CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
Get an email when Paul Krugman gives a new interview
One email per new interview. Unsubscribe in one click.
Paul Krugman
Distinguished Professor of Economics, CUNY Graduate Center

Paul Krugman/Zachary Carter - The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy & the Life of John Maynard Keynes

📅 Apr 03, 2025 CUNY Graduate Center 57 MIN 26627 VIEWS 75 SEGMENTS · 3 SPEAKERS
Paul Krugman and Zachary D. Carter in Conversation This event was recorded live on Tuesday, March 25. Paul Krugman, one of today’s leading economists, joins in a discussion with Zachary D. Carter, author of an award-winning biography of John Maynard Keynes, the great 20th-century thinker and father of macroeconomics, “whose enduring relevance is always heightened when crisis strikes” — The Wall Street Journal. What can the life and ideas of Keynes, who traveled from Bloomsbury group parties to the halls of power on two continents, teach us about today’s debates over government spending and i...

Questions asked in this interview

6
  1. 5:10We'll have you back in what, three years? Two years?
  2. 17:44Yeah, I mean, he also did it with "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." I mean, what the hell kind of title is that?
  3. 28:36They talk to each other like, "Brother, are you saved?" And they're joking, but are they?
  4. 32:48And I think without that kind of persona, an academic with a good idea, I mean, there are probably a lot of academics with good ideas in this room, right?
  5. 34:59In a way, I mean, I think it emboldens confidence in that, particularly in that generation of people, because you can go out and say something totally preposterous, and at the end of the day, you'll still be an aristocrat, right?
  6. 48:20Leon Keyserling, right? Who's heard of this guy?
Janet Gornick 0:06 ↗
Good evening. I'm Janet Gornick, Director of the Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality. Our center is co-host of this evening's event in partnership with the Leon Levy Center for Biography and the Graduate Center's Office of Public Programs. It's my great pleasure to welcome you all this evening. Welcome to the in-person audience here in the Elebash Recital Hall, and welcome to the audience online. This evening's event is one of many public lectures, panels, and conversations offered here at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York throughout each year. At the Graduate Center we're proud of our history of applying research and scholarship to address societal challenges. And tonight's conversation fits with that tradition.
This evening our attention will be focused on a remarkable and highly praised book titled, "The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy, and the Life of John Maynard Keynes." The author of the book, Zachary Carter, is with us this evening, and starting in a few minutes, he'll be joined in conversation with Paul Krugman. (audience applauding)
So let me first tell you what to expect this evening. After my brief introduction, our two guests will discuss the book and whatever else comes to mind for about 50 minutes. While they are conversing, audience members will have the opportunity to write questions on index cards that have been handed out, and the public program staff will collect those cards at about 10 past 7. They'll be sorted and handed to Professor Krugman. So let me make a quick plea to those of you who submit questions. Please make them relatively brief and print as clearly as possible. In our experience, many excellent questions fall by the wayside because the moderator can't decipher the handwriting. Starting at about 7:30, our guests will address your questions, and we'll close at 7:45. And last but not least, following the event, Zachary Carter will sign books in the lobby.
I'm going to spend only a few minutes telling you about the book, because you're going to hear about it momentarily. The heart of the book is, of course, an account of the extraordinary life of John Maynard Keynes. The book opens in 1914 as England is spiraling toward financial crisis, a foundational episode for the young Keynes. Carter writes this about the British Treasury's response to the crisis: "The emergency maneuver that would eventually carry the weightiest consequences was a seemingly random personnel decision, enlisting an unrenowned 31-year-old academic to fight the panic." From there, Carter takes his readers through a spellbinding intellectual, political, and economic history of the subsequent 30 years, with Keynes, of course, as the central figure up until his death in 1946.
Carter then offers his own eulogy of sorts, in which he writes, "Few lives have ever been lived to the same vibrant, eclectic excess as Keynes lived his. He was a philosopher who rivaled Wittgenstein, a diplomat who became the financial hero of two world wars, a historian who uncovered peculiarities of great Enlightenment figures and ancient currencies, a journalist who enraged and inspired the public, the patron of a famed artistic movement. He was as vain, petty, short-sighted, and impolitic as he was generous, kindhearted, and persuasive." The portrait of Keynes is itself a tour de force, but Carter doesn't stop there. The last third of the book takes us through Keynes' influence through the seven decades following his death. Carter focuses on the United States, tracing Keynes' impact one way or another through a dozen American presidencies, a half century of economic thought and policy making, and consequential economic developments, including the rise of inequality. Readers have the opportunity to spend time with John Kenneth Galbraith. You'll be treated to nearly a second biography, as well as Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, Milton Friedman, and more. If I may say so, the book is captivating from start to finish, and the writing is gorgeous.
