Freedom of the fundamental rights. Freedom of conscience. Academic freedom. Freedom of press. And the right to listen. You're listening to So to Speak, the free speech podcast brought to you by FIRE, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education.
Hello again. I am Nico Perrino and this is So to Speak, the free speech podcast where every other week we're taking an uncensored look at the world of free expression through personal stories and candid conversations.
Two weeks ago I was joined on this podcast by my FIRE colleagues Will, Sam, and Joe to discuss emerging trends surrounding free speech on campus. We covered a lot of ground on that show, but one thing we didn't consider is the possibility that there is a growing complacency among Americans that serves as a sort of secret engine driving much of the recent campus discourse and that helps explain concerning student attitudes toward free speech.
Our guest on today's show recently wrote a book that makes this argument. He contends that college campuses are home to the most complacent among us and that this is a fact that can't be ignored if we want to understand the free speech on campus debate.
Tyler Cowen is our guest today. He's an economics professor at George Mason University and serves as chairman and general director of the Mercatus Center. In February he published the book The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream, and in it he theorizes that the modern comforts that make many of us Americans enjoy life so much have sapped our sense of urgency and made us weary of change and challenges.
He says we are increasingly making decisions that, while at first blush seem like they are in our best interest — the decisions, of course, are rational and benefit us socially and financially on the individual level. However, if we observe how these decisions play out at the macro or societal level, we see significant consequences.
For example, you might think we live in an age of great innovation and entrepreneurship, but according to Professor Cowen, if you look at the data, the rate of startups forming has trended lower and lower each decade since the 1980s. Companies like Uber, Airbnb, and Google are the exception, not the rule. What's more, established older companies are sitting on stockpiles of money rather than pursuing new grand projects.
The stasis or stagnation in the economy works for those within the established companies, argues Professor Cowen, but the slowing rates of entrepreneurship denies the sort of creative destruction necessary for innovation and dramatic rises in GDP and the standards of living.
Also consider how online services like Match.com and eHarmony are connecting many of us with the perfect mate. Good on the individual level, right? Sure. We can see more easily now how we can find partners that are just like us. But on the macro level, Professor Cowen argues this generates more power couples, which boosts income inequality and increases segregation in a ton of different ways.
And what about polarization, which many see as a big driver of the increased discord on and off campus? Professor Cowen sees this as the result of more of the aforementioned sorting or matching, which, as he writes in the book, makes liberal areas more liberal and conservative areas more conservative.
We can increasingly find comfort now in gathering our news from outlets that confirm our biases, and we can live in neighborhoods that look like us and share our values. Again, this is all well and good on the individual level, but this better sorting manifests itself, for example, in who we elect to Congress and makes it harder to find compromise in an environment of more contentious and polarized debate.
Professor Cowen says, "The truth is that peace and high incomes tend to drain the restlessness out of us." But as a result, he wonders how much we are slowing down, digging ourselves in, and investing in stability.
Importantly, he spends a significant portion of his book explaining how complacency manifests itself on our college campuses. And that's, of course, what I wanted to focus on during today's conversation.
To help me explore that angle of the story, I enlisted the help of recurring, so to speak, guest FIRE President and CEO Greg Lukianoff, who kindly took a break from writing his new book to travel to George Mason's campus in Arlington, Virginia, to interview Professor Cowen with me last month.
Professor Cowen is a Renaissance man whose area of expertise isn't confined just to economics, as anyone who reads his blog Marginal Revolution knows. Notably, he's an expert foodie who wrote a book entitled An Economist Gets Lunch. And he publishes an extremely popular dining guide called Tyler Cowen's Ethnic Dining Guide.
So, Greg, being a foodie himself, took the opportunity this podcast provided to quiz Cowen on food. So, in addition to complacency and free speech, of course, you will also get Mexican barbecue and Korean fried chicken. I mean, figuratively, of course.
Now that I have you all hungry, I shall censor myself and present George Mason University Professor Tyler Cowen.
All right, Professor Cowen, thank you for joining Greg and I on the show today.
So, you've written the book The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream. And in it, you say you've coined the phrase The Complacent Class to describe the growing number of people in our society who accept, welcome, and even enforce a resistance to things new, different, or challenging. And you say that most Americans don't like change very much unless it's on the terms that they can manage and control. And that now we have the resources and the technology to manage our lives on this basis more and more. And you argue this is to the country's long-term collective detriment.
