NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the Ankara summit agenda

Fred, thank you so much for that introduction and good afternoon everyone here in this room. It's great to be back in Washington and here with you at the Atlantic Council. Let me first say that the Atlantic Council has been an indispensable intellectual partner to the alliance for over six decades now. When we need rigorous honest debate and analysis, the Atlantic Council delivers. It doesn't just study the alliance, it strengthens it. So really Fred, thank you for your leadership. It's wonderful to have the chance to connect with you and with so many old friends today and to take stock of where the alliance stands less than two weeks ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara. In Ankara, we're going to show the world that we are delivering on the commitments we made in The Hague last year. We'll breathe life into the concept of NATO 3.0, a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. We're going to show just how powerful NATO is. And how ready and determined we are to defend all our citizens and every inch of our territory. And today, I will describe what I expect out of this summit. First, I expect an incredible transformation in defense investment. As those looking to spend an afternoon at the Atlantic Council well know, last year in The Hague, we agreed to invest 5% of GDP in defense by 2035. A historic decision and a daunting if essential undertaking. The direction of travel is clear and allies are stepping up. Several nations, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, are already spending well over the agreed targets. And they are moving with speed to continue investing more. That is conviction. Others are making remarkable strides like Germany, which is on track to double its investment in defense by 2029 from just a few years ago. This will amount to over 150 billion euros per year. That is magnitude. These countries are leading by example. And this is just the beginning. In Ankara, allies will put forward concrete plans for increased investment. Those of you who have been following NATO for a while now understand just how profound a change this is. After years and years and years of underinvestment, we have seen a sea change in the approach to defense spending. Over the last decade, from 2016 to 2026, European allies and Canada have spent an extra 1.2 trillion US dollars on defense. 1.2 trillion with a T. And in 2025 alone, they increased their defense investment by nearly 20%. That equates to 139 billion additional dollars invested in 1 year. That is transformative. Who would have imagined a decade ago that we would get this far? We couldn't even have the conversation. And yet, here we are. Allies united around the imperative to invest in our security, committed to fairly sharing the responsibility, strong and getting stronger. The threats we face are a key factor in this mindset shift. But I'm also convinced that we would not have made such an astounding leap without President Trump's leadership. Every US administration since President Eisenhower's called on America's allies to invest more and take burden sharing seriously. And one president got them to do it. I understand that some chafe at this observation. But the reality is that European allies and Canada are now on a trajectory to equalize their defense spending with the United States. And not just that, they are taking on more leadership within NATO's command and control structure. Stepping up on conventional defense including on efforts to bolster our deterrence and defense along the eastern flank in the Baltic region and in the Arctic. And spearheading support to Ukraine. And this is NATO 3.0. A stronger Europe and a stronger NATO, conviction of purpose, magnitude of investment, true transformation.

