Welcome to Catching Up To Fi, a podcast on mindset, money, and life for late starters of any age on their journey to financial independence. I'm Bill and I'm a late starter.
I'm Jackie and I'm also a late starter, and we're your host. We're here to help you on your journey to financial independence, no matter where you're starting.
We're going to talk to experts about the late starters and explore topics related to our mission.
Join us as we catch up to Fi together.
Hello and welcome back to Catching Up To Fi. I'm Bill Yount with my lovely co-host Jackie Cummings Koski, and we have an extra special guest for you today. I think that's what he says at the beginning of his podcast too. But as humans and investors, we are constantly told what we need to do to be successful in life and personal finance. Today we find out a few things about how not to be successful as men and women in these arenas. So Jackie, we do not have an extra special guest actually, but we will do the best we can with what we got. And 10 years ago, I was financially illiterate. I was a rich but not wealthy doctor, prototypical actually, and you were well on your way to catching up to Fi as a single mom.
I didn't know my net worth, but you knew all the numbers, so I was still catching up to you. So how do I not introduce Barry Ritholtz is my question? How do you not introduce someone who does not really fit introduction?
Barry Ritholtz is not a lifelong Wall Street insider. He's not someone who followed a carefully mapped out career. He's not a guy who grew up knowing that he really wanted to be an investor. He's not even someone whose education, career, or interests followed a particularly straight line.
And we're not going to give you the usual boring resume: Bloomberg, Masters in Business, The Big Picture, Ritholtz Wealth Management, best-selling books like How Not to Invest, and many, many other things that he's accomplished, because today we're more interested in the nots than the resume. So who was Barry before he became Barry Ritholtz? What happened to him? What influenced him? What experiences shaped him, and what mistakes did he make and change him?
Yeah, so we are excited to have Barry. And how did those seemingly disconnected pieces like his childhood, his education, his heroes, his cars, watches, laws, markets, writing, behavioral finance, and eventually wealth evolve into the Barry Ritholtz we know today? And then we're going to turn the clock forward. What are some stories and highlights from his not book? What has Barry done with all of his wisdom and experience, and what is he doing today?
And where is he headed next? Barry, welcome to Catching Up to Fi.
Well, thank you guys. Thank you so much for having me, and I'll see if I can live up to that introduction.
Well, you don't have to because it's all about the nots today. Let's start with one of our favorite questions: what is your first memory of money? What did it mean to you way back when you were a kid?
I remember growing up kind of hardscrabble, kind of broke. There was always food on the table. It's all relative, but I remember wanting to do things or go places or buy things, and my parents would say, hey, if you want that bicycle, that's what a birthday present is for. Or if you want to go out to eat, well, we go out to eat occasionally on Sundays, but not during the week. And I kind of realized that money can be a constraining limitation.
I found it frustrating, and so as a kid, I did a bunch of odd jobs. I delivered Newsday on Long Island. I was a paperboy. Anytime it would snow, and when I was a kid, it snowed in the winters in New York. Not so much now, but I would shovel driveways and sidewalks for people for a couple of bucks. I had a lawn mowing business. As soon as I could get a job at the supermarket, I was stocking shelves of beer, soda, and potato chips. And then as I got to be a little older, I worked as a waiter and a bartender and put myself through college. So I recognized early on that money is a tool. It is not an end unto itself, but it is a means to an end. Every now and then I come across a person who hasn't quite figured that out yet. It's not a scorecard. The goal isn't to die with the most amount of money. The goal is to use money as a tool to buy yourself first security, then the things in life that you and your family want: a house, a car, an education, a retirement, and then to create experiences. People ask me a lot about the cars, and we'll talk about that later. It's not the cars. It's getting together with the people in the car group and just BS-ing about cars. That sort of Saturday morning is a lot of fun.
Whether you pull up in an old clunker that has potential or roll up in a Ferrari. A friend does a car show every year, and he said bring the EV. So I had one of my projects. I love finding these old crappy cars and turning them into something interesting. So I took a 1987 Porsche 911 with 300,000 kilometers on it. It was going to the junkyard, even though the body and the interior was in pretty nice shape, and I converted it to an EV. And I brought it to the show, and nobody wants to talk to this poor guy with a brand new Ferrari. Everybody was like so interested in, you did what to this car? I took it from 200 horsepower to 400 horsepower, and now it's a little rocket ship, and it's the only one in New York, or at least in the beginning of the summer it was the only one in New York. So it's not the bubble, not the watch or the car or whatever. It's the experience around it that's so interesting.
There you go. I think that's an important thing. So, neither one of your parents was in the financial world? Like you sort of found that on your own?
My mother was a real estate agent. So, every night over the dinner table, interest rates and mortgages and housing was a conversation. My dad started out as a personnel manager in the STEM space, meaning back in the day, if you were a scientist or an engineer and you wanted to get a job, you would go to an employment agency and they would help place you at different places. Obviously, the world is very different. About halfway through his career, he pivoted and he decided he wanted to open a sporting goods store. He opened a retail, sneakers, sweatshirts. I have friends who are sneakerheads and I'm like, yeah, here are my old ratty pair of Jordan 1s. I was dad's test mule. Here are the Kobe Poison Dart Frogs. They're like $5,000 sneakers. I've just worn them to death. I would wear all these sneakers all the time, and this was long before StockX was a thing, because my father would say, here, try this pair. See how you like them when I was in college. By the time my younger brother and sister were in high school and college, the family was doing a little better. Money was a little easier. I had to put myself through a lot of college and grad school, and in hindsight, I'm probably better off for it.
