50 billion euros per year. That is the magnitude. These countries are leading by example and it is just the beginning. In Ankara, allies will put forward concrete plans for increased investment. Those of you who have been following NATO for a while now understand just how profound a change this is. After years and years of underinvestment, we have seen a sea change in the approach to defense spending. Over the last decade, from 2016 to 2026, European allies in Canada have spent an extra 1.2 trillion US dollars on defense. 1.2 trillion with a T. And in 2025 alone, they increased their defense investment by nearly 20%. That equates to 139 billion additional dollars invested in one year. That is transformative. Who would have imagined a decade ago that we would get this far? We couldn't even have the conversation. And yet here we are, allies united around the imperative to invest in our security, committed to fairly sharing the responsibility, strong and getting stronger. The threats we face are a key factor in this mindset shift. But I'm also convinced that we would not have made such an astounding leap without President Trump's leadership. Every US administration since President Eisenhower called on America's allies to invest more and take burden sharing seriously, and one president got them to do it. I understand that some chafe at this observation, but the reality is that European allies in Canada are now on a trajectory to equalize their defense spending with the United States. And not just that, they are taking on more leadership within NATO's command and control structure, stepping up on conventional defense, including on efforts to bolster our deterrence and defense along the eastern flank in the Baltic region and in the Arctic, and spearheading support to Ukraine. And this is NATO 3.0. A stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. Conviction of purpose, magnitude of investment, true transformation. Now, we need supply to meet demand. And this brings me to my second point. In Ankara, I expect to see industry and innovation engaged to help us deliver the capabilities that credible deterrence and successful defense demand. Allies are investing a whole lot more. The budgets are there, but the assets we need, the capabilities to deter and defend, simply aren't available at the scale or speed that our security requires. Now, it's true that our industries on both sides of the Atlantic have already added production lines to accelerate supply. That's important, but we need a whole lot more. And it is not just about inventory. It is also about innovation. It's about delivering effects, finding novel solutions to deal more efficiently and effectively with the security threats we all face. What we need and what we are working to foster is a real transatlantic defense industrial revolution. Allow me to again thank the Atlantic Council for its thought leadership in this space. The team at the Reimagining European Defense and Innovation or Ready Task Force are helping us to navigate these complex challenges, to scale up production, spark innovation and outsmart our competitors. And who is our competition? Russia remains our current and long-term threat. It is investing more than 40% of its budget in defense, churning out military equipment around the clock and learning quickly from the war it's waging against Ukraine. China continues to modernize its forces and to expand its nuclear capabilities without any transparency, investing massively in military technology and innovation. North Korea persists in growing its nuclear program and is gaining valuable experience from supporting Russia's war against Ukraine. And then there is Iran. For well over a decade, allies have agreed that Iran can never possess a nuclear weapon. Recent US action has severely degraded Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program. But we must remain vigilant. On their own, it's already an issue, but these countries are working together, and we can easily agree that they don't have our best interests in mind. That's what we are up against. And there's absolutely no doubt that we collectively have everything we need to succeed. But we need to ensure that we are translating our economic might into military capabilities. This means overcoming fragmented national defense industries on basically the other side of the Atlantic, cutting red tape here in Washington, and keeping innovation front and center. Across the alliance, I can see that we are finally beginning to take those steps. For example, last year I visited a new Rheinmetall ammunition factory in Germany. This is a factory that went from blueprints to brick and mortar in just over a year. That is speed. That factory will soon produce 350,000 artillery rounds per year. That is scale. This spring, I spoke with talented young