Now we need supply to meet demand. And this brings me to my second point. In Ankara, I expect to see industry and innovation engaged to help us deliver the capabilities that credible deterrence and successful defense demand. Allies are investing a whole lot more. The budgets are there. But the assets we need, the capabilities to deter and defend, simply aren't available at the scale or speed that our security requires. Now, it's true that our industries on both sides of the Atlantic have already added production lines to accelerate supply. That's important. But we need a whole lot more. And it is not just about inventory. It is also about innovation. It's about delivering effects, finding novel solutions to deal more efficiently and effectively with the security threats we all face. What we need and what we are working to foster is a real transatlantic defense industrial revolution. Here, allow me to again thank the Atlantic Council for its thought leadership in this space. The team at the Reimagining European Defense and Innovation task force are helping us to navigate these complex challenges. To scale up production, spark innovation, and outsmart our competitors. And who is our competition? Russia remains our current and long-term threat. It is investing more than 40% of its budget in defense. Turning out military equipment around the clock and learning quickly from the war it's waging against Ukraine. China continues to modernize its forces and to expand its nuclear capabilities without any transparency, investing massively in military technology and innovation. North Korea persists in growing its nuclear program and is gaining valuable experience from supporting Russia's war against Ukraine. And then there is Iran. For well over a decade, allies have agreed that Iran can never possess a nuclear weapon. Recent US action has severely degraded Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program. But we must remain vigilant. On their own, it's already an issue, but these countries are working together. And we can easily agree that they don't have our best interests in mind. That's what we are up against. And there's absolutely no doubt that we collectively have everything we need to succeed. But we need to ensure that we are translating our economic might into military capabilities. This means overcoming fragmented national defense industries on basically the other side of the Atlantic, cutting red tape here in Washington, and keeping innovation front and center. Across the alliance, I can see that we are finally beginning to take those steps. For example, last year I visited a new Rheinmetall ammunition factory in Germany. This is a factory that went from blueprints to brick and mortar in just over a year. That is speed. That factory will soon produce 350,000 artillery rounds per year. That is scale. This spring I spoke with talented young engineers at Aselsan, Turkey's largest defense electronics company. They're driving Turkey's defense industrial revolution, which will benefit every member of our alliance. And here in the United States, spurred by President Trump's leadership, we see household names like Lockheed, RTX, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics massively ramping up their production to meet this moment. We also see newer firms like Anduril, Palantir, and divergent technologies innovating on tech and production methods at pace and with purpose. That is revolution. Bottom line, the prospects are plentiful. And in Ankara, we will provide the platform to showcase how we are seizing the opportunities and making this revolution a reality. We will announce tens of billions of dollars of new contracts. And when our industries from Arlington to Ankara combine their strengths and step up supply, the result is not only improved security. We are in the early stages of a defense industrial revolution that will help grow our economies and support hundreds of thousands of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And this is the defense dividend.

My third point is Ukraine. Five years into Russia's war, Ukraine is not only standing strong, but it is reminding us all of the power of principle. That freedom is worth fighting for, no matter the odds. President Zelenskyy will join us in Ankara and I expect to show him and all Ukrainians that our support endures. And remind President Putin that we are not going anywhere. Earlier this month, I was back in Kyiv. I was there with the entire North Atlantic Council for the first iteration of the NATO-Ukraine Council ever held in Ukraine. A strong message of the enduring bond between NATO and Ukraine. We arrived in Kyiv in the wake of yet another massive Russian missile and drone attack. This time Russians struck a shopping center. And more recently, they hit a historic monastery, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. These are the brutal acts of a weakened Russia. They hurt, of course, but they don't deter Ukrainians who are fighting relentlessly to defend their freedom. And you must be just as relentless in supporting them. And for this, all allies need to pull their weight. America's allies and partners have contributed billions of dollars worth of essential equipment to Ukraine through the pillar program, which President Trump and I launched last July. It's the initiative through which Ukraine receives nearly 90% of its air defenses, including Patriot interceptors. These are essential to counter the ballistic missiles that Russia uses to target Ukraine's cities and civilian infrastructure. This support continues to flow. And Pearl is just one avenue through which allies support Ukraine. There's the Czech ammunition initiative, defense industrial partnerships. The list goes on. And as we continue to support Ukraine, we are also learning essential lessons from their battlefield experience, especially when it comes to the use of drones and counter-drone technology. This is a threat we all face, and no one has better experience here than Ukraine. So, we will continue to stand with Ukraine. Our security is interlinked. Ukraine has shown that we won't be deterred by Russia's aggression. We will continue to show that we as an alliance with Ukraine won't be either. So, that's the overview. Transformation in defense investment, revolution in defense industry, affirmation of our enduring support to Ukraine. This is foundational. Now, the implementation of three NATO 3.0, like any major change, comes with uncertainty as we pave a new path. An alliance that is less dependent on the United States, but on which the US remains firmly rooted. Ankara is about recognizing that we are committed to this truly transformational way forward. It takes heart. It takes guts. Allies have made clear that they are fully in. And as a European, let me say I'm particularly proud to see this step change to a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. NATO 3.0. Thank you so much.

