Welcome to Blue Chip Dialogues. I'm Garrett Jones, chief economist at Blue Chip. And my guest today is the excellent Tyler Cowen. He's a professor of economics at George Mason University, also my colleague, and he's been extremely helpful to me over the years, in particular by being an adviser to Blue Chip. So, welcome. Welcome, Tyler. And I want to start off with a question that comes from Paul Krugman's recent blog post. He's been blogging about stablecoins a little bit. He said the only reason for stablecoins is to facilitate criminal activity. I'd like to get your reaction to that.
First, happy to see you, Garrett, and thank you for all the great work you do. I think there are few issues where Krugman is more wrong than that one. He's been saying that for many years, and I think he's just locked into his opinions. So the estimates I see is stablecoin payments, which mostly business-to-business, will be about 70 to 90 billion dollars this year.
Now is that a little or is that a lot?
You could think about the level. You could think about the impressive rate of change, but that is all legal. It is motivated by lowering transaction costs and convenience. It's not criminal activity. And the market capitalization of USDT and USDC taken together recently was estimated at over $200 billion. You now have Visa, Mastercard, and Stripe with an active presence in stablecoin areas. Those are very new projects. It's fair to say we don't know how well they will do. They're entirely legal, not motivated by anything criminal. So just the actual facts are so strongly against what Krugman says, in a sense, I don't know where to start. So I think one should be quite agnostic about most of these issues and how stablecoins and other financial innovations will evolve. But let's at least start by getting the facts straight. Stablecoins have gone quite legitimate.
Yeah, I think that's something that's just been amazing to watch over the last couple of years. Even when it was in a way less legitimate, when stablecoins — and to this day they still are being used mostly to clear transactions for people who were just basically gambling in stablecoins, people who are engaging in high-speed transactions buying Bitcoin or Ethereum or whatnot, and then they use a stablecoin as the clearing medium. Like, to some people that's less exciting morally because it's a form of gambling, it's pure finance in a sense, right? But even that is not criminal activity, and that's the overwhelming majority of transactions right now. You're right that of course B2B are growing, but I think he has a sort of thing where he's moralizing purely financial transactions, which I don't think that's good economics.
And even the decentralized finance, I don't think we should assume it's all unproductive. Again, I think agnosticism is the correct attitude. But for the United States, it's very important that we remain the world's number one financial center, in my opinion. Right now, until the Trump administration, we had pushed that activity overseas, and it was not really contributing to us being the number one financial center. But over time that matters, and it could be that if you want to be and stay the number one financial center, you just need a lot of froth around the edges of your most productive activities. And you can always pick out pieces of froth, or also high-frequency trading — oh, that's no good, or what good does that do.
And always pick to particular things, but if we take the Jim Buchanan insight that you're thinking in terms of rules and systems, and the froth comes with the meat. The froth might be part of what helps you keep your dominant position. So again, I'm not sure how significant that is, but we shouldn't dismiss it as an argument, and it could be quite a good thing for the future of this country and the future of the dollar if we could bring more of that crypto activity within the United States and the US legal system.
Yeah, I think that's a good general rule, right? This distinction between froth and meat is important. People have a tough time identifying the borderline between the two, and anytime you choose a cut, you're pretty likely to cut off some stuff that you would have found in a deeper analysis was actually really valuable. So you've written — you wrote a book with Randy Crosner in 1994 or so. That's when it came out at least, dates from much earlier. So what was your first paper together in that project?
It was called "The Development of the New Monetary Economics," published in the Journal of Political Economy, 1987, I believe.
Okay. And it argued there was this new approach to thinking about money that emphasized the distinction between medium of exchange and medium of account. And we traced the history of that approach through the history of economic thought. So who are the biggest names early on who were into this distinction? And can you explain that distinction between medium of exchange and medium of account?
In most normal monetary transactions, the two are together in the same asset. So you might say pay with a dollar bill, and the price is marked in terms of dollars, and it says say $1, and you hand over $1, you get the thing, you give up the money. That's a very naive way of using money. It works fine. What you're handing over is the medium of exchange, the dollars. But there's also dollar as a medium or unit of account. That is, the price is $1, $10, $500. And those are two distinct functions of money, and they can be separated. And we see more and more often with crypto that in fact they are separated. In many contexts this works just fine or is even preferable. And that's a monetary innovation that Crosner and I, dating back to the 1980s, said was likely to be the future of money.
So where do you — now, who were the earliest people?
I think the very earliest reference we found was actually in the French political theorist Montesquieu, who pointed this out in the middle of the 18th century. But more significantly, there were a group of American theorists, often broadly libertarian, some British theorists — Benjamin Tucker, Henry Dunning Macleod, Hugo Pilgrim — in the early 20th century that had a lot of these ideas. They were picked up by some classical liberal Germans like Heinrich von Storch. And these people argued that money was going to continue evolving. It would take some forms that would look rather strange. It might be backed by private sector assets and private sector goods. You would often have this separation between what is the medium of exchange and medium of account, and they predicted all of this a very long time ago, and no one had really paid attention to these theorists. So what Crosner and I wanted to do was unearth that tradition and try to learn from it.