Yeah, what's interesting too is you never met an obstacle you couldn't overcome or get around. And if money was the obstacle, you found a way to overcome that. There's a great story here because I don't think people know that you were an equestrian. You know, and as a kid, I was doing a deep dive on you. As, you know, riding lessons were 40 bucks an hour and that was too much. But then you found a way around that and equestrianism became a thing for you even through college. And so there's a financial aspect to this. Can you take us through your horsey story and maybe that's the reason you have a cowboy portfolio, but who knows?
So first I have to channel Scott Galloway and say, yeah, I overcame some obstacles, but I was born just outside of New York City in the post-war era. There were tons of opportunity. I faced relatively modest obstacles compared to what so many people outside of the United States went through, for sure, but even within the United States, the history of the US is filled with unfortunate obstacles that the government placed in people's way. So I'm always a little wary of what obstacles were placed in front of me. These weren't 20-foot-tall brick walls. These were 4-foot fences that any horse could leap over. I always was interested in horses and riding. I was a kid, you go on trail rides and things like that when you're upstate New York. And I was working in a hotel that had a set of stables and a trail, and I went to the people running it and said, hey, I'm a waiter and short-order chef in the coffee shop at the hotel, but I'd love to learn how to ride better. I'm happy to exchange whatever labor you need. If you need someone to muck out the stalls, I'm good with a pitchfork. If you want someone to wash and groom the horses, like whatever you need, if I could ride for free because I didn't have 40 bucks an hour. And so I did that every day, either after the lunch shift, before the dinner shift, I would go over to the stables, muck out the stables, groom the horses, brush them, clean their manes, get all the dirt and gravel and rocks that accumulate in their nether regions out with a hose. It was a lot. You kind of learn how to interact with a horse, how to make them not be nervous. They're 1,500-pound animals with steel on their shoes. You don't want to piss them off, and so you learn how to deal with them. And so I started riding over the summers every day as part of the deal. And then when I went to college, I was shocked. I didn't know this was a thing. I went to SUNY Stony Brook. Wait, the university has a riding team? And not only do they have a riding team, they're national champions. They'd won all these things. So one Saturday morning, I just walked over to the stables, which was about a 20-minute walk from my dorm room. Hey, I'm interested in riding. It was mostly a bunch of young women who owned their own horses. I had ridden Western, not English, and said, I'm pretty good with a horse, but I don't know how to do this formally. So they tried me out. They saw I could manage a horse, but didn't have any Western or dressage skills. And I spent a few years learning how to do that. And shockingly, you get a gym credit for that. You get two credits a semester, which was a problem because when I was supposed to graduate, they're like, hey, you're only allowed eight gym credits. You have 16. Only eight of these apply to graduation. You need some more credits. So doing that in college was a ton of fun. And it's funny. I don't own horses, but where I live is horse country. And there's a barn over there. There's a stable over there. I mean, I could point, that's three miles that way, two miles that way. There are probably 100 horses within a 10-mile radius of my house.
So Barry, are you still in New York?
Yeah, I'm on the North Shore of Long Island.
Okay. So you were really very adjacent to Wall Street, the financial world, and all of that. What was your foray into learning about that world?
Sure. So mom in the real estate side is just kind of finance adjacent because you're looking at inflation, you're looking at mortgage rates, you're looking at that side of it. I went to law school, not business school, and really did well. Loved law school, didn't love being an attorney. A little too tedious and detail-focused for my preference, but I had a buddy who was running a shop that I had done some real estate closings for, and one day I do something at their office and I get a tour of the trading room, and he says to me, what do you think? And my answer was, Nintendo for money. I get it. The math makes sense. I kind of understand this. And he's like, you're good with numbers, you're good with computers. Ever think about becoming a trader? Now keep in mind, this was mid-'90s. There was no online trading. The firm he was running was the predecessor firm to E-Trade. It eventually became E-Trade, and E-Trade soon after rolled out their online trading. This was '96. I remember being told in 1996, hey newbie, you can't trade the Netscape IPO. That's only for people with experience. I'm like, I didn't want to trade that. I wouldn't know what the hell to do with it. The interesting thing about starting on a trading desk, first, they don't really teach you. It's kind of like throwing people into the deep end of the pool, and if you don't drown, congratulations, you're a lifeguard. And second, I had a tendency to look around and to pay attention to what other people were doing to figure out who was doing it right and who wasn't. And I picked up some things pretty quickly. I learned to understand risk management and when to be aggressive and when not.
