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Tyler Cowen
Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics; Chairman, Mercatus Center, George Mason University

Tyler Cowen — The #1 bottleneck to AI progress is humans

📅 Jan 09, 2025 Dwarkesh Patel 60 MIN 94944 VIEWS 136 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
This is my fourth interview with the pre-eminent infovore Tyler Cowen – and yet I’m always hearing new stuff from him. We talked at the Progress Conference 2024 about why he thinks AI won't drive explosive economic growth, the real bottlenecks on progress, him now writing for AIs instead of humans, and the difficult relationship between being cultured and fostering growth – among many other things. Thanks to the Roots of Progress Institute (with special thanks to Jason Crawford and Heike Larson) for such a wonderful conference, and to ‪@freethink‬ for the videography. Roots of Progress Instit...

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 0:48Why won't we have explosive economic growth, 20% plus, because of AI?
  2. 4:07His model is far too much a one-factor model, right?
  3. 12:12Where were the bottlenecks when Deng Xiaoping took over?
  4. 15:45Why do you think it's so important for that to be the case?
  5. 22:27Wasn't Churchill, by the time he was 24, an international correspondent in Cuba and India?
  6. 25:50Why did we have so many just awful, awful leaders in the early 20th century?
  7. 30:54Did you see SBF's balance sheet?
  8. 35:14Is TLS going to pick it up?
  9. 39:04And what's going on with the 75%?
  10. 41:59If you buy your picture of AI where it increases growth rates by half a percentage point, what does your portfolio look like?
  11. 47:08That you can have returns. Ricardo knew this, right?
  12. 53:07... wonder, when you go around the world—because I know you go outside the Bay Area and the East Coast as well—and you talk about progress studies related ideas, what's the biggest difference in how they're received versus the audience here?
Dwarkesh Patel 0:48 ↗
Tyler, welcome. Dwarkesh, great to be chatting with you. Why won't we have explosive economic growth, 20% plus, because of AI?
Tyler Cowen 0:57 ↗
It's very hard to get explosive economic growth for any reason, AI or not. One problem is that some parts of your economy grow very rapidly, and then you get a cost disease in the other parts of your economy that, for instance, can't use AI very well. Look at the US economy. These numbers are guesses, but government consumption is what, 18%? Healthcare is almost 20%. I'm guessing education is 6 to 7%. The nonprofit sector, I'm not sure the number, but you add it all up, that's half of the economy right there. How well are they going to use AI? Is failure to use AI going to cause them to just immediately disappear and be replaced? No, that will take, say, 30 years. So you'll have some sectors of the economy, less regulated, where it happens very quickly. But that only gets you a modest boost in growth rates, not anything like the whole economy grows 40% a year.
Dwarkesh Patel 1:46 ↗
The mechanism behind cost disease is that there's a limited amount of laborers, and if there's one high productivity sector, then wages everywhere have to go up. So your barber also has to earn twice the wages or something. With AI, you can just have every barbershop with 1,000 times the workers, every restaurant with 1,000 times the workers, not just Google. So why would the cost disease mechanism still work here?
Tyler Cowen 2:03 ↗
Cost disease is more general than that. Let's say you have a bunch of factors of production, say five of them. Now, all of a sudden, we get a lot more intelligence, which has already been happening, to be clear. Well, that just means the other constraints in your system become a lot more binding, that the marginal importance of those goes up, and the marginal value of more and more IQ or intelligence goes down. So that also is self-limiting on growth, and the cost disease is just one particular instantiation of that more general problem that we illustrate with talk about barbers and string quartets.
Dwarkesh Patel 2:34 ↗
If you were talking to a farmer in 2000 BC, and you told them that growth rates would 10x, 100x, you'd have 2% economic growth after the Industrial Revolution, and then he started talking about bottlenecks, what do you say to him in retrospect?
Tyler Cowen 2:52 ↗
He and I would agree, I hope. I think I would tell him, 'Hey, it's going to take a long time.' And he'd say, 'Hmm, I don't see it happening yet. I think it's going to take a long time.' And we'd shake hands and walk off into the sunset. And then I'd eat some of his rice or wheat or whatever, and that would be awesome. But the idea that you can have a rapid acceleration in growth rates and that bottlenecks don't just eat it away, you could agree with that, right?
