused or you have very big parties like the Republican Party or the Democrats here or the Conservatives or Labour Party in the United Kingdom, but then they are coalitions in themselves. What I have learned over the years is the most important thing when it comes to politics is that you try to speak maximum 10% of the time and listen 90% of the time because you have to understand what the other person needs, what the problems are, and then you have to be consistent and don't be double-faced. And if you try to do that, it's not always easy, but when you try to do that you can together come to joint conclusions.
I like the 10% 90%. I think all of us would... here I'm 90% speaking, sorry for that, but this is not... well, I mean 40 60 is a good outcome, but in any case let me turn to thank you for all of that and let me turn to questions from the audience please, and then here please yes.
Absolutely, Secretary General, thanks so much. Fix, I'm a senior fellow at the US-based Council on Foreign Relations. A quick question. You talked about the structured process towards NATO 3.0. Obviously, as you know, there are many European capitals that are concerned it's not all a structured process, but more of a chaotic process. They're concerned about strategic gaps. Do you think it is time for a mutually agreed road map between the United States and the European allies about when does the United States withdraw, what and how can Europeans fill that? Wouldn't that be the logical path forward for the alliance to make this less in reaction to frustrations and more as a strategic exercise?
Thank you for that important question, and I would argue that we are doing it in a structured way when you look at the NATO force model, which is basically as you know a planning tool. So what can you count on in case of an emergency, and it doesn't mean that if it is not previously committed it might not be there in case of a crisis, but what it basically says is, and particularly for the United States having to think of a situation in which you have two theaters to attend to at the same time, if something happens in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe, then it is only fair that the US says, 'Hey, that means that we can only commit so much to the European theater because we also have to take care of the Indo-Pacific theater, so that Europeans can then step up,' and this is done in a very structured manner. This is about understanding and agreeing what do we need to do as Europeans to step up. This is why we spend more, one of the reasons why we spend more as Europeans and Canadians, to make sure that we can take over some of those capabilities and essential support from the US. But again, it is a planning tool. It doesn't mean that it's exactly what's there in case of war, but at least it's fair. And this is why General Cavoli, the supreme commander, said it makes it stronger that the US is now so clear on what, particularly when there's a threat of spreading your resources too thinly, what the US can deliver.
So I'm going to go back and forth because we got some incredibly important people listening to us from around the world. Your questions.
This one comes from K. Bailey Hutchinson, and I'm putting it up so people can see it. And thank you for your great leadership, Mr. Secretary General. Ambassador K. Bailey Hutchinson, NATO ambassador, former senator, member of the board—was the G7 positive in showing easing of economic tensions with many allies including Europeans? Does that bode well for easing of tensions between US and NATO allies in Ankara? So essentially the impact of the G7 on the Ankara summit.
Well, I think the G7 was a great success. It was because there was a joint declaration with clear language on all the main issues including Ukraine. So this was very important. But I think it also shows you something else, and that is that in the end the United States being so big and so powerful is the leader, and it means that the President of the United States is the leader of the free world. This is what you saw at the G7. This is what you will see again, as my absolute conviction, when it comes to Ankara. In Ankara, we will have 41, 42 countries coming together, including the European Union, and most of them at the highest level—the 32 allies plus all the guests which will come from the Middle East and from the Indo-Pacific. And again, this will be a gathering. When you look at the combined economy of all these countries coming to Ankara, you know how big it is—70 trillion. The US is 30 trillion. So you will have a gathering of a combined economy two and a half times the size of the US economy. And who is the most powerful man in that room, who is in the end leading that whole team? That's the President of the United States. And this is what I said yesterday to him: 'Hey, you are the President of the United States. But for me, first of all, you're the leader of the free world.'
Thank you for that answer. So many great people. I'm going to take one here and then I'm going to go to these two and actually I'll combine two because they both have to do with defense. One from Mariam Ammash, Voice of America. You've talked about making real progress. You're also asking countries to come to the summit with credible plans. Here's the question: If you had to give a scorecard today, how many allies are truly meeting NATO's goal? Not just politically but in terms of actual capabilities and readiness. And I assume you get that question from your American counterparts as well.
Yeah. When I look across the board now, Europe and Canada, I must say they are doing well across the board. Of course, you always have some difference between one and the other country in terms of the credible path to the 5%, and that's one of the issues we will discuss in Ankara. But when you look at the money coming in and the overall defense spend, and of course we agreed last year at the defense ministers before the Hague summit what to spend it on—the capability targets. So this is not just saying the 5% including the 3.5% core defense spending is just a number plucked from the air. Like we did in Wales in 2014, that was a bit plucked from the air. This is deeply rooted in the capability targets. My predecessor Stoltenberg started that whole process, and that means that there is rigor and we know that to deliver on all these capabilities you need to spend between 3.4 and 3.67%, ballpark 3.5%. And all these countries are busy now and making sure that they over time will deliver on all these targets. This is why we do this. So I think we are in pretty good shape, and if there are one or two who need a bit of encouragement, I will do that discreetly, and I can assure you that is tough but discreet.
