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Paul Krugman
Distinguished Professor of Economics, CUNY Graduate Center

NOTC Office Event #1: Paul Krugman

📅 Nov 19, 2026 Notes on the Crises 125 MIN 896 VIEWS 191 SEGMENTS · 4 SPEAKERS
Economist Paul Krugman is interviewed by Nathan Tankus in the inaugural NOTC "In-Office" event series. Subscribe to Notes on the Crises here: https://www.crisesnotes.com/#/portal/... You can find Krugman's initial post-election analysis here: https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/am... You can find future events, and buy tickets, here: https://www.crisesnotes.com/events/

Questions asked in this interview

9
  1. 1:04Paul, what are your immediate reactions to what we just experienced?
  2. 1:03:58And in terms of like the water cooler conversation at this conference, what was the kind of mood about like actually doing something to deal with these choke points and these vulnerabilities?
  3. 1:06:31It's a question that answers itself a bit, but is there any conversation about maybe finally having the EU parliament having a macroeconomically significant budget?
  4. 1:25:30It's like where do we build?
  5. 1:37:09But a lot of it is just like, what am I going to do with $400,000?
  6. 1:42:03Well, it's, okay, can I introduce myself?
  7. 1:44:58We're trying to make your hometown like Disneyland. What's so great about Disneyland?
  8. 1:46:23... or rent control that applies after 15 years after a building is constructed, and would that really affect, discourage investment when you're trying to get paid back on the depreciation within a decade and your horizon is 10 years?
  9. 1:54:18And then also a more qualitative question: Does Europe feel tense to you right now?
Nathan Tankus 0:00 ↗
Thank you everyone for being here. I'm very excited to be holding the first in-office Notes on the Crises event. Extremely excited to kick off this series with Paul Krugman. Feels silly to even introduce Paul. I mean, everyone knows who Paul is. Economist, longtime New York Times columnist, now has his own shingle, just the Paul Krugman publication, because, you know, people want to hear what Paul has to say. And the same kind of studious output that I remember from the Great Financial Crisis, the Great Recession, and especially more than the columns for me, the New York Times blog or your Conscience of a Liberal blog. And so I'm enormously excited to kind of start this series off with a bang.
We're going to have an event next week with Phil Rockoff talking about fiscal federalism, which, you know, in a lot of ways will be a hot topic now that we have, what is it, 30 Democratic governors coming in, which is extremely historic to say the least. And to talk about his book about the 2020 census and the role that state and local governments have in the census, which I think is going to be also an essential topic over the next two years now that Democrats have taken Congress. And in December 11th, we're going to have an event with Madison Condon, a Boston University law professor, to talk about climate modeling and all things of that manner. And in January, I'll announce a full spring schedule which has a lot of very exciting people lined up. So, this is the start of something that I think will be important, interesting. It'll be a mixture of my personal interests and what's the most important things going on now. And I'm hoping now that the tides are turning that I can play a role in setting the agenda of what reconstructing the federal government is going to be. And that leads well into what our conversation is going to be. The midterms were two days ago, and in a lot of ways it feels like that's forever ago, and like we're barely processing the moment that happened. And so I think we'll just start with that. Paul, what are your immediate reactions to what we just experienced?
Paul Krugman 2:53 ↗
Well, first of all, wow. And I was really pissed because I was quite, I'm still at the tail end of a cold, and so I really didn't think that I could drink, and so otherwise that would have definitely been time to break out some of the really expensive scotch that I have in the closet. But so that's the first, you know, this was, you know, we've all got PTSD from previous elections where you thought things were in the bag. You know, I'm a big fan of the quantitative modelers. I myself have done a number of interviews with G. Elliott Morris, who's my favorite in that category. And so I knew that it was, you know, was looking good, but didn't know. And of course, what's turned out is, yeah, the polls were wrong. They understated the Democrats this time. And so wow.
And then, you know, there's going to be, whenever there's a big political event like this, then the whole punditocracy, of which I guess I'm a member like it or not, it's like a fumbled football. Everybody wants to jump on it and say it's mine and it proves whatever, you know, whatever I wanted it to. And what I've been doing right now is doing a lot of pushing back against the idea that this was just, oh, it's all because of the price of diesel basically, that it was all just cost of living. That was certainly an important part, but not, you know, we can go through it, but that was clearly not the whole thing, that there really were multiple reasons that people basically said enough, stop. And this is, and it's a quite amazing thing. And actually, it's not just that it makes me feel better about who's going to be controlling state governments, who's going to be controlling Congress, but it makes me feel better about America. Turns out that the American people are better than we were starting to fear.
Nathan Tankus 5:00 ↗
Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. I wanted to ask you a little bit more about the, like, this is not just about the cost of living and the kind of, you know, the overarching vision or, you know, narrative about America, what government is supposed to be, or even just lack of narrative in terms of just kind of bald-faced corruption and kind of how you see that as this holistic picture that people reacted so negatively to.
Paul Krugman 5:32 ↗
Yeah. And so first, why I don't buy the it's just cost of living thing. Partly it's just the vote numbers. We know what an election where people are basically just saying I'm angry about what things cost looks like. And that's the 2024 election where Trump won the popular vote by 1.5 percentage points. We know when an election where people say no, holy, yes, the economy is falling apart, and that's like the 2008 election where Obama won by seven percentage points. This was 13 points. I mean, this is not like just people are upset, they, even when the economy is doing very badly, you don't get numbers like this. I don't actually know how big, I'm not sure what FDR's margin in 1932 was, but I think we're, you know, that's the, so this is, and you know, the economy, there are a lot of problems for people, and some of them I think not properly measured by the standard data, but it's not a disaster economy. You know, it's 3.7% inflation and 4.2% unemployment is not the kind of economy that you would expect to generate this tidal wave.
Then you look, partly if you ask people what they were motivated by, yeah, cost of living, economy is at the top, but corruption comes in a strong second. So really people were reacting to the corruption stories. It is a pretty big concern if we look at what people say was motivating them. By the way, the third sort of after economy and corruption is healthcare, and I do think, you know, we think that about 12 million people lost health insurance in the past year because of, that's directly, that's Trump and a Republican Congress, and that it somehow doesn't get mentioned very much in the newspaper stuff. I think that's a big part of it. And maybe just this whole, oh, and sorry, then, sorry, demographics, huge.
