All right, everybody. Welcome. We're going to get started. I am David Autor, the recently beheaded head of the MIT Economics Department, and co-director of the MIT Stone Center on Inequality and Shaping the Future of Work, along with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. The mission of the Stone Center is to analyze the forces that contribute to growing income and wealth inequality through the erosion of job quality and labor market opportunities, particularly for workers without college degrees. We look for innovative ways to change that trajectory, to shape the future of work. And the issues that Daron tackles in his new book, "What Happened to Liberal Democracy? Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity," could not be more fundamental to understanding these issues. And this is a book about economics, about technology, but fundamentally it's about democracy and how do we balance sort of technocratic tendencies of elites, often well-intended, with the need for legitimacy and the need for respecting diversity of opinion, even when elites don't respect or don't tend to be favorable towards those opinions. So it's a challenging book to read, interesting, timely, and will be highly influential. So we're delighted to be hosting this discussion today along with the Leadership Now Project chapter at MIT Sloan. Thank you. A membership organization of business leaders seeking to protect and renew democracy. We are honored to soon have Michael Sandel join us for what I'm sure will be a fascinating and informative discussion. Before I introduce our speakers, I'd like to thank the James and Kathleen D. Stone Foundation, which is the namesake of our center, the Stone Center on Inequality and Shaping the Future of Work, for their generous support that made this event possible and many things that we do possible. Sonia Plet, Aaron McGawan, and Aaron Driver Lynn are here today from the Stone Foundation, and we're so glad you're able to join us. So thank you.
We'd also like to thank the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for their support, and Jen Harris from the Hewlett Foundation, who is joining us virtually today. It is now my pleasure to introduce Daron Acemoglu, who is an Institute Professor at MIT, a faculty co-director of the Stone Center on Inequality and Shaping the Future of Work, a research affiliate — see how I'm speeding up? You'll see why — at MIT's Blueprint Labs. He is an elected fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, the British Academy of Sciences, the Turkish Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, the European Economic Association, the Society of Labor Economists. He's also a member of the Group of Thirty, which is one of the most distinguished groups under size thirty-one. And he's the author of seven books, right? We don't know how this is possible, because if you see the number of papers — also author of like 700 papers, including "Why Nations Fail" with James Robinson, fellow Nobel co-laureate, "Power and Progress" with Simon Johnson, also fellow Nobel co-laureate, among many other awards and honors. Daron was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2024, and I could say so much more, but we would run out of time. So let me preview Michael Sandel, who will be with us shortly, who teaches political philosophy at Harvard University, whose writing on justice, ethics, democracy, and markets has been translated into more than 30 languages. His course, "Justice," is the first Harvard course to be made freely available online and on television, and has been viewed by tens of millions of people around the world. Sandel's books relate very much to the topics of Daron's work about legitimacy of democracy, about meritocracy and its merits and also its risks. So some of those books include "The Tyranny of Merit," "Can We Find the Common Good?", and "Democracy's Discontent: A New Addition for Our Perilous Times." That's just two of them. He received Spain's Princess of Asturias Award for Social Sciences in 2018. In the US, he served on the President's Council of Bioethics. He's a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He also won the Berggruen Prize last year, which is — it's got to be the biggest prize in philosophy. So look it up on the web. Look up Nicolas Berggruen. Fascinating, fascinating person. Okay. So, Michael is here as well. So I'm going to turn the mic over to the both of them. Would you like to take a seat, or do you want to make any introductory remarks before that, Daron?
No, no, I think we can just jump into it with Michael. So I was just going to say how delighted I will be when Michael is here, and he's here. So I am really delighted and great to have you all here.
Well, as Michael is getting settled, let me say that David's introduction was wonderful, and as you would expect from David, but he also sort of laid the main themes. And you can see why talking to Michael about these things is so important, because a) I learned a lot from Michael's work, and b) I think he and I are struggling for the same broad set of objectives, which is to define a better conversation and a governing philosophy for the future, despite all of the challenges and the excitement that the future will hold. So now I'll pass it on to you, Michael.