engineers at Aselsan, Turkey's largest defense electronics company. They are driving Turkey's defense industrial revolution, which will benefit every member of our alliance. And here in the United States, spurred by President Trump's leadership, we see household names like Lockheed, RTX, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Boeing, and General Dynamics massively ramping up their production to meet this moment. We also see newer firms like Anduril, Palantir and Diversion Technologies innovating on tech and production methods at pace and with purpose. That is revolution. Bottom line, the prospects are plentiful and in Ankara, we will provide the platform to showcase how we are seizing the opportunities and making this revolution a reality. We will announce tens of billions of dollars of new contracts. And when our industries from Arlington to Ankara combine their strengths and step up supply, the result is not only improved security. We are in the early stages of a defense industrial revolution that will help grow our economies and support hundreds of thousands of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And this is the defense dividend. My third point is Ukraine. Five years into Russia's war, Ukraine is not only standing strong, but it is reminding us all of the power of principle, that freedom is worth fighting for, no matter the odds. President Zelensky will join us in Ankara and I expect to show him and all Ukrainians that our support endures and remind President Putin that we are not going anywhere. Earlier this month, I was back in Kyiv. I was there with the entire North Atlantic Council for the first iteration of the NATO Ukraine Council ever held in Ukraine. A strong message of the enduring bond between NATO and Ukraine. We arrived in Kyiv in the wake of yet another massive Russian missile and drone attack. This time, Russians struck a shopping center and more recently they hit a historic monastery, a UNESCO World Heritage site. These are the brutal acts of a weakened Russia. They hurt, of course, but they don't deter Ukrainians who are fighting relentlessly to defend their freedom. And we must be just as relentless in supporting them. And for this, all allies need to pull their weight. America's allies and partners have contributed billions of dollars worth of essential equipment to Ukraine through the Pearl program, which President Trump and I launched last July. It's the initiative through which Ukraine receives nearly 90% of its air defenses, including Patriot interceptors. These are essential to counter the ballistic missiles that Russia uses to target Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. This support continues to flow and Pearl is just one avenue through which allies support Ukraine. There's the Czech ammunition initiative, defense industrial partnerships. The list goes on. And as we continue to support Ukraine, we are also learning essential lessons from their battlefield experience, especially when it comes to the use of drones and counter drone technology. This is a threat we all face and no one has better experience here than Ukraine. So we will continue to stand with Ukraine. Our security is intertwined. Ukraine has shown that we won't be deterred by Russia's aggression. We will continue to show that we as an alliance with Ukraine won't be either. So that's the overview. Transformation in defense investment, revolution in defense industry, affirmation of our enduring support to Ukraine. This is foundational. Now, the implementation of NATO 3.0 like any major change comes with uncertainty as we pave a new path in the alliance that is less dependent on the United States but in which the US remains firmly rooted. Ankara is about recognizing that we are committed to this truly transformational way forward. It takes heart. It takes guts. Allies have made clear that they are fully in. And as a European, let me say I'm particularly proud to see this step change to a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. NATO 3.0. Thank you so much.
Well, that was powerful. Sorry, that was a powerful and important speech. Thank you so much for making it here at the Atlantic Council. So I'm going to ask a couple of initial questions and then turn to the audience. You can either catch my eye and ask a question from the audience or you can go online to ac.org. First of all, I started in my introduction looking at history. You're talking about in really dramatic terms defense industrial revolution, NATO 3.0, and we have to remember 1.0 was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. And so I wonder if you could first start with the broad sweep of history. The Atlantic Council's been around for 65 years. It's the 250th anniversary for the United States this year. How crucial in your view is the current moment and why?