Latinos swung towards Trump in 2024 because they actually believed him when he said he was going to reduce prices. And they swung back way more than that. And that is, you know, I'd like to see this documented a little better, but pretty obviously is, I thought I was getting lower grocery prices and instead masked men are kidnapping my cousin on the street. Right. That was very much a backlash against ICE and the whole deportation policy. Blacks turned out very heavily. I think that they, in some ways, one of the odd things is that black voters often seem to be more on the ball about what's happening in America than the rest of us. And they clearly saw that this was basically the southernization, the Jim Crowization of America was in process. So that's also part of it. And yeah, and just, I think we could also say, or this is, I always do this, answers are too long, but anyway, the...
Nathan Tankus 9:07 ↗
I love long answers.
Paul Krugman 9:08 ↗
As anyone who can read my articles can attest to.
Nathan Tankus 9:12 ↗
Yeah.
Paul Krugman 9:14 ↗
Yeah, I do think that at some level the sheer, the fact that Trump doesn't act like a president.
You know, I think it does kind of filter through that. I mean, the reflecting pool, and the Republicans actually thought that they had a winner when Obama said it, that he was, you know, like Saddam Hussein was building a cheesecake factory because they said Americans love cheesecake, and actually they do kind of, but they don't think that's what the White House should look like. So I think all of these things came together, and it was kind of a verdict that not just that things are bad and I blame this management, but that these are not people who should be running things.
Nathan Tankus 10:16 ↗
Yeah. I described it in my piece today that Trump comes off as comically aloof and seemed more like, especially in recent months, but over the course of the whole second term, kind of more like a grotesque underground comic, like paring Jackie Kennedy redecorating the White House. And it really comes across like that. I mean, his closing statement about the midterms was how great the reflecting pool was. He spent like 20 minutes talking about how great the reflecting pool was and had nothing actually to say about the election or why you should vote for his allies, and he's still talking about the reflecting pool. I don't know if you have seen the recent coverage. He's still talking about the reflecting pool and how great it is. I don't actually think he cares about anything in terms of the presidency. He's just trying to get the rest of the remodeling done before the clock runs out. Yeah.
Paul Krugman 11:16 ↗
I mean, it really does come across that way. And, you know, to be serious for a moment, that's how voters perceived it. And I think it's a correct perception. You know, there's all the talk about Biden being aloof from economic concerns. And I do think that there's something real, and people hate it when you are telling them that the economy is great, and if the economy isn't great for you, it's your fault. But, you know, Biden was kind of just bumbling about that topic. He was like inarticulate. Whereas Trump, when you get him to finally give an answer on it, is kind of menacing. Like, you know, if you're against data centers, you want to be poor, all that kind of stuff. But in the meantime, he's just full in decoration and empire-building mode. It's like if we could give him an island where he could build a hundred monuments to himself, he would be willing to resign the presidency. No, there is a, I mean, it's funny, we, you know, people, you want your leaders to have the common touch, but there is still, I think, also expect some level of dignity, and it's just this, I mean, there's all these other things going on, but this might be the first midterm election where a significant influence was the fact that the president has just horrible taste.
Nathan Tankus 12:40 ↗
I think that's really real. I mean, there's something really real about like doing all these horrible things that are impacting you, impacting your neighbors, and, you know, he's just going off somewhere talking about like his modeling choices or whatever. And I think that really, really, it symbolizes the distance between him and everyone else in a way that wasn't really true about Biden.
Paul Krugman 13:11 ↗
So we're going on a bit here, but also it's very un-American. I mean, if you think, I mean, Washington, there's a style that's a kind of Republican grandeur, not small-R Republican grandeur, of, you know, we have these grand monuments, but they're not glorifying the president, they're not glorifying, you know, there's a style about Washington, D.C. It's actually, it can be a kind of a thrilling experience to visit it, or was until the barbarians stormed it. But it was, and people sense that. So yeah.
Nathan Tankus 13:53 ↗
So yeah, we were talking about this when we were preparing to come out here, that there's something about Trump that like is profane both in the religious sense and just the secular sense as well. And I think that's part of this election wave. It's notable that we have a lot of candidates who are like pastors or people just simply speaking able to speak in religious terms. And I think after a decade of this, there is sort of just this exhaustion with everything being so crude and disgusting all the time, and something about just saying, no, we actually want some standards. We want some decency. We want some basic baseline way of interacting and treating people that we think is good. I think really resonated in a way that hadn't quite broken out for the last decade.
Paul Krugman 14:52 ↗
Yeah. I mean, we used to have a religious left in this country, and it's well, and, you know, again, I'm thinking whites, and I should be saying, you know, the religious leaders have always been a big part of black political culture in America, and reclaiming that is, so people finally, you know, the average American voter started to have the same sense of disgust about where we are that a lot of us had from the very beginning.
Nathan Tankus 15:28 ↗
Yeah. I wanted to get back at the medical care point that you brought up because I think it's so important. It's one of the things that I liked best about Abdul's recent media hits since he won the Senate is on his three list of things is the poison pill health care cuts that are cynically staged for right after the midterms. And so important to right at this moment seize the initiative and say something about that. And, you know, in terms of what you're saying about how the media commentary on health care in this country kind of always ignores it as a real issue. It's just either sort of like, oh, Bernie Sanders has this pie-in-the-sky thing, or we don't really talk about health care, or we have this kind of obstruse conversation about the ACA and the ACA exchanges. But, you know, I have some forthcoming work, just some basic descriptive statistics that I hadn't seen anyone else do on the swing states in 2024. And in that work, we found that 7.1% of the populations of the swing states were disenrolled from Medicaid from April 2023 to August 2024. And if you cut out North Carolina, it's 7.8%. And the reason you cut out North Carolina is they took the Obamacare Medicaid expansion in December of 2023 to counteract the Medicaid cuts coming off from the COVID programs rolling over. So they were kind of this outlier where only 3.1% of the population was disenrolled from Medicaid. And when you get to specific states like Michigan, it's 10.7%.