Well, it's great to be with you, Daron, and to celebrate the publication of this book — your most recent — but also to celebrate the way you do economics, which I greatly admire. You've expanded the boundaries of economics to connect with, I would call it, moral and political economy, broadly speaking. You're a kind of old-fashioned classical economist, and I admire that a great deal. And I've learned an enormous amount, Daron, from your work, including on how the direction of technological innovation is not inevitable. It's not a fact of nature to which we have simply to adapt. It's open, or should be open, to public deliberation and debate. I have a question, since we're really here in the first instance celebrating the book. I'd like to begin our discussion by putting to you a question, Daron, about liberalism and what happened to it. What happened to liberal democracy, being the title of the book? You call for what you call working-class liberalism. Now, going back to the New Deal, the liberalism of the New Deal didn't require a special adjective. Liberalism was a political movement embraced by FDR and the New Deal and the Democratic Party, and in the decades since. How did the interests of working people and liberalism come apart? How did that happen?
Well, thank you, Michael, and I think you put your finger on two of the most important things already in the opening question. One is that I think liberal democracy is in a sort of crisis, and we have to understand that crisis. And second, it is related to the divergence between the working class, broadly construed to include people essentially working in blue-collar and, you know, low- to middle-wage white-collar jobs, trades included. And all of that is essential because, also in line with your earlier comment about moral and political philosophy, I think I argue in the book, liberal ideas are still essential. In fact, they're probably going to be more essential, especially liberal democratic ideas, for our future, because we need to shape a very different set of institutions, perhaps in the age of AI, and deal with growing inequalities, the influence of AI, very, very large corporations. All of that is a democratic project. But that cannot be done when liberal democracy has lost its legitimacy, and people, especially the working classes, have abandoned either its principles or at least its practices. And I argue in the book that we have to have the correct diagnosis. I'm not claiming that I have the right sort of exact philosophy for what should be the organizing principle, but I believe at least what I talk about in terms of the diagnosis has a lot of the clues about where we went wrong and how we can fix it. And broadly speaking, and this is going to speak to the working-class issue that Michael raised, we have to look for the roots of the crisis in the rise of post-industrial society.
And post-industrial society created two sorts of challenges for liberal democracy. One is economic. It made it much harder to create shared prosperity, which is one of the key pledges of liberal democracy to the working people. In fact, in the US, this is particularly jarring, although it's present in other industrialized nations as well. In the United States, between 1980 and about 2014, men with a high school degree or without a college degree have seen their real incomes decline more or less every year in that 34, 35-year period. That's just, like, incredible. For women, it was a little bit better, but still pretty dire unless they had a college degree. That is related to the very different economics of post-industrial society, much more based on digital technologies, automation, globalization, that created room for companies to expand. At the same time, they were either automating work or offshoring it abroad, and that really closed some of the pathways that were the most natural ones for wage growth. But also at the same time, the set of coalitions around liberal democratic principles, especially around left-liberal parties, center-left parties such as the Democratic Party in the United States or the Labour Party in Britain, social democrats in the Nordic countries, completely changed. All of these countries used to receive the majority of their votes from the working class, as I've defined it, whereas people with better education, the college graduates, typically voted for the center-right. That picture completely transformed starting sometime in the 1970s in the US, a little later in the UK, where today the college-educated overwhelmingly support the center-left, and the working class have moved away to either the center-right or, in some cases, the hard right. And I argue in the book, and we can — I think it's a very, very important part of the conversation — liberal democracy and center-left politics that bolsters liberal democratic ideals cannot stand without the center class having a working class at its center. That means making shared prosperity and a realistic plan for shared prosperity in the age of AI a very important part of that governing philosophy and the practice that's part of working-class liberalism, as I define it, but also bringing the working class back into the fold, which requires a very different stance on cultural issues and a greater tent for liberal ideas, in the same way that the New Deal liberalism, which was a coalition, as you've pointed out, between the trade unions and the laborers and intellectuals and the Southern Democrats, or the social democratic coalition in Europe, which, you know, was broad enough to bring in the middle classes, then the farmers, as well as the trade unions, and then ultimately reach a sort of truce or an understanding or a compact with business, most of business interests. So that sort of big tent cannot stand but with the working class at its center. So the working class abandoned center-left parties in the US, in Britain, and in Europe. The diploma divide widened. These parties became increasingly attuned to the values, the interests, and the outlook of the professional classes, the well-credentialed classes. And so many working people went instead not for the traditional center-right parties, but for right-wing populist parties and movements.
