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Tyler Cowen
Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics; Chairman, Mercatus Center, George Mason University

Tyler Cowen on AI, the Future of Work, and Why We Trade Too Much | WealthCon2026 Fireside

📅 Oct 22, 2026 Elm Wealth 46 MIN 1378 VIEWS 83 SEGMENTS · 3 SPEAKERS
Economist Tyler Cowen joins Victor Haghani at WealthCon2026 for a conversation on how AI may change work and leisure, and why investors tend to trade more than they should. They also cover the global fertility crisis, government debt, effective altruism, and how Tyler invests his own money. Presented by Elm Wealth as part of WealthCon2026 - exploring the intersection of academic finance, investing, and wealth. Learn more about Elm Wealth: https://elmwealth.com/ Timestamps 01:04 Why financial decision-making matters 02:08 Introducing the speakers 05:23 Tyler Cowen joins Victor Haghani 06:07 W...

What Tyler Cowen said

Written from the verified transcript and checked against it. Every figure links to the moment it was said.

Tyler Cowen argued that empirical economics is on the verge of being automated, with economists re-gearing as 'impresarios' of large language models. He dismissed the notion of a leisure dividend, predicting that AI will increase stress and jobs will demand more initiative and creativity, with workers retiring later. He applied Aumann's agreement theorem to advocate for epistemic humility in disagreements, estimating only a 20% chance you are right when a spouse disagrees. He lamented that the world trades too much and identified sports betting as a persistent societal problem, suggesting frictions but acknowledging imperfect solutions. On fertility, he expressed deep concern, noting high-education Americans now have slightly more kids, but global rates like Brazil's 1.36 are unsustainable, and he sees no immediate fix. He remains optimistic about AI and American exceptionalism, counting on immigration and innovation, while worrying about political squandering.

Key takeaways

  1. Aumann's theorem: when you disagree with an epistemic peer, assume a 50% chance you're right.
  2. Sports betting is 10% destructive, and making it harder via advertising limits is the best fix.
  3. China faces a 1.0 birth rate and obstacles in lithography, boosting American exceptionalism.

Numbers and commitments

FigureWhat it refers toTypeAt
50% Probability you are right when disagreeing with an epistemic peer other 13:33
20% Probability you are right when disagreeing with your spouse other 13:33
80% Share of sports betting that is legitimate metric 16:16
10% Share of sports betting that is destructive or addictive metric 16:16
5% of GDP Hungary's birth subsidy spending metric 19:54
1.36 Brazil's fertility rate metric 20:32
1.0 Argentina's fertility rate metric 20:32
1.1 Mexico's fertility rate metric 20:32
120% Sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio if AI boosts growth by 0.5 percentage point guidance 26:54

Chapters

  1. 0:00Economics and automation
  2. 8:44Leisure and work stress
  3. 11:46Aumann's theorem and trading
  4. 16:16Sports betting policy
  5. 19:09Global fertility crisis
  6. 23:22Robots and immigration
  7. 26:54Government debt sustainability
  8. 30:05Effective altruism critique
  9. 34:42Personal investing approach
  10. 38:49Rapid-fire overrated/underrated