It's absolutely crucial and we have to really meet this moment. So NATO 1.0 was the NATO I was born in in the Netherlands. Absolutely realizing that without the United States, the Netherlands would probably never have been liberated. And of course the Canadians and the Poles and all of us being very much involved and the Brits, but the US really being crucial here. And NATO being there to defend ourselves collectively the US and Canada and the Europeans against communist Soviet Union. Then we had NATO 2.0, which basically was a period of lowering investment, less spent on defense, but also NATO which tried after 9/11 to do whatever was necessary, for example in Afghanistan. But it was generally speaking a period of lesser defense investments. And then, since a couple of years there is this new realization. And of course, the full onslaught of Russia on Ukraine has really triggered this. But even after that, we have not seen the money spent in Europe really go up. It was a little bit more, but not enough. And I would credit also President Trump for again pushing the Europeans and Canada to do more. And what we are now seeing are our numbers of investments which are incredible. So NATO 3.0 is about spending more. It is about a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO. Don't forget that Europe is 600 million people. European NATO territory is 600 million people. Very rich countries defending themselves against Russia and being still overly dependent on the United States which is 350 million people. But as last time I flew from Europe to the US it's about 8 hours flight. So why are we so overly dependent? But we need as US and Europe to stay together because this is also about the defense of the United States. Preventing these nuclear submarines from Russia ending up at the shores here. Europe being a platform of power projection for the United States. Look at Epic Fury. Between 4 and 5,000 flights taking off from European bases in support of Epic Fury. The action the war against Iran. And of course it provides the US with industrial depth. The fact that we work together. So we all have an invested interest. This is NATO 3.0. More European led, equalizing defense spending but still with the US firmly rooted in NATO.

No, no, it's not that. But I mean, I see your analysis. And listen, when an organization like NATO, our collective transatlantic alliance, go through a transformation like this, hey, you will have some debates. You will have some discussions. You will have some tensions. These are democracies working together. It would be strange if it would not be the case. And the president of the United States being disappointed with, as he sees it, lack of European support when it comes to epic fuel, hey, I so I understand it. But I said also yesterday in the White House, you saw this in the public remarks, these are isolated cases. When you look at the whole picture of Europe, all these European nations living up to their bilateral agreements with the United States when it comes to the use of bases and other support for the United States, this number of between 4,000 and 5,000 US planes taking off from European bases in support of epic fuel. I mean, this was crucial and important for the US to be able to conduct that whole operation. And this is one of the reasons why we have this transatlantic cooperation. This is not strictly speaking NATO, but these are all NATO allies. So, hey, that means that of course the NATO name is involved here even despite the fact that these are individual agreements. So, and then when countries have to really step up their defense spending, yes of course there will be discussions. Look at the United Kingdom, look at Italy, look at the Netherlands, look at all countries in NATO because you have to maybe find the money elsewhere or you have to make savings to be able to spend on defense. But this is the first task of every government to keep the nation safe. So, in the end it happens and all the big economies now have reached that 2% including Belgium, Italy, Spain, Canada who were not at 2%. All of them before the NATO summit in The Hague reached the 2%. This is all targets from Wales which they were far from at the beginning of last year.

Well, first of all, don't be afraid of some discussions and sometimes some tensions. I'm never afraid of those because from these tensions and discussions good things evolve and come from that. So let's not be too scared if hey, sometimes we fight each other a bit. That's normal. We are democracies. Again, this is the difference between us and dictatorships. They give the impression that everybody agrees. Well, they don't. We know this. But because of the total control of media in Russia or North Korea, you will never see this. This is the strength of NATO. We are an alliance, of course a defensive alliance, but also alliance of values where we have democracies, the free media, we have parliamentary debates, we fight each other sometimes at the top of our lungs, and then in the end we always come together for 77 years now. And now we go through this transformation. And one of the things I'm constantly reminding my American family, my American friends here is NATO is not only there to protect Europe. NATO is also there to help to protect the US mainland and to make sure that the United States can play its impressive, crucial role on the world stage in terms of projecting American power, which is so crucial to keep the whole world safe.