It's absolutely crucial and we have to really meet this moment. So NATO 1.0 was the NATO I was born in in the Netherlands, absolutely realizing that without the United States, the Netherlands would probably never have been liberated. And of course the Canadians and the Poles and others very much involved, the Brits, but the US really being crucial here, and NATO being there to defend ourselves collectively, the US and Canada and Europeans against the communist Soviet Union. Then we had NATO 2.0, which basically was a period of lowering investment, less spent on defense, but also NATO which tried after 9/11 to do whatever was necessary, for example in Afghanistan, but it was generally speaking a period of lesser defense investments. And then since a couple of years, there is this new realization, and of course the full onslaught of Russia in Ukraine has really triggered this, but even after that we have not seen the money spent in Europe really go up. It just was a little bit more but not enough. And I would credit also President Trump for again pushing the Europeans and Canada to do more. And what we are now seeing are numbers of investments which are incredible. So NATO 3.0 is about spending more. It is about a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. Don't forget, Europe is 600 million people. European NATO territory is 600 million people. Very rich countries defending themselves against Russia, and being still overly dependent on the United States which is 350 million people but as last time I flew from Europe to the US it's about 8 hours flight, so why are we so overly dependent? But we need the US and Europe to stay together because this is also about the defense of the United States, preventing these nuclear submarines from Russia ending up at the shores here. Europe being a platform of power production for the United States, look at Epic Fury between 4,000 and 5,000 flights taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury, the action, the war against Iran. And of course, it provides the US with industrial depth, the fact that we work together. So we all have a vested interest. This is NATO 3.0, more European leadership, equalizing defense spending, but still with the US firmly rooted in NATO.
Thank you so much for that. So as you know, Mr. Secretary General, the Atlantic Council was in Brussels recently with the delegation. Thank you for your compliment of our work, the Reimagining European Defense initiative. Tory Taik here at the Atlantic Council, our Transatlantic Security Initiative which is hosting this event, is the leader of that with General Chris Kaboli as the co-chair with Minister Lansberg as his co-chair, and we really want to contribute. In Brussels though, I know Europe pretty well and I lived there for 20-25 years. And I did not expect the level of tension I felt when I was there. Where the HEG was a high point, but you have President Trump as you know very unhappy, despite what you said about the flights, very unhappy with several European allies and what they did not offer or give with Iran. And I think some of that was also some of the rhetoric. Europeans unhappy after Greenland, after tariffs, some of the defense reductions. So you're talking about a revolutionary vision to bring the Atlantic Alliance perhaps to its strongest point yet. How do you do it in this atmosphere? And am I right that I'm seeing some tricky tensions? Are you sometimes have to be a marriage counselor?
No, no, it's not that. But I mean, I see your analysis and listen, when an organization like NATO, our collective transatlantic alliance, goes through a transformation like this, you will have some debates, you will have some discussions, you will have some tensions. These are democracies working together. It would be strange if it would not be the case. And the president of the United States being disappointed with, as he sees it, lack of European support when it comes to Epic Fury, I said I understand it. But I also said yesterday in the White House, you saw this in the public remarks, these are isolated cases when you look at the whole picture. All these European nations living up to their bilateral agreements with the United States when it comes to the use of bases and other support for the United States. This number of between 4,000 and 5,000 US planes taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury, I mean this was crucial and important for the US to be able to conduct that whole operation. And this is one of the reasons why we have this transatlantic cooperation. This is not strictly speaking NATO but these are all NATO allies. So that means that of course the NATO name is involved here even despite the fact that these are individual agreements. And then when countries have to really step up their defense spending, yes, of course there will be discussions. Look at the United Kingdom, look at Italy, look at the Netherlands, look at all countries in NATO, because you have to maybe find the money elsewhere or you have to make savings to be able to spend on defense. But this is the first task of every government to keep the nation safe. So in the end it happens, and all the big economies now have reached that 2%, including Belgium, Italy, Spain, Canada who were not at 2% all of them before the NATO summit in the HEG reached the 2% target from Wales which they were far from at the beginning of last year.
What is most important at this period of time to navigate these tensions to this incredibly positive outcome that I think we all know we could achieve right now? If the European allies really come up to 3.5 to 5%, if the US really does stay devoted as a leader of NATO, then NATO turns out to be stronger than ever before. But there's another scenario as well. What does each side have to do to get to the scenario that you hope we would be able to achieve?