You also say that we've lost our pioneer spirit, reflected in rates of entrepreneurship, innovation, economic mobility, our standard of living, where we choose to live, who we choose to marry, how often we change jobs, how we use the internet. Now, this is a free speech podcast hosted by an organization that does free speech in higher education. You yourself are a professor, so we're going to ask you some questions about how this thesis plays out in the university context. And I know Greg has a million other things he wants to ask you about.
But to start, you say in your book that campuses today are among the segments of American society where the complacent class exercises its strongest influences. And as I said, you're a professor, so presumably you know a little bit about this thing. Why do you believe campuses are home to the most complacent of the complacent?
There's a high degree of political homogeneity on campuses, but I think also there's a great deal of data that when professors get tenure, their behavior does not change. They don't take more risks. Arguably, they take fewer risks. And I find this stunning. You're given what is literally the greatest job ever in the history of mankind, even if it's a relatively low salary, and all they do with it is more of the same.
And this to me suggests there's something fundamentally wrong with the filter mechanisms. Because why is it that people's behavior doesn't change when their incentives change? Well, it has to be the filters that determine who gets to be a tenured professor so select for certain kinds of behaviors and personality types and sets of views that even when the incentives flip, you still get same basic results. That to me is shocking, startling, and we ought to think about it more closely.
Do you think — I'm assuming you're a tenured professor in this university?
Professor, and I've been so for a long time.
And do you think it's affected your willingness to go out there and explore controversial ideas at all?
I hope I've been a kind of maniac in my career. [laughter] So one thing I did a long time ago was to just start working on a field called cultural economics, which at the time didn't exist. But then after that, I devoted myself essentially full-time to blogging and then writing for the New York Times and now doing podcasts, not just this one, but my own series.
And I mean that those are not chances in the sense that if you have tenure, yes, it's safe, but they're chances relative to what other tenured people have done. And I've tried to keep some kind of cutting edge. We're doing this podcast from a studio where I make free online videos and don't get paid anything for, but I view it as part of my personal mission in this like deep American Protestant sense to do something for the rest of the world. But it's tough because you're in an environment where the default is an extreme degree of complacency.
And do you see that before professors or lecturers get tenure? If they're on a tenure track position, I walked in here where in Mercatus today and I noticed that you share a building with the Institute for Humane Studies, which trains people to enter academia or supports them when they enter academia. What are the concerns that they're expressing on the path toward tenure?
I wouldn't speak for them, but I can tell you my own view. I think a lot of the flipping goes on in graduate school. The people want to become academics because they're interested in some topic, like how does the economy work? Or what did the American Revolution really mean? Or, you know, do people have free will and what can we learn from neuroscience about this? They're interested in and excited by big questions, which is great.
But then they get into the incentive structure, which encourages specialization. And I feel that's probably the most extreme bias we have in the system. It's not political. It's just people being careerists and wanting to do well, and they should want to do well, and they should want to do science, and that does involve a lot of specialization. But somehow there's no intermediate point, and you can have either, you know, too little or too much specialization, and we've ended up with too much, and we're stuck in that.
But I think of graduate school, the first two years as for a lot of people where that tipping point occurs.
What about for the students themselves? You write in your book, "Millennials are too part of the complacent class, and they are also its finest product and its most committed ideological carriers." Do you see complacency among your students as well?
Well, I should stress, my own university, George Mason, in my opinion, is one of the least complacent in the United States.
Also a green light institution by FIRE's rating of speech codes.
That's correct, and I thank you for that, and I can say my school has always treated me very well, and I've never felt any undue pressure here or had problems. And I'm not just saying that, quote unquote. It is true, and one can look at my record, I think, and see that.
But what's special about George Mason is how many of our students are immigrants or children of immigrants. And my general view about this country is immigrants are our least complacent class.
They take more chances, they start businesses at higher rates. They're often of different skin color, different religion, different culture, different whatever, even if they are from Canada, and they realize you come here to make and build some new life for yourself. That's the default assumption. So they're very willing to change. There's no expectation things will be handed to them on a silver platter. So I'm working at the school that I think it was rated second or third for most international school in the country.
So it's like going to the United Nations, and people want good jobs, and they're upwardly mobile, and it's not the traditional environment that sometimes is described as a bunch of spoiled rich white kids. I wouldn't myself call it that, but just to refer to the cliche that that's not what George Mason is about. It's a wonderful place.