Dwarkesh Patel 3:15 ↗
I don't know what the word 'could' means. So I would say this: You look at market data, say real interest rates, stock prices, right now everything looks so normal, startlingly normal, even apart from AI. So what you'd call prediction markets are not forecasting super rapid growth anytime soon. If you look at what experts on economic growth rate... We had Chad Jones here yesterday. He's not predicting super rapid growth, though he thinks AI might well accelerate rates of growth. So the experts and the markets agree. Who am I to say different from the experts?
You're an expert.
Tyler Cowen 3:49 ↗
I'm with another expert. In his talk yesterday, Chad Jones said that the main variable, the main input into his model for growth, is just population. If you have a doubling, an order of magnitude increase in the population, you plug that number in in his model, you get explosive economic growth.
Dwarkesh Patel 4:03 ↗
I don't agree.
Tyler Cowen 4:05 ↗
Why not buy the models?
Dwarkesh Patel 4:07 ↗
His model is far too much a one-factor model, right? Population. I don't think it's very predictive. We've had big increases in effective world population in terms of purchasing power. A lot of different areas have not become more innovative. Until the last, say, four years, most of them became less innovative. So it's really about the quality of your best people or institutions, as you and Patrick were discussing last night. And there it's unclear what's happened, but it's also fragile. There's the perspective of the economist, but also that of the anthropologist, the sociologist. They all matter. But I think the more you stack different pluralistic perspectives, the harder it is to see that there's any simple lever you can push on, intelligence or not, that's going to give you breakaway economic growth.
What you just said, where you're bottlenecked by your best people, seems to contradict what you were saying in your initial answer, that even if you boost the best parts, you're going to be bottlenecked by the restaurants.
Tyler Cowen 5:00 ↗
You're one of our best people, right? You're frustrated by all kinds of things.
Dwarkesh Patel 5:03 ↗
I think I'm gonna be making a lot more podcasts after AGI.
Tyler Cowen 5:06 ↗
Okay, good. I'll listen. I'll be bottlenecked by time. Here's a simple way to put it. Most of sub-Saharan Africa still does not have reliable clean water. The intelligence required for that is not scarce. We cannot so readily do it. We are more in that position than we might like to think, but along other variables. And taking advantage of the intelligence from strong AI is one of those.
Dwarkesh Patel 5:31 ↗
So about a year ago, your co-writer on Martial Revolution, Alex Tabarrok, had a post about the extreme scarcity of high-IQ workers. And so if the labor force in the United States is 164 million people, if one in a thousand of them are geniuses, you have 164,000 geniuses. That's why you have to do semiconductors in Taiwan, because that's where they're putting their nominal amount of geniuses. We're putting ours in finance and tech. If you look at that framework, we have a thousand times more of those kinds of people. The bottlenecks are going to eat all that away? If you ask any one of these people, if you had a thousand times more of your best colleague, your best coworker, your best co-founder, the bottlenecks are going to eat all that away? Your organization isn't going to grow any faster?
Tyler Cowen 6:07 ↗
I didn't agree with that post. If you look at labor market data, the returns to IQ as it translates into wages, they're amazingly low. They're pretty insignificant. People who are very successful, they're very smart, but they're people who have say eight or nine areas where they're like, on a scale of 1 to 10, there are nine. Like they have one area where they're just like an 11 and a half on a scale of 1 to 10. And then on everything else, they're an eight to a nine and have a lot of determination. And that's what leads to incredible success. And IQ is one of those things, but it's not actually that important. It's the bundle, and the bundles are scarce. And then the bundles interacting with the rest of the world. Like just try going to a mid-tier state university and sit down with the committee designed to develop a plan for using artificial intelligence in the curriculum. And then come back to me and tell me how that went, and then we'll talk about bottlenecks. They will write a report. The report will sound like GPT-4, and we'll have the report. The report will not be bottlenecked, I promise you.