Well, first of all, don't be afraid of some discussions and sometimes some tensions. I'm never afraid of those because from these tensions and discussions, good things evolve and come from that. So let's not be too scared if sometimes we fight each other a bit. That's normal. We are democracies. Again, this is a difference between us and authoritarian dictatorships. They give the impression that everybody agrees. Well, they don't. We know this. But because of the total control of the media in Russia or North Korea, you will never see this. This is the strength of NATO. We are a defensive alliance, but also an alliance of values where we have democracies, free media, we have parliamentary debates. We fight each other sometimes at the top of our lungs and in the end we always come together for 77 years now. And now we go through this transformation. And one of the things I'm constantly reminding my American friends here is NATO is not only there to protect Europe, NATO is also there to help protect the US mainland and to make sure that the United States can play its impressive crucial role on the world stage in terms of projecting American power which is so crucial to keep the whole world safe.
So do you think I was impressed by your meeting with President Trump yesterday, the chart, the statistics about flights for Epic Fury, the charts showing the new investments in Europe which I don't think are entirely appreciated in the United States. Do you think that there are some misconceptions that need to be corrected not just across the United States but perhaps inside the administration about the value of the alliance for Americans?
I think the administration realizes this, but what I tried to do yesterday is directly address the American people and say, 'Hey, I know you guys in the United States sometimes think it's not a fair deal that Europeans being so rich do not spend the same on defense as you are spending in the United States. Guess what? We are going to, and we are on a trajectory. Look at we are now at the max you can spend extra in one year, growing by almost 20% in Canada and Europe. You are really at the max absorption capacity because you need to hire the men and women in uniform, you have to make sure the defense industrial output is there. So there's a max on what you can do year on year, but it also shows you that we will get there.' So that's one. Then when it comes to inside the alliance, the fact that Europeans are taking over the combatant command positions for air, land, and sea over the next 12 to 18 months is again evidence of Europe stepping up. Europe now paying the bill for crucial industrial defense output and industrial support for Ukraine, like the Patriot interceptors. Still US supplying this, Europeans and Canadians paying for this. Again Europe, Canada stepping up. So this is my message. The deal is fair. It is also that NATO is there for the United States itself, not only to protect Europe but again also to protect this country and to make sure that the US can play its role worldwide.
NATO 3.0. So many people in this audience will know this term but a lot of people in our broader worldwide audience, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, what does this all mean? A senior Pentagon official gave the speech that introduced this term at Bridging the Gap or something. And I was really encouraged to talk to many of my own contacts in Europe who were very encouraged by that speech. You've now adopted this language as well, NATO 3.0. In short, what does it mean? And then is the concept that's growing out of the Pentagon, the Trump administration, identical to the concept as it's emerging in Europe and in NATO, or where do you see differences that need to be sorted out?
NATO 3.0 as I said is the Europeans really stepping up, taking more responsibility for the collective defense, particularly when it comes to the conventional defense of Europe, with the US still having a conventional presence long-term in Europe, of course providing the nuclear umbrella as the ultimate guarantor of our freedom. It means Europeans taking more responsibility for the crucial roles, when it comes to the support for Ukraine really stepping up on all these fronts, creating a NATO which is a fair deal across the transatlantic community and family. And when it comes to the administration, this is what President Trump has argued for when he was Trump 45 and he was Trump 47, and this is what I showed yesterday that under his leadership the extra spending coming in from Canada and Europe now reaching over 1.2 trillion. It was about 40 to 50 trillion in 2018 and now it is over 1.2 trillion. It is a staggering amount of extra money spent. This year and last year combined will be about $250 billion extra spent on defense by Europeans and Canadians. In nominal terms it is staggering.
As I pick up this, and obviously you know much more about 3.0 than I do, Europeans worry that the US will stop providing things like Patriot air defenses, tankers, long-range fires before they're ready to fill in. This is called simultaneity. Americans are fearful that the Europeans will move so slowly that they'll have to put more and more pressure because they won't actually fill the gaps they need to fill as quickly as they need to. Does that describe a little bit the tension right now in trying to achieve that?
