Nationalist groups here at the entrance of the camp previously appeared with shouts, provocative banners and signs. Here, the National Path Association with exactly the same shouts, such as 'Transylvania, Romanian Land.' I would just briefly add that it wouldn't hurt to study the history books for a few dozen Romanian nationalists as well. One way or another, however, those visiting this camp are waiting for Viktor Orbán to outline the framework for a fresh start in his speech. This will be revealed soon, as Viktor Orbán will soon begin his speech here on the Tusnád stage. The word is to the studio.
Áron. Thank you very much. And Viktor Orbán already made a reference this week about what he will talk about, because at the joint press conference with János Bóka, he said that he will elaborate on national resistance, or opposition resistance, in Tusnádfürdő. And by the way, many say that this current speech could also be a kind of manifesto for the renewal of the national side. In your opinion, how prominent will foreign policy be, for example, compared to previous years, or those grand plans and global phenomena that we have been used to from the Fidesz president, or will he focus entirely on right-wing renewal?
Well, we'll find out soon, I could dodge the answer like this, but indeed, what was characteristic in the past years, especially in the period when Viktor Orbán held his speeches as Prime Minister for the past 16 years, was that it was fundamentally a real big picture, that is, from his perspective, a vision presented from a strategic high perspective, how he sees the processes of world events, what conclusions would be drawn from these for Europe, and precisely regarding the challenges facing Hungary. I think there will be plenty of this in the current speech as well, considering that the result of the Hungarian elections and the campaign were also connected to international processes, if only we think of the intervention attempts, the almost undisguised secret service interventions in the campaign, which obviously aimed to remove the previous government, then we have to say that I think things have come together in this campaign and this election that, at the level of conflicts, at the level of conflicts determining the world, Hungary has become a serious player, and both Viktor Orbán and Hungary could feel the effects of this. So from this perspective, I am curious, but obviously the focus, I think now, since the greatest interest is in what will happen to the Hungarian right, what will happen to Fidesz, how he evaluates the government performance of the past four years, how he evaluates the opposition position, what posture he proposes, how long to analyze, when to resist. So I think he will cover all of these. And I say that personally, I haven't been this curious about Orbán's Tusnád fürdő speech in a long time. Many people feel the same way. And the question is, for example, I don't know what you think about this, how much the present rewrites what was formulated in the previous Tusványosi speech and opposition behavior, because more than 20 years have passed since then. There is a new situation, new tools, new challenges, not only the domestic mood, public mood has changed, but the entire international climate, political climate. So how much will he change this opposition posture compared to that?
I think Viktor Orbán will present Viktor Orbán. So he will be...
Oh, he said that he never changes.
Yes, because Viktor Orbán always places politics in context, if we recall, and not just the Tusnát fürdő speeches, but any of his speeches, he always places Hungary and Hungarian domestic politics in context. So this will also have some arc. And that's why, besides what you also said about foreign interference, the influence that took place in Hungary, let's not forget that soon there will be elections in large countries, large Western countries. Changes can be expected in Brussels soon. So there is a context to the whole thing, and let's not ignore the crises, because the American-Iranian conflict is getting stronger. So I don't think he will ignore this, and indeed, within a framework, he will turn to domestic politics and the renewal of Fidesz, or as he imagines, not Fidesz, but the renewal of the right, because Fidesz is just one element of the right, in my opinion. Then I am also very much looking forward to what will happen.
Yes, because several journalists asked him what this opposition resistance means in practice, what resistance and protest with peaceful means inside and outside parliament means. Inside parliament, there is relatively little room for maneuver where politicians, the faction could move. But outside parliament, what tools are there? I will also be curious about what specific steps or events or anything he envisions for the future. That is definitely important, and I think since the elections it is clearly visible that Viktor Orbán does not say that now I will tell everything from above and it will be so, but he expects there to be impulses, so that many people think and debate about the future of the right, and also about what they did wrong in the past years, in the past four years, and everyone states their position, and I think this has indeed happened in the past weeks, months. Someone went a little too far, someone didn't go too far. So within Fidesz there is also a Tibor Navracsics, who is quite strongly... so there are actors who have started thinking about how this fits together as an organic whole, we don't know yet how. And maybe Viktor Orbán will also emphasize this in his speech. You were smiling while I was talking, why is he smiling?