Dwarkesh Patel 7:16 ↗
These other traits, look, the AIs, it's conscientiousness, if it's pliability, whatever. The AIs will be even more conscientious. They work 24/7. If you need to be deferential to the FDA, they'll write the best report the FDA has ever seen. They'll get things going along. With these other traits, they're not going to be bottlenecked by them. They'll be smart and they'll be conscientious, that I strongly believe. I think they will boost the rate of economic growth by something like half a percentage point a year. Over 30-40 years, that's an enormous difference. It will transform the entire world. But in any given year, we won't so much notice it. A lot of it is something like a drug that might have taken 20 years now will come in 10 years. But at the end of it all is still our system of clinical trials and regulation. If everything that took 20 years takes 10 years, over time, that's an immense difference. But you don't quite feel it as so revolutionary for a long time.
Tyler Cowen 8:02 ↗
The whole vibe of this progress studies thing is, look, we've got all these low-hanging fruits or medium-hanging fruits that if we fix our institutions, if we made these changes to regulations, to institutions, we could rapidly boost the rate of economic growth. You're okay, so we can fix the NIH and get increases in economic growth. But we have a billion extra people, 10 billion extra people, the smartest people, the most conscientious people, and that has an iota of difference of economic growth. Isn't there a contradiction between how much that rate of economic growth can increase between these two perspectives?
Dwarkesh Patel 8:34 ↗
There's diminishing marginal returns to most of these factors. A simple one is how it interacts with regulation, law, and the government. Another huge one is energy usage. How good is our country in particular at expanding energy supply? I've seen a few encouraging signs lately with nuclear power. That's great. Most places won't do it. And even those reports, exactly how many years it will take, I know what the press releases say. We'll see, you know, it could be 10 years or more. That will just be a smidgen of what we'll need to implement the kind of vision you're describing. So yeah, they're going to be bottlenecks all along the way, the whole way. It's going to be a tough slog, like the printing press, like electricity. The people who study diffusion of new technologies never think there will be rapid takeoff.
Tyler Cowen 9:18 ↗
My view is I'm always siding with the experts. Economists, social scientists, most of them are blind and asleep to the promise of strong AI. They're just out to lunch. I think they're wrong. I trust the AI experts. But when you talk about, say, diffusion of new technologies, the people who do AI are basically totally wrong. The people who study that issue, I trust the experts. If you put together the two views where in each area you trust the experts, then you get my view, which is amazing in the long run, will take a long time, tough slog, all these bottlenecks in the short run. The fact that there's like a billion of your GPT whatevers, which I'm all in love with, I promise you it's going to take a while.
Dwarkesh Patel 9:59 ↗
What would the experts say if you said, look, we're going to have, forget about AI, because I feel like when people hear AI, they think of GPT-4, not the humans, not the things that are going to be as smart as humans. What would the experts say if you said tomorrow the world population, the labor force, is going to double? What impact would that have?
Tyler Cowen 10:16 ↗
Well, what's the variable I'm trying to predict? If you mean energy usage, that's going to go up, right? Over time, it's probably going to double. Growth rate, I'm not sure it'd be a noticeable difference. Doubling the world population? Yeah, I'm not sure. I don't think the Romer model has been validated by the data. And I don't agree with the Chad Jones model, much as I love him as an economist. I don't think it's that predictive. Look at artistic production in Renaissance Florence. There are what, 60,000 people in the city, the surrounding countryside. But it's that so many things went right at the top level that it was so amazing in terms of still value added today. The numbers model doesn't predict very well.
Dwarkesh Patel 10:52 ↗
The world economy today is some hundred trillion something. If the world population was one-tenth of what it is now, if we only had 1 billion people, 100 million people, you think we could have the world economy at this level with our level of technology? No. The delta is a killer, right? This is one thing we learned from macro. The delta and the levels really interact. So shrinking can kill you. Just like companies, nonprofits, if they shrink too much, often they just blow up and disappear. They implode. But that doesn't mean that growing them gets you 3x, 4x, whatever, proportional to how they grow. It's oddly asymmetric. It's very hard to internalize emotionally that intuition in your understanding of the real world. But I think we need to.