People will debate anything on campus, including like should women wear the veil? And this will be done with openness and seriousness, and it's very diverse, and there's not one political spectrum, but dozens. And it's one reason why I'm very happy being here. But that said, at many of the more expensive schools, that is those filled with spoiled rich white kids, things are not the way they are in Fairfax and Arlington, Virginia.
Yeah. You see the language, and you talk a lot about — and Greg, feel free to jump in whenever you want to.
But you talk a lot about protests in your book, and how the nature of protests has changed.
That one. There was a lot about free speech in it, and it was actually in some ways I was really psyched to see someone who wasn't a lawyer looking at how much we sort of tamed free speech primarily through time, place, and manner restrictions. But can you talk more about what you talk about there in the book?
Well, most discussions of free speech today, they center around the First Amendment. And that's very important, but I feel that's been covered plenty by other people, including FIRE. So I focused on the right of public assembly, which has not been taken away by any means, but it's been so bureaucratized, there are so many permits you need, there are so many reasons for telling people no, there are so many NIMBY forces — local homeowners, oh, we don't want the protest here, or there's a national security reason we can't do this on the Washington D.C. mall.
All right.
Not in my backyard is NIMBY. And it's not just backyard, it's like not in the backyard three backyards over or 17 backyards over from that.
So there are many fewer protests. If you imagine today's politics, no matter what you think of Trump, existing in say the late 1960s, right now, every week there would be massive pro-impeachment marches. Whether or not you want to impeach him, it simply would be a fact of life, and they would be significant and have force and be on the evening news all the time.
And the first week or two, there were some events. There's still a bit of a trickle, but it's remarkable what to some people is such an inflammatory president, and then the response being so pacifist, really, so passive.
And I think that's getting at this underlying complacency in American life. People can't imagine that they could change things so much. They do plenty on social media, which I view as mostly ineffective.
The idea that physical space is the medium that really matters, and you get out there and do something and signal, has vanished from our minds. And the general notion that we can't imagine a future so much better than the present we have. The way we imagine a better future is to take a city and gentrify it, which is fine. I'm all for that. But like that's it. Compare that to 1950s utopian science fiction and building roads to the moon and jetpacks and flying cars and whatever else. And we're like, "Oh, we gentrify cities, and oh, there's a new Laotian restaurant on this corner." Which I'm a fan of, but that's the whole vision.
Very strange, and it shows up in our politics.
So, in preparation for this, I read four of your books and I read The Great Stagnation, Average Is Over, um, lunch, what is it, having — gets to lunch? Economist Gets Lunch, and I hope I don't offend you by saying this, but do you consider yourself a pessimist?
I'm a pessimist relative to the people who think nothing is wrong. And most libertarians consider me a pessimist, but I actually think I'm an extreme optimist.
That I have a framework that recognizes the problems and also sees them as manageable. So, relative to reality, I'm an extreme optimist, but of course the pessimist always says that.
[laughter] I describe myself as a Russian optimist. That basically means like, you know, I expect really horrible things to happen and I'm often pleasantly surprised.
That's my wife, who grew up in Moscow.
Actually, I wanted to ask you about that, too. Did I get it right that you met her through Match.com?
Yeah, I — 14 years ago. That's great. And so, she and she's politically liberal, right?
I wouldn't call her liberal. I mean, liberal's a tricky word. For one thing, it can mean classical liberal or modern.
If you took, you know, a person from the Soviet Union who hated communism and was Jewish and who felt uncomfortable with rural America and guns and gave them a set of views, that's her.
I'm not sure exactly what to call it.
A lot of her friends are what you might call liberals, but that's not the best description of her, either.
And she's become a federalist now that Trump has been elected.
And she never, ever was in the past. She used to think, "Oh, federalism, it's absurd. Why do we have it?" I just would say, "You wait. You're not going to believe me now. You wait."
It's been funny watching the discussion of California seceding turn it and watch what people really mean by it. It's like, "Well, actually what we're saying is we don't want more autonomy for it." And I'm like, "That's you're arguing federalism, whether you know it or not."
Yes. [laughter] It's like the Scots who want to secede but still keep the British pound and the Queen.