Paul Krugman 17:15 ↗
This is the expiration basically of the expanded COVID. Yeah. But we did have, in spite of all that, we did have some expansion of Medicaid from pre-COVID persisted, and then we had the, and the initial Obamacare subsidies were just way inadequate and cut off at way too low an income level, and Biden fixed that, but with an expiration date which was never intended to happen, but Joe Manchin, you know, forced that, and so they have expired, and people are seeing, so premiums shot up already this year, and for next year they're shooting up even more, so large numbers of people are dropping coverage because they can't afford it or are getting undercovered. And then the Medicaid, even though the worst of the work requirements and so on on Medicaid, which are all fake, right? Everybody who's looked at this at all knows that work requirements on Medicaid don't make people work. What they do is they create a bureaucratic jungle that people have to hack their way through. And of course, exactly the people least able to do that are poorer, highly stressed people who need Medicaid. So even though that was supposed to be backloaded, in fact, there have been large Medicaid cuts already this year. So yeah.
And what Democrats should do is, I have to say, cynical politics. I would say the most important thing is to pass legislation that restores the ACA subsidies because that's going to hit a lot of middle-class people and force Trump to veto it. Force Republicans to uphold the veto, which they might not. They might be scared enough to actually join Democrats in overriding the veto. In any case, and then Medicaid, you have to go for it. Although that's, unfortunately, people always think that Medicaid recipients are not like us, except in fact it turns out that it's hugely important.
Nathan Tankus 19:26 ↗
Medicaid recipients are just like me. I'm terrible at filling out paperwork.
Paul Krugman 19:30 ↗
Well, they know that. Oh. Weird anecdote. I have, you know, my academic position these days is at CUNY, and I have stepped away from, stepped down from being a whatever professor to research professor, which means no teaching, you know, still doing a lot of stuff, but that rather oddly, okay, it's, CUNY is at the, is actually owned by the state of New York. No, because the state acquired it during the 1975 bankruptcy of the city, and so I'm a New York State employee as a civil servant, and that means that just happens the way they've structured this, I have to fill out timesheets, which are of course totally fictitious, right? And the trouble is I can't get it right every time. It takes like three tries each month to get a timesheet filled out correctly. So yeah. So...
Nathan Tankus 20:36 ↗
Well, include this couple hours when you fill out the timesheet.
All right. What? Yeah. So, I mean, we're already getting into a little bit about the agenda, and we talked about that. I mean, I think in your piece Monday, I think that you also mentioned about having a kind of push, even if it was get it vetoed, even if it didn't even pass, around Medicare for all, just, you know, put it on the table that Democrats are interested in big things. Of course, it's an open question about whether how much the Democratic Party leadership is interested in big things right now. Certainly the people who are coming in, the wave coming in, are interested in big things.
Paul Krugman 21:18 ↗
I would, if I were you, whatever their personal sentiments, if I were Hakeem Jeffries or Chuck Schumer, I keep on thinking Chuck Schumer is just too old, and he's exactly my age, but anyway, but just as a, again, just as competent politics, a lot of people, there was a lot of base enthusiasm that was really important this election, and you have to at least show that you're trying, that it's not just going to be, that, you know, Obamacare was the way it was because the political realities were that you couldn't do anything ambitious, and it's possible that Medicare for all is still a bridge too far, but to preemptively surrender on that would, I think, just be, just from the point of view of sheer political utility, would be a big mistake.
Nathan Tankus 22:18 ↗
Yeah. As always, we shall see. I mean, this brings up that, you know, a lot of the mainstream media is talking about how this is the biggest wave election since Watergate and since the Watergate kind of reform slate of Democrats. And that's an interesting point for a few reasons. One is, you know, the kind of obvious point is obviously the oil crisis was going on in 1974, but it's not credible to say, oh, people were just voting out Republicans and voting in Democrats just because of cost of living, oil prices were high. You know, Watergate was a big part of it. And there's an analogous thing with the Trump administration insofar as, you know, with the political norms 50 years ago, Trump would have long ago resigned, which is not the case today. But also that a response to the reform slate was a trend which has really gone for the last 50 years of changing the rules in Congress to concentrate power and leadership. And I think there's already some rumblings around this, but to shift things. So for example, leadership doesn't have absolute control over what bills go to the floor, which is an obvious way to discipline things around, whether it is the Block the Bombs Act or things like Medicare for all, if leadership isn't interested in putting those bills to the front.
Paul Krugman 23:46 ↗
It's an interesting thing because with Republicans controlling Congress, the rules don't matter, and they're all taking orders, and whatever Trump wants, he gets. But with Democrats, yeah, the question is whether, I mean, there's a, if there are mostly would-be progressive stuff, can progressive stuff be just essentially bottled up in the speaker's office or the majority leader's office and never hit the floor? And I think there's a lot to be said for not making that possible. If the votes aren't there for something, then the votes aren't there. But that shouldn't be the decision. And there's enough, I mean, enough suspicion of not motives, but I think mostly just of how much steel there is in the spines of top Democratic leadership that for them not to have a veto point on everything would be a good thing. I also think it's a middle ground between the calls for pushing out Jeffries and Schumer as leadership and not doing that is, okay, you're leaders, but under internal congressional rules that are much more democratic and lets the reform segment, the progressive wing, push forward legislation without just having a leadership veto.
Nathan Tankus 25:19 ↗
Yeah. I mean, and it's an interesting, I mean, I really honestly, Schumer really should step down, just not, he's had, you know, he's not terrible. He's not evil, and in many ways he was...
Paul Krugman 25:34 ↗
We can agree to disagree on these things.
Nathan Tankus 25:36 ↗
Okay.
Paul Krugman 25:37 ↗
But he's, I don't think he's the man for the moment. I mean, Jeffries would be more of an issue again because you got to bear in mind that if you, it's a pretty big deal for Black Americans to have a Black majority leader, even if he's in fact a very cautious guy. And so you really don't want to, but I don't think it's necessarily critical as long as we can get either a change in the rules or just, if short of that, at least a kind of understanding that having anything slightly risky in the progressive direction bottled up by leadership would be a bad thing and they should not do it.
