The widening inequality, both on the wealth side and the income side, although on the income side it surprisingly got better post-pandemic with a lot of Keynesian fiscal stimulus. We weren't all that far from a president Bernie Sanders. That could have happened. I think a president AOC is a genuine issue, at least for the 0.1%. And I'm not referring to the carried interest deduction or any of the other loopholes. I'm talking about, hey, guess what, there's going to be a new tax bracket, and if you make $10 million a year, there's an alternative minimum tax, and you're going to pay it.
Barry, where does this podcast find you?
I'm sitting at 731 Lex in my regular podcast studio at Bloomberg. I think you were one of the first podcasts I ever came on at Bloomberg. I mean, I remember coming in there seven, eight years ago. Yeah, you're a great interviewer.
So let's bust right into it. Your book, How Not to Invest, is out next week. In it, you group common investing mistakes into three kind of three buckets: bad ideas, bad numbers, and bad behavior. Break these down for us.
Sure. So first, we have a century of books telling us what to do, and despite, I don't know, tens of thousands of books, most people are still pretty mediocre investors. So I took a page from the two Charlies: Charlie Ellis, who compared investing to tennis. Most people are not professional tennis players. Professionals win by scoring points; amateurs lose by unforced errors. And if you just bring that approach to investing and say, rather than try and find the next Nvidia or jump in and out of the market before and after the next crash, how about we just make fewer mistakes? And it turns out that puts you 90% ahead of everybody else. And the other Charlie is Charlie Munger, who, in his inimitable fashion, was asked, 'Are you and Warren smarter than everybody else? Is that why you're so successful?' And Munger responded, 'No, we're just less stupid.' Less stupid is better than smarter, at least in investing. So when I was trying to put the book together, I just started thinking about all the errors I had come across over 30 years, and they neatly fit into: we believe things that aren't true, we don't understand the numbers that drive the markets, the economy, investing, and then we engage in behavior that is super self-destructive.
You mentioned that you never planned on becoming a wealth manager, but were driven by frustration with Wall Street's practices. What are some of those practices that are kind of potentially put a money manager or Wall Street not on the same side as its investor base?
So I didn't go to business school; I went to law school, and a big part of the legal education is understanding your fiduciary obligation to your clients, your ethical obligation. Something similar applies to accounting, to the medical practice. Doctors have a similar obligation to their patients, and yet money is so important to our safety and security and financial well-being, our retirement, our what we pass down to our children, and to our philanthropy. But the rules were such that there's no greater obligation to you from traditional financial practice than you get from a used car salesman. It made no sense to me.
Wait, you just can't misrepresent that the transmission is bad, and other than that, it's an arm's-length transaction. That never made any sense. You can just do what you want to do with the client, harvest their organs, sell them on the black market, that's fine.
It simply was consistent with all the other professional relationships we had. And following the financial crisis, which I more or less got the top and bottom right, lots of people started throwing money at me. I wasn't comfortable referring those people to other places, and I wasn't comfortable even at the firm I was at at the time, because they were a little bit, you know, it's called a hybrid model, a little bit of a fiduciary, except when it's inconvenient, then they swap hats and suddenly they can just be a broker and maximize profits. And it was really out of just absolute frustration: all right, we can't turn these people loose to the wolves. Let's see if we can give them a, provide a service that puts them first. And you know, over the past 20 years, Wall Street has slowly drifted in that direction. It's still not quite all the way there, but it's much further along than it was 10, 15 years ago.
So I want to put forward, and by the way, Barry and his partner Josh and I get together not regularly, but we do get together, and they kind of save me for myself. I want to throw out a couple theses around biases or some of the things that have haunted me in terms of investing and have you comment on them, and then just some general structural impressions or thoughts. The first is that your emotions are your enemy, and that is when I get hurt really badly, I'm just like, I can't take any more pain, I want to sell. When I do, my greed glands get going, and I start thinking about levering up with margin because I start believing I'm actually good at this. And I find, and I have to check myself, I think of that Seinfeld episode where George Costanza decides to do everything that he instinctively, he does the opposite of what he thinks he should do, and his life gets much better. I feel like your emotions and sometimes your instincts are your worst enemy around investing. What are your thoughts?
So think about why we even have a limbic system and an amygdala and an emotional response to external input. Humans now dominate planet Earth. It wasn't always that way. We're soft, chewy, delicious creatures without fangs or claws or armor. So yeah, so we're super vulnerable, and we developed a series of subroutines that allowed us to not only stay alive but adapt and eventually dominate the planet. And what kept you alive on the savanna is your fight or flight response, the ability to quickly identify a potential threat and respond in the most effective way. That turns out to be great if you're a biological organism that's constantly under threat, but making risk-reward decisions in the market, it goes right to Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow. Thinking fast keeps you alive; thinking slow is how you make money in the markets. And emotions, your limbic system, are clearly part of that thinking fast. I love the quote from Dr. William Bernstein, former neurologist and doctor who became an investor. He said, 'Your entire level of success as an investor is determined by your limbic system. If you can't get that under control, you will die poor.' And that is really quite the warning about emotionality and investing.