So, I noticed a really big switch in — and one thing I think is that you do that's so impressive is you do a lot of predicting and it's interesting watching how many of things came true. But, in Great Stagnation, you were pretty skeptical that there would be some kind of revolutionary type shift. And even though — but by the end of —
Yeah, in politics. But in the end of Complacent Class, by the time I finished that, I mean, the last section of that, the last, you know, 10 pages of it, it sounds like we're in trouble. Like you see like violence increasing and really headed toward a major societal shift.
Yeah, you call it a reset.
You might call that pessimism, but another way to look at it is simply to think America will go back to its historical norms.
Which have included, you know, wars against Native Americans and the Civil War and Reconstruction and Great Depression and Civil Rights in the 1960s. And that's what we are. Some of that is quite bad, some of it is good.
And we had these funny two decades, the '80s and '90s, that somehow reset all of our expectations. Like we all became progressives, even if we're libertarian. Like everything will just get better, the world will be more democratic, incomes will grow, maybe not as quickly as we'd like, and yes, trade should be free or whatever caveats. But there was some new peaceful era that was perpetual.
And I now think that expectation was a complete mistake. Those two decades were the trick. What I'm predicting for the future is actually some version of the past. I don't view it as a radical prediction. The fact that people think it's radical is in fact a sign of complacency.
Yeah, I, you know, I'm a child — I was born in 1990. So I don't remember the '80s and I have this sort of romantic view of the '60s and '70s. And I was really struck in your book when you talk about how there was one year, I think in the early '70s, where there were 2,500 bombings.
Typically very small and amateur, but nonetheless — a day. Yes.
And when you talk about campus protest during that era, too, you're talking about takeover of buildings, violence in many cases. And now we see a situation at Berkeley and it's headline news. And we're asking what's happening to our college campuses.
So this is, you know, an education for me as well as to — you know, I've been acculturated to this new norm.
And do you see this concept of safety, which you see permeating everything that's happened in American society, also permeate campus? Because when you look —
Absolutely. Safe spaces, literally the word, but not just that, the whole culture of political correctness. The norms about what you can say. So, what people were able to say in the 1960s through 1970s was just remarkable. To have Black Panthers on campus or people advocate violent overthrow or the worst excesses of Maoism or on the other side of the spectrum various extreme, you know, right-wing views. I'm not saying everyone liked it, but it happened all the time.
The debates were contentious. They were nasty and brutal and unpleasant, but it was in some ways a marvelous age where the space of intellectual options on campuses or off them was much larger than today. And there's something fundamentally healthy about that. I'd like to nudge us in the direction of getting some of the good stuff and not all of the bad.
Yeah. Well, I mean, some of the bad was some of the more violent reaction to what was happening in the world on campus. But now it seems as though protesters have less skin in the game than they might have in the '60s or '70s. I'm thinking back to the story at Yale from just a week or two where it was a group of student teachers who wanted to renegotiate their contract and went on a hunger strike, but they didn't — it was a fake hunger strike.
Yeah. [laughter] When they — when the hunger strike was affecting their health, they rotated in new people so that they can go out and presumably have a —
To be like once every six hours.
So, I wanted to ask a little bit more about safety. John Haidt and I are working on a book and we're going to be discussing this sort of obsession with safety among parents in sort of K through 12. Do you think that's something that just gets worse as societies get more wealthy? Because you talk at times about sort of obsessive safety, concern with safety in a couple of your books.
It increases with wealth, but I think it also increases as women have more influence in society. And keep in mind, safety's a wonderful thing. We all seek it. It's good. Dying is bad. Most risk is bad.
But feminization, I think, is the underrated variable here. There's plenty of evidence, say, from finance that women with their portfolios are more risk-averse than are men, and that you can measure quite exactly. And that our society is far less violent and better and nicer and more tolerant and safer.
A lot of the credit of that goes to the feminization of society, which is maybe the number one trend and biggest positive trend of our age. But these things, to some extent, come in packages. And some of what maybe we don't like with extreme political correctness or safe spaces, which are overrepresented in majors that are relatively female, I might add. You know, much weaker in, say, engineering. That's part of the package we're getting.
Yeah. Pinker gives a lot of credit to why he thinks things are improving in terms of violence to the feminization. And I like his description of what he thinks political correctness is — is basically just an overcorrection to that's brought to sort of an absurd degree generally.
I don't think it has to go on forever. I think we don't know.
But my view of history has become more cyclical.
So you already see the election of Trump. There's a lot more kinds of nasty speech going on. Not always on campus, but it's there. It's on the internet. People read the internet while they're on campuses.