But the most interesting thing that experience gave me was at a certain point you're on a trading desk with 20 other guys, and then there are rows of these desks, and you start to realize, wait, Bob on my right is making a ton of money this month, but last month Bob was getting killed, and Shecky on my left, and that's a real name, Shecky, is getting killed this month, and last month he was making a ton of money. What are they doing differently? And that led me down the behavioral finance rabbit hole, which in the mid-'90s, that was before all the cool kids discovered it, and long before Danny Kahneman and his by-then-deceased partner Amos Tversky were awarded. You have to be alive to win the Nobel Prize. So Danny accepted on behalf of both of them, but Kahneman is the one who won that prize. And by the time people started to understand what was going on in that space, I had immersed myself in it for the previous five or six years.
Yeah, I mean it's interesting because your formal education started with math and physics. It ended up with political science and philosophy, which poised you in some ways perfectly for economics and markets. And you're a lifelong student and now a teacher. And behavioral finance became one of your main strengths. And I think that was one of the big sections in the book you wrote that we'll talk about in a minute. But your whole education was bouncing around, and you were a great observer, and you absorbed all this material. And you've done a great job recently taking that wisdom, distilling it, and giving it back to us in a $24, $25 book, 400 pages or so. To get into your mind and take 30 years of experience was really incredible when I read the book.
Well, thank you for saying that. I've always been curious. I've always been fascinated by different things. In high school, you're really good in math and science, and then you get to college and look around and like, oh, those guys are really good. I got away with doing minimum work and still getting in the '90s on my math tests. But once you get into applied mathematics and theoretical physics, hey, you can't just skate through that. You really have to work hard. And at a certain point I'm like, well, this is probably not going to be my career. I like having a background in probability theory and in statistics because those two things are really important in everything. It turns out they're incredibly important in investing, if for no other reason so as to not be fooled by people throwing numbers at you. You need the ability to say, wait a second, that math doesn't make sense. Break that down and show me how A, B, and C happens. And you want to not be gullible. Joan Robinson was a woman economist in the '50s and '60s, and she famously said, we study economics not to understand the economy, but so as to not be fooled by economists. And the same is true with probability and statistics and math. You need a thorough grounding in that. You could throw in accounting also, which is not my forte, but it's important so as to not be fooled by people. If you look at all the big blowups in market history, the WorldComs and Enrons and even Lehman Brothers, if you understood statistics, probability, and just basic corporate accounting, you wouldn't have been fooled by those companies because they were clearly problematic. The question is how did Lehman Brothers get away with effectively being insolvent? There was a thing they did every quarter called Repo 105, which they would do this complex derivative operation and move billions and tens of billions of obligations off of their balance sheet. Then they would do their quarterly filings, which made them look fine. And then after the quarter was done, they would put those liabilities back on their balance sheet. They would unwind the repurchase agreement of that. And it's astounding they got away with it for as long as they did. It was the financial crisis that revealed, just like it did the same thing with Madoff. Suddenly the tide went out, and as Buffett famously said, that's when you see who's been swimming naked. And so when you have a big market decline like you saw in '07 to '09, started from October of '07 to March of '09, people are going to have demands on capital, and so it doesn't matter what it is, if it's either Lehman Brothers or Bernie Madoff, when clients say, hey, I need some cash because of this, if you say, I don't have the money, well, guess what, you just admitted that you're a fraud. And so we saw that with Bernie Madoff, and we saw that with Lehman Brothers.
Wow, I was just going to ask you because you're smack dab in the middle of New York City, so Bernie Madoff comes to mind when you talk about Wall Street and the financial world, and of course Lehman Brothers. So you got a front-row seat to what was going on with Bernie Madoff in the industry. What was the talk right around that time?
So there's two really fascinating things about Madoff. The first is a number of people had kicked the tires at Madoff and early declared something's not right here, this isn't kosher. Ed Thorp famously in the '90s was asked to look at it, and he said, I can't figure out how he's doing it because the underlying options trade that he's claiming to make, there simply isn't enough options traded to explain his returns and assets. So that's number one. Then you had Harry Markopolos, whose boss came to him and said, hey, this guy is killing us in options, go and replicate what he's doing. And it took Markopolos, he said, 15 minutes to figure out that he was a fraud, and then days to prove it. But same sort of thing. It's like, you know, the stock market has returned 10.2% annualized over the past 100 years, but rarely in any given year is it 10.2%. It's usually much more or much less. And Markopolos looked at the series of returns. There's an old trick that statistician teachers do. They send the students home and they say, flip a quarter 100 times and bring your sheets. And he would immediately be able to tell who literally did it 100 times and who made it up.
Why? Because if you're going to flip a quarter 100 times, you're going to run into some wildly unanticipated 8, 10, 14 heads in a row, which is very counterintuitive, but that's what happens sometimes. You go on these long runs. But on the other hand, if it's heads, tails, heads, tails, heads, tails, heads, tails, the professor knows the student cheated. And it just goes to show you that someone else did an analysis. There's a similar analysis where you look at the last digit in a long number. And all this comes back to statistics. So you would think the number of long digits where the last number is a one and the last number is a two and the last number is a three, you would think they would be fairly evenly distributed. And it turns out that the way the distribution falls in real life can be compared to how people's numbers are. And very often, when you see that last digit is wildly off from what the expectations of it should be, it's a red flag. There was a piece in Barron's, I want to say in 2001.