Nathan Tankus 26:28 ↗
We're going to swing back to elections things and the implications of the midterms for a bit, but I kind of wanted to take a kind of swing to Europe for a bit because you were just in Europe having lots of different conversations. You were just at the annual European Central Bank research conference, and so I wanted to first your general impressions in your last Europe trip, and then I wanted to hear a little bit more specifically about that conference.
Paul Krugman 26:58 ↗
Okay. So Europe is a favorite topic of mine, and which I don't write about as much as I would kind of like because most of my audience is still here, and it feels to me like I spent my entire journalistic career writing occasional pieces about Europe and having mass reader reaction is, we're not interested. Go back to bashing Bush or Trump or, you know, whatever. But so two things, let me tell you my favorite economics thing. Okay, give you a kind of, so there's a widespread impression that Europe is really, you know, falling behind, leaving aside the short-run crisis possibilities, but that Europe is really falling behind, and there's this tremendously influential report, the Draghi report by Mario Draghi, the world's greatest former central banker, and I think tens of people in the United States have read it, but I have. And but here's, okay, I'll give you numbers.
According to, we can compare countries two ways. We have growth of GDP, which is as measured by national statistical agencies, and we have also, we can compare economies at a point in time because the World Bank has this whole program which tries to adjust for cost of living and then compares incomes at a point in time. So if we take the Eurozone, the 20 countries that currently use the euro, according to the growth numbers since 2000, productivity, output per hour, has risen about 20% in the Eurozone versus 40% in the United States. So clearly Europe is falling way behind. If you look at the comparisons of GDP per worker in 2000, the euro area was about 85% of the US level. If you look at it for 2025, the euro area is about 85% of the US level. So the comparisons at a point in time say that there's actually, that Europe is keeping pace with the US. And the walking around test.
Nathan Tankus 29:30 ↗
Europe doesn't look backward.
Paul Krugman 29:32 ↗
It's a, I spent a plurality of my time in the Netherlands, and Holland does not look like a backward place. It's a, the sort of everyday use of technology is if anything more than it is here. Actually, I say that you can't get anything done in the Netherlands without a QR code. And so I believe that the point-in-time comparisons are actually telling you the truth, and then there's a question, what is going on, why do the growth rates look so different? Because I think that's basically a fiction, and I can go on about this, but part of it is that it just, yeah, the US has a preponderance of the extremely high-tech industries which have very high measured productivity growth, but those gains are global. Most of the gains on Silicon Valley's productivity are actually reflected around the world, not just in the US. And the other thing is that if you actually start to dig into how GDP numbers are constructed, especially real GDP numbers are constructed, there's a lot more guesswork and interpolation, and, you know, how do you measure the value of the latest iPhone in 2000 prices? You know, there weren't any smartphones in 2000. And so the question of how you value those things, and there's no... I think all of the agencies doing this stuff are doing the best they can, or trying to, you know, they're doing, they're smart, but they make different judgment calls, and it turns out that I think that the US statisticians are very optimistic in their hedonics and their estimate of what new technology is worth, and some of the Europeans are much more conservative. Actually, the most conservative, the most unwilling to believe that new technology really does very much for you, seem to be the Italians. So, which is a little odd, but, you know, I say the Italians are less exuberant than the Germans, but that turns out to be true, at least in terms of GDP growth. Anyway, so that kind of... So, my view is that the European economy is actually in much better shape than people think, that the bottom line is they basically are keeping up with the US in productivity and in technology. They've done very well at job creation. If you're an adult in prime working years, you are more likely to be employed in Europe than you are in the United States. So, they've actually done better on jobs than we have. But they have, well, we also have a lot more people 55 and older who hung around in the workforce. And that's not exactly a glowing endorsement of the United States. Yeah, people work, and we also work many more hours. That's the thing. France appears to have about 10% lower productivity than the US, I think, but about 30% lower GDP per capita, and it is true that the French retire earlier, but mostly it's that the French actually take vacations. Is that a negative? So that's the kind of stuff, that's stuff that I, which I think is actually kind of a happy story. It actually turns out that the Europeans are doing okay in terms of macroeconomics. They're doing okay in terms of quality of life in many ways. In general, if you do the Rawlsian test, imagine yourself choosing a society without knowing who you would be in that society, for sure you would choose Northwest Europe over the United States. But they have big problems. They too have a radical right that is dangerously close, is probably going to be the government of France next year. They have extremist, you know, the political systems differ, but certainly it's, this is a great worry, although it's a funny thing, if you look at issue positions and try and do a calibration, the US Republican Party is to the right of the AfD, the Alternative for Deutschland in Germany, which everybody says correctly is a neo-Nazi party, and yet the GOP is actually more right-wing than the AfD is.
Nathan Tankus 34:12 ↗
Well, in fairness, they're not in power yet. So...
Paul Krugman 34:14 ↗
They're not in power, but that's kind of the point, that we have an actual governing party that is to the right wing of the party that says, 'Wouldn't it be horrible if they actually gained power?' Yeah. They are having now, they're having a, but clearly there's a real crisis going on in France with obviously with riots and the likely election of Marine Le Pen as the next president. And a slow-motion financial crisis. It's not, the run on French bonds isn't nearly as bad as the Greece, Spain, Portugal crisis 15 years ago, but it's pretty striking and which is interesting.
Nathan Tankus 35:04 ↗
Oh my God, you said 15 years ago, and I was doing the math in my head. I was like, that can't be right. That can't be right. And then it's like, it is 15 years ago. My God.
Paul Krugman 35:13 ↗
Yeah. No, that's it. That was, Europe was in, you know, was horrific depression-level unemployment in a lot of southern Europe, and the crisis was vastly alleviated. When I say Draghi, he's the world's greatest central banker, he said three words, 'whatever it takes,' we will be, the European Central Bank will make sure that countries don't run out of money. And all of a sudden, the panic subsided. But anyway, but yeah, it was 15 years ago. It's hard to believe for those of us who were very involved in studying it and all that. But the, but France is... it's not at all hard to see how the situation in France spirals into a euro area crisis, that they just can't roll over the bonds, and that the European Central Bank can do another 'whatever it takes' moment. And the problem is France is, there's a certain point when you cross over from being too big to fail to being too big to save. And France is such a large part of Europe that if there's a bailout of France, then the general public in Germany and the Netherlands and so on is going to go wild. So I can see that really going crazy.