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 4:07And then he took questions and somebody raised their hand and they said, "Myron, how are you finding the difference between academia and Wall Street?
  2. 5:35And you know, I think you have some candidates from things that you've written. What would you say?
  3. 7:35Or do you think that his idea was flawed and that it's missing something in terms of this work-leisure balance?
  4. 10:43And can you tell us a little bit about Aumann's theorem, your understanding of it, how it has maybe shaped your thinking, how it should shape our thinking, and a little bit about your paper?
  5. 17:57... do you think that that takes us to a different equilibrium, or you know, does it all kind of wash out, and this lower fertility just happens, and we're going to stabilize at some lower population if we make it for another 100 or 200 years?
  6. 21:30And actually in terms of the predictability, I mean, I think if we had looked at—if we had talked to demographers, demographers have just unfortunately for them just been so wrong, right?
  7. 22:11How do you think about that shift and you know, do you think that there's things that we can look to in terms of how our societies might respond to it?
  8. 25:03I'm glad I'm kind of worried the clankers either?
  9. 28:26You know, what's your what's your view of the overall idea?
  10. 31:21Does that make sense at all?
  11. 34:18How do you think people should invest um their savings?
  12. 35:51What do you think is the possibility of or the potential of of music and song as a pedagogical tool?
Host 0:00 ↗
So first of all, thank you to Paradigm, to Matt, to Dan, to all the team that is hosting us and letting us use this incredible space. Really grateful for that, and so thank you. Second, the only little bit of housekeeping we have is that if you need to get up during the panels and talks and so on, if you could kind of go out around the outside, that would be better. But that's all you need to know about the rules. What I want to do—well, I also, sorry, there's more thanks to be given besides to the Paradigm guys. I want to thank my colleagues at Elm.
We had our whole team here, my partners Jerry and James, Nolan and Frankie and Zoe, who are here all week. It's been wonderful. Thank you to NJ, who helped us organize this, who's based here in San Fran, and of course thank you to everybody for coming. You know, the purpose of this seminar—it's our second attempt at trying to communicate ideas around good personal financial decision making. And you know, we wrote a book about this a couple years ago, The Missing Billionaires, and we're still at it.
You know, we're working on another book that hopefully is going to come out in February. We're using these events, this being our second one, to really try to figure out how to best communicate these ideas. We're looking forward to hearing questions from you, you know, after all the sessions that we have. We just hope that we can do a better and better job of this. There's a real need for better financial education in this country and all around the world, and our illustrious special guests today have devoted their lives much more than James or I or Jerry or any of us have done. So they've devoted their whole lives to educating people and to doing research on making good decisions under uncertainty, making good personal financial decisions. And the most special thing about today is having these three wonderful intellects, wonderful people with us.
First, you're going to hear from Tyler Cowen. He needs no introduction, but we'll give him a small introduction anyway. He's a professor at George Mason University, the head of the Mercatus Center there. He tries to help young people with good ideas through Emergent Ventures. But you know, probably you'll know him from his amazing blog that he's been writing on economic topics along with his colleague Alex Tabarrok, and also Conversations with Tyler, which is one of the best podcasts that exists. And you know, when we're talking, I'm going to be doing my best to emulate Tyler's approach to getting the most out of a guest in terms of what they think about different important issues.
We have Terrance Odean, professor at UC Berkeley, a pioneer in behavioral finance. Not only has he made a lot of contributions to the field of financial decision making, but he has been running a course at Berkeley for I don't know how many years, quite a few years, almost 2,000 students a year at Berkeley are going through this course on personal financial decision making. And he has a wonderful series of about 50 videos called Making Smart Financial Decisions, which was actually a title we almost wanted to use for our second book. And I highly recommend that, it's fantastic.
And finally, we have Myron Scholes, a long-time friend and colleague of mine. Myron has been at the forefront of the development of the field of finance. You know, you probably know him from his name on the Black-Scholes options formula, but that is just the tip of the iceberg of the things that Myron has been up to in his long career.