And yet all these things were ignored. So the first thing is he didn't just come out of left field. He had taken advantage of a number of social and other elements that helped him avoid detection for a long time. But to me, the most fascinating thing, and this is in the book, what Bernie Madoff stole from people wasn't so much money. He was doing this for so long that he stole time from people. And let me explain what I mean by that. So the person who was the special master for Bernie Madoff ended up recovering something like 96% of the lost assets. By the way, when someone comes in to try and be a special master and a few million dollars are stolen, that money is gone. It's pissed away on travel and gambling and a couple of expensive watches which are worth half of what you paid for it and cars that depreciate. It's easy to piss away a few million dollars. It's very hard to piss away billions of dollars. And so everything that he had bought, real estate and stocks and bonds and whatever, more or less held their value. Remember, he had taken, I want to say it was about $9 billion from clients and claimed it was worth $45 billion or something to that effect. Most of the $9 billion was returned. But when you look at people who had money with Madoff for 20, 25, 30 years, if you gave Bernie Madoff money 30 years earlier, 1980, think about it. You gave him a million dollars, markets double every seven years on average. You're going to end up with something like six or eight million dollars 32 years later, right? 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32. You double six times over that time period. That's going to be a ton of money. They get their million dollars back, but they don't get three decades of compounding, which, you know, a million would have gone 1, 2, 4, 8 at the very least if it had just been in a simple index fund. And so he stole decades of investing returns from people and gave them back their original capital. Wait, I thought I was a long-term investor. It's been 35 years. You told me this is worth 12 million dollars. It's worth 1.2 million. Where's my 11 million dollars? So that's what Madoff stole from people was the long-term compounding over time. That's one of the things I want people not to do is don't get in your own way. Don't steal your portfolio's ability to compound over the decades.
Yeah, I mean that's a perfect segue into all the nots in your book. And before we get into that, I really was fascinated that you dedicated this book to the two Charlies. And there's a really good reason for this. Take us through the two Charlies that you dedicated this book to and why you did it.
Sure. So first Charlie Munger, who's a fascinating guy who left us a great historical record of how to think about business and investing and life really. Whether you read Munger's Almanac or there's a new book by Alex Morris that went through 30 years of public annual Berkshire Hathaway meetings and organized everything that was said in those over, you know, literally hundreds and hundreds of hours by Buffett and Munger. Munger very famously said, he was asked about Berkshire Hathaway, have you guys been so successful because you're smarter than everybody else? And Munger's answer was, it's not that we're smarter than everybody else, it's just that we're less stupid. And there's a lot to be said for that. If you look at Berkshire Hathaway, they make very few decisions. They occasionally will buy a company, they will occasionally do a stock buyback, they will occasionally put money into something like Apple 15 years ago. But their takeaway has been the more decisions we make, the more opportunities we're giving ourselves to make a mistake. Turns out that us humans, we're not that great at this capital allocation thing. It's not what we were built for. And so they decided we're going to make very few decisions, but the ones we're going to make are going to be very well thought out, and we're going to put the odds in our favor. So that's the first Charlie, not smarter than everybody else, just less stupid.
And then very related to that is Charlie Ellis, who I've been fortunate to interview a number of times. He actually had a new book come out earlier this year. I'm going to interview him next month again. But Ellis was this legendary, and still is, this legendary investor. Not only did he run Greenwich Associates, but he sat on the board of directors of Vanguard, and he was the chairman of the Yale Endowment. I don't think you get much better than that in the world of investing resumes. And Ellis wrote a paper in the 1970s that eventually became a full book, but the paper was titled Winning the Loser's Game. And in that paper and that book, he compared investing to tennis. When you look at tennis, it's really two games in one. There's the games the professionals play, and there's the games that amateurs like me play. The professionals win by scoring points. They hit with power, they serve with accuracy, they put all sorts of fancy spin on the ball, drop shots that the opponent can't get to. They keep the ball away from their opponent's sweet spot. That's how the professionals win. They win by scoring points. How do the amateurs win? Well, it turns out the amateurs don't so much win by scoring points as they lose through unforced errors. What's an unforced error? That's when you make a bad decision, when you do something that you end up not really being able to do, and it gives a point to the other side. So in tennis, double faulting, meaning you don't put it into the box twice. How hard is it to just tap the ball into the box? Well, if you're trying to really overpower the ball, it's really hard to hit with power and precision is really difficult. I play with a bunch of guys 20 years younger than me. They're all much better than me, and I consistently kick their asses. Why? Because they're hitting the ball with so much power, it goes into the back wall. They'll hit the ball, smash it right into the net, or they'll hit the ball with so much power right to me that I don't have to do anything, just a nice stroke, and the ball goes screaming over the net, drops in where they can't get to it, and they should be able to run me off the court. I'm smarter than them. I'm more experienced than them, and I play within myself. And that's the lesson that Charlie Ellis teaches us, which is learn how to operate within your own framework, within your own parameters. If you're trying to do more than you legitimately can do, that's where you run into trouble. And by the way, the parallels between that and investing couldn't be more obvious. Every time we see people try and pick stocks that they don't know how to do, try and market time that they lack the skill, process, and discipline to do. Today we have end-of-day options, single-day options that people seem to be trading, and it's just pure speculative nonsense. And those are the sort of things that very much are problematic for the typical investor.