It's my pleasure to welcome Zachary Carter for his first time to the Graduate Center. He's currently a non-resident fellow at the Global Order and Institutions Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and he's a columnist at "Slate." Before that, he worked as a financial and political journalist, including spending 10 years as a senior reporter at HuffPost, where he covered the implementation of Dodd-Frank, political standoffs over trade policy, federal budgeting, and schisms within the Democratic Party. His work has also appeared in "The New York Times," "The Wall Street Journal," "The Washington Post," "The Atlantic," "The New Republic," "The Nation," "The American Prospect," and more. He's currently at work on a biography of John Stuart Mill. (audience laughing)
We'll have you back in what, three years? Two years? - [Zachary] If the crowd's this good. - If the crowd's this good. (audience laughing) You're officially invited.
Paul Krugman is a distinguished professor in the Graduate Center's PhD program in Economics and a Senior Scholar in the Stone Center. Before joining the Graduate Center, he was a Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton. Professor Krugman's scholarship has been honored countless times, including in 2008 when he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on international trade theory. He's the author of more than 200 articles and many books, most recently "Arguing with Zombies: Economics, Politics, and the Fight for a Better Future." In addition to working with us here at The Graduate Center, he co-authors textbooks on micro and macroeconomics with Robin Wells. And of course, many of you know him best from his 25 years writing op-ed columns for "The New York Times." Just this year, he transitioned away from "The Times" and away from X, but he surely hasn't left the world of public engagement. You can now find him on Substack, where he's writing up a storm, and on BlueSky. So welcome to our two guests. And Paul, I turn the evening over to you. (audience applauding)
Paul Krugman 6:25 ↗
Hi. Well, thanks for coming. This book was a real wild ride, especially I've been trained as a boring economist and tend to think that Keynes is the guy who said that fiscal policy can be used to increase aggregate demand, and there's a little bit more to his story than that. (Zachary laughing) And the introduction begins, I mean, actually it begins with Keynes falling in love, but after that, it takes us to Genoa, where there was a monetary conference in 1920, where he was writing a series of articles for "The Manchester Guardian" that became one of his great books. And it gives right there you give us a view that I really hadn't thought about of how Keynes saw his own role. Anyway, why don't you talk about Keynes and Genoa, and let's talk about what's going on there.
Zachary Carter 7:17 ↗
So Genoa is one of these, there are several councils that happen between the two world wars where different European leaders, sometimes with some sort of American presence or unofficial American presence, are trying to work out what to do about the way the economy has changed as a result of World War I, the enormous reparations duties that have been imposed on Germany, the tremendous war debts that are owed to the United States and to a lesser extent to Great Britain. And basically everybody thinks this whole thing is a big mess, and there need to be things, something needs to happen to help coordinate economic activity and particularly allow trade to function as smoothly as it had prior to the war. And so everyone's trying to sort of recreate the political conditions that can allow a free trading economy to do its thing. And everybody thinks that free trading is responsible largely for the significant increase in the standard of living that's happened in Europe and the United States over the previous 50 years.
None of these conferences ever go well. I mean, that's why we have the Great Depression. So I don't want to spoil the whole thing, but a lot of bad stuff happens after the conference in general in 1922, most notably the Second World War. But Keynes is showing up sort of as a journalist to cover what's happening, because he's been thrown out of officialdom as a result of his first big book, which was "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." It's a scathing indictment of, in some ways unfair indictment of the Treaty of Versailles that totally changes the international perception of the legitimacy of the treaty that ended World War I. And so nobody wants to have him, no politician wants to have this guy in his inner circle because he's just dumped on everybody. But he's going as a journalist, and he's trying to think of a new scheme to help coordinate currencies and make the world a safe place for free trade again. And he kind of accidentally comes up with monetarism while he's doing it, which is an entire economic doctrine saying that essentially the quantity of money is what dictates prices in the global economy, and we ought to manage the quantity of money in such a way, not just to make sure that trade between countries is balanced, but to make sure that you actually have a functional employment situation. And that's new. It's a new way of managing the gold standard.