I first met Myron when he came to Salomon Brothers to give a talk just when I think he was joining Salomon Brothers coming from MIT, I believe, and you know, everybody came out to hear Myron speak. We were in the big auditorium, a few hundred people there, and he gave his talk about how happy he was to be coming to help us figure things out at Salomon Brothers. And then he took questions and somebody raised their hand and they said, "Myron, how are you finding the difference between academia and Wall Street? You know, what's it like being in the industry versus academia?" And he said, "You know, what I found is that Wall Street, it really is dog-eat-dog, but in academia, it was the other way around." [laughter] And I knew that we were going to be great friends and that it was a privilege to know him.
So, with already a long introduction, I'll try to keep my questions to Tyler short. Tyler, come on up. Let's talk for about a half an hour. [clears throat and applause] Yeah, we'll talk for about a half an hour and then we'll have a break for about 10-15 minutes and then Jerry is going to do a panel with Myron, Terry, and James, and then we'll have another break and then I'll do a little bit of reminiscing for about 20 minutes at the end as well. So, Tyler.
Tyler Cowen 5:33 ↗
Happy to be here.
Host 5:35 ↗
[laughter] Oh my goodness, this is so much fun. So, Tyler, you're an economist and you wrote in your textbook that you co-wrote with Alex that economics is the study of incentives, or that incentives matter. You know, a number of economists have been saying that recently, well, in the last 10, 20 years, but if we go further back to maybe the beginning of the study of economics with Adam Smith, he said that it seemed at that time that economics was the study of wealth and wealth creation. And there was that feeling for a while, and then in the early 20th century, we had economists who said economics is really the study of the allocation of scarce resources. Things are changing in the world, and I wonder even though probably now economics should be thought of as first and foremost the study of incentives, what do you think might come next? What might be the next thing that economists say economics is the study of X? And you know, I think you have some candidates from things that you've written. What would you say?
Tyler Cowen 6:45 ↗
You could say microeconomics is about incentives, macroeconomics is about wealth and Adam Smith and growth. I think economists will become a funny kind of—I hesitate to say software engineer, but they'll be impresarios that manipulate offshoots of large language models and the data work will be done by the AIs, and our job will be to gather data or run natural experiments or do things that only humans can do, but a big chunk of what we now call empirical economics, I think will be automated. I think we have the tech to do it now. It has not been a priority in the same way these math problems have been a priority, but I think in less than a year, it could be taken care of whenever the people in this town get around to doing it. And if you're an economist, you're going to need to re-gear and retool ASAP.
Host 7:35 ↗
Second question, we're going to stay with economics and economists. Galbraith, Keynes also, but Galbraith wrote these many editions of a book, The Affluent Society, I think starting around 1950, and saying that we have so much productivity growth, we have so much technological improvement that the affluent society is going to move to a society where we all have a lot of leisure. And that the more productive and the richer our societies and the more developed our societies would become, the more we would all be swapping work for leisure. And it seems as though, you know, for 50 years, even though he kept updating his book, that this switch from work to leisure didn't arrive. I wonder, do you think that we're now close to starting to see this happen? Do you think that COVID was kind of a catalyst for this and now with AI, do you think that we're going to see this switch? Or do you think that his idea was flawed and that it's missing something in terms of this work-leisure balance?
Tyler Cowen 8:44 ↗
If you live around here, you've probably never had to work as hard as you need to work now. I have to work hard just to stay on top of AI models and what's new. Never mind the rest of my job. So, the stakes for doing well are much higher because your efforts are multiplied and the costs if you fail are also much higher because someone beats you very decisively and not just by a small amount. I think it's a puzzle for economists why people consume leisure the way we do. So, our core intuition is people want to smooth things, smooth their consumption. But we're not in a world where people work in the US, say, 20 hours a week, but you do find teenagers are much less likely to work than when I was a kid. When I was a kid, everyone at 16, 17 got a job. That is no longer the case and people retire earlier. So, they do the opposite of smoothing. They take more leisure at the very beginning and then a lot more leisure toward the end. And if people live longer, that's going to extend further yet. And then in the middle, they work much harder. So, there's something about bunching that's efficient, that maybe there's some indivisibility of how you allocate your attention. So, once you're working, they need you, they need you, they keep on needing you. You can't just, you know, click off at 7:30 p.m. And then you compensate for that by working less at the beginning and the end.