You've actually been an advocate and have been pretty vocal about saying investors are better off buying index funds rather than trying to pick individual stocks. And yet you're a money manager and you make fees trying to find alpha. I think, help me reconcile why you tell your clients not to just go invest in Vanguard.
Well, we're big Vanguard investors. We're Vanguard, WisdomTree, BlackRock. Our approach is a combination of core and satellite, where the heart of the investing are pretty broad indexes: US total market, ex-US developed, some emerging markets. The idea is, look, look at this as an example, recording this towards the end of the first quarter, and the US is up a percent or two, Europe is up 15%. So when you're diversified over a long period of time, different parts of the world are going to do better or worse, and that's the core. You, that should lock the beta in for your portfolio, beta being take what the market gives you and be happy. The satellite are all the things you do around that. So if you believe in momentum or value, or maybe you like technology or India, or you know, there's a thousand different variations. Think of it as the Christmas tree is the core index, the garland and all the ornaments are the things you put on your portfolio with those satellite things, however you want to flavor it. You could do that. There are some other technologies and some other things that we really like that helps us find tax alpha, and we're also big believers in what we call advisor alpha, which is what can we do to prevent investors from hurting themselves. So we have a very simple tactical model that we put a small percentage of the portfolio in, and its purpose is not to generate alpha, its purpose is to prevent people from touching their real money when things get hairy.
As we've seen the past week or two, we don't learn this lesson, but whenever I met with you and Josh, you guys are drilling home, and that is people, I think one of the most underappreciated strategies for a risk-adjusted return and also limiting your emotional downside is diversification. It's so boring, and yet I just don't think most of us really think about how powerful it is. And really add up our assets and say, okay, if I've got 90% of my wealth in my home and my vacation home, that's probably not a great idea. Or if I've got, at some point US growth will slow down or US tech growth. My two biggest mistakes, I've been wealthy three times, which means I've lost it all twice. And the reason I lost it all twice, and it was hugely emotionally and mentally trying, was I didn't appreciate the power of diversification. I was always highly levered to US tech. And so what do you know, in 2008, I was no less a person or no dumber, I just got wiped out. Talk about the power of diversification and why we just naturally don't learn that lesson.
Sure. So there are two emotional impediments to being and staying emotionally, investment-wise, diversified. The first is being diversified means there's always something in your portfolio that's not doing well. You know, the past decade, it's been Europe. Europe has wildly underperformed. Suddenly, Europe is now doing much, much better than the US. Value has done really poorly over the past decade, in large part because of the shift in markets away from hard industries and towards intellectual property. And value, at least as historically described, hasn't adjusted. So when you're looking at your portfolio and why is my emerging markets doing poorly and why is this value sleeve underperforming, it's very easy to get frustrated and walk away from that. The second factor is we all have a tendency to tack into, to lean into whatever is working. So for the past decade, technology has been great, just as it was in the 90s. But at a certain point, those things come to an end. Every cycle turns, every bull market ends, every bear market ends, every period of economic expansion eventually hits a recession. And so one of the free lunches, and there aren't many on Wall Street, one of the free lunches is occasionally rebalancing towards a core set of allocations so that one part of your portfolio doesn't run amok and suddenly half of your exposure is to, or more, is to technology. We regularly see people come into the office who 10 years ago took a flyer on Nvidia or Apple or Amazon, and they're paralyzed because three-quarters of a not-insubstantial chunk of wealth is one company. And that single stock risk, not everything is going to be a Lehman Brothers and go to zero, but look at General Electric, you know, one of the most beloved stocks.
Oh, Cisco, I have a whole chapter on Cisco. 99 to 2001, lost 90% of its value. Right, it was single digits. People forget Amazon was trading for single digits. So you give up, you willingly give up potential upside in a single stock because for many, we have no minimums in the firm, so we have people with $50,000, we have people with 50 million. When you hit a certain point, you have to recognize, hey, I won. There's no reason to take all this additional risk. Let's trade off upside in exchange for steady, steady gains without the possibility of a 90% collapse.
We'll be right back. Couple more theses. We've talked about index funds and fees. I still don't think the market is really cognizant of how much of your return fees will eat up. And I would argue, I'll put forward a thesis that the alternative investment community, and I would say a good 50% of my friends are in this community, who recognize the most extraordinary gains relative to their talent, and by the way, they're exceptionally talented, but from kind of 1995 to 2015, I think that 20-year period will be remembered as the period where a small group of people made more money on a risk-adjusted basis than any sector in history. I had friends who were good, hardworking, you know, work at hedge funds, and the good, hardworking people in other industries were making $200,000 to $2 million a year, and they were making $20 to $30 million a year. And then that came to an end, or slowly but surely, I would say the majority of them are even out of the business. Over the last five or 10 years, they've stayed in the business, but their AUM's gone from, you know, 3 billion to 300 million. And my thesis is that the alternative investment sector could best be described, that's mutual funds, hedge funds, as San Francisco real estate, and that is expensive but bad. And that is the returns have been in stocks that everybody knows. So no one's going to pay you 2 and 20 to buy Nvidia, and they've been left trying to find alpha in a narrow part of the market, and they've just vastly underperformed. I think the data shows if you added up all the people on CNBC who come on and pitch stocks, they have performed the S&P by the amount of their fees. Isn't this arguably one of the biggest grifts in economic history?