We have wrecked our military credibility. We wrecked our diplomatic credibility. In the end, this is my country. I don't want my country to be a pitiful, helpless former giant. And yet, we've gone a long way down that road in just two years.
I'm Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator at the Financial Times. American voters have delivered a resounding defeat to Donald Trump's Republicans. The Democrats now control both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but Trump still has two years in the White House. How much can the Democrats constrain him? And has this election changed the course of American democracy?
American voters have spoken and they've delivered a resounding thumbs down on the first two years of Donald Trump's second presidency. But does the Democrats' sweeping victory in the US midterms signal a turning point in American politics? What exactly should we read into it? It's a question I want to unpack with my guest today, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, a longtime critic of Trump. Paul, welcome to the show.
After the US midterms this week, Paul, you argued in your Substack that the old political maxim, 'it's the economy, stupid,' no longer adequately explains American politics. You see the scale of the Democrats' victory as evidence that Americans have rejected something much more fundamental about Trumpism. But how can we distinguish between voters rejecting a president's values and voters simply rejecting a president who's made their lives more expensive?
Well, it's almost certainly both. The economy certainly played a role, but we kind of know what an election driven by voter discontent with the economy looks like. And that was the 2024 election in the United States where Donald Trump won the popular vote by about 1.5 percentage points. This one, it looks like the popular vote for the House will be about a 13-point margin for Democrats. It's nearly an order of magnitude bigger than what happened in 2024, which surely was an economy-driven election. And then we have demographics, and we can look at which groups swung. A huge swing among Hispanic voters, a large surge among Black voters. Those are groups that have a lot going on besides just the economy.
A lot of Hispanics voted for Trump in 2024 because they believed his promises to, you know, cut grocery prices. And now it's quite obvious, this is really an unprecedented surge, that something special is motivating them now, which is, you know, that their friends and relatives are being grabbed on the street by masked men. Oh, and I should add a third thing, which is that if you ask voters what they care about, the economy is number one. But corruption is a quite strong second in the polling. Those are the really two big issues that people mention, which does suggest that, hey, this is something that is beyond simply, yeah, the consumer price index has risen above the Fed's target this past year.
Makes sense to me. But isn't there a danger of reading too much into this? In 2008, after the 2006 midterms in which of course George W. Bush did very badly, then Barack Obama was elected and we all, I certainly thought that this was a fundamentally different America and two terms later Donald Trump became president. So, can we confidently believe that the sort of politics we've been seeing is now gone? Or might it not come back in some guise, possibly even worse at some point? Not soon, but it's still around, isn't it?
Oh, yeah. I mean, as best we can tell, something like 25 to 30% of the US electorate is fundamentally comfortable with authoritarianism and fundamentally uncomfortable with democracy. And that's a large enough number that under the right circumstances, the bad guys can win. It's funny actually, it's also true as far as we can tell that a similar proportion of the electorate has the same attitude in pretty much every Western nation. So the US is more exceptional in just how it played out than in the underlying support. And also, I think there are some structural reasons why authoritarians govern badly when they're in power. But the kind of lurid incompetence and lurid corruption that Trump has displayed is not something you can count on. You can't always count on the bad guys to be that bad at doing their job.
I think that's a very important point. Now, when you look at it, I know this is difficult to distinguish, but I was thinking about your list of reasons. They sounded to me more like reasons for voting against Trump and the Republicans than an enthusiastic embrace of what the Democrats are about. Would that be a reasonable view of what's actually happened? They're not embracing some completely new and exciting vision that you can identify.
Oh, yeah, for sure. Now, it's true that the Democrats have thrown up some pretty charismatic, inspiring, younger politicians this time around, much more so than since Obama. John Oaf is like Obama with more edge. There are people who are inspiring. The party's agenda is a little more solidly center-left than it was before, but it's not well defined. So this was very much a vote against, but they don't have a thrilling agenda, or at least not so far.
One of the wonderful things is that we're not seeing a great battle about whether the Democrats really won because it was so decisive.
But now you have to tell the, we, the Democrats have to decide what to do with this situation. They still don't control the presidency, of course. And the institutions of government are still very much in the hands of Trump and his minions. So, what do you think the right approach for the Democrats is in their use of the legislative power they're now going to have?