Because I realized that you subtly referred to the Zsolt Német vadhajtások debate, but undoubtedly Mandiner and I also participated in these debates about how we experience the past period, what could have led to this defeat. There are those who say, and to the victory of Tisza, I add, who think that we don't need to deal with this anymore. So undoubtedly on the right side. I see two directions basically. One is that we shouldn't deal with what happened, how it happened, why it happened, but with the fact that now there is a new situation, a new power striving for overreach, showing truly authoritarian signs, unprecedentedly violating the constitution, removing constitutional dignitaries with constitutional amendments, that's what we need to deal with, because this is the most important new situation now. I think both positions are defensible, and there need to be people who deal with the discussion of both questions. And indeed, Viktor Orbán's speech today could be a synthesis of this, because he has to look into the future from the present, from the current situation, but he cannot leave unmentioned that last year he said things from which what the people sitting there and his followers expected did not follow. So obviously, one can go in a thousand directions here, but since these are usually speeches of about an hour and a half, I think if there is ever a time, now is the time for the former Prime Minister to talk about everything.
I will also be curious about what, for example, Zsolt Német or László Tőkés will talk about, because they always had their own topics. But that's a question for the future. Now we connect again to Tusnát fürdő, to the Tusványosi Free University. Gulyás Áron is there, if all is true, with Csaba Dömötör, Fidesz MP. Áron.
That's right, that's correct. Csaba Dömötör is here with me. Good day, Mr. Representative. Everyone is guessing, we here and those sitting in the studio, about what Viktor Orbán's speech was about. Presumably, the great geopolitical characterizations will get less focus. How do you see this?
Thank you very much to Csaba Dömötör.
To the Szó studio.
We also thank Áron. And in 2002, when Viktor Orbán also spoke in opposition at Tusványos, he proclaimed the building of the civic world, and then perhaps seven or eight years later, this meant a victory. However, if you think about it, in the past years there was an effort within Fidesz, and personally with him, to renew this civic world to meet the challenges of the age. See, last year he announced the creation of digital civic circles, and looking at the election result, we can say that it was not successful, or less successful. The question is, how do you see the bottom-up building? Do you have to go back completely personally and everyone has to talk to people locally, or can the right combine these two, the digital space and personal connections, in some new way?
I think primarily what was needed in the past weeks, months was to clarify the situation, because what is the situation, now we see that those who are in government think, and they also say it, that they want a regime change. And what does a regime change consist of? Remove everyone who was part of the previous system, the previous 16 years...
The previous two. The previous... Yes. Yes. So, yes.
For 14 years, the Prime Minister was also part of the system, so to speak.
Yes, yes, yes. I also wanted to say that. So they draw a line, and whoever was in power before, in every sense, must be made uncomfortable so they cannot return. It went very well in the case of Dávid Vitézy, this is impossible. Yes, yes, yes, there are... so the exception proves the rule, but we see the President of the Republic, we see the Constitutional Court, we see the exclusion of representatives, we see the attack on Viktor Orbán, exclusion, cannot run, etc., etc. But what is this about? I think this is the big question. And indeed, they think of the regime change as the past 16 years being a guilty system, and therefore it must be closed, and anyone connected to it must be excluded from public life. It's fine that they think so, but the past 16 years was not a guilty system. So here is the big problem. Let's take Spain, after a frank dictatorship there was a regime change. And the regime changers in Spain said that then it was guilty, and we see some pattern here, or 89-90, then they should have acted hard, because then it could have been the previous system, because it was a murderous system, the communist system and the frank system is also a murderous system...
But the past 16 years was not that, and the people didn't feel it that way, I think the Tisza voters didn't feel that it was a murderous system, and therefore everyone must be excluded. And I think that in the Tisza voters too, many, because the Tisza party is really going on such a broad base, many might wonder if this was really about it, so that a regime change or just a government change happened. The left thinks it was a regime change, therefore the past 16 years must be clarified. And that's why everyone must be excluded. But it's not certain that their voters think so. And the right-wingers especially don't think so.
I also have a question after the past 16 years, that then why did they elect Fidesz for 12 years continuously with a two-thirds majority? And then this last four years, when they didn't elect them, and Fidesz-KDNP lost the election. So this last 16 years, or this 16-year thing, I can't deal with this for now. And it's important that the right and the right-wing public always clarify this question, that we can reject, we must reject the regime change narrative, the guilty era narrative, and what you said is...
That's right. I absolutely agree with your diagnosis. This is the government narrative, because there is no governing, let's say they are still preparing, or not...
Why do you say that? There was already a price reduction in the case of medicines.
That's right.
An average person can save even 10,000 forints. So undoubtedly this is already the core of governing, but joking aside, if we just look at how they solved the school year support, the second installment of which will arrive in November, I think the school year doesn't start then, in the form of some voucher. So sooner or later these will start to come in, expectations related to the government, to substantive governance from society, because I am convinced that many voted down the past four years, and not the past 16 years. And the reason for this, in my assessment, was primarily that economically Hungary and the majority of Hungarian society did not feel that they could get from one to two. Unlike the previous 12 years, when they always felt from four years to four years that they were moving forward. The reasons for this are obviously to be found in governance, in international circumstances, but this always finds the world...