Nathan Tankus 36:33 ↗
Yeah, which makes it ultimately at base a political crisis, that it's about the fundamental arrangements of the Eurozone and the willingness to kind of stick to the settlement of we're going to make sure that we're not going to have a bond crisis in these individual states that don't have, or member states that don't have their own currencies.
Paul Krugman 36:56 ↗
Yeah, that's, and that's where, okay. And just to say, and the French, they have a political deadlock. They, you know, I've been a deficit dove forever and all through this stuff. But it does, I do think it's alarming that you have a country that has debt that's more than 100% of GDP and a budget deficit that's about 6% of GDP and is doing nothing to deal with it. But that description applies equally well, almost exactly by the numbers, to the United States as well. So our fiscal situation looks just like France's, although we, although the, I actually...
Nathan Tankus 37:35 ↗
But our own currency.
Paul Krugman 37:37 ↗
Well, our own, that's right, we borrow our own currency, which makes all the difference. It may matter a little bit as well that it's a special currency, but mostly it's just that we borrow, we can't run out of dollars because we print them, and the French can run out of euros because they don't. But yeah, and what's funny, actually also not funny, but the solution for the French crisis economically is quite easy, which is that their retirement age is too low. Sorry, but that's, and my comparison for people who say, oh, you're just being a right-wing...
Nathan Tankus 38:10 ↗
Paul is just my guest, I do not endorse everything he says.
Paul Krugman 38:13 ↗
Exactly, but my comparison, the two most generous welfare states in Europe are France and Denmark, and Denmark does, you know, they, everyone, their kind of model of responsibility, their retirement age is 67. So, you know, if France had a Danish retirement system, they would be home, which means that ultimately it shouldn't be hard for them to resolve it. The United States, if anybody, if we ever, it's really kind of hard to even work out how the US can have a bond crisis, but if we actually do have a fiscal crisis...
Nathan Tankus 38:50 ↗
If we let a Doge kid in the way.
Paul Krugman 38:55 ↗
That's true, but it's funny because the US solution is also easy. We're undertaxed. We just pay way, way less in taxes than every other advanced country, so we could easily resolve our problems by just collecting a few more percent of GDP in taxes. The French can easily resolve their problems by sort of matching their peer countries in terms of retirement age. But they can't, they're stuck, and we're all stuck. So, and, you know, one of the things that you, you know, we're, it's quite likely right now that in 2029, the United States will have a sensible center-left government and France will be ruled by the hard right. It's just a role reversal is definitely possible here. But either, if we do have, are we able to make hard choices? I mean, right now, I wouldn't advise, you know, going on about them, but in the end, do we think, are we, are any of us in the end really serious countries? And that's, that's, it's increasingly hard to have faith in.
Nathan Tankus 40:11 ↗
Yeah. I mean, in a lot of ways, the project of the 2020s going into the 2030s is make basic competence great again across the world.
Paul Krugman 40:24 ↗
Well, it's, yeah, I mean, one of the, actually one of the things that, you know, of course, the tremendous attack on science and learning in the United States, which could be an opportunity for the Europeans, which they are basically not taking advantage of. Their own research funding, their university systems are too rigid. There's this old line about how the US became the world's scientific leader, which was that when scientists began fleeing Germany, that in England the universities saw hiring great German researchers as an obligation, and in America we saw it as an opportunity, and the Europeans have not, unfortunately, taken the American route.
Nathan Tankus 41:15 ↗
Yeah. I've been meaning to write about the French situation, actually. And especially because one of the things that I was very interesting when I got all these Federal Reserve Board meeting minutes from 1967 to 1973 from the Federal Reserve through FOIA, was that during the 1968 student uprisings in France, the Federal Reserve extended swap lines to France as sort of like stabilized the situation while everything was going on. And, you know, that's an interesting idea about, like, you know, it's kind of, there's all these interesting possibilities, which seems to have been for good reason and happily extinguished by the blue tsunami. And one of them is if there wasn't such a commanding lead, and then Le Pen becomes the prime minister of France, you could imagine a weird situation where the ECB isn't willing to step in for France, but the Trump administration tries to get the Fed to step in with swap lines and do a little bit of a kind of much more politicized rerun of 1968.
Paul Krugman 42:38 ↗
Which, but again, it's one of those, it's too big to save. It's the size of the swap lines, you know, France is not a...
Well, you know, there are some legal memos that not many people are aware of that swap lending can be any maturity. They have the legal authority to make 30-year swap lending. So, you know, there was all sorts of, let's say, disastrous and interesting experiments in American monetary policy which have been fortunately, I think, knock on wood, extinguished by the recent political events. One more funny thing there is, and you might know this better than me, but as I recall, those were the days of de Gaulle, who wanted gold and was very opposed to the exorbitant privilege of the US dollar and all that. And so France was accumulating gold, and then apparently somebody told him that the gold physically actually sits in the basement of the New York Fed. He was very upset, and the logistics of actually bringing it to France were too difficult, except that in the last few months a number of European countries actually have been shifting their gold reserves out of the basement of the Fed.
Nathan Tankus 43:58 ↗
Yeah, I have some sources at the New York Fed who I've talked to about this, and during the pandemic actually there was a lot of sort of under the surface things because the costs, just because of like basically like the literal cost of shipping gold out of New York, kept on going up and up. And so a lot of Europeans were complaining about like, we're going to have to pay all this money to get our gold back and shipped over.
Paul Krugman 44:27 ↗
Well, so I understand that nothing was actually shipped. What actually happened was some of the gold here was sold to the private market and the European central banks bought gold from the private market there. So it was, but yeah, it's one of those weird things that literally there are literally...
42nd Street is a lot closer than Europe. Yeah, down there on Liberty Street, there actually are rooms in the basement with stacks of gold bars, and they are separated by country. So when a gold is transferred between central banks, they actually pick up an ingot and move it to the other pile. But anyway,
Nathan Tankus 45:08 ↗
So you brought up de Gaulle. So that brings me to the other aspect that I was very entertained by reading these meeting minutes, was that the Fed chair at the time, William McChesney Martin, explicitly comments on this saying, 'Well, we're helping them out with the student uprising and giving a swap line, so hopefully de Gaulle will be more reasonable about demanding the gold back since we're, you know, helping them out in a jam.' Which of course is not how it played out.