I guess I think that's how it's going to be. So, I'm not worried about unemployment as a result of AI, but I think people feeling more stressed. And then other people who liked jobs of tedium, there are people like that. Again, typically, they would not be people living here, but those jobs will be harder to find because they will be automated by the AI. And every job will force you to take initiative, be creative, do something, retrain yourself. A lot of people hate that. So, that's my big worry, not unemployment.
Host 10:27 ↗
That's my son Mark over here. Mark, I'm sorry, there is no leisure dividend coming your way. That's the way it's going to be. [laughter]
Tyler Cowen 10:33 ↗
Mark? I don't...
Host 10:34 ↗
About 26, I would say.
Tyler Cowen 10:35 ↗
Oh, so the teenage underemployed...
Host 10:38 ↗
And he's single, too, Tyler. [laughter]
Tyler, an idea that my partner James and I came to relatively recently in our lives is Aumann's agreement theorem, Professor Robert Aumann. And we actually interviewed him about a year ago when he was 95 years old. He took a call from us and explained as best he could his theorem, which is about 50 years old now. And I wish that I had known about this when I was younger. I would have been much more agreeable. You and your colleague Robin Hanson wrote an excellent paper on this that helped also to not only take it further, but also to explain what Professor Aumann had come up with. Can you tell us a little bit about your paper about disagreements, Honest, I think is the title of it. Did I get that right? And can you tell us a little bit about Aumann's theorem, your understanding of it, how it has maybe shaped your thinking, how it should shape our thinking, and a little bit about your paper?
Tyler Cowen 11:46 ↗
I think about Aumann's theorem all the time. It basically says, to oversimplify a bit, that if you meet someone who is as smart and intellectually honest as you, and you each announce your positions, that you should end up agreeing. You don't even have to trade information, but the mere fact that they hold a different position, the two of you should iterate in some manner where the change in your opinions over time somewhat resembles a random walk, and you just say, "Well, they're as smart as I am, so why should I think my opinion is any better than theirs?" Now, in fact, I've never met a human who behaves according to that. And Robin and I wrote a paper on this, and at the end of the paper, we didn't agree on what the paper meant. [laughter]
Now, this is closely related to what are called all the no-trade theorems in finance, where if you go to trade with someone, well, there can be purely liquidity-based trading, like I need to liquidate my portfolio to put my kid through college, but you ought to assume, all the more in the world of AI, Jane Street, Citadel, right, that the person you're trading with knows more than you do, like all those people trading options in India should have thought that. Same with sports betting. But people just somehow don't seem to believe this way. So, I suspect there's some evolutionary reason why we're overconfident. It's good for our lives in general, but bad for us when we start betting or often start trading. The world as a whole trades far too much. You see these people like in Taiwan, trading's a kind of addiction. They're making, you know, many retail trades a day. It's just negative expected return. The practice persists, and that's one of the great puzzles of economic life. It's ultimately behavioral, but rest assured, if that is you, being overconfident has other advantages. For men, I think it's an advantage in the dating market. There's something Darwinian going on here, and that's how I think about Aumann's theorem.
But, practically speaking, I think you can become much wiser, at least at the margin, be a little more Aumannian. And if you meet someone you consider your epistemic peer and they disagree with you, just to walk away thinking there's a 50% chance I'm right. And if it's in the context of a marriage, figure spouses on average are equally smart or truth-seeking, you're actually better off saying, "Well, there's a 20% chance I'm right and an 80% chance my spouse is right." And then you do much better in life. [laughter]
Host 14:05 ↗