Paul Krugman 9:50 ↗
So what struck me in your description was that he was not just, in the end, even economic stabilization or even free trade wasn't what he was about. That it was about civilized values against militarism. And that the problem as he saw it then and continued, I guess all through his life to see it, was that all these people, all these statesmen who still thought in archaic terms, still thought that power came from conquest of territory, that national strength was to be measured in terms of what you owed, that it was that the world was kind of a zero-sum place where you needed to extract from other countries. That's just a much larger vision. And I have to say the idea that that was the conflict would have seemed to me very archaic a few years ago, not so much now. (Zachary laughing) That is really kind of, his whole thing was, as you say, the price of peace. It was always about, his aim was always larger than just economic stabilization.
Zachary Carter 10:50 ↗
He's kind of battling against European medievalism. And your point about territory, I mean, the idea that national glory comes from conquest. He doesn't believe that. He thinks Liberalism, and here, I mean, like capital L, like Liberal party in the UK, Liberalism, is about this bringing together of people of different backgrounds and ideas. I mean, it's a very European and Eurocentric ideal, but you know, he's friends with all of these artists and they love to go to Paris and hang out with Picasso and they love reading Tolstoy, and they can just see art and letters and stuff bringing the world closer together and making it a more beautiful place. And he's totally enraptured in this idea of a kind of internationalist, sort of elite, but also middle-class artistic community that he wants to build.
Paul Krugman 11:43 ↗
We might say nowadays a globalist.
Zachary Carter 11:44 ↗
Yeah, (laughs) very much so. And as he ages, he wants to democratize access to that culture. But particularly in the 1920s, he's just trying to keep what he thought was good about the pre-war order alive. And he's very worried, particularly about authoritarian imperialism rising again. And with good reason it turned out.
Paul Krugman 12:10 ↗
Let's back up a bit because it really starts, I mean, Keynes starts, he's 31, and somehow or other he ends up basically running Britain's war finances during World War I. Tell us about that, how that happened.
Zachary Carter 12:25 ↗
He always wanted to work for the Treasury Department. In the British Civil Service, the treasury is just a very prestigious, elite place. He couldn't quite get in after he got his degree in math, not in economics. So for anybody who doesn't have a degree in economics, it's okay. You can be just like John Maynard Keynes. (audience laughing) He's working in the India Office, so that's like one step down, very much a British imperial manager, thinking about how to operate the financial relationship between the UK and India. So he has a foot in British government, but he's not a big deal. He doesn't have a graduate degree, but he has some friends who he meets through that process. And they say, "This guy Keynes is really sharp. We should get him to come up." Because there's a financial crisis at the outset of World War I. It's a huge financial crisis. It's probably the biggest one the world has ever seen, maybe bigger than 2008. It's just they figure out what to do about it and they have a war afterwards, so people don't talk about it the same way they do the 2008 crash. And he gets invited up to take part in the conference about what to do about these crashing stock markets around the world at the onset of the war. And that ends up being his avenue into the British government for the duration of the war. And he's 31 years old. He very quickly becomes the head of British war finance, which is a very, very big job, especially in the era of the gold standard during the conflict.
Paul Krugman 13:53 ↗
Just a random observation I had. This is his career arc, in a lot of ways is the inverse of what a modern economist is expected to do. You're supposed to spend your first 20 years as an adult writing theoretical elaborations, and then maybe go into policy. And Keynes plunges right into the heart of policy and then sort of eventually in his 50s, goes out there and writes the most fundamental work, economic work of the 20th century. It's just wild.
