institutions are not quite running as smoothly as either we might like or we might fear. We have these weird things happening with Nvidia. If you look at prediction markets for what the Anthropic IPO will go for, it's not flying above two trillion.
Do you expect the growth to continue or do you think a leveling up?
Benefits will exceed costs, but it will take some time and the path will be quite a bit more normal than many people would have you believe.
What you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence. It's the ability of these agents to coordinate with one another. There's this idea of agentic swarms, but if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating. They're mostly just doing parallel processing.
Often the faster that some things move, that just means you hit the real bottlenecks more quickly. If you ask me the question, when will agents be 10% of GDP? I don't think it's soon.
What do the two different worlds look like? One in which GDP growth is a bit more normal and another in which it actually becomes double digit.
Alex, Tyler, welcome to the a16z podcast.
Thanks. Thanks for having us.
So, there's a lot to talk about. First, let's talk about some timely topics. The METR report came out. There's been a lot of conversation. Paul Cristiano has talked and tweeted. There's a lot of sort of unrest and anxiety around sort of the state of AI right now and RSI. And I'm curious, Alex, what is your reaction to what we are seeing and where do you stand on some of the proclamations being made right now?
So I mean, I read it closely. I think it's undeniable that we're having incredible progress and that the progress is accelerating. I think anybody who's looking at the model releases, they're becoming more frequent. They're becoming more powerful. The capabilities are going from like last November to this November. It's just an unrecognizable world, especially with the difference between like agentic AI and the chatbot era. You're seeing what's coming out of companies when you have data coming out on the difference between the chatbot era versus the agentic era. You're seeing real productivity now. Like with the chatbot, you're kind of using it almost like a fancy version of Wikipedia or something like that. You're asking it questions, it gives you answers. With an agentic system, you're seeing actual work, and that level of work, the ability of these systems to actually do the work, is just progressing so quickly. And you're seeing a lot of hockey sticks, basically. And that's what the METR report showed, is that look, here's another hockey stick. So to me, to tell you the truth, I didn't update too much from the METR report because a lot of the data in the METR report has been around in other spaces. So the S1 statement, we knew about some of the unreleased models. So I didn't update too much, but that's because I was kind of already there.
Is your view that the hockey sticks that you're identifying, that they will just sort of continuously grow, go up? At what point might they peter out? Or, you know, sort of how bullish are you from here on some of these hockey sticks maintaining?
So I mean, like, the thing that you said, some of these hockey sticks, I think the main term is like, where are the hockey sticks going to be? How are they connected? So in the METR report, to me, the key phrase was unwell-verified, you know, unspecified tasks. The big question is like, what about less specified tasks? A lot of work is not well specified. I'm not one of those people who thinks this is like, all right, we're safe on the non-well-specified side. I think the models are becoming increasingly better on non-very-well-specified tasks as well, but I think, you know, it might be harder to do hockey sticks on those sort of tasks. There's also a lot of questions of like tacit knowledge, kind of Hayekian concerns about like the actual impact on the economy. I think, you know, Tyler and I are both economists, so all of this information I have to kind of sift through about what these hockey sticks mean for economics and what does it mean for economically valuable tasks. And the big questions for me are like, every model iteration, what are the economically valuable tasks that this model is unlocking that the previous model wasn't unlocking? And this is kind of captured very imperfectly by the hockey stick. So you can get a hockey stick that looks crazy on a benchmark and then you're not really seeing a lot of acceleration in the real world. We're not there yet. I think we're seeing a lot of acceleration in the real world. But these are just, you know, some of the questions that I have.
Tyler, let's go to you. I feel like you've been a more sober voice in the conversation. Alex hasn't been sober, but I just mean, have you updated at all based on what's been happening here, or what is your view?