The German economy has collapsed, and by the way, the new government also has to face this, because we are historically the most exposed to the German economy, and since the regime change it has developed in such a way that we cannot suddenly do anything about this given. But the German economy is on the floor. Well, according to the latest data, even in Berlin the AfD, the protest party, is leading. This has almost never happened before. So there are very serious crisis symptoms there, and their effects hit the previous government, but will also hit the new one. So while there is this narrative building and daily it goes like this Fidesz, like that Orbán Viktor, handcuffs, handcuffs, bars, bars, this is good for theater. By the way, from a rule of law perspective, it's quite dangerous. Obviously, in the Union they don't see it this way, because now they are applauding Viktor Orbán's farewell, but sooner or later some might wake up to these signs, because these have long-term effects on Hungarian rule of law. So there is this theater narrative, this still we are in opposition but already in government attitude, and alongside it the problems will float in. And I think that for the right side, since we are basically talking about what will happen, what the right can do now, this will be an opportunity, because government performances can also be compared when the new government is also governing, and then I think that will be a new situation. Then real opposition politics can be pursued. Now there are still absolute film theater hyphen honey cases. Listen, basically the question is, you mentioned the American-Iranian conflict, so the Hormuz situation will not ease, but will get worse. And as you said earlier, a crisis like the energy crisis affected Hungary too after the covid. A crisis of this nature affects the whole world just the same, fuel prices are rising everywhere. Hungary cannot keep this out. The response to that, for example, I will be very curious about, because they voted for the authorization for Captain István, that he will personally decide what should be done, whether there should be a price cap or not, or anything. But the question is whether they want this, because the Union didn't like the Hungarian price cap either. Do they want to bring this in, or do they say that well, the money is coming, the EU support, and then we won't introduce such measures. But this is just one thing. There are countless difficulties and problems, to which we have already seen what answers the Orbán-led government gave. I will also be curious, if there is a similar problem, what the current Tisza government will do.
Yes, these seem like policy questions, but they are actually social policy questions too. Economic policy, social policy questions. And then we are already at high politics, because the price cap, the fuel price cap is also a social policy question. It also affects inflation, so it's a financial economic influencing tool. And if they let fuel prices go, then we remember, I don't want to get into history lessons, but there was a taxi blockade here, and that was because of fuel prices. But it was a long time ago, but Hungarian society already reacted to this back then, and fuel prices are always such a cornerstone. And what is the psychological limit for fuel prices? This is also a big question, because if it's 700-800 forints for 1 liter of gasoline, and now I'm talking about the 95 octane, diesel is even more expensive, and that's the transport vehicle, so the trucks, the transport vehicles run on that, and that will be even more expensive, it's always more expensive nowadays, it used to be cheaper. Anyway. So that will be more expensive. That might cause a psychological moment when fuel prices need to be intervened, but how much is the reserve? There is a debate about this too.
There is a debate now about what the reality shows...
But if people storm the gas stations, that's already... how should I say? That's already a psychological limit. And if we look at what Captain István talked about during the campaign, that there is no need for price caps, and now we are not just talking about fuel, but also about food prices, food products, and the utility price reduction...
Yes.
We can't catch him from... what is he... liberal left... so this was also a success factor in the campaign that you couldn't say that now this is such a left-wing thing, but they didn't say anything, and with this the perception in voters is that we will do good for everyone, and then when reality comes, steps must be taken, and that will show what the government's ideology is. If they don't step in, then they say, well, everyone drives, that's their responsibility. If they don't want to pay a lot, then take public transport, but public transport will also get more expensive.
Well, that's just that these are interconnected. Decisions must be made, the government must be decisive, and if the government is not decisive, then the film theater can go on. Well, I was just about to say that about one such decision or non-decision, because Magyar Péter communicates well, so he can divert the focus with various showcase measures. See, every politician must be held accountable, and put in prison, and I don't know what. So the President of the Republic must be replaced. Now there is a clash with the Speaker of the House. So that's why I say he can divert the communication focus, so that people talk about that, and not about how much the fuel costs. For a while, sorry. For example, the presidential election and removal issue highlights what danger factors are present in Magyar Péter's communication in the respect that it really negatively affects his own voter base, because for example, the way he handled the Polgár Judit nomination on the night of the VB final, I don't know what mood he was in, but his phone was at hand, and he commented, posted, and immediately promised that then the next day he would sit down with the many famous civil personalities nominated chess grandmaster, and ask if he would accept the presidency. This was barely 24 hours after he would have said that there would be wide-ranging social consultation, many names would be gathered, consultations with factions too, and the head of state would be selected through a truly more democratic process than ever before. So this kind of side-stepping, he also said about this that only the communication was bad. So he tries to get out of it by saying that this was just badly communicated, instead of saying sorry, contradicting myself a bit, I wanted to nominate Polgár Judit.