So you've traveled a lot of places and seen, engaged in a lot of unusual money transactions as a result. How often do you see this around the world where people will post a price in dollars but accept payment in the local currency or vice versa?
The most common thing you will see is in tourist areas, especially in the Caribbean, parts of Latin America, you can pay with dollars. But anytime you're buying something with a credit card while abroad, in essence, you're seeing a price denominated in British pounds, Japanese yen, whatever, and you end up paying with dollars, and it's quite seamless. You don't give it much of a second thought, and it simply works. So that would be the main time it happens. It's something we regard now as fairly automatic. The question is how far should that extend into a monetary system. My general view is to let competition determine that question, and you're going to see a mix. I think most ordinary transactions — oh, you buy a latte at Starbucks — that's just going to be dollar, and that's fine, but it's not the only thing you'll see in your monetary system.
Yeah. So when over the — since 2009, since the rise of Bitcoin and whatnot, a lot of people have wondered whether people would start doing something like this, making Bitcoin payments that are denominated in dollars, using Bitcoin as a means of payment but still using dollars as a unit of account. That hasn't taken off. Similarly, like to draw on more of what you talk about in the book, there's no equivalent of people, say, keeping their wealth in an S&P 500 and paying people with stocks, paying people with stock transactions, but then denominating those in dollars. Those things never really took off. And I thought of that as a possible endgame of this new monetary economics. So, why do you think something like that hasn't happened? Was that just speculation more than a practical plan? What do you think?
I don't think either of those were ever convenient. The most likely path we might have seen, and to some extent did see, is to use money market funds rather than, say, stock shares. Now, it so happens we do not typically pay people with money market fund checks or wire transfers, but we could. It's not an incredibly difficult thing to do. You can wire funds from your money market account rather easily. But what's the advantage in terms of dollars has not been established. But more recently with crypto, and I would just say globalization more generally, we see some big advantages to using something like stablecoins rather than just trying to do everything through a mix of US dollars and the US banking system. So just two simple examples. If I want to send a remittance to Mexico, which I do pretty frequently, it's a pain in the neck and I pay a high commission. Crypto has the potential, and sometimes the reality, of lowering those costs a lot. There's a lot of foreign banking systems that are just crummy. So through Emergent Ventures, I'm pretty often sending money transfers to Ukraine. If you want to send a money transfer to Argentina, especially, or Brazil, which is one of the richer poor countries, it doesn't go very well. In many instances, you would have lower costs doing it through USDT or USDC, using stablecoins. So the more you're dealing with screwy banking systems around the world, which is occasionally the US, the greater the desire to do this through some kind of crypto.
Treating stablecoins as not dollars is in a way a little bit weird, right? Because we're used to the idea that stablecoins ultimately turned out to be a libertarian fantasy of money, which is 100% reserve-backed currency. And when people are making transactions with that, looking at the well-run ones at least, at what point should one be thinking of them as just basically money itself, as US dollars themselves, the same way that I treat checking account clearing as US dollars even though they're not US currency?
I don't feel they're exactly that. For one thing, they're not FDIC insured or even implicitly backed by the Fed, though they may end up being that. But there's this funny trigger kind of equilibria in stablecoins. So you can ask, are they fixed nominal value? Most of the time they are, but they succeed in being fixed nominal value in part because they are not. So if the backing becomes more uncertain, the price of the stablecoin can fall. It won't be pegged strictly one-to-one to the US dollar. And that's a warning sign to markets. So often what has happened with Tether is the company will take some actions to shore up its reputation, convince people it's quite well capitalized, and the price has gone back to one over time. But that's not metaphysically necessary what happens.
So this mixed notion of it is fixed in nominal value. It isn't. You could even say it's a galleon. And to the extent it stays fixed, it's because it has the potential not to be fixed, that price signals tell you when you need to worry. So that's a rather complicated exposition, but I do think it's different than, say, I have a dollar in my local checking account, but it seems it works. In a lot of cases, the markets prefer that. And the live price signals really are — they give the market a chance to vote on this all the time. If it weren't for FDIC insurance, which has worked basically perfectly, then it seems like there'd be a lot of value in having market signals on the value of checking accounts from all the major top 20 banks in the US. We don't have that signal right now.
That's right. Now, you make a point FDIC insurance has worked perfectly. I agree. But I would like to stress there are many countries, and wealthy Western European countries, where deposit insurance is quite slow and has some residual uncertainty. It's not a perfect system where they come in over the weekend, clean things up, and you write a check on your account the next day.
Yeah. Yeah. So even in those cases, in many countries you might prefer stablecoins to the prevailing system of deposit insurance. Though I would say for the US that's one area where we've done a very good job. Yeah. Six-month delay on getting your money matters a lot when the point of having checking accounts is the liquidity.
That's right. Another advantage of crypto, as you well know, is the markets are open 24/7, and there's plenty of cases where that's of some value, and I think the logical expectation is just for use of stablecoins to grow.
Yeah, it seems right that the idea that people take it so much for granted that financial transactions should be 24/7. If I'm getting Amazon deliveries and it tells me it'll show up between 4 and 6 in the morning, why can't I get my money outside of traditional banking hours? So that's something that'll matter, of course, especially when you're doing international transactions.