What are the specific bottlenecks? Like, why? Humans. Here they are. Bottleneck, bottleneck. Hi, good to see you. And some of you are terrified. You're going to be even bigger bottlenecks. That's fine. It's part of free speech. But my goodness, once it starts changing what the world looks like, there will be much more opposition. Not necessarily from what I call doomsday grounds, but just people like, hey, I see this has benefits, but I grew up, trained my kids to live in some other kind of world. I don't want this. And that's going to be a massive fight. I really have no prediction as to how it's going to go. But I promise you, that will be a bottleneck.
But you can see even historically, you don't have to go from the farmers to industrial revolution 10x. You can just look at actually cases in history where we have had 10x rates, sorry, 10% increase rates of economic growth. You go to China after Deng Xiaoping, they have decades of 10% economic growth. And then that just because you can do some sort of catch up. The idea that you can't replicate that with AI or that it's not infeasible. Where were the bottlenecks when Deng Xiaoping took over?
Tyler Cowen 12:42 ↗
They're in a mess now. I'm not sure how it's going to go for them. They're just a middle-income country. They struggled to tie per capita income with Mexico. I think they're a little ahead of Mexico now. They're the least successful Chinese society in part because of their scale. Their scale is one of their big problems. There's this fear that if they democratize and try to become a normal country, that the median voter won't protect the interests of the elites. So I think they're a great example of how hard it is for them to scale because they're the poorest group of Chinese people on the planet.
Dwarkesh Patel 13:12 ↗
I mean not the challenges now, but the fact that for decades they did have 10% economic growth, in some years 15%.
Tyler Cowen 13:17 ↗
Well, starting from a per capita income of like $200 per head. And now they're ancestors were going to be like as poor as the Chinese, you know, like 30 years ago. I'm very impressed by the Industrial Revolution. Like you could argue progress, or all progress studies here, most important event in human history, maybe. Typical rate of economic growth during that period was about 1 1/2 percent. And the future is about compounding and sticking with it and, you know, seeing things pay off in the long run. Just human beings are not going to change that much. And I don't think that property of our world will change that much, even with a lot more IQ and conscientiousness.
Dwarkesh Patel 13:53 ↗
I interviewed you nine months ago, and I was asking you about AI then. I think your attitude was like, 'Eh.' How has your attitude changed since we talked nine months ago?
Tyler Cowen 14:06 ↗
I don't remember what I thought in what month, but I would say on the whole, I see more potential in AI than I did a year ago. I think it has made progress more quickly than I had been expecting, and I was pretty bullish on it back then. The 01 model, to me, is very impressive. I think further extensions in that direction will make a big, big difference. The rate at which they come is hard to say, but it's something we have, and we just have to make it better.
Dwarkesh Patel 14:32 ↗
You showed me your document of different questions that you came up with for 01 for economic reasoning.
Tyler Cowen 14:36 ↗
I don't think I used GPT-4 for those.
Dwarkesh Patel 14:39 ↗
Okay, but what percentage of them did 01 get right? Because I don't think I got a single one of those right.
Tyler Cowen 14:42 ↗
Those questions were too easy. They were for GPT-4, so I abandoned those questions. You know, a hundred questions of economics. How well does a human do on them? They're hard, but it's pointless. I would not be shocked if somebody's AI model, in less than three years, beat human experts on a regular basis. Let's put it that way.
Dwarkesh Patel 15:08 ↗
Did that update you in any way, that now you've resigned on these questions because they were too easy for these models? And in the initial, like, they are hard questions objectively, right? They're just easy for 01.
Tyler Cowen 15:20 ↗
I feel like Kasparov the first time he met Deep Blue. There were two matches, and in the first one, Kasparov won. I lived through that first match. I feel like I'm sort of in the midst of the first match right now, but I also remember the second match. In the final game, Kasparov made that bonehead error in the Caro-Kann defense. That, too, was a human bottleneck, and he lost the whole match. So we'll see what the rate of change is.
Dwarkesh Patel 15:45 ↗
Yesterday, Patrick was talking about how important it is for the founders of different institutions to hang around and be the ones in charge. I've heard you talk about, you know, the Beatles were great because the Beatles were running the Beatles. Why do you think it's so important for that to be the case?