Regarding communication, there is another example when his microphone was left on and he said that Andi will send two sentences to everyone. Here is the press, he put in their place the 141 free representatives, whose opinion counts individually. He said about them earlier, these... his moves put a period to this earlier saying. But we can bring more examples from the past period. Indeed, I think the greatest danger of Magyar Péter's communication is himself, because it must also be acknowledged that in opposition position this non-stop talking, moving, threatening, absolute film theater proved successful, but the Prime Minister, however well he communicates, it seems he can still sometimes make a misstep, make a mistake, but really it will be that voters, as in the past four years too, and always fundamentally their quality of life, their economic opportunities, their degree of freedom, although I think we can put a period to this in the past decades, I think Hungarian society has been living in unprecedented freedom for decades, regardless of whether the Hungarian Prime Minister is called Viktor Orbán or not, they lived in great freedom, now too they live in great freedom. So we can put this part in parentheses. This is a given. Here, really the economic and financial opportunities will be those that will be decisive in the long run before the next election, but we are still a few months after the previous one.
This is already autumn, because we will see the new budget or its amendment in the autumn, so then we will basically see what direction they want to go. Yes, there will be...
There will be a budget, for example, next year's and this year's correction, we don't see that very well yet, and from that we will see...
Yes. Well, and what are the expectations or what is the direction that a government wants to move in? Because this hasn't emerged yet. So you can promise everything under the sun. And when reality hits, when you are already in government, you see whether the budget can bear, for example, the reduction of the VAT on medicines, I mean the entire medicine market. So it should have been the other way around, the VAT on non-prescription medicines should have been reduced, right? Because that's an expensive thing for the budget, the VAT is higher...
But he talked about this during the campaign.
Don't be in the middle, don't bring up the doubling of the Charlie allowance immediately.
Yes, we are still waiting for that. Yes. And the maternity allowance was also there. Care allowances and immediately double food... food VAT.
Yes. So from opposition you can say anything, and he said it very firmly, and I think many believed them. I'm also talking about former Fidesz voters. So the hope, the hope-selling went very well. In government, it's much harder. And that such a camp, such a wide spectrum voter base, this with conflicts, as we move forward in time to the next election, this with conflicts, how should I say, not the core voter base, because there is a core voter there too, former opposition voters, I mean besides the MSZP-SZDSZ voters. That base will be hard to keep together. So there is a core, there is a 1.5-2 million core, I'm sure of it, but outside of that, that voter layer, that 1.5 million voter layer, will it stay with such indecisive measures as the medicine VAT or the school start allowance, or I don't know what, that's not too good...
But here comes what János Bóka also talked about, and several others talked about, and we also touched on, that precisely for this reason it can be interpreted politically as a rational step that the Prime Minister is now with all his might drowning Fidesz. So he shouldn't deal this much at the beginning of a term with who can be voted for in four years. He bans 60% of the members of the one-third Fidesz faction sitting opposite him, even smaller than that, from running in the election. He bans, so to speak, his arch-enemy. Viktor Orbán was his arch-enemy two years ago, he looked up to him and considered him a lighthouse...
Yes, that's right. So obviously a good part of his voter camp has long had Viktor Orbán bothering them, every four years they voted against him, but now they succeeded. But that he takes his idol, his ex-idol off the field, because he doesn't allow him to be voted for again, on one hand doesn't project confidence in the success of the next four years. Why would there be a need to make opponents impossible like this if he believed that after four years of success he would automatically be the popular politician in people's eyes. So he takes away this opportunity. And by the way, all these threats of accountability, etc., the constant torpedoing in parliament aims for when we get to what we talked about, that due to the negative consequences of governance, a good part of society will turn away from him, there will be no one to turn to, because Fidesz won't be credible, because until then it destroys his Nimbus.
And here the question is, when they say that Fidesz needs to renew, what does this mean in practice? Because in practice it basically means that those who were their voters before and now voted for Magyar Péter, they need to be lured back somehow. Is there a way for this, that the party separates from such characters and a kind of purification. I'm thinking more of people, characters. I won't name specifics now, because maybe the search for answers is still going on, and as we see in the media, the finger-pointing at each other. And then there is the question that has been continuous since the election. Fidesz or a new party? How can the right be unified? How can voters be brought back? With Viktor Orbán or without Viktor Orbán?