Paul Krugman 45:33 ↗
Yeah. Well, it's that I, you know, I'm not old enough not to actually remember the economics of the 60s, but I remember a time when that was still very live in people's minds when I was just starting out. And you know, all of the... but what always strikes me then is what people then thought of as a crisis, what they thought of as immense speculative movements of capital, is kind of like a rounding error these days. If you want to ask when is the period when international economics was wildest and most erratic and threatening, it is now. It is the time we're living in.
Nathan Tankus 46:17 ↗
Yeah. That does remind me, and you know, since we brought up, you know, the 70s and de Gaulle, I wanted to ask you a little bit about Portugal. And you know, you had, if I'm recalling correctly, after the revolution in Portugal in '74, you spent some time at the Portuguese central bank.
Paul Krugman 46:42 ↗
Yeah.
Nathan Tankus 46:43 ↗
And you were just at like a 50th anniversary conference.
Paul Krugman 46:45 ↗
Yeah, I was at the 50th anniversary conference, and then I was actually just back there for another event last week. But the, wow, it's, I mean, it's a lovely story in many ways. The whole Portuguese story is actually a feel-good story. So Portugal, they had the original fascist regime actually, Salazar, in 1923. So it precedes Mussolini, precedes Franco, and it was, you know, it was less luridly totalitarian, but it was pretty, pretty totalitarian. Plus they had these huge colonies in Africa where the Portuguese were not benevolent colonizers to say the least. And so they had a coup basically by the colonels in the army to...
Nathan Tankus 47:46 ↗
specifically rebelling around the war in Angola.
Paul Krugman 47:49 ↗
Yes. They were so terribly upset. They, you know, and so, and it was a close-run thing. There's actually a very good book about it that I read a couple of years ago called The Carnation Revolution. And they almost didn't pull it off, but they did. And then there was a lot of back and forth, and there was an attempted left-wing coup in '75. Anyway, they got through it. Democracy survived and is actually arguably stronger there than in some other European countries. It turned out that the new head of the central bank, António de Almeida Santos, was a personal friend of Dick Eckaus at MIT, and through that connection, first in late '75, Robert Solow and several other MIT faculty members went there and helped the Portuguese do their national accounts, by the way. And the Portuguese said, 'This was great. Can we get some MIT faculty back?' And the answer was, 'Well, no. You're too small and poor a country. How about five of our graduate students instead?'
Nathan Tankus 49:07 ↗
So, good.
Paul Krugman 49:09 ↗
So that was me and Miguel Bazer. We had one Portuguese national who later went on to become finance minister and governor of the central bank. And if you don't probably know academic economics, but Jeff Frankel and Andy Ales, who are also fairly prominent, high-flying academic careers, and Ray Hill, who decided to go off to the private sector and become filthy rich. And so we spent, and so summer '76, the real risk of failure of democracy was in the rearview mirror, but that wasn't obvious. Lisbon was still full of Maoist posters everywhere. There were, you know, it just, and it was quite chaotic. Portugal was much more third-worldy then than it is now. And they were also having a balance of payments crisis because they still had their own currency and they were running out of foreign currency, and they had all kinds of emergency measures. Among other things, Portugal imports a lot of its electricity actually from hydropower in the Pyrenees, and to save on foreign exchange they turned off the power for two hours every afternoon, including the stoplights, by the way. That was really quite something. I suppose it was, but it was never, it's a non-threatening country. I mean, during that left-wing coup attempt there was an all-night firefight outside the presidential palace in which three men were slightly wounded. Obviously they were just firing their guns into the air. Nobody wanted to hurt anybody, and so it was a great experience. I got to see, we worked with the national accounts people, and boy, they really had only like six real numbers. Everything else was just guesswork and interpolation. I mean, the agricultural output they got from the US satellites. But it was...
Nathan Tankus 51:24 ↗
That reminds me, I meant to plug this book earlier, but a former guest writer for Notes on the Crises, Morten Jerven, has a really great book called Poor Numbers. And it's basically an ethnography of about half a dozen national account statistical agencies in Africa and how the mismatch between big claims about what is going on in African economies versus the actual understanding of data and stuff like economists running regressions where they find that there's this correlation between rainfall and the GDP numbers, and it's like, well, rainfall was used as a proxy estimate of part of agricultural production of the country. So they're just reinventing the underlying imputations in the numbers, and how you need a really good understanding of the underlying national accounts to be able to suss out what's real and what is a mirage.
Paul Krugman 52:33 ↗
Yeah. I haven't ever verified the story, but I've heard of one Latin American country where somebody tried a money supply to GDP, and the fit was exact because they were actually using the money supply to estimate GDP. But yeah, what can I say? It was, obviously I had a great time. Found it really revolting. Made some lifelong friends. Actually, one I managed on this last week to catch up with my old friend Jorge Baraga de Medeiros, who was a Yale grad student at the time but was called up and wanting to preserve his country relationship, he went and served, and he went to Angola, but after the revolution. So during the period when the Portuguese army was acting more as a kind of holding peacekeeping force rather than the shoot-all-the-natives force, and then was recalled to Lisbon, and then the army said, 'What do we, we've got this economics PhD candidate, what do we do with him?' So they put him to work covering economics for the army journal, and he interviewed the MIT team, and that's how we became friends and have kept that up for 50 years. So that's a pretty good story.
Nathan Tankus 54:05 ↗
But yeah, I mean, I was especially interested in asking about it in terms of, you know, we're hopefully coming out of a low point in American democracy for a very long time. And so an example of a country finally, after long last, throwing off a fascist yoke and then trying, in fits and starts, building durable democratic institutions.