Zachary Carter 14:26 ↗
To some extent, he's part of the generation that's defining the economist as we know it today. I mean, they call it political economy at the time, which is a term downstream from political arithmetic from Isaac Newton's day. And data's not super great at the turn of the 19th, 20th century. So a lot of the stuff that's happening in economics is sort of reasoning from a set of principles. It's very deductive, not necessarily ultra empirical. So it is a place where if you're very smart and you can make good arguments, and you have a charismatic presence as an orator, you can make an impact very quickly. And he was an enormously competent and confident person. He's also 6 foot 7, which I don't think hurt him. You know, I think he shows up at these places and he's just towering over everybody, and they're like, (laughs) "Don't hurt us, crazy giant." But he was very persuasive. And particularly one of the things that I thought was really fascinating studying his career, he works out so many of his ideas in the popular press. At one point he buys his own newspaper to just sort of play around with economic ideas in public. He also writes for academic journals, but a lot of his big ideas come from writings that show up in "The New York Times" or in "The Nation and Athenaeum," which he runs, which I think is a really important lesson for the way that economics is conducted today. There was sort of a joke for a while that the best sort of academic economics discourse was happening on a website called Twitter. I don't think that's true anymore, but it's not totally unusual for people to be playing with ideas in public. And I think there's a sort of sense that, the sense that we didn't have it all figured out from the era of Keynes that made it okay to try new things and experiment with new ideas, which I think is really important for the humanities in general, but particularly for economics, because the models always work until they don't. And you never know what's going to happen when it's going to stop working.
Paul Krugman 16:32 ↗
There's a, yeah, I mean, he was reporting for "The Manchester Guardian" when he was in Genoa, and the essays that he wrote becomes "A Tract on Monetary Reform," which certain people think that that's better than "The General Theory." (Zachary laughing) But the idea that he was writing that stuff at "The Manchester Guardian" is kind of stunning.
Zachary Carter 16:55 ↗
It's not one of his more accessible works either. I mean, so the stuff that he's putting in the newspaper, I don't know how well, like how widely it was read, but it's remarkable. He just put this 20-page essay on like the nature of currency right there in the newspaper.
Paul Krugman 17:11 ↗
By the way, side question. What was it with his titles of his books? I mean in the modern world, if you're trying to reach, no matter how abstract you are, if you're trying to reach the world, you title your book something like, "The World is Flat" or something. (Zachary laughing) And he has what is actually very engaging. There's a fair bit of technical stuff in it, but it's also very engaging. It's full of polemics and all this stuff. And he calls it "A Tract on Monetary Reform." - (laughs) Yeah. - And he did that with his magnum opus too, but that was meant to be inaccessible. I'm not sure this was.
Zachary Carter 17:44 ↗
Yeah, I mean, he also did it with "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." I mean, what the hell kind of title is that? And I don't think he expected that to be a big international sensation. That book sold hundreds of thousands of copies at a time when books didn't sell hundreds of thousands of copies. And the title just makes it sound like the biggest snooze fest in the world. But of all of his works, I mean, it's just he has, because he is embedded in this Bloomsbury artistic set, he's around incredible writers all the time. And the portraits he has in "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," the biographical sketches of Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson, are just incredible. I mean, the writing is really beautiful. And that's one of the hacks for this book. So if any of you are thinking about writing biographies, if you write about people who write well, a lot of the work is done for you. You can just quote them if you get stuck. (laughs) (audience laughing)
Paul Krugman 18:38 ↗
"Economic Consequences of Peace." I mean, economists have read snippets of the general theory, mostly read interpretations of it. And then "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" is his magnum opus, which, again, not the most inviting title in the world, and at least aware that he wrote "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." But tell us about that book, why it has such an impact. And I think in some ways it had, I realized after reading your book that it probably had a very profound impact on the post-war order.
Zachary Carter 19:16 ↗
I think it did. And it's, from a contemporary perspective, you can dispute the underlying economic analysis in it. I mean, I think his basic case, that the war debts are too high and the reparations duties are too high, is basically right. But that's not by any means like an undisputed consensus.
Paul Krugman 19:35 ↗
People don't know. I mean, after World War I, the victorious powers demanded that the defeated powers pay. And Keynes was arguing that it was terrible, it was a Carthaginian peace, as in sowing the soil with salt. Yeah, but, and anyway.