Thank you, Tom. Thanks for bringing in the no-trade and the trading aspect of that. I forgot to add that at the end. But I want to continue on that a little bit. So, you know, you gave your view about so much of the speculation, gambling, economic or market-based activity being zero-sum, being negative expected value, being negative expected utility. You know, sure, there's, you know, some economists and some observers are saying, "Well, this is consumption, you know, it's fun to bet on a football game." Clearly, this is not the motivation of many, many of the people that are engaging in these activities. It might be fun. My mother, by the way, is a day trader and I haven't been able to convince her against it. She's 92 years old. But there's clearly also this belief that they're going to increase their financial position through all of this. We were talking about this with Terry to begin with. It'll be great to hear what he thinks, you know, in the next panel.
But what one thing that we wonder about is, is there anything that as a society we should be thinking about doing? Are there any policy things or, you know, I mean, there are different possibilities. There's education, there's information. You know, that the situation is not made clear to the participants. So if you're going to do sports betting, you're not told that you will be kicked off the platform if you make money consistently. So the only people that are allowed to consistently stay on these online platforms these days are people that are losing a certain amount of money and not, you know, not showing a high Sharpe ratio. If you're showing a good result, you know, they're assuming that you're fronting for somebody else. So among the different possibilities, and maybe there are other responses away from greater transparency, education, or regulation, are any of those attractive, or are there other ones, or should we just let it run its course? What are your thoughts about the response of our society to this, what it might make sense for it to be?
Tyler Cowen 16:16 ↗
It's a hard problem to fix. So I don't myself bet at all on anything. Not in the direct sense. But I think that something like 80% of the market, you bet 20, 50 dollars on a football game, and that's fine. And if that's 80% of the market, it's hard to just do away with the market, because much of it's legitimate. But there's another part of the market, it seems to be at least 10% that's destructive, addictive, families are ruined, people end up in alcoholism, or problems with drugs, or in debt. It's hard to fix that 10% without trampling on the 80%. Now, the best position I've been able to come up with is I think we've made it too easy, and there are ways in which we could make advertising of sports betting less legal, and just put a lot of frictions in the way. But look, we have the internet, we don't have a great firewall. There's other ways you can ruin your life. So simply limiting sports betting, if you push people into something else that's bad for them, we live in a world where all kinds of things are more addictive, including directly taking of drugs. And I do think we're headed for a future where just because there are more bad things for you, a lot of people, I don't know, 5, 10% of any country, they're just not going to do well. Sports betting, I would make it harder, boost frictions, and like take the ads off TV and a few other places. Highly imperfect solution.
Host 17:36 ↗
Yeah, yeah, this is a tough one. It's a really tough one. I mean, I didn't even mention state-run lotteries, which really bugs me.
Tyler Cowen 17:43 ↗
It's terrible. It can be like 40 cents on the dollar, right?
Host 17:46 ↗
Yeah, yeah, it's a terrible...
Tyler Cowen 17:47 ↗
sports betting. But like you ban sports betting, everyone plays the state lottery.
Host 17:51 ↗
Yeah.
Tyler Cowen 17:52 ↗
It's really hard to do complete whack-a-mole on self-destructive behavior.
Host 17:57 ↗
Yeah. Moving on, global fertility. So, or at least fertility in productive developed societies has fallen below replacement in general, in the West, in Japan, and Russia. And it seems as though there's very little that can be done to change that. You know, different countries have tried different incentives, and you know, once so to speak the cat's out of the bag, it's hard to put the cat back in, it seems. How worried are you about this? Are you okay with it? I mean, I think a lot of—we hear a lot of people that are worried about it, but you know, I think there's this other point of view that, well, you know, it's going to be maybe better for our planet. You know, why not? You know, if this is how people, you know, why should it be that people should have so many kids? And related to all of this, are you at all concerned that certain subsections of our society are having a lot of children with certain characteristics? And you know, do you think that that takes us to a different equilibrium, or you know, does it all kind of wash out, and this lower fertility just happens, and we're going to stabilize at some lower population if we make it for another 100 or 200 years?
Tyler Cowen 19:09 ↗