The tennis analogy also strikes home with regards to sort of portfolio consistency and construction because you have the Roger Federers and all the great tennis players in the world. When he gave a famous speech one time where he said, yeah, I've won 80% of my matches, but I only won 54% of my points. And consistency and just getting over that 50% mark is what won him so many titles. And the other thing that reminds me of Charlie Munger is Warren Buffett had a corollary to this. It had something to do with IQ. What did he say about IQ and smarts and how they got you in trouble?
If you have an IQ of 160, you should sell 30 points because as an investor you don't need them. And in fact, very intelligent people have a tendency to think their intelligence means they know more than the market when markets aren't perfectly efficient, but they're more or less pretty efficient. It's a fair statement to say markets reflect all of the known information about what's going on in any given stock at any given time. Hey, it doesn't mean that a merger announcement can't come out or an FDA approval of a particular drug will suddenly send the stock spiking, and then that information gets quickly reflected in the price. But one of the reasons why it's so hard to beat the market is because the market's very efficient at incorporating everything that's known about any given company into price. And that happens by people recognizing, hey, this is going to be a big deal. It's not that the market is a magic thing that happens on its own. The market consists of a lot of people who have an incentive to get it right. And so when someone who's following company XYZ hears that the FDA just approved this, they'll go out and buy it, and that's what sends the price higher.
Yeah, I think it's really interesting and refreshing that the passive investing versus active investing, that's what we talk to our audience about. But the fact that insiders and regular people say the same thing, that you're far better off just by doing like an index fund or something like that. So I guess as a Wall Street insider, for you to come to that conclusion is very telling.
It's just math. The crazy thing is modern portfolio theory looked out at what was happening on the active side and said for every winning trade, someone's on the losing side of it. And once you build in that plus taxes and fees, active has to over time underperform passive. There's just no way around it. Now that's not saying that you can't invest money in a company and that one company is going to create wealth over time. That's not what that analysis is saying. There's a lot of academic research throughout the book. And one of the things that we've learned from Hendrik Bessembinder at Arizona State University is 1.2% of all outstanding stocks create all of the wealth in the market. So, one way to get wealthy is to see if you can guess which of the 1% of stocks, and remember there's about 3,500 publicly traded stocks. So, pick the 35 out of 3,500 that are going to create the wealth, or alternatively buy the whole market, and by definition you will have the stocks that are creating wealth, and by doing this market-cap based, as those stocks get bigger you'll own more of them. And so that's just the underlying math of indexes. The challenge is as much as you might intellectually understand that to be true, emotionally and psychologically and ego, you don't want to believe that. You want to think you could pick the stocks that are going to beat the market. You want to think you can jump in and out because you have an insight into what's going on in the world that everybody else does not. And it's not the cerebral side of it. It's the emotional side of it. It's our behavioral side that seems to get us into the most trouble.
You talk about numbers and behavior, and those are two of the sections in your book, bad numbers and bad behavior, and you talk about economic innumeracy, which is kind of a fancy word, but you have a good number of stories to tell about this and how people use or abuse bad numbers. Any good stories for us on that?
Oh God, countless. Well, since it's the middle of the summer and the Discovery Channel just ran Shark Week, I like to...
Remind people that it's the big, emotional, scary things that get our attention and not the mundane, boring things that are going to be a problem. You know, we're afraid of sharks. There's 10 shark attacks globally for 8 billion people, and a handful of people die every year. We kill tens of millions of sharks in fishing. Sharks should be afraid of us, not the other way around. We're terrified of terrorism. We're really afraid of it. There was a study that the Pew Institute did after 9/11 that said, because of the result of the terrorist attacks, all these people in the United States drove instead of flying over the next three years. And as 40,000 people a year die in automobile accidents in the United States, almost nobody dies in plane crashes in the United States. There have been years where the number's been zero. And so over the next five years, 3,000 additional people died driving instead of flying. And they could tell this by the annual, you know, numbers suddenly spiked up. And so while 9/11 killed 3,000 people in the Twin Towers, another 3,000 people died because they were concerned about terrorism. It's the big, emotional, scary things that lead us to these bad decisions. Statistically speaking, the odds are you're not going to die in a shark attack. You're not going to die in a terrorist attack. Heart disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, that's what's going to kill most of us.
Now apply that to your portfolio. We're afraid of crashes. Crashes come along very infrequently. And we've had a few. We had a 34% crash during the pandemic. It was quickly recovered. You had the financial crisis from October '07 to March '09, down 57%. By 2013 you were back to break even. You had a giant crash around the dot-coms in 2000, and then in '87 you had a massive one-day 22% crash. And so those are the things we're afraid of. What is the equivalent of cholesterol and high blood pressure in markets? It's high fees, it's excess trading, it's paying too much in capital gains taxes because you're in and out of stocks instead of just letting them run. It's the mundane things that we overlook because they're so run-of-the-mill that are the cholesterol and high blood pressure of markets. We're afraid of shark attacks. One of my favorite chapters in the book is selfie deaths. Outdoor Magazine ran a thing on an epidemic of selfie deaths. And it turns out when you look at the numbers, yeah, a few people died over seven years, but you figure out how many selfies are taken a day. It's some insane number like 93 million selfies a day. And so if 10 idiots kill themselves trying to take a picture leaning out the window of a moving car or leaning over a cliff, these are real people who died, or on a train track and getting hit by a train, there isn't an epidemic of selfie deaths. There's an epidemic of really bad decision making where people didn't make a good risk-reward calculation. And when the risk appeared, that's when they got into trouble. And so that's a really significant issue. We're blind. I use the term denominator blindness, which comes from an academic paper of the early 2000s where we see the big scary number: 270 people died over the past nine years taking selfies, but we don't stop to ask how many selfies were taken over that period. And it turns out 9 billion. So it's like .0000. You're more likely to win the lottery and get struck by lightning the same day than to die taking a selfie relative to the amount of selfies that get taken.