Well, often the faster that some things move, that just means you hit the real bottlenecks more quickly. So, I don't update that frequently, but this is AI land, and in AI land, the exact dates really matter. So, we're recording on November 11th, 2026. And that matters. I would say since August, I've changed my views a fair amount, most of all because of the math problems. So, progress in areas where there are not many human bottlenecks, I see much more rapid progress and the ability to create a new model that is clearly better, say, within something like three weeks. I hadn't thought that would happen as quickly as it had. So I would date that to a few months ago. But if you mean over the last week, the METR report... bearish, we have these weird things happening with Nvidia. I have no prediction, but it will slow down the sector a bit. If you look at prediction markets for what the Anthropic IPO will go for, they bounce up and down, but it's not flying above two trillion. You look at Anthropic's own projected revenue numbers. I forget the exact numbers. I wouldn't say I was underwhelmed, but they're not numbers that you would expect under the super fast takeoff scenarios. And that's for their IPO. So, I'd say I'm like 1% more bearish over the course of the last week than I was a week ago for those reasons. Just the institutions are not quite running as smoothly as either we might like or we might fear, depending on your point of view.
Are either the sort of growth rates of OpenAI and Anthropic... is your sort of base case that over the last, let's say, you know, two or three years that those growth rates continue? And put aside the specific companies, but I more mean just the leading AI companies, like the sort of economic impact that we've seen, you know, whether those two companies, you know, maintain the lead. Of course, they're competing with the hyperscalers too. Do you expect the growth to continue or do you think a leveling out?
Well, I was in the Bay Area a few weeks ago and many people were pushing very high revenue numbers on me and I asked them all the following question. I said, 'What are the other sectors that are going to grow sufficiently rapidly to justify the extreme revenue numbers you're giving me for Anthropic and OpenAI?' And no one had an answer for that question. They didn't even try to give me answers. So, I think that means the extreme revenue numbers are false. That doesn't make me bearish on the sector as a whole. I'm still bullish. I think it will be fine. Those are great companies. But at the end of the day, you look at market data, whether it's real interest rates, stock prices, anything, market data still look pretty normal. And the whole world investing community is talking about AI. It's not some kind of weird mystery like it was back in 2014 where you could say, I read a LessWrong blog post and now I'm really wealthy because I did. So I trust the judgment of the market more than the judgment of the Bay Area people who don't think that carefully about social interactions. So that's where I stand. It'll change the whole world. Benefits will exceed costs, but it will take some time and the path will be quite a bit more normal than many people would have you believe.
Yeah, and just to add to that, I think Tyler is exactly spot on in the fact that like you need to start seeing the productivity numbers in the rest of the economy to justify the revenue increases. So at some point the rest of the economy needs to be willing to pay for that product, and that increasing willingness to pay has to be from increasing productivity in the rest of the economy. And we haven't really seen too much evidence of that. Not to say that it won't happen, but it does need to happen at some point. The other part about it is competition. So I think what's started to happen particularly in the last few months is extreme price competition from the frontier labs. As far as like before, they were just trying to compete on like who has the better model, and now that the models are being used by an increasing number of enterprises and they're becoming quite expensive because agentic AI, by the way, uses way more tokens. So now companies are, you know, OpenAI, Anthropic, they're trying, you know, Mistral is in the game, DeepMind is in the game, trying to actually say like, 'No, we're offering a cheaper model that's as good or maybe even like a little bit better or maybe a little bit worse.' And so you're seeing token prices come down a lot. And so, you know, RAMP has a really nice data set to track these things. And you saw exponential increases in token usage and flat revenue numbers, right? Where's that coming from? It's because of price competition. So at the frontier, you're seeing way more price competition than you used to like six months ago.
And the very recent elections, I think those are being overplayed. I think a lot of data centers still will proceed, but I think it will slow things down a bit. There's greater likelihood of regulation, or somewhat tougher regulation, or regulation a bit sooner, or Trump, you know, giving on the issue of guardrails. To me, it's not a major force, but again, it's going to make me a modest bit more bearish on the sector in terms of speed of takeoff, revenue numbers, anything else.
By the way, while we're on the topic, did the midterms cause you to update anywhere else, Tyler? Or it kind of, you know, thermostatic back, you know, backlash is a thing and, you know, we should just expect these pendulum swings often.
Well, most of it I expected and indeed predicted, but Texas truly surprised me. I didn't think Texas would flip the way it did, and maybe I just haven't been to the state enough lately, but that was a shock.
Yeah. So, AI in the economy, you both talked about how, you know, you push back strongly against the idea of, say, you know, double-digit GDP growth at some point, due to your far more sober that, hey, it will be tremendously impactful for consumers. It will change a lot of things, but GDP growth, as you said a few minutes ago, it might be more normal than we might expect. But before getting into why that is, can you explain what would need to be true, or what do the two different worlds look like? One in which GDP growth is what we just said, a bit more normal, you know, and another in which it actually becomes double digit. And Alex, you were alluding to it a little bit, like paint that world to me of what it looks like if it's actually having, you know, massive impact on the economy.