And I'm not sure that's going away. So there's already a, you know, a back — a very nasty kind of backlash. And then there's a backlash that's not nasty. Just people wanting more freedom of expression in the very best sense of that word.
Like, why can't we talk about these legitimate ideas on my campus?
Yep. Talk to me a little bit more about polarization because you mentioned the word polarization sometimes, but sometimes you're referring to Fiorina, who's a scholar who actually says we're not as ideologically polarized, but usually when I use the term polarized, I'm talking about what's known as affective polarization, where we might not actually be that far apart on actual political policies in many cases, but we hate each other.
That's what I think's happening is effective polarization.
And geographic polarization. So say Clinton voters who didn't know a single Trump voter.
It's less likely to have Trump voters who didn't know any Clinton voters because of service professionals.
My parents said they didn't know a single Clinton voter.
Yeah, well, they won't know many. They won't have them as peers. They may know some.
Yeah. No one that they'd talked with said they were voting for Clinton at least within their community. But my parents aren't like us who live in the DC bubble who talk about politics very often. They go to work, they have their job, and then they come home and watch the news.
And Clinton and Trump voters are less different than they might be here because they're less — they're more theoretical near here Washington, D.C., which is our blessing and our curse. It's all that education.
But when you have less theory and you just look at like what different groups want to do with the budget, in spite of the budget Trump just put out, I don't think it's actually that different in most cases.
Most people buy into some version of what the current federal budget looks like no matter what party they belong to.
Mhm. There was something that you said that point obviously I've heard repeated, but you really explained the stakes to me about how much of the economy is actually on autopilot and what that actually means for democracy itself.
Yeah, we vote all the time, but we don't change our mind on the expenditures. We don't even consider changing our mind on them. So what are we really voting over? It makes politics more symbolic. That increases effective polarization. It makes discourse on campus worse because people think with tiny symbolic disputes the stakes are super high. Like, oh, this is about millions of people starving. This is about the whole history of racism, and it's not.
Yeah. So, what do you think — so definitely one of the things I loved about Average Is Over was your extensive discussion of chess and talking about how, you know, people have to — there's going to be a lot of opportunities for people who actually can interact with machines in a clever way. Could you talk more about your history in chess and how you came to be such a fan?
I started playing chess seriously when I was 10. I watched the Fischer-Spassky match on TV in 1972, and I played very intensely for the next like five and a half years.
I was pretty good pretty quickly. When I was 15, I was New Jersey state champion, not just for kids, but like New Jersey state champion. And I worked very hard at it, but I was also getting interested in economics, philosophy, social sciences, and one day I just quit.
And I thought, you know, let's try to do something like this but in social sciences. And sort of take what I learned through chess, which is like absorbing feedback, being meta-rational, don't make excuses when you lose, and try to use that learning to build a career in something else.
Oh, and I love the term meta-rational. Could you explain to the listeners what that means?
A willingness to admit when you're wrong or have been wrong. And great chess players or even good chess players need to have it because if you don't, you just commit the same mistakes over and over again. And there are very few excuses on the chessboard. You can't blame it on the referee or say the sun got in your eyes. You really do need to learn from your mistakes or you're done.
Well, it sounds like the characteristics of a good intellectual as well.
It's tricky, though, because a lot of the most successful intellectuals, they do well by presenting themselves as infallible.
And they have a stick, and they put it forward, and they repeat it a lot, and that gets attention.
So, I think you find a mix of both approaches amongst top intellectuals.
Yeah. Well, you have more skin in the game, I guess, in chess because the potential outcome is that you lose, whereas what is the outcome if you lose an intellectual debate?
You can be wrong in predictions, but people forget or they didn't know to begin with. It's amazing, in a sense, how little people know about most intellectuals and the accountability mechanisms, which actually I don't necessarily think they should be so strong, but they are remarkably weak.
You say something that's wrong and typically you get away with it, for better or worse.
So, that makes it all the easier to just deny you made mistakes.
Yeah, in The Rational Optimist, it was interesting seeing Matt Ridley, you know, just flat-out express his anger at being in an environment in the '70s where basically he just took it for granted we're all going to be dead in 10 years. And basically, you know, nobody felt like they had to recant on the apocalyptic predictions.
And Paul Ehrlich, you know, he's still famous. Still, I don't know if he's still at Stanford, but he was at Stanford for a long time.