Now, you mentioned — so my next question is, how did this happen? Now, you mentioned post-industrial society, but knowing how you think about such things, it wasn't inevitable with the emergence of post-industrial society that center-left parties would abandon the project of shared prosperity and alienate working people. Well, you mentioned globalization and offshoring and wage stagnation for working people. Why is it, do you think, that center-left parties, really from the '80s up through the present, gave up on the project of shared prosperity and embraced the version of globalization that led to that wage stagnation and the outsourcing of jobs? Why was that?
Yeah, you are 100% right. That is central to my thinking, and I believe also true that none of this was inevitable. But we have to recognize how it came about, because it's not like there's a blank slate and we can choose any distribution of income or any sort of way in which we form coalitions. There are constraints, and the two sets of constraints that shaped what emerged is the digital technologies, which really changed the dynamics of the economy. So the old way of bolstering shared prosperity in an industrial age was, well, make sure that the labor market functions well and workers have countervailing power against big companies, and companies cannot shortchange workers. As a result, when companies themselves expand, innovate, introduce new technologies to reach the mass market, they will need labor. And if they cannot shortchange labor, they will have to compete for it, and that's going to build up wages. So that model started becoming much more complicated. So it's not that there was an easy path for politicians or bureaucrats to completely sort of change the system at one fell swoop and everything was going to be okay. So that's — yes, please.
While we're still on that, there was digital technology, but there was also a political-economic project of offshoring jobs and embracing and promoting free trade agreements that had the effect of undercutting the bargaining power of working people, and too little — and also creating a condition where the winners of globalization, taking advantage of new technologies but also new arrangements to do with trade and capital flows — capital being more mobile than people in this system — pushing policies for the unfettered flow of capital across borders. So that the negotiating position of working people at a time when capital became hypermobile, that didn't — that undercut not only the capacity of working people and unions to bargain, to have leverage, but to reduce the dependence, the mutual dependence between capital and labor. Wasn't that an effect?
100%, 100%. Both the digital technologies and the free trade policies and the free capital — and I think that's a good way of putting it. The capital and business owners needed labor in the industrial economy. With automation possibilities, with reorganizing production in firms that had very few lower-educated workers, with offshoring, that dependence significantly reduced. But we also have to understand the political decisions, I think, as you're implying, and to sort of recognize the background to those political decisions. Let's sort of think about what happened starting in the '50s and the '60s, and accelerated in the '70s, '80s, and '90s, that the college-educated started living in separate neighborhoods, working in separate firms. You know, the companies of the early industrial age were melting pots. All occupations, all education groups, very, very diverse skills were present in Ford Motor Company or General Electric. Now instead, think of Google at these early stages with only the software engineers, and fast-food restaurants with, you know, even where the managers are not very well educated in most cases. They started marrying within their groups, and their values started diverging. So that creates the background for a reduced mutual recognition of dependence and lower empathy. And you see that — I don't see that as the only driving force, but as an important contributor to it. And you can see that, for example, in the Democratic Party in the 1970s, there was this cohort of young Democrats that came into the House, which were sometimes called the Watergate babies because they came after the Watergate scandal. Then later on, the same people were called Atari Democrats because they kept talking about computers, and their idea was, look, you know, the computer age is so transformative and so wonderful, it's going to lift us all up. So all we have to do is just open the way to computers. And this same group was very well educated, often disdained the approaches and the ideas of the less educated, more populist Democrats, especially sort of Midwestern and Southern Democrats. They thought things like unions, minimum wages, trade restrictions were the evil, and they had to be rooted out. They were sincere that they still cared about equality and shared prosperity, but I think their lack of communication and understanding of the working lives of the less educated manual workers gave them a very different outlook. And it was that outlook that they implemented with very few constraints, because as they were rising to power, the remaining forces that were part of that coalition were getting weaker and weaker. And I think that's the background, that's also the background to cultural politics. Cultural politics is real and it has had very important effects, but it is itself a symptom of this new sort of politics of the post-industrial era, and it also comes, in my assessment, from the same place. It comes — you know, people were trying to grapple with true problems of, in a very diverse society, discrimination, helping less advantaged groups, sort of issues that liberal philosophy has always had a problem with, going back to the 18th or the 19th centuries. But again, the way that they did that, without that communication, mutual dependence, and empathy, was much more top-down and therefore much more destructive at the end.