I think the administration realizes this, but what I tried to do yesterday is during actually also address the American people and say, 'Hey, I know you guys in the United States feel sometimes that it's not a fair deal, that Europeans being so rich do not spend the same on defense as you are spending in the United States. Hey, guess what? We are going to. And we are on a trajectory and look at we are now at the max you can spend extra in 1 year. Growing by almost 20% in Canada and Europe, you are really at a max absorption capacity because you need to hire the men and women in uniform, you have to make sure that industry output is there. So, there's a maximum what you can do year on year. But, it also shows you that we will get there. So, that's one. Then, when it comes to for example, inside the alliance, the fact that Europeans are taking over the combatant commands, air, land, and sea over the next 12 to 18 months is again evidence of Europe stepping up. Europe now paying the bill when it comes to crucial industrial output and industrial defense industrial support for Ukraine like the PAC-3 interceptors. Still US supplying this, Europeans and Canadians paying for this. Again, Europe, Canada stepping up. So, this is my message. The deal is fair. It is also the NATO is also there for the United States itself, not only to protect Europe, but again, also to protect this country. And to make sure that the US can play its role worldwide.

NATO 3.0, as I said, is that the Europeans really stepping up, taking more responsibility for the collective defense, particularly when it comes to the conventional defense of Europe, with the US still having a conventional presence long-term in Europe, of course, providing the nuclear umbrella as the ultimate guarantor of our freedom. It means Europeans when it comes to the crucial roles taking more responsibility when it comes to the support for Ukraine, really stepping up on all these fronts, creating a NATO which is a fair deal across the transatlantic community and family. And when it comes to the administration, this is what President Trump has argued for. When he was Trump 45 and he was Trump 47, and this is what I showed yesterday that under his leadership all the extra spending coming in from Canada and Europe now reaching basically going over 1.2 trillion. It was about 50 trillion in 2014 and 50 trillion in 2018, and now it is over 1.2 trillion. It is a staggering amount of extra money spent this year and last year combined will be about 250 billion dollars extra spent on defense by Europeans and Canadians. In nominal terms, it is staggering.

Well, yeah, I think it is a way to describe it. I would argue that when you look at the numbers, Europeans are really now stepping up. So, from an American perspective that success is there. This was argued since Eisenhower that this needed to happen and now it is happening.

The numbers are such that there is a max to what you can invest in one year extra. This is the almost 20% extra defense spending because you also have to spend this. So you have to find the people, you have to find the defense industrial output, etc. So that's there. And at the same time, of course we all have — nobody should be naive. So we always have to keep each other to account. But when I look at the numbers, I would think, 'Hey, keep the pressure on.' But there is a limit because at the moment you could argue that the Europeans are delivering this NATO 3.0, are delivering a stronger European, stronger NATO. This is exactly what the American administration wanted and I'm also convinced that long-term, next to the nuclear, the conventional presence of the United States in Europe is essential. But hey, listen. The US has to take care of more than one theater. There's also the Indo-Pacific and other interests the US has to take into account and that means that when it comes to spreading the US resources and the risk that they are spread too thinly, it is only right that Europeans take over some of those responsibilities. We have to do it in a way that no gaps emerge, that the deterrence and defense stay strong. And this is the sort of structured process we are working on.

Well, first of all, I have no complaints about the US because you guys are still providing this essential anti-ballistic missile equipment, particularly the PAC-3 missiles for the Patriot system, but also other essential gear only the US can provide. I think it's only just that the Canadians and the Europeans are paying for it. And all this — all the support the US is still providing. And it is true that Ukraine is doing well. It is doing extremely well. They are still ahead of the Russians when it comes to innovation, for example, in the drone and the counter-drone technology. They are more and more successful in hitting essential energy infrastructure in Russia, defense-supporting infrastructure in Russia. We see the overall output from refineries in Russia down by a third, which is massive. We know that Russia is in severe economic difficulties. Their state fund is getting depleted. They spend now over 40% on defense, even close to 50%, which means that more than 70% of the tax intake in Russia is now spent on defense. So that's not sustainable. I think in Europe we really have to make sure that there is a fair burden sharing. Because when it comes to all the support, it now comes down to a couple of countries who are really doing the heavy lifting. It's Canada outside Europe and in Europe it is the Germans and the Dutch and the Swedes and the Danes and the Norwegians are really doing the heavy lifting. And then a lot of other countries also helping, but really to a lesser extent. So we need better burden sharing within Europe. That's really crucial. But I'm really impressed with the Ukrainians. And the president yesterday in the public part of the meeting was acknowledging that because he's fair. He says, 'Hey, this guy there, my colleague, President Zelensky of Ukraine, he's doing well. He is courageous.' And he is. And I think this is important. But their main issue is to prevent their vital infrastructure and cities coming under attack again from Russian ballistic missiles and generally from drones or whatever from Russia. So that's why we need to support them with all the air defense systems we can give them.