Well, the good news in America, at least, is that people of higher education and higher income, they now have more kids. Only by a smidgen, but there's no dysgenics going on. Whether or not there ever was, you could debate, but right now, clearly not. But I'm extremely worried about the fertility crisis. But for me, it's a very long-run worry that ultimately we're asymptoting, not quite towards zero, but to something unsustainable. There'll be simply fewer happy human beings, less innovation, smaller market size. On the way down, aggregate demand and with the supply are both contracting. It also doesn't sound that great for asset prices. And I think the core reason for that is fundamental: that kids just aren't as fun as we used to think. [laughter]
And globally, birth control now is available almost everywhere. Subsidies don't seem to work. Hungary tried 5% of its GDP for birth subsidies. It mattered for 2 years, then it went back to where they were, and then even worse. So I think your hope just has to be, like after any number of decades, the world is just so hard to predict that you shouldn't assume it will go on forever. And that's my hope. Just so many things will change in the world, we'll eventually rise above replacement level. But if we don't, we're totally cooked. I guess ultimately I'm an optimist, but I have absolutely no good story for you as to how that will happen. I think for now we're stuck.
The other piece of good news, if you're an American, you live here, we can take in the best people from the world more or less indefinitely. So we can just drain the world. And in relative terms, it's a big advantage for us. We're not going to lose population for a long, long time. I guess at some point every nation's drained and we're stuck, too. But that's really very, very far out. So I don't think America has to worry, but the world as a whole does. Like, you look at Brazil, I looked at the number, it's 1.36. There were just recently a number released for Argentina. You think of that as a speaking country, it's 1.0. Mexico is 1.1. And they are not nearly as wealthy as we are. Their ability to attract immigrants is nothing close to what we have. In fact, we're attracting a lot of their best immigrants, maybe some people in this room. So, you know, Iran is another example. You know, more screwed up than Mexico or Brazil. And again, low and still falling birth rates. I don't know how those places are going to cope.
Host 21:30 ↗
And actually in terms of the predictability, I mean, I think if we had looked at—if we had talked to demographers, demographers have just unfortunately for them just been so wrong, right? I mean, you know, [laughter] yeah, I mean, we go back, you know, go back and like the predictions for how many Russians there were going to be. And it's just so unpredictable. I mean, Iran had a huge birth rate, and then it just fell off a cliff, actually. It was, you know, Iran was just growing rampantly in the 1980s, I guess, 1980s, early '90s, and all of a sudden it just came to a dead halt. So, a little bit related to this question of fertility, I feel like I need to ask one question around AI. We are in the Bay Area,
Tyler Cowen 22:11 ↗
Sure.
Host 22:11 ↗
but it's not really our beat, you know, the AI thing, you know, where—so we don't want to ask embarrassing questions, but there is one question I want to ask, and it's a little bit related to fertility in a way. And it is this: that do you think that the physical embodiment of AI, in other words, robots, do you feel that robots will be a step change in our evolution with AI, and do you feel that the response of our societies to them might be informed by how we currently, as societies, are thinking about immigration? Do you feel that it's a—you know, it seems like it's just such a shift, it will be such a shift when we go from digital intelligence, you know, a data center of a thousand geniuses or 10,000 geniuses to like a room full of highly effective geniuses that also can do everything that we do. How do you think about that shift and you know, do you think that there's things that we can look to in terms of how our societies might respond to it?
Tyler Cowen 23:22 ↗
Robots mean different things to different people. If you just mean automation, that's been going on for a long time. It does involve some disruptions, but we're used to that and overall it tends to raise real wages. If you mean humanoid robots like out of a science fiction movie, that something walks around and it's roughly in the shape of a human and it brings things from one desk to another,