Zachary Carter 19:51 ↗
Yeah, and a lot of his analysis in the book, I mean, it's almost, it's more a work of, I think, political theory and sort of public psychology than it is a work of financial analysis. His ultimate argument is that nobody's going to put up with this stuff. They've just had a horrible war. Everybody in Europe is completely depleted. And if you tell them all, "Now, we've got to raise your taxes to a zillion percent" to pay back the Americans for funding the war, or to pay the British for defeating us, if you're Germany, this is going to lead to the people who the economic system will not support this, and you will have a revolution. And he's a very great admirer of Edmund Burke, which was, for me, at least, a surprise. As I went through his work, I sort of associated Keynes with Paul Krugman, and I don't associate Paul Krugman with Edmund Burke particularly. I don't know if that's accurate or inaccurate, but he's obsessed with the idea of stability, and he's deeply afraid that revolution would threaten his little paradise of art and letters that he lives in, but he does have a very deep sense of social justice, and I think he just thinks the peace at some level is unfair, like the war was basically a huge mistake and to blame it all on Germany is, he works for the British government, he tries to defeat Germany, he's very much a British patriot, but he thinks this is basically a raw deal. And he's very angry with the Americans. He's like, "We fought this war, we're totally depleted, and now you're just going to take all of our trade, basically, because in exchange for your help?" And I think the way the interwar years play out, I mean, to some extent the Great Depression to a very large extent, is just the result of Europe and the United States being unable to resolve this problem over the course of 15 years.
Paul Krugman 21:48 ↗
What struck me, somehow I'd never thought of before is that, in a way what happened after World War II, where the United States played this previously unprecedented role. But first, where you have, you talk about, there were all these monetary conferences in the interwar period, all of which were disastrous failures. And then 1944, Bretton Woods, which is most notably not a failure. And Keynes is there, and it's all about, let's not make the mistakes we did the first time. - Yeah, let's cooperate. (laughs) - And then, I had never really thought of the Marshall Plan as being fundamentally Keynesian, but if we think of Keynes not as the prophet of increasing aggregate demand, but as the prophet of creating a world that's safe for art. - Yeah. (laughs) - So, yeah, I mean, that was kind of revelatory to me anyway.
Zachary Carter 22:47 ↗
I mean, think about all film noir, that whole genre of cinema has that name because the United States sent so many movies to France after the war. So there is this sense that, like, because we had a somewhat Keynesian end to World War II, at least between the United States and Europe and the members of the sort of Bretton Woods community, there was this flowering of art and ideas across international lines. There are alliances that still exist today. I mean, my entire life, Europe has been a relatively stable place. That is not the global history of that continent. And we're now seeing what can happen if you just decide to take that for granted or try to throw bombs into it. But I think listening to Keynes at the end of World War II was responsible for those elements of the 20th century order that are worth defending today.
Paul Krugman 23:43 ↗
Wow. Yeah. Do we know? Well, we know that Keynes was at Bretton Woods and he didn't make it through to the Marshall Plan, but he was there. I mean, he probably died a couple of years sooner than he might have if he hadn't been so insistent on actually trying to save the world up to literally his last ounce of strength.
Zachary Carter 24:02 ↗
And he didn't believe, like he just didn't believe in his own frailty. I mean, his self-confidence was just incredible. And you can see him just decaying in the photos from the 1940s, and he just blew it all off. I mean, he has a heart attack in 1937 that almost destroys him, and he has another one at Bretton Woods, and he's just thinking, "Whatever," let's get back in the pit (audience laughing) and get some World Bank stuff going. But I think the Marshall Plan, in a lot of ways, it's ideologically downstream of what happens at Bretton Woods. The idea there, for Keynes, fundamentally, is that the victors have to pay to rebuild, because they're the people who won, they have the money, and if they don't pay to rebuild, then the conflict continues to fester. And so at Bretton Woods, he's thinking that the World Bank and maybe the International Monetary Fund a little bit, are going to be funding the reconstruction of Europe. And there's a little bit. It's very early to influence France, but the Marshall Plan, the United States is basically persuaded and says, "Okay, let's do this." The result of that is something that Keynes was not terribly enthusiastic about, which was American economic and political hegemony. But I think he would take that over the alternatives that were available in 1946.
Paul Krugman 25:20 ↗
Yeah, the striking thing about Bretton Woods is that it's a, again, sort of things I didn't fully appreciate, but nowadays there's so much water under the bridge, and we think about it as it eventually became constraining and all that. But it was setting up a system where, at least in principle, surplus countries were supposed to help deficit countries, where you were supposed to help manage the international system. And also one in which was kind of symmetric. There was no global. In practice, it was American hegemony, but not on paper.