I mean, in that sense, it is all about coalitions. It's always about coalitions in the world. Even if you have systems like in the US or in the UK where one party is governing, then these big parties are by themselves coalitions. We know this. So either you have coalitions of smaller parties which are more single-focused or you have very big parties, big tent parties like the Republican Party or the Democrats here or the Conservatives or Labour Party in the United Kingdom. But then they are coalitions in themselves. What I have learned over the years is the most important thing when it comes to politics is that you try to speak maximum 10% of the time and listen 90% of the time because you have to understand what the other person needs, what the problems are, and then you have to be consistent, and don't be double-faced. And if you try to do that — it's not always easy, but when you try to do that, you can together come to joint conclusions.

Here I'm 90% speaking, sorry for that, but this is not —

I thank you for that important question and I would argue that we are doing it in a structured way. When you look at the NATO force model, which is basically, as you know, a planning tool, so what can you count on in case of an emergency? And it doesn't mean that if it is not previously committed, it might not be there in case of a crisis, but what it basically says is, in particular for the United States, having to think of a situation in which you have two theaters to attend to at the same time. If something happens in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe, then it is only fair that the US says, 'Hey, that means that we can only commit so much to the European theater because we also have to take care of the Indo-Pacific theater, so that Europeans can then step up.' And this is done in a very structured manner. This is about, yeah, basically understanding and agreeing what do we need to do as Europeans to step up. This is why we spend more, one of the reasons why we spend more as Europeans and Canadians, to make sure that we can take over some of those capabilities and essential support from the US. But again, it is a planning tool. It doesn't mean that it's exactly what's there in case of war, but at least it's fair. And this is what Pinkofitch, the Supreme Allied Commander, said — it makes us stronger that the US is now so clear on what, particularly when there is a threat of spreading your resources too thinly, what the US can deliver.

Well, I think the G7 was a great success. It was because there was a joint declaration, there was clear language on all the main issues, including Ukraine. So this was very important. But I think it also shows you something else. And that is that in the end, the United States being so big and so powerful is the leader. And it means that the President of the United States is the leader of the free world. This is what you saw at the G7. This is what you will see again, is my absolute conviction. When it comes to Ankara, in Ankara, we will have 41, 42 countries coming together, including the European Union and most of them at the highest level — the 32 allies plus all the guests which will come from the Middle East and from the Indo-Pacific. And again, this will be a gathering. When you look at the combined economy of all these countries coming to Ankara, you know how big it is? 70 trillion. 70 trillion. The US is 30 trillion. So you will have a gathering of a combined economy two and a half times the size of the US economy. And who is the most powerful man in that room? Who is in the end leading that whole team? That's the president of the United States. And this is what I said yesterday to him. Hey, you are the president of the United States, but for me, first of all, you are the leader of the free world.

Yeah, when I look across the board now, Europe and Canada, I must say they're doing well. Across the board. Of course, you always have some difference between one and the other country in terms of the credible path to the 5%, and that's one of the issues we will discuss in Ankara. But when you look at the money coming in and the overall defense spend, and of course, we agreed last year at the defense ministers before The Hague summit what to spend it on, the capability target. So this is not just saying the 5% including the 3.5% core defense spending is just a number plucked from the air, no? Like we did in Wales in 2014, that was a bit plucked from the air. This is deeply rooted in the capability targets. My predecessor Jens Stoltenberg started that whole process and that means that there is rigor and we know that to deliver on all these capabilities you need to spend between 3.4 and 3.67%, ballpark 3.5%. And all these countries are busy now and making sure that they over time will deliver on all these targets. This is why we do this. So I think we are in pretty good shape and if there are one or two who need a bit of encouragement, I will do that discreetly and I can assure you that is tough but discreet.