That's so true. Now, we know that media plays a big part in this. Now, for a long time you did a stint with CNBC, right? That you were giving your commentary. So what are your thoughts about the role that media plays in all this sort of the sky is falling type of thing?
Sure. So I did CNBC from let's call it '02 to 2013, so over a decade. And then I moved over to Bloomberg and slotted my partner into CNBC. So, we each are trying to get the firm's ideas out to as many mom and pop and institutional investors as we can. And the story we tell over and over again is, you're investing towards a plan, when you're thinking long term, most of the day-to-day stuff is just noise and you really don't need to pay all that much attention to it. But I understand that people can't go through life just tuning everything out and they want to feel a little informed. So, the takeaway I always say to people is your mom had it right: never take candy from strangers. And so, before you take that next hot stock tip or before you listen to somebody telling you the world is coming to an end, find out who is this person, what's their track record, what's their temperament like? Are they even-keeled? Do they freak out every 5% drawdown? Did they just get lucky once or do they actually have skills? Is there a process behind it? Is it repeatable? Those are the things you need to know before you pay attention to somebody. And that's a pretty big lift. That's a lot of due diligence. But the takeaway is it's for entertainment only. You certainly shouldn't have someone come on TV and warn you about whatever or pound the table about buying this or that and just buy it. You need to have some sort of experience understanding who this person is, what they're about, and is their recommendations and hot take worth paying attention to? And more often than not, the answer is no. Listen, people do Bloomberg and CNBC and CNN and Fox Business because, as I write in the book, everybody has something to sell, right? I want people to read my blog post, to listen to my podcast, and to send me their money to manage. And so, that's what I'm selling. I'm just more upfront about it than many. And literally, there's a chapter in the book, what are they selling? And I have to say, if I'm criticizing these people for selling something, well, let me tell you what I'm selling. And as long as that's disclosed and people know what you're pitching, all right, they have the ability to put that into some context.
Yeah, you talk about the process being so important and more important than even the result. And you quote Annie Duke on this one. And that's how you tell in some ways, you know, a bad forecaster is. They're focusing maybe on the goal or the sensation as opposed to the process. How do you feel about that?
Sure. So Annie Duke has this wonderful anecdote she tells. I forgot if it was a Super Bowl or I think it was a playoff game where football is nothing but math, nothing but all these statistical odds. And one of the things we know is that historically, if you go for it on fourth and one, the odds are in your favor. Now there are a couple of variances and, you know, how far you're down the field, you probably shouldn't go for it on fourth and one on your own 20. But anywhere in the opposing team's territory, fourth and one is a really good bet. I think it was the San Francisco 49ers went for it on fourth and one and they were stopped, you know, at the 10-yard line. Instead of taking the field goal, they went for it. And everybody criticized the coach for this call. And that's a classic example of resulting. You don't get to look at the results of this decision to say whether or not it was a good decision. Before you know the outcome, you have to say, hey, is this the right call? Because, hey, everybody can be a Monday morning quarterback. But what good is that? Tell me what my decision should be going forward. There was an article in the Wall Street Journal not too long ago about the Ferrari Testarossa and how the prices have doubled and this is a great investable car. And I'm like, hey, fantastic. You could read the score and tell me what I should have bought 10 years ago. Tell me what car I should buy to put away for the next 50 years. Suddenly it's a much harder decision to make. Yeah, I could tell you the 275 GTB that sold for $15,000 in 1964 is worth $9 million today. Thanks. I could read a scorecard. I know who won the game yesterday. That doesn't help me make investments today. And so we have this tendency to look at outcome over process. You really as an investor want to focus on process. All that comes back to in the prediction section talking about the people who've made one outrageous forecast and got it right, was it skill or luck? And if you want to just bet on the guys who are lucky, then you're just speculating. And that's why process is so much more important than outcome. You can't just engage in resulting. You can't just look at how did this turn out and not recognize this is a good bet or a bad bet.
Yeah, I mean you're famous for making the call in 2008-2009, and you refer to people that make those kind of calls as ultimately having a halo effect later on where they start doing things in domains that aren't theirs and making predictions that they have no business doing. Are you one of those guys or you just call out the people that are those guys?