I want to come back to the class mixing that you've mentioned, which I think is very important. But before we do, the role of economists in supporting the political project of neoliberal globalization — they argued, both with respect to new technology and with respect to the program of free trade agreements and free capital flows, it'll lift up everyone, because yes, there will be winners and there will be losers, but the gains to the winners will be more than sufficient to offset the loss to the losers. We heard this time and again with regard to neoliberal globalization policies, and we're hearing it now with regard to AI. Were those economists missing something?
So, well, I'm not suggesting you were among the cheerleaders for this, but what were they missing?
Well, I think first of all, there were two separate arguments, or perhaps more than two separate arguments, and you've sort of hinted at both of them, and they played somewhat different roles in the reasoning of economists and therefore in the political economy. One is that — and that's, I think, very, very dominant also today in the discussions of AI — that somehow any technology that is a technological advance, therefore improves our capability to produce goods and services, or in the parlance of economists, you know, shifts our technology possibilities frontier up and out, would ultimately benefit everybody. There may be a temporary setback as some people lose their jobs, but with higher productivity there will be more jobs, higher wages, and anything that you do, even if at first it benefits capital owners or engineers or a select group, will trickle down. So there were different versions of the trickle-down argument, but it's essentially the same sort of thing. And that's the argument that Simon Johnson and I, in our previous book, "Power and Progress," centrally sort of try to confront. I don't know how much impact we've had, but we've tried. And in a lot of the work that I've done with David Autor, with Pascual Restrepo, I was also trying to do the same sort of academic things. And then the second argument is that there will be some permanent losers, especially once you recognize that there are different skills in the context of globalization, for example, but that's the one that you've also mentioned — somehow the gains are bigger than the losses, and there will be some mechanism for compensating the losers. The problem is there never is. That's something that's decided in the political economy. If you get more economically well off, you also get politically more powerful. You typically don't then carry out those redistributions, and often we don't even have the perfect instruments for it. And that's where David Autor's work, for example, on the China shock has very mightily illustrated.
Yes. And even — I think that work is very important, you and your colleagues. But the work that you and your colleagues have done is a welcome heterodox alternative to what seems, at least from the outside of the economics profession, to be a mainstream that doesn't necessarily view things that way. And one of the aspects of this account that the mainstream economists, or many of them, seem to overlook was that the gains to the winners didn't translate into effective redistribution. And it's a further question whether redistribution is an adequate substitute for shared prosperity, which is something else. We should come to that.
I would love to. That's the very issue. But what happened was the winners of globalization used the winnings not only to fend off redistribution, but to buy the government, and through the system of campaign finance we have and lobbying, to prevent those left behind from sharing in the increased GDP and in the increased prosperity.
Is there a way for economics to take account, or for political economy to take account, of what was not an unpredictable effect, which was for the gains to the winners being used not for shared prosperity but instead essentially to buy the government, to transform the system of liberal democracy into a kind of oligarchy? Is that being too harsh? Do you think there —
I don't think it's entirely too harsh, but I would say that the problem is a little more multifaceted in my assessment, precisely for reasons that you have yourself highlighted in "The Tyranny of Merit," for example, that it's not just campaign contributions and lobbying, though they are hugely problematic and they've gotten much, much worse, but in a market economy, and especially in the United States, status and dignity follow success. So as certain groups became more successful, their status increased. So there was a natural process for why the Watergate babies or the Atari Democrats were becoming so much more assertive, because they were the ascendant groups. They were the very well-educated Harvard, Stanford, MIT graduates or whatever, at a time when the sort of the premium for being well educated, especially in technical areas, was growing already in the late 1970s and early 1980s. And that sort of created the context, and this is why the class mixing is so important. When the status starts diverging between different groups, community is one way in which you keep them together and you bring people back to saying, "No, you know, your neighbor, you know, who was your friend last year is still your friend just because you've started making 20% more." And the fact that during the same time community was in retreat, both because of economic factors and societal sort of reactions to it, I think really contributed to it. So that's why I think it's very important to think about this more holistically. But yes, it is central to the political economy that we create new pathways for that kind of empathy between different groups, different education groups, different economic classes, between different diverse people with different skills, different backgrounds, and an environment in which — and this is very important, and this is what I see as the liberal project. Not just that people have this freedom of speech, which is very abstract in some sense, but they have the freedom of self-government, because unless you really articulate a pathway for people to shape their social lives, freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom of speech doesn't have the same import, because our lives are mostly social. So who cares if I can by myself have some speech and I can say anything I want, but I cannot have any influence on the public affairs, on how my life is governed? That's where the community comes in, and that's where self-government comes in.