There's a beautiful paper out there that outlines exactly the conditions you need for this like singularity-type growth by Ben Jones, Chad Jones, I believe Aghion is on that paper as well. And essentially what you need is a bunch of pretty knife-edge conditions to be met. Particularly the main one is essentially no real bottlenecks. And the main bottleneck that can't exist is the idea production function. So you can't get decreasing returns to ideas. So basically you go from like the old world where you have this technological breakthrough and then you kind of have decreasing returns to that technological breakthrough, to using that technological breakthrough to start creating more and more technological breakthroughs. So you need less resources while getting more and more technology and more and more production out of that technology. And so you basically have increasing returns rather than decreasing returns. And this is, you can actually estimate this parameter in the model. And if it's greater than one, you're in this like double-digit growth world. If it's less than one, you're in the standard kind of like diminishing returns single-digit growth world. And if you look at the data so far, including kind of the METR report, the data that's out there, and you take that data and you estimate this parameter, it is decidedly less than one. So this could change, and some people say it will change. And when you get the full RSI loop, this is exactly what that's going to change. But right now, you need increasingly more resources in order to eke out increasingly more intelligence out of these models.
I would add to that, you can look at cases where growth has been very high. So, not long ago, Guyana grew 40% in a year. That's crazy. But it's a tiny place selling one thing, oil. There's a brief period in the 80s where the US is growing over 8%. But that's coming out of a deep recession. After pandemics, after major wars, you can have temporarily high rates of growth. So if the US were to screw up in some way, or we had another pandemic, some kind of terrible war, some other weird event, and that combined with a burst of AI-driven growth that might have given us 3 to 4%. Like, could we for a year get to 10%? I'll say yes. I'd bet heavily against it, and the effect would be temporary, and a lot of it would come from getting out of the recession, war, or pandemic. But that's another way to think about it, fully consistent with what Alex was saying.
And if robotics emerge, would you have a similar view? Or because that, you know, is impacting more the real world, the real economy?
Well, I think that would likely come relatively slowly. Look at how long it takes to get a Waymo in Washington, D.C. We're still not there. And that's a pretty simple kind of robot. There's like forwards, backwards, and turns. And if you look, well, what are the valuations of robotic companies at? Way higher than it had been. Hard to estimate, but you don't just see them popping into trillion-dollar companies. I mean, you could count Tesla as a kind of robotics company, but the market data suggests, you know, it will happen. And it's making good progress, but not going to give us 20% growth like three or four years from now. No.
Right. And so the smartest people who are, you know, the biggest believers in sort of this runaway growth, you know, Dworkin, Leopold, you know, are our friends who believe that. What do you think they think differently? Is it that they have a different belief on the speed of technology? Is it that they believe that it will sort of overcome some of these bottlenecks? Or can you steelman the other side?
I think, and Tyler, please chime in. I think the argument, I'm going to get a bit technical here. It's about having something called homothetic or non-homothetic preferences. And basically, what that means is that if you look at kind of things that get automated in the past, what ends up happening is the thing that gets automated contributes less to growth. So let's say you have a million robots, let's bring robotics, the thing that they're making, because the price becomes cheaper, the thing that they're making ironically becomes a smaller part of the economy, and so they contribute less to growth. And so if you have non-homothetic preferences, which is this, you know, there was a really nice paper estimating these preferences using, you know, 200 years of data. What ends up happening is that let's say you have broad automation, people just, people, the value in the economy of what contributes to growth moves to the bottlenecks. That's just an inconvenient part of how growth is measured. And so the thing that's growing least will be contributing most to GDP. And that's why you get these sort of effects.
I agree with all that, but I would add a more sociological element. In my case, and I suspect Alex's, what is emotionally vivid in our minds is the long slog of human history, previous growth episodes, centuries of GDP data, productivity data. What I think is emotionally most salient probably for Dworkin, Leopold and many others is conversations they have in the Bay Area, which have real information. But when you ask the big question, you know, with which emotional salience will you make better predictions, I would opt for what Alex and I have stuffed our heads with over what they imbibe all the time. But of course, you know, they would take the other side of that.