Paul Krugman 54:36 ↗
Oh, and there's more that's good about the story, by the way. Portugal, I mean, it's a kind of a lovable country, but it's also really kind of interesting. One of the things that happened was that they pulled back from their colonial empire, and about a million people came back, the retornados, of whom only a fraction were white. There were just a lot of people from Angola, Mozambique, who one way or another felt that they might have problems under whatever came next. And so Portugal had 9 million people at the time. They got a million people, many of them non-white. The question is, you know, how would there be assimilation? And as far as I can tell, it's gone very well. There are a lot of non-white or mixed-race people managing shops, managing businesses. They actually did a pretty good job of assimilating people who look different. So it's actually, in many ways, Portugal feels more diverse than almost any place else in Europe. So it's an interesting, you know, it's a happy... Now their economy has done a lot better in recent years. It lagged, and it's still visibly poorer than the rest, but not dramatically. So when my wife and I go there, I always say, you know, it's really nice that Lisbon basically feels like a normal European city. And it's also kind of disappointing because I remember when it was much more interesting because it wasn't a normal European city. But yeah,
Nathan Tankus 56:31 ↗
I wanted to swing back since we didn't get around to it. The ECB research conference.
Paul Krugman 56:39 ↗
Yeah. So what you've learned first of all is that the ECB, like the IMF actually these days also in their research conferences, they basically, well, the alleged theme of the conference was geoeconomics, which could mean anything, but turns out to basically be about choke points and exploitation of interdependence for power. It's basically the Straits of Hormuz everywhere. And there were, you know, a lot... So I was telling you this, but what the hell, since we've got some autobiographical stuff there, I was actually terrified to be giving the keynote because I've been at conferences where some grand old man of the profession gives the keynote and gives a crystal clear summary of the state of the field as it was 20 years ago, and I was afraid that I was going to be another out-of-touch old guy. But I read the papers and I did understand them and I tried to incorporate what was in them, and I think I came out all right. And there's a lot of recognition that a lot of what we thought of as this sort of permanent globalization, that the world is flat and everything is going to be, and countries are not going to, and also that world trade will be a force for peace and all of that...
Nathan Tankus 58:20 ↗
Yeah, I just want to be clear, this is Paul Krugman. It is not Tom Friedman. I know that there's been historically some mixture, but I...
Paul Krugman 58:29 ↗
I used to get accosted on the Upper West Side by people who thought I was Tom Friedman, but it's a mark of how very special that neighborhood is that a couple of times I've been accosted by people who think I'm Joe Stiglitz. So, yeah. Anyway, it turns out that a lot of what we thought was, or I guess I never fully bought it, but a lot of what was widely thought to be immutable, unstoppable forces of globalization was just the Pax Americana. As long as the United States was enforcing the rules, and the United States was, you know, we've done a lot of terrible things, but in the history of global hegemons, the United States has at least been relatively, you know, there are rules and we will obey the rules too. And we kept the waterways open and all of that. And that...
Nathan Tankus 59:25 ↗
In a lot of ways there's been this bifurcation between America's war foreign policy and who is kind of outside the right, you know, whose sovereignty will be respected, and the kind of rules of the game for economic policy.
Paul Krugman 59:42 ↗
Yeah. And when actually in Portugal in '76 there were still a lot of people who kept on thinking that a chilling moment was going to arise, who will be Portugal's Pinochet, and the United States... Sorry, I'm allowed to meander, right? Yeah, I'm an old guy.
Nathan Tankus 1:00:00 ↗
Paul, I wouldn't have invited you if I was just like, 'All right, we're going to have crisp 45-second answers. We're going to get through 30 questions and, you know, we'll fill out a form at the end.'
Paul Krugman 1:00:12 ↗
Yeah. One of the interesting things about Portugal in '76, just to come back, who was supplying money, aid, advice to the pro-democracy, and mostly at that point that meant center-left, who was supporting the Portuguese center-left? And the United States had to keep a very low profile, could not be involved. There were just, you know, the memory of Vietnam, the memory of Chile was still very strong. So it was actually the German trade unions who were the defenders of democracy in Portugal. So anyway, so where we are now is that the weaponization, the fantastic book by Abe Newman and Henry Farrell called Underground Empire, which was about how the US weaponizes its financial position. But it turns out that weaponized interdependence, which I think is their phrase, is everywhere now. It's everywhere from Chinese control of rare earths to Iran on the Strait of Hormuz to potential... well, the Russians tried to weaponize natural gas supply against Western Europe after they invaded Ukraine, and all of the potential other weaponizations out there. And so everybody is trying to measure who's vulnerable, what are the channels, how do we prevent a kind of... I think at this point the concern is less of a universal trade war than it is of an arms race where everybody rushes to become self-sufficient in strategic industries, you know, which is costly, which is a big waste. But it is quite amazing actually, especially if you're on the European scene. You have Anglo-Saxon, normally very free trade people yelling at the European community that you need some tariffs and you need an industrial policy to do strategic stuff. So Chad Bown and Soumaya Keynes have this book called How to Win a Trade War, which is actually, you know, it's tongue-in-cheek except not entirely, and they have been saying, you know, you really need a better mechanism for protective tariffs against Chinese goods. And so it's been a real sea change in attitudes. The research was... I think there was a core paper by Liu and Wang, which was... the good thing was that I thought to myself before opening up, how would I do this, having read their abstract of what the subject was going to be, and that is how they did it. So that's always a nice feeling. It's nice with a lot of empirical work I would never have had the patience to undertake, but so it wasn't really innovative modeling, but lots of empirical work and novel use of sources of data, people actually using UN votes as a way of measuring power relations, which is a little funny because, you know, nobody ever thinks that the UN matters, but still. It was interesting, and a lot of smart, reasonable people, and whether what it actually does, I don't know, but...
Nathan Tankus 1:03:58 ↗
Well, so I mean, for obvious reasons they're having this conference, geoeconomics, but choke points as you're saying. But it's one thing to have a conference where you have like, you know, a dozen, 20 economists come, write papers, submit, you know, you've got a hundred, a couple hundred people there, whatever it is. It's another thing to actually be doing something. And in terms of like the water cooler conversation at this conference, what was the kind of mood about like actually doing something to deal with these choke points and these vulnerabilities?