So, and I think it's very important what you've just emphasized, that there are the purely economic effects of widening inequality, wage stagnation in real terms that flow from the trade policies and the neoliberal economic policies that were enacted for four or five decades, and what you described as inequalities of status or recognition. So, one way of putting it might be that the economic arrangements of neoliberal globalization widened the gap between rich and poor. That's economic inequality. But at the same time, there was a deepening divide between winners and losers, which is different from the divide between rich and poor.
Exactly. Winners and losers. And that had to do partly with the growing economic inequality, but also with the tendency of the winners to believe that their success was their own doing and therefore the measure of their merit. And by implication, that those left behind must deserve their fate, too. And so we have this — we have the diploma divide. We have professional credentialed —
meritocratic elites who many working people feel begin to look down on them, don't respect the work they do. And so we have, along with widening economic inequalities, the erosion of the dignity of work. And this fuels not just a sense of unfairness. Economic inequality by itself can produce a sense of unfairness, but a sense of anger, grievance, resentment, and humiliation that many working people feel when they don't believe that they are needed or valued, that they're looked down upon by credentialed elites, the winners in the economy, but also the successful. Yes. And so there's this combined effect of economic inequality and the divide between winners and losers that has to do with social recognition and esteem, which may suggest why even a more generous project of redistribution would not be enough to address this sense of grievance.
100% because when the winners are redistributing from their winnings to those who struggle, that doesn't convey social recognition, honor, respect, and esteem. For that, there has to be a shared project of work and contribution where everyone, whether or not they have a college degree—and it's easy for us to forget that most of our fellow citizens do not have a four-year college degree. More than 60% of Americans do not. And so it's folly to have created, it seems to me, and I suspect you agree, an economy that makes dignified work and a decent life depend on having a four-year degree that most people don't have. It's a recipe for anger, grievance, humiliation that can be exploited by the kind of right-wing populist politics of humiliation that's been very successful and it has this country exploited.
But let me—I mean, those are central themes, and I want to sort of just pose on them for a second. And also, you know, I said abstractly at the beginning that Michael's work influenced me a lot, and in these comments you see the three main areas in which I learned a lot from Michael's work. One is the role of community from your earlier work, but then the other two, which very much relate to this discussion, especially from The Tyranny of Merit. One is the sort of role that the meritocratic reading of success and failure can have as a humiliating force on those who are not doing as well. And then the third is sort of a very interesting way to articulate a lot of ideas that I was struggling with, which is in the notion of contributive justice—that it's not enough to just redistribute and give people enough consumption. They also need a sense that they are contributing to society, which is important for their own recognition of their own contribution, others' recognition that feeds into that. All of those sort of relate to it.
But it also, I would say, the college non-college divide has one other aspect that's also very important, which David anticipated in his excellent starting comments, that it easily lends itself to a technocratic conceit. We are the educated, therefore we know everything best, and that sort of even deepens that kind of tension. And I think there are two very important ideas that follow from that, which you've touched upon. One is that it is essential to have a shared project, and that's actually very easy because despite our current polarization, I think there are so many shared moral values, including values of fairness, on the two sides of that polarized divide that people share, and they can become even stronger when those community relations are there. [snorts]
Second, indeed, it's not just a redistribution project. And there are two ways in which I can emphasize that further. One is that I know of no example of durable shared prosperity in history, recent or distant, which is not based on wage growth. So wage growth is absolutely essential for both shared prosperity and that shared prosperity to mean something to people. And second, I think the extreme forms of redistribution would have a very debilitating effect along the lines of what you suggest, and I think we can understand that best in the context of universal basic income. And I think if we have to go to universal basic income to support, say, 50, 60, 70% of the population who ultimately, in the age of AI, cannot find employment or cannot find gainful enough employment to support the rising aspirations, that would very much be a very demoralizing economy where a large fraction of the population feel and are told that you're only living off the crumbs of the very creative engineers or the business leaders or the CEOs. And I think that's a recipe for disaster. And I think that's very, very important.