and sort of acts like a human and is very smart, that seems to me far away. So, in San Francisco, you all see these Waymos. Those took a long time. They're pretty simple things in a way. They go forwards. They don't actually go backwards so much. They turn. They still don't make money on net and it'll be a while before they do. And if I look more generally like how much is the most valuable robotics company worth? You can debate what's exactly a robotics company or like does Tesla count? Well, that too is driverless vehicles which will soon be worth quite a bit. But I don't see humanoid robotics companies right now worth a lot. So, for me that's far enough away. It's past the horizon where we can predict. But I certainly don't think it's a century far away. So, we'll face this choice at some point, but not in the next few years. Do we want to let humanoid robots inhabit our world? My guess is for better or worse people will say no and we'll keep them in factories. You know, the old Blade Runner movies where they're allowed on other planets and there's factories on other planets. I know we're getting very far out there.
That would be my guess. We'll never live in a world of like full large numbers of humanoid robots, but of course automation in factories will proceed and mostly be a good thing.
Host 25:03 ↗
Yeah, thank you for that. I'm glad I'm kind of worried the clankers either?
Tyler Cowen 25:07 ↗
Yeah, and I well yeah, I mean I think well I just think it's going to be very hard for us to adjust to it over a short period of time in any case. And uh and it does seem that our societal attitudes towards immigration are somewhat uh relevant to that. And so it it's I I'm glad to feel strange with so many foreigners coming into your country, whether that's the correct attitude or not, how will you feel surrounded by humanoid robots that clearly are going to be much smarter than you? Right? Uh I don't think people will do it.
Host 25:38 ↗
I remember recently I recall you had a conversation I think with with Alex about government debt. So we're going to switch a little bit now towards um more economic things again. And um you know, I think that Alex was saying that he was quite worried about the sustainability of government debt uh if I recall. And uh and and your view was, "Look, you know, let's just look at what market prices are saying. You know, there's not that much to be worried about." Uh credit default swaps on US government debt are trading at around a half a percent a year for 5 or 10 years, which implies, if we just took that number and didn't adjust it for some kind of state contingency or whatever, would tell us that there's like a 10% chance that the US government is going to default and not pay back its debt, you know, maybe losing 30, 40 cents on the dollar with a 10% cumulative probability over the next 10 years. Um do you is your uh do do you think that's a an overestimate of that, uh an underestimate potentially? Do you still feel the same? How do you think about the sustainability of uh government borrowing? Is the wealth of the country just so much greater than the debt that we shouldn't worry? What are your thoughts on that? A lot of people are worried about it, and I'm sure sure would benefit from uh your thinking on this.
Tyler Cowen 26:54 ↗
Uh wealth to debt ratio is entirely acceptable. So, the real worry is about politics. So, figure the ratio of wealth to income typically is stated to be six to eight times. I'm not sure how meaningful a number that is, but there's a lot more wealth than there is income at any particular point in time. So, if a system is credible with its ability to either limit spending or tax wealth, it's sustainable. I also think AI will boost rates of productivity growth by at least half a percentage point. If that happens, our debt to GDP ratio converges to something close to 120%, which I think is also quite sustainable. But, I do have real worries. One is just crowding out, which we see already. Like spending on construction that is not data centers or compute is down a lot this year. Another is just our politics is terrible. We could get these AI dividends. Thank you, all San Franciscans. Uh but, our politicians just keep on giving them away as they come in. So, it all boils down to how cynical are you about American politics? I think ultimately we'll pull through. I wouldn't say I have no worries, but I do worry less than Alex does.
Host 28:00 ↗
Okay. I'm not too worried, too. I think uh I think this 10% number is a bit of a uh kind of needs some risk adjustment. You know, it's like there's a risk premium in there as well and you know, a 5% There's a 5% chance of a lot of bad things happening over the next 10 years. So,

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APA

Cowen, T. (2026, October 22). Tyler Cowen on AI, the Future of Work, and Why We Trade Too Much | WealthCon2026 Fireside [Interview transcript]. Elm Wealth. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3146709/

MLA

Tyler Cowen. "Tyler Cowen on AI, the Future of Work, and Why We Trade Too Much | WealthCon2026 Fireside." Elm Wealth, 22 Oct. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3146709/.

BibTeX
@misc{cowen2026_3146709,
  author       = {Tyler Cowen},
  title        = {Tyler Cowen on AI, the Future of Work, and Why We Trade Too Much | WealthCon2026 Fireside},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Elm Wealth. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {oct},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3146709/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}