By the way, the academic term for that is called epistemic trespass, where you have an expertise in this space and then you hop to an adjacent space where you may not have any expertise. So quick funny story: the bottom of '09 was really obvious, but with a caveat. In '07 I had been writing about housing and derivatives and subprime, and it was clear something bad was coming, especially when you get a market crash like you had in 2000, you tend not to have a two-year bear market and you're done. It tends to be 10, 12, 14 years. And so first, it just seemed like that was too quick and easy following an 18-year bull market. And then second, you know, I looked at things like median income to median home price. They had been level for years and then suddenly three standard deviations away, cost of owning versus cost of renting. There were a ton of data points like that. And so when I did the forecast, it wasn't a forecast. It was, hey, I think people are underestimating how much risk is embedded in this market due to derivatives and how much of the equity markets are reliant on real estate. I called it the backwards real estate-driven economy. So it was either right or wrong, it was a valid fundamental analysis. And getting the bottom right was really funny. I said at the time, 6,800 is my downside, the worst-case scenario for where I think the Dow could go, which was down 50%, which everyone was aghast at. And so I was away on vacation. My wife is a teacher, and I'm fond of saying the school board sets the school calendar a year in advance. And so the March '09 school vacation was set sometime in January '08 or maybe even December '07, whenever they do the school calendar a year or two years in advance. And so when I had said to a friend after there was a lot of buzz about the Dow 6,800 number, which again was just a, hey, this is where the risk could take us, not we're definitely going here, I said to a buddy, if we ever get anywhere near that, don't let me be that idiot that doubles down and says Dow 3,400. And so by dumb luck, we were away on vacation, courtesy of the calendar set by the school board two years in advance, when the Dow crossed 6,800. And I get home from vacation, and this is just at the early days of iPhones. I didn't have an iPhone then. There is the flashing red light on my home answering machine: Hey Ritholtz, you said to give you a call if we got anywhere near 6,800. Here we are. Are you going to double down like every other idiot or are you going to declare victory and go home? So it was Sunday. I just got home. I wrote up a note. I sent it out: cover your shorts and go long. Market's been cut in half. When is buying the US market down 50% not a good investment? And that was Sunday night. I went on TV on Monday, and then the lows were Tuesday. So dumb luck, not so much epistemic trespass, but just saying, all right, even if we fall another 10 or 20%, who cares? I missed down 50%. That's a win. What I didn't do, and this is the funny part of the story, was after that I had a bunch of people approach me: let's set up a hedge fund. We'll raise you a couple of hundred million dollars. We'll charge two and twenty. And that really would have been an epistemic trespass. That would have been using the halo effect to take what was maybe a little bit of smarts and some skill, but a whole lot of luck both at the top and the bottom, and moving it into an area that I had no business being in. Instead, I said, why don't we take this people throwing money at me and rather than see how much in fees I can squeeze out in a couple of years, why don't we say let's set up a long-term investment portfolio, let's build financial planning into this, and let's get rich slowly instead of trying to have a giant score to take advantage of '08-'09. I know the guys I was working with back then were very excited about setting up a hedge fund, and when I said not interested, they were shocked I was walking away from millions of dollars. But, you know, here we are. We're at about 9.4 billion dollars in client assets. It seems to have worked out.
So you have expanded my vocabulary. Now I have a new term, epistemic trespass. So I love that.
Epistemic trespass. Yeah, I love that phrase.
Trespass. Now, ChatGPT is giving me two different ways to do that, but that totally makes sense. So thank you for explaining that. So what else from the book about what not to do do you think is a must-know?
So there are a few things. A lot of it comes back to understanding yourself, your skill set, your abilities, what you're good at, what you're not good at. And another chapter in the book is Dunning-Kruger. I'll give you another 50-cent word: metacognition. Metacognition is our ability to evaluate our own skill set and ability. And it turns out that people who are relatively unskilled at things are not particularly good at evaluating how skillful or not they are. And that is the perfect setup for an investor stumbling into whatever. I hear stories about people playing around with options and futures or trying to time markets or rotate within sectors. You would never say, how hard is it to remove a gallbladder? I could do surgery, unless you're a doctor. But no one hesitates to say, all right, I'm 24 years old, I've never managed money before, let's set up a highly leveraged hedge fund and invest in AI. That is classic Dunning-Kruger, not knowing where your limits are. And that's how you end up with 45-billion-dollar hedge funds getting whacked and losing whatever it was, 70-80% of their publicly traded stocks. So that's probably knowing your own skill set, knowing your own abilities is a big one. The second thing that I wish I understood when I was younger, took me decades to figure this out, is simply the power of compounding. We live in a geometric world, not an exponential world. Meaning, I'm looking at my back window and that tree is 40 feet from me, and I understand I could count the number of trees and all this sort of stuff. That's geometric arithmetic. Exponential means raised to the power of. And so, if you put a grain of rice on a corner of a chessboard and the next day you put two grains of rice, and then four, and then eight, and then 16, by the time you get to the 64th grain, you've consumed all the rice in the entire kingdom. That's exponential. Compounding is exponential. Increasing 10.2% a year, and then not only does the underlying increase, but the 10.2% itself increases. And then in year three, all three of them increase: the underlying amount, and then the increase of 10%, and then increase on the increase on 10%, and so on. It's why markets double every seven or so years, and we just lose the ability to comprehend that because the numbers just get so large. One of the chapters in the book, spoiler alert, I'm giving this away. I keep reading people saying, you know, the dollar has lost 96% of its value over the past century. Nobody ever responds to that correctly. The correct answer is, why the hell are you holding on to a dollar for a century? It's not a store of value, it's a medium of exchange. I get paid in dollars, I use that to pay my mortgage, my taxes, my food bills, my entertainment, and then to invest in my portfolio and my firm. The dollar does that job splendidly. If instead of holding on to $1,000 100 years ago and burying it in mason jars in the backyard, and today it's only worth $40, if you would have put that thousand dollars into the stock market, what do you think that would be worth today? And people sometimes guess $10,000, $100,000, and the answer is $32 million. And that just seems like, wait, how does a thousand dollars turn into 32 million? The returns have been 10.2 percent. It doubles every seven years. Do the math: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 1024, now you're up to 10 million, and that doubles one and a half more times, and you're at 32 million. And it's just shocking to people how much that accumulates, but your brain wasn't built for exponential equations. It's not how we think. It's not what our experiences are.