Well, yeah, I think it is a way to describe it. I would argue that when you look at the numbers, Europeans are really now stepping up. So from an American perspective, success is there. This was argued since Eisenhower that this needed to happen and now it is happening. And the numbers are such that there is a max to what you can invest in one year extra. This is the almost 20% extra defense spending because you also have to spend it. So you have to find the people, you have to find the defense industrial output, etc. So that's there. And at the same time, nobody should be naive. So we always have to keep each other to account, but when I look at the numbers, I would think keep the pressure on. But there is a limit because at the moment you could argue that the Europeans are delivering this NATO 3.0, delivering a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. This is exactly what the American administration wanted, and I'm also convinced that long term next to the nuclear, the conventional presence of the United States in Europe is essential. But hey, the US has to take care of more than one theater. There is also the Indo-Pacific and other interests the US has to take into account. And that means that when it comes to spreading the US resources, the risk that they are spread too thinly, it's only right that Europeans take over some of those responsibilities. We have to do it in a way that no gaps emerge, that deterrence and defense stay strong, and this is the sort of structured process we are working on.
Thank you for that. Excellent answer. So two more quick questions for me, then I'll turn to the audience. Ukraine, the president's comments on Zelensky, President Zelensky in Ukraine yesterday were a long way from February 2025, where Zelensky was in the Oval Office with no cards. And I just wonder how important, give me your assessment. Obviously the Ukrainians are making gains, President Putin is in some trouble. How big of a shift are we seeing? And how should both the US, its North American allies, Canada, European allies, should we be ramping up even more than we're doing right now for Ukraine because of this historic moment?
Well, first of all, I have no complaints about the US because you guys are still providing this essential anti-ballistic missile equipment, particularly the Patriot missiles for the Patriot system, but also other essential gear only the US can provide. I think it's only just that the Canadians and the Europeans are paying for it and all the other support the US is still providing. And it is true that Ukraine is doing well. It is doing extremely well. They are still ahead of the Russians when it comes to innovation, for example in the drone and counter drone technology. They're more and more successful in hitting essential energy infrastructure in Russia, defense supportive infrastructure in Russia. We see the overall output from refineries in Russia down by a third, which is massive. We know that Russia is in severe economic difficulties. Their state fund is getting depleted. They spent now over 40% on defense, even close to 50%, which means that more than 70% of the tax intake in Russia is now spent on defense. So that's not sustainable. I think in Europe we really have to make sure that the Ukrainians are making gains...
Fair burden sharing because when it comes to all the support, it now comes down to a couple of countries who are really doing the heavy lifting. Canada outside Europe, and in Europe it is the Germans, the Dutch, the Swedes, the Danes, and the Norwegians who are really doing the heavy lifting, and then a lot of other countries also helping but really to a lesser extent. So we need better burden sharing within Europe, that's really crucial. But I'm really impressed with the Ukrainians, and the president yesterday in the public part of the meeting was acknowledging that because he is fair. He says, hey, this guy, my colleague President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, he's doing well. He is courageous. And I think this is important, but their main issue is to prevent their vital infrastructure and cities coming under attack again from Russian ballistic missiles and generally from drones and everything from Russia. So that's why we need to support them with all the air defense systems we can give them.
Yeah. No, you're right. I thought the president's comments were very important yesterday. My last question, and then others will chime in. I've always wanted to ask you this question. Coalition politics is tough in the Netherlands. Coalition politics in NATO is pretty challenging as well. And then you add to that China, Russia, North Korea, Iran. How are the jobs different?
I mean in that sense, it is always about coalitions in the world. Even if you have systems like in the US or in the UK where one party is governing, these big parties are by themselves coalitions. So either you have coalitions of smaller parties which are more single-focused, or you have very big parties like the Republican Party or the Democrats here or the Conservatives in the United Kingdom, but then they are coalitions in themselves. What I have learned over the years is that the most important thing when it comes to politics is that you try to speak maximum 10% of the time and listen 90% of the time, because you have to understand what the other person needs, what the problems are, and then you have to be consistent and not be double-faced. If you try to do that, it's not always easy, but you can together come to joint conclusions. I like the 10% 90% — I think all of us would.