Yeah. So basically what we're saying is when you look at the last few hundred years, the breakthrough technologies from electricity to sort of, you know, the internet to, you know, everything in between, they haven't led to runaway growth, basically, or if they did, it was because of sort of a, you know, it was a small base or, you know, after a war or something like this. I do think this will likely be quicker than those, but still...
You have a sense of the bottlenecks, whether it's the industrial revolution, history of the scientific revolution, implementation of electricity, the IRS still uses fax machines, and so on and so on. Try using edtech software, which I do all the time, it's a nightmare. They're not even up to, you know, how things should have been 10 years ago.
And that's not... regulation is not the problem. It's a problem, but just inertia is difficult to overcome. And so much of our economy, it's government, it's nonprofits, it can be highly regulated parts of the health care sector, higher ed, general schooling. When you actually have experience with how those work, you could say like, I don't know, 40% of the US economy is a kind of nightmare. In Europe, it could be higher, like in France. And those sectors might need to be that way for other reasons, but still, it's a big dose of realism that not everything is like startups.
Yeah. Let's say you were both tasked by the president to come up with a set of metrics that determine whether AI is, you know, leading to our country's flourishing, you know, broadly defined. Obviously, that's a very big question. But is GDP one of the main metrics you would think about? Like, should we be aspiring for it to have a big impact on GDP, or what are some of the metrics you would consider?
Yeah, I mean, so this is a really important question. So I think the other thing that I would add before even starting is like, I don't think Tyler and I really disagree with like the San Francisco consensus on like the capabilities. Like I think, you know, I don't... a lot of people hear Tyler and I or people like us talk and they're like, 'Oh, you're bearish on AGI' or something like that. That's absolutely not it. It's more about how that affects the economy and the structure of the real economy. And so thinking through like what measures we can be using, I think GDP historically has been a really good tracker of, you know, how basically human welfare and flourishing. It tracks pretty well with the gross domestic product. But what Erik Brynjolfsson, Avi Kohas and others have been kind of studying is the fact that technology has actually started to introduce this sort of wedge where a lot of the products that technology creates are basically free. And so they think about the sort of like digital entertainment and digital products, and then they have something called GDPB, which is, or GDP... I forgot the acronym. I'm sorry about that. But it's essentially, you take GDP and then you amend it with a kind of a survey-based measure to actually see how much other products that are not necessarily priced, or products that have become cheap or even free because of automation, how much the increased amount of those products is adding to human welfare. Because you could see a world where you're still kind of like in this four to, you know, 3 to 5% GDP range, which is already on the high side of the growth, but you have a world that's actually truly flourishing. Like, how do you pick that up? And I think the way to pick it up is through these alternative measures.
The longevity effects could well prove important. So Erik, say you live to 120. I don't think I'm going to make it. That will, in complicated ways, boost GDP, and even more complicated ways, possibly boost per capita GDP. But it is something distinct from GDP that you get all those extra years, and economics can value those years, and that's another way in which it may become more important to revise GDP. But I, you know, as Alex said, GDP will become somewhat less accurate over time as AI progresses, and we'll need to revise and improve it. But in the short run, it's just not that bad a measure. I like to say GDP is the most underrated statistic that there is.
Yeah. In the 2010s, Peter Thiel, you know, famously decried sort of the lack of progress in atoms relative to bits. But here we are, you know, 10 years, 15 years later, and we've got, you know, self-driving cars. We've, you know, early flying cars. We've got, you know, major, you know, the biggest companies are now hardware companies. You know, Nvidia, SpaceX, Tesla. Tyler, would you go so far as to say that, you know, that that isn't a concern as much anymore? Or how would you reflect on that 10 years later?
The atoms will break through, I would say almost for sure, but we still don't have them. Like the contribution of driverless cars to actual human welfare is tiny. Like the biggest contribution is that it's fun and you can tell your friends, 'I was in a Waymo.' It's not really better than an Uber. For me, it's a little worse because they go by the speed limit. It's fun in a science fiction kind of way. Most of America still doesn't have it. Europe, forget about it. So, we're still not there. That's the amazing thing. And it gets back to robotics also will be slow.