The first thing that matters that has changed hands is the investigative power, the gavels. We are now going to have congressional investigations and with subpoena power and with sanctions against witnesses who refuse to testify on scandals. That matters a lot. A lot of things where the power of office, the power of control of Congress was being used to keep a lid on wrongdoing, now they can't do that anymore and the Democrats can go after it. And they, much more than in the past, they seem ready to do that. And in previous periods of Democratic control there was always this, 'well, we should move forward, not back,' and not this time. Now they're, you know, the prospective head of the House Oversight Committee just tweeted out, 'lawyer up,' you know, among other things.
That's going to affect the ability of Trump to continue to exert his will because this is not just the normal executive power that we've been seeing. We've been seeing a government in which officials throughout the executive branch of government are simply ignoring the rules and the law. They've just been, if Trump says do it, they do it even if it's very clearly illegal. Now they are going to look around and say, 'will this land me in jail?' A lot of business groups, other institutions as well, but particularly especially businesses that have been very willing to be accommodative to serve Trump's agenda, are now going to be looking around and saying, 'gosh, this isn't just going to maybe hurt the corporation, but what about me personally?' So, that's going to mean a lot.
The other thing is the Democrats will now be able to pass legislation. They won't be able to get it past a presidential veto most of the time, but they can force Trump to use the veto pen on popular, extremely popular proposals. They can force Republicans in upholding Trump's veto to put themselves on record as being opposed to things that the public wants. There are a few areas where I do think it's quite possible that some Republicans will defect. I'm thinking particularly about policy towards Ukraine where a significant number of Republicans, enough Republicans might defect that they can actually override a presidential veto. So, we're not going to get Obamacare 2.0. We're not going to get Medicare for all. We're not going to get a nationwide wealth tax on billionaires. Not in the next two years. But that doesn't mean that the Democrats will be completely ineffectual.
And what about impeachments? There's a long list of people who, starting with the president of course, that some of the Democrats would love to impeach. I think the secretary of war would be a pretty obvious candidate. So can we see that happening? Presume they'd all be vetoed or perhaps not from what you said. Maybe there'll be one or two the Republicans would quite like to see the back of.
My big concern about Hegth, who is by the way legally still the secretary of defense whatever he wants to call him. So my worry is that they won't be able to impeach him because Trump will fire him first. But sure, I mean, there are several figures starting with Hexath, but a couple of others who are much, much hated within their own party, possibly even people that Trump himself will scapegoat for his problems and will get rid of. So impeachment may be short-circuited by summary dismissal. And again, they are loathed enough that just the process of forcing Republicans to vote against impeachment is itself a political win. So sure, I mean, I think of that as being kind of the same process.
One area of legislation which sort of seems obvious is now going to be very fiercely contested is finance budgets. An administration needs a budget, doesn't it? If it wishes to continue operating, America needs a budget. It would seem to me very plausible. They're not going to agree one. He's not going to have the sort of legislature he had when he passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. What could that lead to? A shutdown of the government, another one of those cliff edges over the ability to service debt. And could we expect, and this is something a lot of people outside America were thinking about, some really big fiscal shenanigans in a situation in which it should be said there's already some worry about the American fiscal position.
Yeah. You know, I've been a deficit dove over the years, but even I am not happy with the idea that we're running 6% of GDP deficits at full employment with debt at 100% of GDP. By the numbers, the US and France look identical. And it's only the fact that we borrow in our own currency which happens to be the world's dominant currency that is keeping us from seeing a France-style rise in spreads. So that's going to be an interesting strategic and difficult strategic question for the Democrats. They will be hitting debt ceilings. We just passing a budget. I don't know historically that kind of brinkmanship has the examples we have are ones in which that sort of thing backfired on the party that brought the government to a halt. But on the other hand, you know when Republicans did that to Obama, Obama was still a relatively popular president. Now it's something quite different when you have a president with a whatever 35% approval rating, almost zero strong approval, and this is really very tough strategic calculation and we'll see. I mean it is true that even Trump, even with his loyalists and even with his veto power, he wants half a trillion for defense. He just wants to keep the thing running. Not sure the power of the purse remains.
For the Democrats, they really do have to think very carefully about how they play that because obviously there's the wind in their sails, but they won't really want, particularly given who has voted for them and why, to trigger something that can plausibly be presented as a forced fiscal crisis, which they cause. So this is an area where they're really going to have to be very careful, aren't they?