Here I'm 90% speaking, sorry for that, but this is not.
Well, I mean 40-60 is a good outcome. But in any case, let me thank you for all of that and let me turn to questions from the audience, please. And then here, please, yes. And please identify yourself and put a question mark at the end of whatever you want to say.
Absolutely, Secretary General. Thanks so much. Fix, I'm a senior fellow at the US-based Council on Foreign Relations. A quick question. You talked about the structured process towards NATO 3.0. Obviously, as you know, there are many European capitals that are concerned. It's all but a structured process, but more of a chaotic process. They're concerned about strategic gaps. Do you think it is time for a mutually agreed road map between the United States and the European allies about when the United States withdraws? What and how can Europeans fill that? Wouldn't that be the logical path forward for the alliance to make this less in reaction to frustrations and more as a strategic exercise?
Thank you for that important question. I would argue that we are doing it in a structured way. When you look at the NATO force model, it is basically a planning tool. So what can you count on in case of an emergency? It doesn't mean that if it is not previously committed it might not be there in case of a crisis, but what it basically says, particularly for the United States, having to think of a situation in which you have two theaters to attend to at the same time — if something happens in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe — then it is only fair that the US says that means we can only commit so much to the European theater because we also have to take care of the Indo-Pacific theater, so that Europeans can then step up. This is done in a very structured manner. This is about understanding and agreeing what we need to do as Europeans to step up. This is why we spend more — one of the reasons why we spend more as Europeans and Canadians — to make sure that we can take over some of those capabilities and essential support from the US. But again, it is a planning tool. It doesn't mean it's exactly what will be there in case of war, but at least it is fair. And this is why General Cavoli, the Supreme Commander, said it makes it stronger that the US is now so clear on what, particularly when there is a threat of spreading your resources too thinly, the US can deliver.
So I'm back and forth because we got some incredibly important people listening to us from around the world. This one comes from K. Bailey Hutchinson. And I'm putting it up so people can see it. Thank you for your great leadership, Mr. Secretary General. Ambassador K. Bailey Hutchinson, NATO ambassador, former senator, member of the board of the G7. A positive easing of economic tensions with many allies, including Europeans. Does that bode well for easing of tensions between US and NATO allies in Ankara? So essentially, the impact of the G7 on the Ankara summit.
Well, I think the G7 was a great success because there was a joint declaration with clear language on all the main issues, including Ukraine. So this was very important. But I think it also shows you something else. In the end, the United States, being so big and so powerful, is the leader, and it means that the president of the United States is the leader of the free world. This is what you saw at the G7. This is what you will see again, is my absolute conviction. When it comes to Ankara, we will have 41 or 42 countries coming together, including the European Union, most of them at the highest level — the 32 allies plus all the guests which will come from the Middle East and from the Indo-Pacific. Again, this will be a gathering. When you look at the combined economy of all these countries coming to Ankara, you know how big it is — 70 trillion. The US is 30 trillion. So you will have a gathering of a combined economy two and a half times the size of the US economy. And who is the most powerful man in that room? Who is in the end leading that whole team? That's the president of the United States. And this is what I said yesterday to him: hey, you are the president of the United States, but for me, first of all, you're the leader of the free world.
Thank you for that answer. So many great people. I'm going to take one here and then I'm going to go to these two, and actually I'll combine two because they both have to do with defense. One from Mariam Hama of Voice of America. You've talked about making real progress. You're also asking countries to come to the summit with credible plans. Here's the question: If you had to give a scorecard today, how many allies are truly meeting NATO's goal, not just politically, but in terms of actual capabilities and readiness? And I assume you get that question from your American counterparts as well.