Yeah. I think I asked you 10 years ago, when would the great stagnation be over? And I think you said something along the lines of when we have self-driving cars. I can't remember if it was deployed or, you know, how sort of diffused it was, but you still believe that?
More or less. But that's a matter of degree, and they clearly work, and the new Tesla is pretty phenomenal. I've been in Alex's Cybertruck lately a few times, but in terms of market penetration, I don't know the numbers, but again, it's tiny.
Let's go back to a different topic. Alex recently wrote a related paper about, but I'll start with you, Tyler. The agent swarm topic, sort of the Hugging Face incident. Did that update your views in terms of what's possible, or make you get concerned about something, or any reactions to what happened there?
It didn't update my views much at all. And I'm curious to see if Alex agrees with this perspective. But as an economist, you think first and foremost in terms of principal-agent theory, and unless the conditions are very restrictive, the principal just can't control the agent that well, no matter what contract they try to write. So when we replicate that result with AIs, well, it's interesting, but I'm not very shocked. The answer was always going to be checks and balances and what we might call separation of powers in the political realm, not you have perfect alignment. So again, if you come at this from the economist's point of view, all the hand-wringing about alignment, like, yes, people should work on that a lot, but at the end of the day, you're like, 'Hey, I learned that when I was 17.' Like, okay, it's a real problem. But Alex, what's your thought on that?
I unfortunately did not learn that when I was 17. I think we once again agree. I think, you know, there's like these sort of different perspectives on this issue of how do you best... ultimately it's a question about like how do you best get AI to be in the service of humanity, right? That's the question, that's the question of alignment. And one kind of way of thinking about it is to get the models themselves aligned with like something like a constitution, that the models at an individual level are aligned in this way because they have the same preferences as the human beings that are deploying them. But another perspective, which is what Tyler mentioned, is like you align things. You don't, you almost like don't even care what the preferences of these agents are. They could be extremely individually misaligned, but you can create a mechanism around them where the incentives are such that the agent behaves in an aligned way. And this is the mechanism design perspective in economics, where like as a principal, I don't need the agent to want to help me necessarily. The agent could really, really want to just help themselves and do whatever they want. And the whole study of mechanism design is how do you create the system of checks and balances in order for the agent to still be working in the principal's interest. And I think that is... from the research that I've been seeing coming out of the labs, both like internally, externally, like a lot of people are thinking in this direction that we really need to take a mechanism design perspective. And as Tyler said, like I wasn't, you know, shocked by what happened.
I'm not aligned with the governor of Virginia, but it's a pretty well-run state and I'm happy here.
We have two-party competition, sort of, and it works.
Do you think the way that Anthropic or OpenAI or some of these companies, or just the sort of AI safety community thinks about alignment, do you think that is sort of not the right way to think about it, or confused in some sense?
Well, there's how they think about it and how they talk about it. And how they talk about it is way too shaped by Twitter, which can be quite hysterical. How they actually think about it, I believe, is a lot more reasonable than how it ever looks from the outside. So, I don't have some big speech about, oh, we've got to totally reform them. I think they're pretty practical. They're companies. They have IPOs coming up. They don't want to get sued too much. They don't want to be overregulated. We already have checks and balances, not all of them good, to be clear. But the reality is the actual problems we've seen, you know, the hacks, they're mostly coming, or maybe entirely coming, from evil human individuals where the AIs are doing what the humans told it to do, and that is a huge problem. But that is a kind of, well, we have the alignment, the evil human says do this and the AI does this, and that's where the costs are coming from.
Yes. Some people make the comparison that alignment is in some ways for the employees. It's sort of like, or safety in general is like in 2020, 2021, and sort of around that time, there was, you know, sort of more awareness around social issues, and so CEOs had to sort of say these things to please their employee base. And, you know, some of them were true believers and some of them weren't. And similarly, perhaps around AI safety, there's a lot of concern, and so some people are making that comparison that the CEOs aren't as true believers as they may be indicating.
There's checks and balances in these companies as well. It's partly why the companies work well, that you have to actually end up pushing through things that will work, and that's somewhat different than what everyone is saying. And there's a winnowing and selection set of mechanisms within the company, and people want promotions or bonuses, and they want to do things that can work. And again, it will end up going better than how it will sound on Twitter, I would say.