So here is a saving grace, and other sort of not optimistic but hopeful tone. I don't think we need to go there. UBI and those kinds of plans are a last gap-filling measure if we give up on everything, and I don't think we need to give up on everything. And I think we can have an AI-based economy that still creates a lot of jobs and a lot of opportunities for people. And this is on the basis of the idea that Simon Johnson, David, and I have written, for example, called Pro-Worker AI, using AI to expand the capabilities, expertise, and abilities of workers in the information age. And that by that I don't just mean white-collar knowledge workers, but electricians, nurses, teachers, plumbers, all kinds of people having better capabilities to do more and newer things in the age of AI. And that's both technically feasible and socially desirable, but it must be based on going back to this sort of shared project, shared moral values, and understanding that covers a broad enough base of society. And that's why bringing the working class into that conversation is very important.
Yes. Well, I think what the three of you have emphasized is very important—that what makes for shared prosperity is not just access to basic goods made possible by a universal basic income. It requires actually being a participant, having a voice, having a say in shaping the forces that govern our lives, including the shape of the economy and the workplace. And the reason I think it's so important, the work that you've done emphasizing worker-friendly AI, is teaching us that the goal of AI, the purpose of AI, should not be to replace work but to enhance work so that the productivity of workers can increase and therefore their wages. The idea of contributive justice, which you mentioned, lies in the background of this. What it suggests is what distributive justice alone misses, which is that our fundamental need, the fundamental human need beyond having access to basic consumer goods and the necessities of life, the fundamental need is the need to be needed by our fellow citizens and to be able to exercise our effort and talent to meet those needs and thereby to win social esteem and honor and respect and recognition for doing so. That's what contributive justice requires beyond what a universal basic income might provide. And that's what makes shared prosperity shared. It's not just the money that's shared. It's the activity. It's the common life.
The project, including the deliberate democratic deliberation about the shape of the project.
Exactly.
That is ultimately shaped. Very important for one other reason, because I think with AI, which is so multi-dimensional and is going to have so many effects on every aspect of our lives, creating a shared understanding and a shared sort of set of objectives for the future becomes all the more important. In fact, at the heart of AI are two sort of statements that we are told all the time that I think are deeply contradictory, and seeing that contradiction is a very important first step. We are told every day that AI is going to transform every aspect of our lives—our work, our communication, our social lives, our wealth, the skills. But then we're also told, you stay out of the path of AI. Let it be guided by the experts and the leaders and a few frontier labs. In a democratic society, those two statements couldn't be more contradictory. If something is going to have even one-tenth, a quarter of the effect that they claim, which I think is very reasonable, then democratic society should be involved in every aspect of that decision because it's going to be completely determining our lives in so many different ways. To say get out of the way is like the last thing you should ever hear from the lips of the leaders.
Now, Daron, I agree with that. They're telling us we have just a couple of minutes until we turn to the audience for questions. But before we do, I can't resist asking, and you can develop this perhaps at greater length in response if there's questions on this, on AI: the recent spate of doomster scenarios about the risk of human extinction within a decade. Why is it—I was hoping that [snorts] when I came here I would learn from you why it is that intuitively I'm very wary of those claims, and not because I'm a technical expert who knows that they misidentified actually the risk and the probability of extinction, but because it sounds weirdly, paradoxically self-serving when the leaders of these labs or the participants are proclaiming to us, we've got something so powerful it might destroy humanity. We better worry about that. Why does that strike me as suspicious?
Well, you know, my perspective—and I don't have any special powers to read into the minds of both the high-level and the mid-level people who are making these pronouncements—but my take is that they are sincere, that they are really worried about these things. But that also highlights, if you look at the background, why having people from a very, very narrow background being empowered in this context could be problematic. All of the upper echelons of Anthropic and many in OpenAI, for example, and many in DeepMind, they come from the same milieu. They have the same approach to AI. They have ingested the same science fiction. They've read the same, you know, internet philosophers.