Tyler Cowen 15:59 ↗
I think courage is a very scarce input in a lot of decisions. Founders have courage to begin with, but they also need less courage to see through a big change in what the company will do. Facebook, now Meta, has made quite a few big changes in its history. Mark had a lot of courage to begin with. But if Mark Zuckerberg says, 'We're going to do this, we're going to do that,' it's pretty hard for everyone else to say no in a good way. I really like that. It economizes on courage, having a founder, and you're selecting for courage. Those would be two reasons.
Dwarkesh Patel 16:34 ↗
How does that explain the Beatles' success?
Tyler Cowen 16:38 ↗
Well, the Beatles are an interesting example. I mean, they broke up in 1970, right? The Rolling Stones are still going. That tells you something, but the Beatles created much greater value. The Beatles are the group we still all talk about much more, even though the Rolling Stones are still with us. They were always unstable. There are two periods of the Beatles: early Beatles, John is the leader. But then Paul works at it, and John becomes a heroin addict. Paul gets better and better and better, and ultimately there's no core. There's not a stable equilibrium. The Beatles split up, but that creative tension for those core seven to eight years was just unbelievable. And it's four founders -- Ringo, not quite a founder, but basically a founder because Pete Best was crummy, and they got rid of him right away. It's one of the most amazing stories in the world. I like studying these amazing productivity stories like Johann Sebastian Bach, Magnus Carlsen, Steph Curry, the Beatles -- I think they're worth a lot of study. They're atypical. You can't just say, 'Oh, I'm going to be like the Beatles.' Like, you're going to fail. The Beatles did that. But nonetheless, I think it's a good place to look for getting ideas and seeing risks.
Dwarkesh Patel 17:39 ↗
What did you think of Patrick's observation of the competency crisis?
Tyler Cowen 18:57 ↗
I see it differently from Patrick, and he and I have discussed this. I think there's basically increasing variance in the distribution. Young people at the top are doing much better, and they're far more impressive than they were in earlier times. If you look at areas where we measure performance of the young -- chess is a simple example; we perfectly measure performance -- very young people are just better and better at chess. That's proven. Even in NBA basketball, you have very young people doing things that they would not have been doing, say, 30 years ago. A lot of that is mental and training and application and not being a knucklehead. So the top of the distribution is getting much better. You see this also in science, Internet writing. The very bottom of the distribution -- well, youth crime has been falling since the 90s, so the very bottom of the distribution also is getting better. I think there's some thick middle above the very bottom and extending a bit above the median. That's clearly getting worse. Because they're getting worse, there are a lot of anecdotal examples of them getting worse, like students wanting more time to take the test or having flimsy excuses or mental health problems with the young or whatever. It's a lot more of that because of that thick band of people getting worse, and that's a great concern. But I see the very bottom and a big chunk of the top of the distribution as just much better. I think it's pretty proven by numbers that that's the case. I would say this increasing variance is a weird mix of where the gains and declines are showing up. I've said this to Patrick, and I'm going to say it to him again, and I hope I can convince him.
Dwarkesh Patel 20:31 ↗
It seems concerning then, the composition, that the average goes down. If you look at PISA scores or something.
Tyler Cowen 20:38 ↗
The median goes down. A lot of tests, they've pushed more people into taking the test -- PISA scores in particular. I suspect those scores, adjusted for that, are roughly constant, which is still not great. I agree. I think there's some decline. Some of it is pandemic, and we're recovering a bit slowly, getting back to human bottlenecks. But I think a lot of the talk of declining test scores is somewhat overblown. At most, there's a very modest decline, I would say.
Dwarkesh Patel 21:04 ↗
If the top is getting better, what do you make of the anecdotal data he was talking about yesterday where the Stanford kids come up to him and say, 'All my friends, they're stupid. You can't hire anybody from Stanford anymore.' That should be the cream of the crop, right?