This is the biggest question. The latter, I think, so...
While Viktor Orbán in the past decades built a national camp, and his authority, his performance, his political... I won't say genius, is what gave him such authority that this community, this was fundamentally organized around him in loyalty, respect, and political interest. Who knows, you can unravel the different actors of the community one by one, and the voters too, about what motivation each has, but it was fundamentally a Viktor Orbán-centered party. Understandably, Fidesz. Now the question opens up, and perhaps the Prime Minister will talk about this now, he even talked about it at the congress, that he is giving himself a year, that it is certain that now he must not leave the ship. That would be a politically and in every respect irrational step, considering how heterogeneous the Fidesz community is. However, in the long run, if we look at that in the past two years we got to know the new opposition, which was completely new and behaved very strangely compared to what we were used to, and this replaced the government that had been ruling for 16 years. I think that so far from the next election, we can simply at most guess about how Fidesz will stand, in what form. And I think even for these big questions or what comes after, or what arrives alongside, or those formations with which it might be able to organize something together, so for these we can now only give directions, tips. And I think the Prime Minister won't give final answers either, like the previous Prime Minister. I still have this stuck, that's what I call it, but that he won't give final answers, because he can't in this position. However, there is a great need to at least give orientation and a sense of security to that community, which is partly beaten and left to itself a little, or at least can feel that way in these past few months. Can three months be enough to understand those processes that took place over many years? Because it didn't happen from one moment to the next that so many people became anti-Fidesz, or anti-Orbán, or very critical, not just that, okay, something good will come, or at all from apolitical to an active voter.
This is years and they are so impatient that after two or three months we expect concrete answers and concrete solution proposals, because a solution proposal can only exist if I already know what happened, if I see the whole picture.
Well, the voter can be impatient. And impatient, and I see on right-wing voters that they are impatient, the politician must take responsibility, and I think Viktor Orbán by the way did take responsibility. And the politician must also take responsibility for what will come. And thinking this through really isn't three months. So those exchanges of ideas, those debates, those are certainly going on within the circle too. We heard at Tusnát fürdő too, there were quite radical remarks. You quoted Zsolt Német...
And there were others too.
Yes, there were others too, but I think that what the situation is, and we don't even know what the situation will be until the next election, because if they really modify the election law and rewrite it, then there is a different situation again. We don't know in what electoral system, in individual constituencies, or rather in list, party list voting they are thinking, because they want to proportion the two. So this won't stay like this, at least they are talking about it. But a party or a movement needs to know under what conditions it can run in the election. And those now, in the current state, cannot run in individual constituencies, who actively participated in the politics of the past... I don't know how many years. Yes, 12. So the representatives cannot run. This now seems final, if we want to naturally follow the laws, but if the President of the Republic is illegitimate, the next President of the Republic, and comes an election law that he will have to sign, then what? So then how does it develop, how do we approach the next election? That's why I say that one can think in terms of scenarios too, the vast majority within the Tisza camp was not bothered that their voting rights were restricted, because they cannot vote for those representatives for whom they have been voting for 16 years. And if this doesn't bother them, then how much does it bother them that on the right they consider the next President of the Republic illegitimate, because it seems the Union is bothered by one thing and not by another.
Well, the Union is not bothered yet, but there may be changes in the Union. Now I am only referring to Germany, which you already mentioned, Germany, or France, where there will be a presidential election next year. We don't know what the international European situation will be at the time of the next Hungarian elections, because those changes haven't happened yet, or in Poland there will also be an election. Although the right's trajectory there is that Kaczyński is in the back and the former Prime Minister, Morawiecki, is in the front. That has now fallen apart there...
Cracked.
Yes, fallen apart. So that model is not necessarily that viable, we don't know, but there will also be an election in Poland, and a series of EU elections, and this will influence, although not the composition of the European Parliament, but the political mood definitely, if in Germany, the strongest EU country, there is a government that is not friendly with that bureaucratic system, and with that liberal world with which Magyar Péter's people maintain friendly relations. Well, then we don't know what they will say about the modification of an election law, or about the opposition considering the President of the Republic illegitimate, and the whole system's operation with this. So there are big questions. However, if they consider it illegitimate, then that means they must also withdraw from parliamentary work, not just in a token way, but substantively, which would really be an unprecedented situation again. I would not recommend this, if anyone happens to listen to my opinion, because...
There is a lot of thinking going on...
Because I think that from this position, in which Fidesz still is, based on measurements in terms of support and as great as its social mandate still is, who knows for weeks, even months, the new...