Yeah. And I think like Hugging Face is like a perfect example of like if you unpack like what actually happened, it's just a bunch of human error on top of human error, right? And so like it's great to have an incident, I mean great in quotes, but it didn't like cause a massive disaster, right? And it exposed a lot of like, you know, broken incentives for the agents. So it was, you know, you see how, you know, the companies have reacted to the Hugging Face by learning from it and creating better environments. And so this is, nothing is smooth. It'll be kind of a little bit down, a little bit up, but, you know, the slope is positive.
I mean, some people, you know, Paul Cristiano, I think, said in his speech, he's like, the most likely cause of death, you know, a year from now or two years from now will be an AI-related death. And that to you sounds sort of, you know, historical. Strong disagree.
Yeah. Alex, let's go deeper on your paper. Why don't you share some of the findings that you had and some of the questions that still remain.
Yeah. So, like the paper, I believe you're talking about the organizing intelligence paper. Yeah. With Andrew Koh and my colleague Shane Lee. And basically the idea of that paper is that it starts with this kind of puzzle that, you know, AI is becoming very capable on particular dimensions, but we don't still see any like visible economic transformation. And the first kind of thing that we start with is that there's been this focus on individual agent benchmarks without kind of thinking about what those agents are actually competing with in the economy, where the thing that's the competitive, the relevant competitive unit is not the agent, it's the organization. And the organization historically has been referred to as a form of superintelligence because of this concept called Ricardian comparative advantage. So basically, if you have a bunch of jobs, the person who does the job is not the average person, it's the person who's best suited for it. So like the envelope of the intelligence in an organization is way better than if you kind of average across the population. And so these AI agents are basically competing against forms of human organizations or teams of humans. And so you shouldn't compare an individual-level benchmark to how well a human does something. It should be across the entire kind of what we call mosaic intelligence. So the thing that we... so then we kind of start layering on like what sort of how do capability improvements will actually affect the economy in equilibrium. So this is a formal theoretical paper and we look at...
different levels of intelligence. So we start with minimal AGI where the AI models are as good as average human capability on every single dimension. So minimal AGI, and we show that even when you get to this point, you're not going to have a huge impact on the economy because again, because the organizations are not the average human ability. They're better than that. And so what you're going to start seeing is actually wages change because you know production becomes cheaper, and so that's going to affect human wages. And so what we show is that what you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence, like ability on particular tasks to change. It's the ability of these agents to coordinate with one another.
If you look at Hugging Face and even like how the solutions to the millennium problems, there's this idea of agentic swarms, right? But if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating. They're not coordinating. They're mostly just doing parallel processing. And if you have benchmarks specifically on coordination, you could actually show that one agent does better than two agents splitting the work even if they can communicate. Whereas if you give the same thing to two people, they actually have division of labor, they communicate, and they do way better than one person with double the resources. So the agents are still pretty bad at coordinating. But if they get better at coordinating, you can basically break the Coasean ceiling on firm size and you can get very, very different firms to emerge. So that's the basic premise: is that once coordination becomes better, the economic space of possibilities of what firms look like, what happens to wages, what happens to employment, that's when the real kind of visible changes are going to happen.
And what's the biggest bottleneck to figuring out coordination at the moment?
To be honest, I don't know. I think it could be as simple as that it's not being trained into the models, it's not part of post-training. I actually don't have any insight on that.
Yeah, we've talked about some areas where you agree. I'm trying to find some areas where there's some difference of opinion. Maybe let's try employment. Alex, I think you're more worried about sort of the transition happening so fast that there might be something sudden happen on the employment side, or when do you share your concerns or views?
I'm basically worried about the potential, and again, like I actually agree quite a bit with Tyler that things are potentially going to move pretty slowly as far as like the effect on the real economy. But if there is a fast transition, like let's say there's a breakthrough in coordination, what we show in that paper is that if there's a breakthrough in coordination, there is the potential for wages and employment to suddenly... there's like a phase transition as far as what will happen to the economy. In that case, there still will be new sectors and new potential opportunities, but the sort of rematching that we have in the economy, that you know because of transitions that used to take quite a long time, the sort of rematching doesn't have an opportunity to happen. So you have these larger pools of unemployment, and that leads to kind of these recursive loops where people kind of get scarred out of the labor market. So that's my personal worry, but you know, as far as that's a scenario that I'm worried about, likelihood is kind of a different story.
I have a related worry. It's close to the same thing, I think, but it's just hard to tell right now if you're hiring someone. Will the person be good at AI?
The skills they used to need, we had imperfect indicators. Oh, they went to Cornell, or they got all A's, or they had a good interview. And now the skill, will they be mentally flexible enough to pick up AI? You know, we don't know often. So that could increase the natural rate of unemployment. Good matches will be harder, search will take longer. I don't think that problem will be with us forever. Eventually the AIs themselves will figure it out and there'll be certifications for how good a person is in AI. But in the transition, everyone's a novice. You might be like, well established, the way a lot of people in the tech world are, but otherwise we're all novices at this very important new skill.
And so I guess what does that mean for, and I guess I'm curious how you think about sort of employment, wages, sort of yeah, these questions.
Well, some additional slowness in hiring people, but there'll be an incredible number of new projects, new jobs. So I'm pretty bullish actually, and labor markets have been fine. So, but of course there'll be disruptions and transition problems as there always are, as there were with the China shock, the industrial revolution. So I expect a new set of those. A bunch of them we haven't even figured out or seen yet, but they'll come. Absolutely.
To what extent will there be just sort of an explosion of agents sort of buying, transacting with other agents in this kind of like almost parallel economy? And you know, there's so many more of them. They're 24/7. And to the extent that you know agents become the dominant sort of impact or sort of force on the internet, and like what is the right mental model of thinking about what that will look like or what that won't look like?
I don't know what you mean by the word explosion. If you ask me the question when will agents be 10% of GDP, I don't think it's soon. Now if they rose from basically zero to 6%, you could call that an explosion. 6% of GDP is enormous. Even that doesn't seem that soon. If it's like one and a half percent, I could see that, I don't know, within five years. Just if you're going to force me to give guesses, you could call one and a half percent an explosion. GDP is huge. That's one of the core insights of economics. GDP is huge. It's huge.
Yeah. And I mean like even with the agents that we have now, they're already incredibly capable, like the sort of consumer grade things that live on your phone. But you know, that's the thing, like there's just completely unintuitive bottlenecks out there, like the websites are designed for human beings and they're all different. And so you know you're still getting into issues with where your super smart agent is like booking you a flight, booking you a seat right next to the toilet every single time. Every single time. And then you're like, I don't want to use an agent next time.
Or the fact that there's all of this regulation out there. I mean that's the big one, right? So like agents, companies are spending billions of dollars trying to do basic choice architecture on their website in order to upsell humans on products, right? They don't want to... agents don't have the same psychology and so they're not going to be prone to this sort of choice architecture. So these platforms have an incentive not to allow, you know, somebody else's agent to go in and shop for them. And you're already kind of seeing it. So like if you pull up Muse or something like that, it can't shop on Amazon for you.
I don't use agents to manage my calendar, although they could, because I want to know mentally in my mind what's coming each day. And the only way I can remember is if I have to write it down in extra time on my calendar. And that's stupid. That's my flaw. But I don't think it's going away. And the agents could be 10 times better, whatever that means. And I'm still going to want to write it on my calendar. So I think, oh, December 18th, I'm seeing a Renaissance music concert. And I know that off the top of my head. So there are these funny indivisibilities in how we allocate our attention, but are often some of the biggest bottlenecks.
Going back to the regulation part, you seem more sober that this sort of, the midterms, you know, might not lead to sort of, you know, data centers stalling indefinitely. I'm curious just for your broader thoughts on AI sentiment. How much of the negativity is real in the sense that it will lead to, you know, we saw like Bloomington, you know, trying to outlaw usage of it as well to some degree. Like what are your thoughts here on sort of what's, how you should think about the political economy of that?
Well, we have 50 states, there's counties, there's cities, there's even other countries. It seems it will slow down a bit but still basically go through. Even the new Texas governor is already backtracking, like, well, we just want the labor unions involved. They need to pay good wages. You know, the projects we have now will go ahead. The others we're going to look at again. Josh Shapiro, the rhetoric was very strong. The reality is quite different. So it raises costs, but I don't think ultimately it will matter that much. But will there be a bunch of places that absolutely say no? Probably. But again, 50 states, I'm glad we have them. Maybe you'll end up with 52.