Tyler Cowen 21:16 ↗
There's plenty of data on the earnings of Stanford kids. If there were a betting market in, you know, what's the future trend? I'm long. How long I should be, I really don't know. But I visit Stanford not every year, but regularly, and the selection in who it is I meet... We're talking about selection, and they're very impressive. Emergent Ventures has funded a lot of people from Stanford. As far as I can tell, as a group, they're doing very well. So that is of no concern to me. If you're worried about the Stanford kids, something seems off in the level of salience and focus in the argument because they're overall doing great. They have high standards, and that's good too.
Dwarkesh Patel 21:57 ↗
Paul McCartney thought John Lennon was a crummy guitar player, and John thought a lot of Paul's songs were crap. In a way they're right, in a way they're wrong. But it's a sign what high standards the Beatles had. How old are you, by the way?
Tyler Cowen 22:11 ↗
Okay, now go back however many years. Was there a 24-year-old like you doing the equivalent of podcasting? It's just clearly better now than it was back then. And you were doing this a few years ago, so it's just obvious to me the young peaks are doing better. You're proof.
Dwarkesh Patel 22:27 ↗
Wasn't Churchill, by the time he was 24, an international correspondent in Cuba and India? I think he was the highest-paid journalist in the world by the time he was 24.
Tyler Cowen 22:37 ↗
I don't know. I mean, what was he paid, and how good was his journalism? I just don't know. I don't think it's that impressive a job to be an international journalist. What does it pay people now? He did some good things later on, but most of his early life he's a failure. And then ask the Irish. Getting back to Patrick, ask the Irish and people from India what they think of younger Churchill, and you'll get an earful. His real great achievement, I don't know how old he was exactly, but it's quite late in his life. Until then, he's a destructive failure.
Dwarkesh Patel 23:19 ↗
There was no one on Twitter to tell him, 'Hey, Winston, you need to rethink this whole Irish thing.' Today there would be. Sam will do it, right? Sam will tweet at Winston Churchill, 'Got to rethink the Irish thing.' And Sam is persuasive.
Tyler Cowen 23:36 ↗
If you read his aphorisms, I think he would have actually been pretty good on Twitter.
Dwarkesh Patel 23:40 ↗
Maybe. But again, what does the equilibrium look like when everything changes? Clearly he was an impressive guy, especially given how much he drank.
Okay, so even if you don't buy the Stanford kids, if you don't buy the young kids, the other trend he was talking about, where if you look at the leaders in government, whatever you think of Trump, Biden, we're not talking about Jefferson and Hamilton anymore. How do you explain that trend?
Tyler Cowen 24:03 ↗
Well, Jefferson and Hamilton, they're founders, right? And they were pretty young at the time. You can do great things when you're founding a country in a way that just cannot be replicated later on. Putting aside the current year, which I think is weird for a number of reasons, I think mostly we have had impressive candidates. Most of the U.S. bureaucracy in Washington I think is pretty impressive: generals, national security people, top people in agencies, people at Treasury, people at the Fed. I interact with these groups pretty often. Overall, they're impressive, and I've seen no signs they're getting worse. Now, if you want to say the two candidates this year, again, there's a lot we're not going to talk about, but there is a lot you could say on the negative side. Yes. But like Obama, Romney, whichever one you like, I think these are two guys who should be running for president, and that was not long ago. So then there's a bunch of candidates running who are good. What goes systematically wrong in the selection process is the two who are selected are not even as good as the average of all the candidates.
Dwarkesh Patel 25:11 ↗
You mean this theory? And I'm not talking about America in particular. If the theory is just noise, it seems like it skews one way.
Tyler Cowen 25:18 ↗
Well, the Democrats had this funny path with Biden, and Kamala didn't get through the electoral process in the normal way. So that just means you get weirdness, whatever you think of her as a candidate. Trump, whom I do not want to win, I think he is extraordinarily impressive in some way, which along a bunch of dimensions exceeds a lot of earlier candidates. I just don't like the overall package. But I would not point to him as an example of low talent. I think he's a supreme talent but harnessed to some bad ends.
Dwarkesh Patel 25:50 ↗
If you look at the early 20th century, some of the worst things that happened to progress is just these psychopathic leaders. What happened? Why did we have so many just awful, awful leaders in the early 20th century?