Zachary Carter 25:57 ↗
It was American hegemony, but there were also reciprocal relationships within the Bretton Woods nations. The USSR never ratifies the treaty. They do actually sign it at Bretton Woods, which tells you how impressive the conference is as a diplomatic event, because they actually put their name on the line, which the national government was not willing to support ultimately. So I think the idea, Keynes' idea, is that Bretton Woods is going to provide the economic foundations for world peace. I mean, he's extremely ambitious about what he thinks can be achieved with wise economic policy. And because the USSR doesn't ratify the treaty, it can't prevent the Cold War. And I think that would have been extremely difficult even if they had signed on, but the relationships among the powers that sign it are still pretty good today. That's quite an achievement. And not in any way, as the experience after World War I shows, not in any way predetermined by the events as they stood in 1944.
Paul Krugman 27:02 ↗
So one thing I really didn't know was why it was there. I mean, this conference, it's the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, which is this huge Victorian, I guess, wooden structure, but it's quite remote. - Big and old, yeah. (chuckles) - Yeah, but it was there because Keynes said, "I am not doing a conference in Washington in July." (Zachary and audience laughing)
Zachary Carter 27:27 ↗
I mean, Washington, I live in Washington now, and it's horrible in July, but in 1944, when they don't have air conditioning, I mean, these people are at war, but they're not masochists. (laughs)
Paul Krugman 27:40 ↗
Okay. I don't think I want to talk about the development of general theory, but I do want to talk about the Keynesian, I mean, so here you have, Keynes has kind of been exiled from politics in the 30s, but he has decided that what he really needs now, after having been in the center of affairs, now I really need some academic credibility, and starts working out this theory. And it's quite a process. Not some guy who goes, I want to talk about writing books in a few minutes, but he's not some guy who withdraws to his study for a year and writes a book. It's almost this, I don't know, how would you describe it? Because I was going to say something about that.
Zachary Carter 28:23 ↗
I mean, the process of the general theory's development. You know, Keynes is, he has this whole cult of personality around him at Cambridge University, they call themselves the Cambridge Circus,
But it's kind of, I mean, it's almost like a cult. They talk to each other like, "Brother, are you saved?" And they're joking, but are they? And they all have this sense that they're developing some new theory, that even the big ideas that Keynes has been putting forward about the quantity of money in the interwar years are just, like, not quite right. And eventually they all put it together. But there are other figures like Joan Robinson, her husband Austin, her lover Richard Kahn, Piero Sraffa, who's an Italian economist.
Paul Krugman 29:09 ↗
Who are a lot more interesting than your modern economists. (Zachary and audience laughing)
Zachary Carter 29:13 ↗
Well, I mean, they're kind of like, to study economics in the 1930s was basically to announce that you were a radical in some way or another, and particularly at Cambridge. And Keynes is like the radical who worked at Treasury. So if you want to be a radical and also have a job and a nice living, like Keynes is a good guy to work for. And in this kind of ferment where they're fighting with Friedrich Hayek in academic papers, he's trying to teach students his old book called "A Treatise on Money," which comes after the "Tract on Monetary Reform." That's an even larger, more ridiculous book than "The General Theory." And in many ways, it's a collective effort.
But his goal, he feels like he's done a really good job reaching the general public since "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." So he's had 15 years where he's been the most famous economist in the world, and the public knows what he thinks. He doesn't have a problem reaching the public, and he has an enormous audience. I mean, he gets paid a crazy amount of money to write those "Manchester Guardian" articles in 1922, but he doesn't think that public opinion is directly influencing government leaders. So he thinks in order to influence those figures, who are still, a lot of them in the British government are still salty about what he wrote in 1919, he needs to convert the sort of priesthood of economics to a new theory of economics. And if he gets this kind of intellectual circle to say, "This is a great new work," then FDR and everybody else will do public work spending and all the things that he thinks are important for saving the global economy.

32 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Krugman, P. (2025, April 3). Paul Krugman/Zachary Carter - The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy & the Life of John Maynard Keynes [Interview transcript]. CUNY Graduate Center. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3392678/

MLA

Paul Krugman. "Paul Krugman/Zachary Carter - The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy & the Life of John Maynard Keynes." CUNY Graduate Center, 3 Apr. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3392678/.

BibTeX
@misc{krugman2025_3392678,
  author       = {Paul Krugman},
  title        = {Paul Krugman/Zachary Carter - The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy \& the Life of John Maynard Keynes},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, CUNY Graduate Center. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {apr},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3392678/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}