Paul Krugman 1:04:33 ↗
Well, this being Europe, of course, was all 'what can we do' given the usual ineffectuality of the European Commission. And if you don't know Europe, many things are under a unanimity rule. They can't do anything unless everybody agrees, which is 27 countries, and until very recently, at least one of those countries being a proto-fascist regime in Hungary. So, but I think you can see that they are inching their way towards a more interventionist, more strategic policy. Now it's also true that to a large extent the Europeans are trying so far as possible to play by the old rules. You know, there was this big free trade agreement between the EU and India, which was mostly remarkable because it was such a normal scene by past standards. This was the kind of thing that used to happen all the time. And although it's also true, by the way, that I believe the negotiations for that agreement have been underway since 2007, if I remember correctly, and now they finally just did it. And they did it largely as a response to the US going crazy. So there's an old joke, it actually was, that they should have a statue, the Berlaymont is the headquarters of the European Commission, they should have a statue in front of the Berlaymont, and it should be a statue of Joseph Stalin who made it possible. And now the joke is actually two statues: Joseph Stalin, but then a second statue, a gold statue of Donald Trump, of course, because if Europe really does get its act together, it will be well through a response to the US craziness. I mean, maybe an aluminum statue or, you know...
Nathan Tankus 1:06:21 ↗
Well, a gilded statue with the gilding peeling.
Paul Krugman 1:06:24 ↗
Well, yeah, you got to spray paint it gold. I mean, like, you got to give Trump that.
Nathan Tankus 1:06:31 ↗
Yeah. I mean, I guess it's almost silly to ask. It's a question that answers itself a bit, but is there any conversation about maybe finally having the EU parliament having a macroeconomically significant budget?
Paul Krugman 1:06:47 ↗
No. And I didn't hear that. And that's actually, you know, one of the things that almost by accident the United States does right is that we have serious... we are a transfer union, to use the phrase. I mean, in Europe, the idea of significant aid as opposed to loans with enormous conditions to countries that get themselves in economic trouble is still beyond the pale, can't be done. Whereas the United States, because, you know, when Florida was hit really hard by the financial crisis back in, which again, hard to believe that that's almost 20 years ago now, but when Florida was hit really hard, well, Florida's payments to Washington plunged because the income tax receipts from Florida collapsed. But the Social Security money kept coming, the Medicare money kept coming, which, you know, big deal in Florida, and actually flows of money to Florida increased because of the federal share of unemployment benefits and so on. So the United States has a kind of safety net for regions that is beyond the wildest dreams of Europeans. It's also, by the way, we do enormous, what would be foreign aid if the states were separate countries. Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, West Virginia all receive in effect foreign aid that's 15 to 20 percent of their GDP. This nobody gets...
Nathan Tankus 1:08:21 ↗
This was one of my reactions to the Greek crisis, that I thought about how the surest way to destroy the United States would be to collect state-level trade balance data. And to have a, you know, we already do it with like tax revenue, but like if you could be like, New York State is running a 5 percent trade deficit, but its current account deficit is only 2 percent because of, as you say, the fiscal transfers or the fiscal payments coming from the federal government, that you could destroy the United States.
Paul Krugman 1:08:55 ↗
Well, the fiscal transfer stuff is available, although it used to be routinely calculated by the federal government, which stopped doing it, and it's now the Rockefeller Institute that does the numbers. And but the Canadians... Canada is in some odd ways less unified than the United States. And so we do have trade data between Canadian provinces.
Nathan Tankus 1:09:21 ↗
Which is...
Paul Krugman 1:09:22 ↗
Yeah, but Canada's not going to fight a revolution over provincial trade data, but it's... well, maybe Alberta. Alberta will declare, you know, we'll secede or whatever. But the United States, I mean, if it was like, oh, they run a trade deficit of 5 percent, but we're all covering it because of all these fiscal payments, like I think we'd just rip apart the United States within a handful of years.
Nathan Tankus 1:09:48 ↗
I think no, I think we'd be safe because the people who would be doing that wouldn't understand trade data.
Paul Krugman 1:09:52 ↗
That's fair. That's fair. That's fair. I'm always imagining like a fascist wonk getting this stuff and really promoting this kind of stuff effectively, but by definition that's never how it works out.
Nathan Tankus 1:10:07 ↗
Yeah, that's Hannah Arendt, right? That basically fascist governments, totalitarian governments never have competent people because they're not trustworthy. And yeah, it's, I mean, this is especially true in economics. You know, economics, there's a fair number of conservative economists who are also technically competent, and they never... Heritage Foundation doesn't hire them. Republicans in Congress never hire them. I think Greg Mankiw working for George W. Bush was the last federal-level competent Republican economist. And so they, you know, if you actually know something...
Paul Krugman 1:10:52 ↗
Is that an implicit Glenn Hubbard commentary?
Nathan Tankus 1:10:54 ↗
I guess Glenn, but it's sort of... yeah, let's not go there. But the...
Paul Krugman 1:11:05 ↗
All right, we got the clip. But no, but the... it is really true that, and I mean, my year in Washington was, you know, during the Reagan administration. I was sub-political level, but I was senior staff, actually senior staff at the Council of Economic Advisers working under Marty Feldstein. I was the senior international economist. Senior domestic economist was a guy named Larry Summers. And...
Nathan Tankus 1:11:35 ↗
And we're going to spend the next half hour on that.
Paul Krugman 1:11:38 ↗
No, definitely not. The thing was that Marty Feldstein, I think, actually did a lot to kill competence because he actually was sensible and talked about, he was honest about the economics, and the Reagan people really hated that. And so it, yeah, it is a, you know, God help us, by the way, if we actually do have another global financial crisis right now. Because can we really imagine, do you want Scott Bessent and Russell Vought having to make crucial decisions in the midst of a crisis?
Nathan Tankus 1:12:24 ↗
So yeah, are we running on...
Paul Krugman 1:12:28 ↗
No, no.

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Krugman, P. (2026, November 19). NOTC Office Event #1: Paul Krugman [Interview transcript]. Notes on the Crises. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3391874/

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Paul Krugman. "NOTC Office Event #1: Paul Krugman." Notes on the Crises, 19 Nov. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3391874/.

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@misc{krugman2026_3391874,
  author       = {Paul Krugman},
  title        = {NOTC Office Event #1: Paul Krugman},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Notes on the Crises. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {nov},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3391874/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}