Tyler Cowen 26:04 ↗
Well, give me like a country and a name and a time period, and I'll try to answer it.
Dwarkesh Patel 26:10 ↗
He was from the university. That's what was wrong with him, right? Just think of what school it was.
Tyler Cowen 26:13 ↗
Who? Woodrow Wilson?
Dwarkesh Patel 26:17 ↗
Yeah, one of our two or three worst presidents on civil rights. World War I, he screwed up. The peace process, he screwed up. Indirectly led to World War II. Reintroduced segregation of civil service in some key regards. Just seemed he was a nasty guy and should have been out of office sooner given his health and state of mind. So he was terrible. But he was, on paper, a great candidate. Hoover on paper was a great candidate and was an extremely impressive guy. I think he made one very bad set of decisions relating to deflation and letting nominal GDP fall. But my goodness, there's a reason they called it the Hoover Institution after Hoover.
But the Hitler, Stalin, Mao's. Was there something that was going on that explains why that was just a crummy time for world leaders?
Tyler Cowen 27:08 ↗
I don't think I have a good macro explanation of that whole trend, but I would say a few things. That's right after the period where the world is changing the most. I think when you get big new technologies, and this is relevant for AI, you get a lot of new arms races. Sometimes the bad people win those arms races. So at least for quite a while, you had Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany winning some arms races, and they're not democratic systems. Later you have China with Mao being not a democratic system. And then you have a mix of bad luck. Stalin and Mao just draw the urn. You could have gotten less crazy people than what you got. And I agree with Hayek, the worst get to the top under autocracy. But like, they're that bad. That was just some bad luck too. There are other things you could say, but I think we had a highly disoriented civilization. You see it in aesthetics approaching beginnings of World War I. Art, music, radically changing. People feel very disoriented. There's a lot up for grabs. Imperialism, colonialism start to be factors. There wasn't like a stable world order, and then you had some bad luck tossed into that. And all of a sudden, these super destructive weapon systems compared to what we had had, and it was awful. I'm not pretending that's some kind of full explanation, but that would be like a partial start.
Dwarkesh Patel 28:25 ↗
You compared our current period to 17th-century England, where you have a lot of new ideas and things go topsy-turvy. What's your theory of why things go topsy-turvy at the same time when these eras come about? What causes this volatility?
Tyler Cowen 28:39 ↗
I don't think I have a general theory. If you want to talk about 17th-century England, they had the scientific revolution. You have the rise of England as a true global power. The navy becomes much more important, and the Atlantic trade route becomes much more important because of the new world. Places like the Middle East, India, and China, that were earlier--you know, Persia had major roles--they're crumbling, partially for reasons of their own. And that's going to help the relative power of the more advanced European nations. England has a lot of competition from the Dutch Republic and France. This is happening at the same time that, for the first time in human history that I know of, we have sustained economic growth, according to Greg Clark, starting in the 1620s of about 1% a year. And that is compounding--again, slow numbers, but compounding. England is the place that gets the compounding at 1% starting in the 1620s, and somehow they go crazy: civil war, kill the king, all these radical ideas. Libertarianism comes out of that, which I really like: John Milton, John Locke. Also, this brutal conquest of the new world. Very good and very bad coming together. I think it should be seen as these sets of processes where very good and very bad come together, and we might be in for a dose of that again now, soon.
Dwarkesh Patel 29:55 ↗
It seems like a simple question, but how do you make sure we get the good things and not the crazy civil war as well?

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APA

Cowen, T. (2025, January 9). Tyler Cowen — The #1 bottleneck to AI progress is humans [Interview transcript]. Dwarkesh Patel. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3399284/

MLA

Tyler Cowen. "Tyler Cowen — The #1 bottleneck to AI progress is humans." Dwarkesh Patel, 9 Jan. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3399284/.

BibTeX
@misc{cowen2025_3399284,
  author       = {Tyler Cowen},
  title        = {Tyler Cowen — The #1 bottleneck to AI progress is humans},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Dwarkesh Patel. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {jan},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3399284/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}