Now, there's a general point I want to make. I don't know if you're going to ask me about it, but I think it's quite important. I've been thinking about this a lot lately. So, people say you let stablecoins in the door, they're run-prone. Now, regulation may or may not fix that, but let's put aside regulation. It's true that many assets can be run, but keep in mind the alternative. So right now in the US, banks used to be the major form of lending, and they have shrunk to about 20% of lending in the US. So 80% of the sector is something other than FDIC-insured banks. It could be private equity. It could be different forms of commercial credit. Those structures are in principle run-prone. The EU is now running stress tests on them. So if you choke off innovation in your banking and payment system, you will push lending out of it into more run-prone structures. So it might be true that if you let in more stablecoins, some parts of your system are more run-prone. But if you don't let in this kind of innovation, you will nonetheless end up with the situation where your financial system is more run-prone. Now, you could argue which is better or worse, but everyone's trying to say, 'Oh, stablecoins, that makes everything more run-prone.' That really does not have to be the case.
Yeah. But this gets back to that 100% reserve fantasy coming true, right? The big — by dollar volume, the vast majority of stablecoin dollars are held, are run by orgs that are 100%, overwhelmingly 90-plus percent backed by US treasuries. And those are, whether they're perfectly safe or not, they're the same unit of account. They're measured in the same units as their liability, the stablecoins. And Circle is very credibly audited. Tether is maybe getting there. We'll see. At least they have an attestation. So there's some evidence that like they've solved, they've taken steps to solve these basic trust problems. We're backing things with normal assets. We're not backing it by Bitcoin. And then we have audited values. We have audited values where you can see the stuff's there. That is a banking system that libertarians fantasized about for a long time. Isn't that pretty hard to have a run on?
Yes. But I do have some concerns as crypto grows over time, you will have more diverse offerings. And in fact, I myself might want ones that are higher yield and higher risk, just like I might buy a portfolio of junk bonds. And then you do get something run. And as you well know, the House and Senate, they're considering stablecoin legislation. I think this would be a good idea. It would essentially mandate 100% reserves backed by high-quality assets. There's such a thing as off-balance sheet risk. We saw run issues with money market funds. The financial system is highly complex. What is actually a corporation is not as simple as it seems. So I don't think we should conclude just all will be fine and well, and there won't be this issue of it being run-prone. I think to some extent there will be, but I don't expect it will be fundamentally different than most of the rest of our financial system. You just cannot have everything run through FDIC-insured banks. People need to wake up to that reality.
Yeah. It's just too big a promise. Is that your biggest concern, that it's just too big a promise to be credible? The FDIC, if you try to ensure the entire real economy, like, a, we can't afford it without the risk of hyperinflation, and b, it's not credible, c, the amount of monitoring they would have to undergo would be insane, and d, there'd be massive moral hazards — like four big reasons why that can't be done.
So I think there's this nostalgia for a time when banks and non-banks were quite separate, the banks were quite controlled and rigidly guaranteed, like that worked fairly well, but just as you have economic growth, you can't keep that system forever. And that's the wakeup call we need. I worry crypto people are a little too enthusiastic. They think crypto stablecoins are like clearly the best way to grow the system. I would retreat to my point about agnosticism, but we should allow it to start and see how it goes. Absolutely.
Yeah. So you're in a way, you're making a point in a way that the Genius Act, which is mandating these precise rules about what assets you can have, might be locking in the system before there can be enough innovation.
That's right. So even though I favor that legislation, I'm nervous about it. I'm also nervous about the idea that there's no interest to be paid on stablecoins as a matter of law. I don't know if you're old enough to remember the time when you would open a checking account and the bank would give you a toaster.
Uh-huh. I do remember this. Yes. That was a kind of implicit interest. So probably we'll see a more modern version of that with stablecoins.
Ironically, it could induce innovation. So since you can't pay people direct interest, you might give them more services. It could be the spur to good innovation, but it also could be a spur to bad innovation. We'll see how that develops. But when you have a complete quantity control on the backing and a price control on no interest being allowed, it's not to me a very libertarian fantasy. It's a form of highly regulated narrow banking. I do want to see the experiment, but we should not regard that as the final word either.
The Genius Act then is basically bringing us back to the bad old days of Regulation Q, the de facto ban on interest payments for people who had checking accounts in the US. And until the early 1980s, to tell the audience, it was more or less illegal to pay interest on checking accounts. And one side effect of that is that whenever interest rates rose, as they did a lot in the 1970s, people had a really strong incentive to try to disintermediate their cash, to get wealth out of checking accounts because they can't pay any interest. So, it's possible that multiplied, it worsened the tightening effects of monetary policy in the 1970s because it tended to destroy check accounts.
And back then, as possibly will occur in the future, it can make the solvency and liquidity of these institutions too dependent on interest rates. If we're at ZERP and the rates are zero anyway, the legal prohibition doesn't matter. If rates then rise sharply, big shifts in intermediation that aren't really market driven. And that's another concern I have.