Yeah, I mean what's interesting about the how not to invest, and we make so many mistakes as humans, is you're not immune from this. You aren't immune from the Dunning-Kruger effect either. There's two famous mistakes you've made that you talk about in the book, and it's humbling, and investing is humbling, and we need humility. Share with us your humility about a couple of things you did that were like, uh, not so good.
Can I curse? Because one of them legitimately has a curse in it.
Yeah, go for it. We're all about it.
We'll bleep it.
The first one was Apple. So I was a Mac user way back in the late 1980s and had written about Apple and had been very enthusiastic about the company in the 90s, and somehow wrangled an invitation to the rollout of the newfangled iPod, not iPhone, but the early version of this before it had a touchscreen, when it had a click wheel on it. I have that original iPod lying around somewhere. I get my hands on this iPod and, oh my god, a thousand songs. This is a Sony Walkman, and I'm aging myself, but this is a digital thing. I don't have to walk around with CDs or tapes or anything. This one little device, a thousand songs, that's the equivalent of a hundred albums. That's amazing. And so at the time, Apple was about $14 with $12 in cash, so you were risking two bucks. And I wrote it up and recommended it to the firm, and all the brokers in the firm bought millions of shares, and I am watching all just counting how much my bonus is going to be. And then two months later, I see all these sales going out at 20 bucks. What's going on? Hey, we're up 33%. Got to ring the bell. Come on, this is going to go much higher. What are you doing? So I owned some personally, and just to rub everybody's nose in it, I held it till it was 45. It was like a triple. And I sold it. By the way, since that time, not only did the stock gain about 10,000%, but it split two for one, three for one, two for one. So the initial purchase was something like 28 cents. And now, you know, it's hundreds, just about 200 bucks a share from 28 cents. But I showed those guys. So Apple was me not recognizing that I was no longer a trader. I was an investor, and I needed to behave that way. The other thing came along more recently in the early 2010s. I want to say it was around 2014. I was friendly with Howard Lindzon. He was founder of StockTwits and ran a venture fund. And I remember sitting in the back of the Embarcadero with the Oakland Bridge in the background and him pitching me on this startup that he was pouring money into. And it's like, it's an app that allows millennials to trade for free. And I remember saying to him, Howard, that could be the single dumbest idea I've ever heard in my life. First of all, millennials have no money. What are they going to do with trading? The world is moving to indexing away from individual stocks. This is just dumb. And that was Robinhood. Howard made about 100 million dollars on that investment, and I made exactly zero. It's a great story that's a reminder: hey, instead of engaging in epistemic trespass, instead of imagining that you understood venture capital, sometimes if you're going to do that, just defer to the experts as opposed to opining where you really have no business opining. To be fair, we were just launched the firm, we were big indexers, we were fans of BlackRock and Vanguard. This was very off-brand for us. I don't think it would have been a problem, but it really wasn't where we were as investors. So I give myself a little bit of grace for missing it, but in hindsight I should have thrown, you know, here's 10 or 20 grand, try not to screw it up. Would have been worth tens of millions of dollars 10 years later. Also, the pandemic was a huge boom for them. In 2014 nobody was expecting a pandemic.
Despite that, you still did exceptionally well. You know, we can make mistakes and we can still move on, and a lot of our audience and myself have made our share of mistakes and things like that. And I guess Apple, I'm not sure if Robinhood is in the S&P 500, but you know, if they had an index fund they would have Apple. So talking a little bit about your firm, Barry, so I know that's a big part of your whole business and where you actually learn a lot of what you've learned. I guess kind of explain how that works with your firm and the trading platform or the custodian that you use, and then this unique player in the game that was Altruist, and there is some breaking news about that. We're recording this on August 26th of '26. So give us your take on the custodian yourself and your opinion about Altruist, and then recently what happened and what you think about it.
Sure. So first off, the reason there's a custodian and a separate reporting entity is so that unlike Bernie Madoff, you don't manage the assets, you don't custody the assets, and you don't tell clients how well they're doing through your brother-in-law's BS accounting firm. So when you come to a fiduciary advisor, they're the ones that set up the plan and set up the portfolio. Somebody else custodies the assets. We use Schwab and Fidelity and Altruist. And then a third party tells the clients how they're doing. There's a bunch of different, Orion, