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Andrew Ferguson
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Anticompetitive and Deceptive Conduct in Healthcare with FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson

📅 Oct 07, 2026 Hudson Institute 65 MIN 717 VIEWS 46 SEGMENTS · 4 SPEAKERS
Join Hudson Institute for a discussion with Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew Ferguson and Senior Fellow Harold Furchtgott-Roth. The event will explore how the FTC’s antitrust and consumer protection authorities can police anticompetitive and deceptive conduct in healthcare. Chairman Ferguson will focus on the agency’s recent efforts to promote price transparency in hospitals and pharmaceuticals, a key priority of the Trump administration. By ensuring price transparency, the FTC empowers consumer choice and promotes competitive markets as a counter to rising healthcare costs. Learn mor...

What Andrew Ferguson said

Written from the verified transcript and checked against it. Every figure links to the moment it was said.

Andrew Ferguson, Chairman of the FTC, argued that the agency will use its Section 5 authority to enforce price transparency in healthcare, targeting deceptive and unfair pricing practices by hospitals. He cited the FTC's history of blocking 12 hospital mergers over two decades, its work against pay-for-delay schemes in pharma, and recent settlements with pharmacy benefit managers. Ferguson announced sending warning letters to two dozen large for-profit hospital groups, representing over 1,000 facilities, demanding complete, accurate, upfront price disclosures. He drew parallels to FTC rules for eyeglasses, funerals, and live ticketing, noting that hospital pricing opacity mirrors these practices. He emphasized that healthcare is a collective action problem requiring government intervention, as providers fear being first movers on transparency. Ferguson also discussed the 'flailing firm' defense in hospital mergers, saying he considers the adequacy of the sales process and state AG input.

Key takeaways

  1. FTC sent warning letters to two dozen large for-profit hospital groups, representing over 1,000 facilities, demanding upfront price transparency or facing court action.
  2. FTC has blocked 12 hospital mergers in the past 20 years, with 14 successful appeals in courts of appeals.
  3. FTC will use Section 5 authority to treat hidden hospital fees as deceptive and unfair practices, similar to rules for live ticketing and short-term lodging.
  4. FTC is investigating rollup strategies in healthcare, including anesthesia providers in Texas, where PE firms created monopoly power.
  5. FTC's complaint database at ftc.gov is the primary channel for patients to report price transparency violations.

Numbers and commitments

FigureWhat it refers toTypeAt
18% Share of US GDP spent on healthcare metric 8:07
12 Hospital mergers blocked by FTC in past two decades metric 11:53
14 Successful appeals in court of appeals for blocked hospital mergers metric 11:53
20-year Order duration prohibiting Surescripts from anti-competitive behavior timeline 16:31
over 1,000 Medical facilities represented by hospital groups receiving letters metric 38:38
2020 Year Congress passed the No Surprises Act timeline 35:19
2021 Year CMS issued hospital price transparency rule timeline 36:07
1,100 Number of FTC employees metric 56:48

Chapters

  1. 0:00Healthcare spending and FTC mission
  2. 11:53Hospital merger enforcement history
  3. 16:10Pharmaceutical anti-competitive practices
  4. 19:09Price transparency enforcement actions
  5. 26:45Deception and unfairness authority in healthcare
  6. 35:19No Surprises Act and hospital rule
  7. 38:38Letters to hospital groups
  8. 56:35Consumer complaint process
  9. 1:00:17Failing and flailing firm defense

Questions asked in this interview

6
  1. 45:29And is that a reflection of this highly complicated structure that we have with insurers, and the people actually paying are not the ones who are the patients?
  2. 49:29And do we have a microphone here?
  3. 49:53What can you comment on that?
  4. 56:35Just following up on that, is there an 800 number or a consumer complaint location at the FTC website that people can file complaints?
  5. 58:14Now, what kind of fraud is that?
  6. 1:00:17So when the companies or the hospital providers come out saying, "Hey, this is a failing firm case," how do you see through that and differentiate, okay, you know, a legitimate case from an illegitimate one? What do you look for?
Harold Fert Scott Roth 6:13 ↗
Welcome to the Hudson Institute. My name is Harold Fert Scott Roth, and I'll be your host today. We'd also like to welcome our C-SPAN audience from across America here to the Hudson Institute. We are greatly honored to have with us the Honorable Andrew Ferguson, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. He's going to speak with us about recent announcements from the Federal Trade Commission about hospitals and the need for greater transparency in billing.
Chairman Ferguson has an illustrious career. He was an undergraduate and law school graduate at the University of Virginia, a double Wahoo, as they say. He has had an illustrious career on Capitol Hill. He worked for Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. He worked on the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
He's worked for the state of Virginia. He's been a clerk to a D.C. appellate court judge, and he's been a clerk to Justice Thomas. I don't think I need to say more than that about his incredible career. Please join me in welcoming the Honorable Andrew Ferguson here to the Hudson Institute to speak about the recent announcements on healthcare policy.
Andrew Ferguson 7:40 ↗
Thank you. Thanks.
Good afternoon. I'm very happy to be here. Let me begin with a short passage from the Book of Sirach, written some 200 years before the birth of Christ. The Book of Sirach was intended to transmit the wisdom of its revered author to his readers. And in chapter 30, he offers the reader the following bits of wisdom concerning health.
Better the poor in vigorous health than the rich with bodily ills. I would rather have bodily health than all gold, and contentment of spirit than all pearls. No riches are greater than a healthy body, and no happiness than a joyful heart. Better is death than a wretched life, everlasting sleep than constant illness. The author's wisdom here is somewhat striking. He claims that bodily health is better than any gold or riches. Because our author's purpose is to instruct his readers in what matters most to live one's life the best way that one can, we can surmise that he thinks that our health is more important, not just for living but for living well, than all wealth. Thus bodily health is not just valued because it keeps us alive, but more importantly because it enables us to live the best kind of life. Without some level of bodily health, we can't dance with our spouses. We can't play with our children. We can't converse with our oldest friends. We can't engage in dignified work. For the loving husband, father, and friend, no amount of money could possibly compensate for the loss of these activities. And because our capacity to take part in these activities and to experience the immense pleasure that they bring to our life and the lives of others depends not only upon our level of bodily health, we spend a lot of money on healthcare. It's no surprise then that almost 18% of this country's GDP is spent on healthcare. You heard that right. Nearly one in every five dollars we spend, we spend on healthcare. Given the importance of bodily health for humans to live the good life, the government must be particularly vigilant in making sure that our healthcare markets work well and that they are free from anti-competitive, unfair, or deceptive business practices.
The Federal Trade Commission has statutory authority to attack practices that impede competition and consumer choice in the healthcare sector and the economy at large. When a healthcare provider or pharmaceutical company must actually compete with rival firms for their customers, they are incentivized to discover ways to innovate their products or their business models to attract more customers. That leads to lower-priced and better-quality healthcare for everyone.
While much attention has rightfully been paid to the role of competition policy and enforcement for big tech firms, the FTC has an equally important and robust antitrust enforcement agenda on addressing healthcare market failures in the healthcare system. Three of our eight competition enforcement divisions are focused on some aspect of healthcare antitrust, and the majority of the commission's antitrust litigation commenced since President Trump took office has involved our healthcare markets. But preventing anti-competitive mergers and other forms of anti-competitive conduct is not all the FTC does and can do to promote competitive healthcare markets. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive business practices that undermine consumers' ability to make informed choices.
The FTC has enforced Section 5's price transparency requirements that promote informed choices across the entire economy, as I will soon explain. And the FTC has used and will continue to use its Section 5 authority to ensure greater price transparency and therefore greater competition and consumer choice in the healthcare system. What I'd like to do with the balance of my time today is provide you with a historical snapshot of the commission's enforcement actions in the healthcare space, an explanation of the FTC's authority and actions on pricing transparency, and my vision for how the FTC can advance the president's objective of promoting greater price transparency in healthcare by tackling deceptive and unfair pricing strategies by healthcare providers.
We'll start with antitrust. Our hospital merger enforcement program is one of the prides of the FTC. FTC staff have contributed to a substantial body of economic literature showing that when competing hospitals merge, healthcare prices go up without any improvement in the quality of care. Insurers, employers, and patients incur higher costs, and patient outcomes suffer. Based on this research, the FTC has pursued a vigorous enforcement program to stop anti-competitive hospital mergers. That's why over the last 20 years, the FTC has brought more enforcement actions challenging the mergers of healthcare providers than in any other individual sector of the economy. Our record is stellar. In the past two decades, the FTC has successfully blocked 12 hospital mergers, 14 of which included successful appeals in the courts of appeals. In part, these successes were made possible by our statutory authority to compel hospitals to provide us with specific information about their business practices that help the FTC lawyers and economists better understand healthcare markets and develop tools to illustrate for judges the harm that hospital mergers can cause. After a string of losses in the 1990s, FTC economists conducted retrospective analyses of hospital mergers to ensure that we understood the actual health effect of healthcare consolidation on prices for consumers. The research revealed a critical flaw in the methodology that the FTC had been using for assessing how hospital mergers affected competition. The FTC used to rely on data that tracked patient travel patterns when they obtained healthcare patient flow data to assess competition. But that data failed to tell a clear story about what was driving price effects for hospital mergers, namely the negotiating dynamics between hospitals and insurers. Armed with this new data, economists developed a variety of predictive tools to evaluate how hospital mergers would shift bargaining leverage in negotiations between hospitals and insurers, and how that shift in leverage would affect healthcare prices after mergers.
The adoption of the hospital-insurer bargaining framework was the turning point for the FTC's merger enforcement program. The FTC has had a striking success rate in litigation since then, so much so that many merging parties have abandoned proposed transactions after the FTC has filed a complaint, or even upon learning that FTC staff intends to recommend a complaint. Our success inside and outside the courtroom is not only a great victory for patients who benefit from greater competition in healthcare, but also a testament to the groundbreaking economic research and legal arguments conducted by the commission's economists and lawyers, and the ability of a government agency to look back, conclude that it had been going the wrong way, and change direction.
Since then, the FTC has expanded its focus beyond hospital mergers to analyze transactions across the entire continuum of healthcare. The FTC has challenged mergers involving primary care physician services, specialty physician services, outpatient surgical centers, inpatient rehab facilities, behavioral health facilities, and imaging centers. More importantly, we have been confronted with rollup strategies involving repeated acquisitions of small medical providers which individually fall below relevant statutory pre-merger review thresholds but which collectively, over the course of time, present serious threats to competition. We have several ongoing investigations into these kinds of acquisitions which are illegal insofar as they substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. For example, the FTC challenged one such rollup strategy for anesthesia providers in large cities in Texas. In that case, a PE firm acquired a series of anesthesia practices in the Dallas and Houston metro areas. Those acquisitions demonstrably created monopoly power for the PE firm, which then raised prices for consumers. Under my leadership, the FTC will continue to investigate whether rollup strategies in the healthcare sector violate the antitrust laws, irrespective of the corporate form of the acquirer.
In addition to merger enforcement, the FTC also focuses on other forms of anti-competitive conduct in the healthcare sector. A particular area of concern has been anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical industry. If you're sick and in desperate need of a drug, you're in no position to haggle over price, especially when there are no alternatives.
In some cases, the reason no alternative drugs are available is due to illegal agreements between drug companies. These pay-for-delay schemes involve one drug manufacturer paying another drug manufacturer to hold off on the production of a generic alternative to one of their drugs, resulting in higher prices for patients whose health depends on the use of the drug. These pay-for-delay agreements, which impede competition that would lower prices for consumers, are textbook violations of the antitrust laws, and the FTC has devoted substantial resources over the last 20 years to combating them. The FTC also takes seriously attempts by incumbent firms to maintain market dominance through coercive tactics or anti-competitive conduct. We pay particular attention to healthcare technology markets, which can be ripe for that type of behavior. For example, the FTC sued Surescripts in 2019, alleging that the company employed illegal methods to maintain its monopolies over two electronic prescribing or e-prescribing markets. The FTC alleged that Surescripts intentionally kept doctors and pharmacies from using competing platforms through anti-competitive exclusivity agreements, threats, and other exclusionary tactics. During litigation, Surescripts agreed to settle the charges by agreeing to a 20-year order that prohibits them from engaging in that type of illegal behavior that was alleged by the FTC in its e-prescribing business and in other service lines. And just this year, the FTC under President Trump negotiated a landmark competition and consumer protection settlement with two of the country's largest pharmacy benefits managers that will save Americans billions of dollars on prescription drugs, impose radical new pricing and transparency requirements, and protect thousands of community pharmacists from abusive reimbursement practices. By vigorously policing anti-competitive mergers and industry practices in healthcare, the FTC seeks to promote competitive and innovative healthcare markets which yield higher wages for healthcare workers and greater economic opportunities for new entrants in the field of healthcare. But most of all, we seek to promote healthcare markets that generate lower costs and higher quality of care for patients. As President Trump's February 2025 executive order made clear, consumer welfare and competition in the healthcare markets requires radical transparency in healthcare prices. To that end, I want to outline how the FTC can utilize its consumer protection authority to promote the president's vision of complete price transparency in healthcare.
The FTC has a long history of acting under both its deception and unfairness authorities to ensure pricing transparency. First, we have a long history of enforcement actions to promote price transparency in nearly every market you can imagine. Just consider the cases the commission has either commenced or resolved since President Trump took office. We've brought lawsuits involving allegations that companies were failing to disclose their prices for food delivery and grocery deliveries. We brought it for failing to disclose prices for travel agency services. We brought it for failure to disclose accurate prices for prescription lenses, for long-term housing rentals, for ride-share services, for ticketing in live music and sporting events, for auto transactions on the dealer lots, and for gym fees. In every market you can imagine, the FTC has been bringing enforcement actions to protect consumers and to make sure that when they begin a transaction, they know the all-in price so that they can both understand what they're about to spend and they can comparison shop. And it's that comparison shopping which lowers prices by promoting competition. We also have a long history of rules that promote price transparency. First, the FTC's eyeglass rule, which almost everyone in this room has probably benefited from, was first promulgated in 1978 and updated just last year. And it requires doctors to provide their patients with an eyeglass prescription before attempting to sell any eyeglasses to patients. The FTC implemented the rule because many eye doctors would either withhold a prescription for eyeglasses until after they made their sales pitch, or they would charge extra for the release of the prescription to shop elsewhere. Since eyeglasses require a prescription, eyeglass comparison shopping presupposes a prescription. If the eye doctor trying to sell you eyeglasses has the authority to write the prescription, any delay in releasing the prescription or charging a fee for its release imposes an unjustified obstacle to consumer choice. In other words, the commission holds that withholding critical information necessary for consumers to engage in comparison shopping violates Section 5. If healthcare providers fail to provide complete and accurate pricing information before a consumer buys healthcare services, they may be withholding critical information necessary for consumers to comparison shop within healthcare markets, violating Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Second, consider the FTC's funeral rule, which was promulgated in 1982. It requires funeral providers to provide consumers complete, accurate, and itemized prices for funeral goods and services. In adopting the rule, the commission recognized some unique characteristics about funeral transactions that reduce the ability of consumers to make careful, informed decisions regarding their purchases. In general, consumers in the funeral market lack familiarity with funeral transactions and act under tight time constraints and the emotional strain of bereavement. Each of these factors poses an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making in funeral transactions. Among other things, funeral providers would take advantage of these factors by providing the bereaved with package details that failed to disclose the price of various funeral services. To combat this practice, the FTC's funeral rule requires funeral providers to provide consumers with an itemized price list of funeral goods and services upfront, as well as to give consumers the option to pick and choose which funeral goods and services they want. In other words, the commission recognizes that it is unfair for sellers to weaponize for their own gain common obstacles to consumer choices in particular types of transactions where those obstacles present themselves. Like the bereaved, most hospital patients do not have extensive knowledge of hospital transactions. They often must make purchasing decisions in a tight time frame, and they often do so under severe physical or emotional strain. Healthcare providers, no less than funeral providers, should not take advantage of these factors by withholding pricing information that would facilitate consumer choice and price competition in healthcare.
Finally, the FTC's unfair and deceptive fees rule, which was implemented earlier this year, holds that it is an unfair and deceptive practice to offer, display, or advertise any price of live ticketing events or short-term lodging without clearly, conspicuously, and prominently disclosing the total price upfront. Whether through drip pricing or other bait-and-switch tactics, the scheme here is simple. You attract a consumer by the allure of a low price, walk the consumer through various time-consuming steps to purchase the product, and then hit them with a higher price at the end that incorporates a bevy of undisclosed fees. In this case, the seller not only impedes price competition by failing to disclose the full price to consumers at the outset, but also imposes costs on the consumer in terms of time spent getting to the final purchase that will incentivize him to purchase the product at the new undisclosed price rather than incurring the higher cost of a search process after they've already seen the final price. The commission considers the additional cost to be a substantial injury to consumers that they could not reasonably avoid, which are not outweighed by countervailing benefits to competition that could be produced by these tactics. So consider these practices run afoul of Section 5's prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices. When hospital-owned clinics hit consumers with surprise, hidden, or unexpected fees on top of their already opaque healthcare bills, they act no differently than merchants in the short-term lodging or live ticketing industry, subject to the rule. We have launched similar rulemakings under the Trump administration for long-term housing rentals and for food delivery apps. Here again, the scheme is simple. Propose a price that looks lower than the all-in price at the beginning to convince the consumer to begin the transaction flow. Disclose the all-in price at the end of the transaction flow where the consumer has already committed substantial time and potentially emotional commitment to the transaction flow. And then hope that the consumer, rather than initiating a new and expensive search, will just agree to the new higher price that they did not understand they were going to get at the beginning of the transaction. Not only does this hurt the consumer individually, it hurts all consumers by denying us the benefits of competition by preventing accurate price shopping. This also creates a collective action problem. The commission has been bringing enforcement actions in these markets under the Trump administration. And what we've heard consistently from the targets of our enforcement activity is a fair point that the commission makes: that our current pricing structure has a Section 5 problem, but all of our competitors are doing it. If you subject us to an order, our prices at the outset will look higher than our competitors who are not continuing to abide by Section 5. Our goal in promulgating these rules is to fix the collective action problem by imposing the same rules promoting transparency on all merchants in the same markets so that consumers can all benefit from the all-in price upfront and facilitate competition by promoting the price shopping that makes competition in all markets possible.
Looking to replicate the successes discussed above, I intend to utilize our agency's unique Section 5 authority to promote greater price transparency in the healthcare sector. So finally, I'd like to give a brief overview of how this authority might be used as a tool to counter unfair and deceptive trade practices in the healthcare space. First, let me begin with our deception authority. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, a representation, omission, or practice is deceptive if it is likely to deceive consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and it is material to consumers. That is, it would likely affect the consumer's conduct or decision-making regarding that particular good or service. Price is almost always material to a consumer for every transaction. Few things matter to a consumer than what something costs. That means that when businesses offer goods or services without accurate or complete information about the price, they may well be engaging in deceptive conduct. And when a healthcare provider misleads you about the terms or services or omits critical information about the terms of a service, Section 5 prohibits that conduct. Full stop. As is well known, some healthcare providers withhold prices from consumers until after consumers have already committed to paying for the needed items or services. Such transactions frequently occur in the healthcare sector because consumers trying to understand a new diagnosis, selecting a service or treatment option, or just trying to follow their doctor's recommendation are often hyperfocused in the moment on scheduling or accessing care, not on figuring out what it costs or comparing costs among different providers. In normal circumstances, though, no one would agree to pay for a service without knowing its price. But when one is faced with an unexpected need for healthcare or confronted with an opaque presentation of the costs of routine medical services, consumers may feel like they have no choice. Instead, they feel compelled to agree to pay for goods or services even in the absence of meaningful price information. In such cases, the agreement looks more coerced than consensual, especially when the resulting charges are excessive or unreasonable. In other words, when they are unexpected by the reasonable consumer.
That brings us to our unfairness authority. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, a practice is considered unfair if it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to a consumer, where that injury is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and where the injury is not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition. Substantial injury is linked to consumer harm, and the paradigmatic form of consumer harm is monetary loss. If someone is coerced into buying unwanted goods or services or buys defective goods without meaningful legal recourse, the FTC considers the money lost on that purchase of those unwanted or defective goods or services and considers that to be a substantial injury to the consumer. If a consumer pays more than she would otherwise have paid for a service before the pricing was complete or if the pricing was opaque, we have presumptive injury to the consumer. Withholding price information from consumers distorts markets, causing injury to consumers when they overpay or siphons cost-driven consumers away from lower-cost providers, which may lessen incentives in the market to lower cost and to compete on price. While there is no doubt that greater price transparency will impose costs on sellers individually or collectively, these costs must be weighed against the costs borne by consumers who are unable to price shop as a result of price opacity. Can a consumer reasonably avoid opaque, incomplete, or misleading price information in healthcare? As a rule, the FTC presumes that under normal market circumstances and conditions, consumers have a genuine choice about the goods or services that they purchase, making a free judgment about which good or service is best for them. Historically, the FTC has brought unfairness cases against sellers whose behavior unreasonably created or took advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making. In other words, if a seller creates or takes advantage of circumstances in which the consumer is unable to make a free judgment about which good or service is best for them, the resulting transaction is unfair. Now, obviously, failure to provide essential pricing information creates circumstances in which the consumer is unable to make an informed judgment about alternatives, depriving him or her of a genuine opportunity to exercise a real choice. Similarly, if the dire or emotional circumstances and medical need of a consumer poses an obstacle to the genuine exercise of consumer choice, healthcare providers are not permitted to take advantage of that vulnerability by omitting critical price information or selling consumers superfluous goods or services, as we saw in the agency's funeral rule. As I said above, such agreements are certainly not consensual and arguably coercive.
Whether a case falls under our deception or unfairness authority, the targeted practice is the same: the failure of healthcare providers to offer complete, accurate, and timely price information to consumers. By withholding complete and accurate price information, healthcare providers impose a substantial injury on consumers. Because without such information, consumers are likely to pay more in healthcare costs than they would have paid had they possessed a full and accurate picture of the costs upfront. Our Section 5 authority is anchored in the promotion of consumer choice, and I intend to wield that authority to ensure that consumers have access to clear, conspicuous, and whenever possible actual rather than estimated prices for their healthcare goods and services. Regardless of one's opinion on the rising cost of healthcare, everyone can agree that consumer sovereignty and a competitive market cannot exist in any sector where pricing is opaque, hidden, or downright deceptive.
If I don't know the terms of a transaction, I cannot truly consent to them. The transaction is not freely chosen. If I don't know the terms of the transaction, I cannot judge whether the service provided is worth the cost, and so the transaction is not necessarily in my best interest. If I don't know the terms of the transaction, I cannot negotiate the terms or seek out other sellers, and so the transaction is not competitive. The bottom line is that if consumers lack knowledge about price, whether due to deliberate opacity, deception, or something in between, the resulting market is inimical to competition and consumer sovereignty.
Now, under normal circumstances, no sane human would agree to pay for something without knowing the price. Why then is price transparency in healthcare a problem? The answer is already contained in the wise words of Ben Sira: no riches are greater than a healthy body. With a few pathological exceptions, we don't need beer or steaks or baseball tickets to survive. Consequently, most of us would not agree to purchase any of those commodities without at least some general knowledge of the price. But health is not like beer, steaks, or baseball tickets. Bodily health is necessary for our survival and for the many important things that make life worth living. When faced with an unexpected diagnosis, a doctor's testing or treatment recommendation, a chronic illness, or a medical emergency, we are put in a vulnerable, sometimes desperate situation when we are willing to pay for anything to preserve our health. When this vulnerable consumer is faced with opaque or deceptive pricing, it is particularly difficult to make rational, informed choices. When healthcare providers fail to provide consumers with complete, accurate, and timely pricing information, they strip the consumer of his or her ability to make an informed decision aligned with his or her own interests and values about his or her future care.
When healthcare providers hide their prices, they not only do violence to consumer choice, they also impose monetary losses on consumers in the form of higher prices or payment for unwanted goods or services. When consumers are ignorant of price, healthcare providers don't have to compete for consumers.
based on price, which means greater margins for providers and higher prices for consumers. It can also lead to lower quality health care by healthcare providers who do not feel they have to compete with one another to improve and innovate their health care for their patients. These tactics have not gone unnoticed. In December 2020, Congress passed the No Surprises Act, which sought to ensure patients were not hit with unexpected additional costs for medical care.
The law required providers to inform patients of any potential unexpected out-of-pocket costs they might incur because of treatment, especially in the case of medical emergency, and to provide upfront a good faith estimate of the cost of pre-scheduled services for uninsured patients.
Similarly, in January 2021, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services issued the hospital price transparency rule, which requires hospitals to disclose their standard charges for shoppable services and procedures, including gross charges, discounted cash prices, and payer-specific negotiated rates. After four years, almost half of our nation's hospitals are still not in compliance with this rule. Although the No Surprises Act and the Hospital Price Transparency Rule seek to ensure price transparency for consumers in different circumstances — the former concerning after-the-fact surprise billing for emergency, out-of-network or pre-scheduled medical treatment, and the latter concerning prices of routine and extraordinary medical services — the two share the same animating principle.
Since patients cannot make an informed decision on treatment options without the knowledge of the potential costs of that treatment, providers must be transparent about their prices. As explained above, when a man selling water in the desert sees a ragged, dehydrated, and dying customer approaching his tent, he needn't bother giving him a price. Some of our nation's hospitals believe that they needn't bother us with prices for medical services either, nor do they believe that they need to inform us about a bundle of arbitrary prices and fees until after we've completed our hospital stay. This lack of price transparency in our nation's hospitals not only violates their obligation to comply with the No Surprises Act and the Hospital Price Transparency Rule, but may also violate Section Five of the FTC Act, which prohibits these deceptive and unfair trade practices.
Under Section Five, businesses must be complete and truthful about the material terms of a transaction, and price is paramount among those terms because price transparency protects consumer choice, reduces consumer costs, and facilitates competitive markets. Broadly speaking, the FTC has two enforcement mechanisms to ensure price transparency in markets, each of which is linked to consumer protection: our statutory authority to prevent and punish deceptive trade practices, and our statutory authority to prevent and punish unfair trade practices. Heeding the president's call to empower patients through the promotion of price transparency in healthcare, I am committed to bringing the FTC's complete statutory arsenal to bear against deceptive and unfair trade practices in the healthcare sector.
Earlier this week, I sent letters to two dozen of the largest for-profit hospital groups, which collectively represent over 1,000 medical facilities, to enforce this bedrock legal standard: that businesses can't mislead consumers about price, and that these companies have a legal obligation to provide truthful and accurate pricing information to consumers upfront.
This standard applies to every industry, and healthcare cannot be different. In some hospitals cannot conceal the true costs of a procedure to prevent patients from shopping for better deals at competing facilities. Hospital price disclosures must be complete, accurate, and offered in advance for scheduled services. These letters are a warning: health care providers must disclose their prices to consumers, and they must do so now, or we will take them to court.
I began this address with a quote from the book of Sirach. This wisdom literature was intended to instruct its readers on how to live a good, wise, and virtuous life. Now, you can't be virtuous or vicious, for that matter, without the capacity to choose. People love us or hate us, blame us or praise us because of our choices. So our choices, no less than our bodies, make us distinctive individuals possessing unique character traits that are the product of our own free decisions. Most importantly, our capacity to choose allows us to take ownership over our lives, making decisions that reflect our needs, our values, and our previous choices. In the domain of choice, every human person is sovereign. As the ancient philosophers recognized, to be able to choose for oneself is to be one's own master, and to be unable to choose for oneself is to be a slave of others. Choice, then, is an essential condition for our status as free and equal persons. When health care providers or any business tries to restrict consumer choice for their own personal gain, they do more than simply disregard human rights — sorry, consumer rights. They make us their slaves. In a republic of equal citizens, we cannot allow markets to be made up of masters and slaves, where one party hides the price and the other party has no choice but to pay it. Together with President Trump, the FTC will use the full scope of its authority to enforce price transparency in healthcare markets and put citizens seeking health care on equal footing with insurers and with providers. Thank you very much.
Harold Fert Scott Roth 41:17 ↗
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was an extraordinary talk. For those of us who believe in the power of markets, it's deeply troubling. And if you think about markets for other things, let's say a car or a pound of apples, if you went to a store and said, "I want to buy a pound of apples, and how much is it going to be?" and the store won't tell you, then you're going to go down the block to another store that will tell you the price. In a competitive market, prices are revealed. The fact that there really isn't price transparency is arguably evidence that these markets — for at least the hospital services that you've described — are really not competitive, or they're deficient in some way. Why? Why is that?
Andrew Ferguson 42:14 ↗
If I knew the full and complete answer to that, you know, I could just fix the healthcare markets tomorrow and we would all be great. I mean, I think it's a variety of reasons. One is our healthcare markets are a confusing overlay of government as payor, government as regulator, government as intervenor, and then the private markets, all of whom are intermingled with the government as regulator and as participant that I just described. The second is it's one of the few markets where the consumer often is not the direct payor for prices. When everyone in this room is buying a car, we all go to a lot of some kind, or we can do it online in the new economy. But if you go to a lot, you negotiate with the dealer on the price. You haggle. But for those of us that receive, like I do, insurance — health insurance through our provider — the negotiations over prices happen out of our presence, often before we were given the insurance product, between the payor, often the insurer, and the provider on behalf of the payor who then is providing insurance to us, the insured. And so there is some disconnect between the prices that are negotiated and then the person receiving the services for which the prices were negotiated. Now, of course, that is not always true. It is not totally unusual for the cash price for some services at hospitals to be lower than the price that your particular insurer negotiated with that provider. You are probably not going to know that because very often you're not going to be given either the cash price or the price that your insurer negotiated with that provider. But I think the big answer is that our healthcare markets are a somewhat complicated intermingling of government as payor, government as insurer, government as regulator, and then the private markets, all of which are subject not just to extensive federal regulation, but the insurers are often most heavily regulated by the states. And it is this confusing mix of regulation and legal obligation that I think ends up disconnecting the consumer from the price negotiations themselves. And then a consumer who has his or her health insurance may often feel when they go into a hospital, "I guess I'm stuck paying whatever my insurance is going to pay, and it just is what it is." And that feeling is enhanced by the fact that hospitals are not generally providing you the price of the service that they're proposing that you undertake. There are a lot of other reasons that our healthcare markets are the way that they are, but those are certainly two of the ones that I think have promoted a lack of price transparency in what I think is probably the most important market, or at least one of the three most important markets that all of us participate in.
Harold Fert Scott Roth 45:29 ↗
If I could just drill down a bit on that. So, what we don't see — let's just talk about what we don't see. We don't see a hospital or hospital group saying, "We're going to be the competitive provider. We're going to be completely transparent. You make an inquiry, we'll tell you. We're going to advertise our rates. We're going to do this, completely transparent. And the other guys aren't doing that." In other markets, if someone did that, they might actually attract customers, but that's not happening here. And is that a reflection of this highly complicated structure that we have with insurers, and the people actually paying are not the ones who are the patients?
Andrew Ferguson 46:15 ↗
So, look, we've been examining these markets now for quite a while since I became chairman. And it is not uniformly the case that no hospital or other provider is not providing prices. There are some hospital systems and some providers where you can go in advance, sometimes to the website, and pull down lists of prices for particular procedures — procedures you would schedule in advance. Emergent care, which is nowhere near the majority of care provided by America's healthcare providers, is sort of a different animal. But for outpatient or other scheduled and advanced services, there are some hospitals that are doing this, and we've talked with them. And what we've learned is that they think they do attract at least marginal additional customers who are price-conscious, who are not in an acute condition, not subject to tremendous emotional or physical strain, and therefore have time to look around. And I think that consumers are becoming more price-conscious as this just becomes a larger and larger chunk of everyone's sort of annual personal expenditure. But I also think if all of the hospitals, or if most hospitals, are generally of the view that other hospitals are not going to do this — I mean, look, the reason that you would want to give your price upfront is to try to snatch a customer who might otherwise go shop at someone with a different price. But if you, a hospital, are aware that most of your competitors are not going to be offering their prices upfront, then you run a risk. If you offer your price upfront, someone might see it, unaware that it's similar to the prices being offered by your competitors, and go, "Oh, that's outrageously expensive. I better go somewhere else." Now, other consumers might be like, "Oh, I actually know what the prices are other places. This is great. I'm going to go there." But if you are a hospital, you're running a terrible risk in the other direction. And if your competitors are not doing it, you have this collective action problem that I mentioned in the speech, which is: I don't want to be the first mover here because I might lose customers on that basis. And look, we can have a debate, and the West has been having a debate for more than 2,000 years about the proper role of government, the proper relationship of government to the governed. But at the very least, I think that all citizens of goodwill can agree that one of government's main jobs is to solve collective action problems that can't possibly be solved on their own. And if the problem here is that no hospital has an individual incentive to be the one that's going to start offering all of its prices upfront, that is when the government — and I would hope all citizens of goodwill could agree — should step in. It promotes competition. It promotes certainty. It promotes good customer will toward the hospital. If you know what you're getting into at the front end, even when it's very expensive, at least you won't experience the horror that so many in this room have probably felt, or your families have felt, which is you went in with a vague understanding of what you're going to pay, and then the bill arrives months later, and you're facing very difficult decisions about how am I going to pay this without trading off other very important parts of my life because of how expensive this is.
Harold Fert Scott Roth 49:29 ↗
I could go on all day asking questions, but that would not be fair to anyone. So, let me open up the floor to questions. And do we have a microphone here? Hold on. Lady here, and then the lady in the back. And please identify yourself for our viewing audience.
Randy Day 49:53 ↗
Hi. My name's Randy Day. I know you're involved in many other projects right now, and on very many commissions, but I thought it was interesting when you did bring in like rehab and senior care and other things. Price disclosure can be very hard to discover when you're trying to help an elderly loved one. But what's to me has been quite shocking with recent personal experience is having a patient in an emergency room of a hospital, and you know they've been there before, and they are reimbursed by Medicare to have the hospital and the physician in the ER call you if you have the POA to tell you that your loved one cannot stay overnight, even though she arrived in an ambulance on a journey a couple hours before, and you got in a conversation with them because you were not in a taking-no-prisoners mood on the subject 3,000 miles away, that it was going to affect their Medicare reimbursement. There's absolutely no way seniors in this country in any of these cases — and we're not, I don't care whether you're affluent or not — have any way of understanding what's going on with the new term that's being thrown around. It's called Medicare churn, churning beds to get Medicare reimbursement. And it really flows through as well to the amount of prescriptions that the companies, insurance companies, are selling them and that they leave the hospital with, which is shocking. They have no prior information of that. And sometimes they'll leave with 15 unnecessary medications. No one's reviewed them. And then to your point, they all of a sudden get the bill from the pharmacy as to what's reimbursed and what is not reimbursed. So how — I know this is a bigger leap, but the hidden costs of the Medicare situation, which we already know is basically bankrupt anyway. How do we address this if you're trying to guide somebody in your family or in business? What can you comment on that? I know that's a difficult question.

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APA

Ferguson, A. (2026, October 7). Anticompetitive and Deceptive Conduct in Healthcare with FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson [Interview transcript]. Hudson Institute. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3004769/

MLA

Andrew Ferguson. "Anticompetitive and Deceptive Conduct in Healthcare with FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson." Hudson Institute, 7 Oct. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3004769/.

BibTeX
@misc{ferguson2026_3004769,
  author       = {Andrew Ferguson},
  title        = {Anticompetitive and Deceptive Conduct in Healthcare with FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Hudson Institute. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {oct},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3004769/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}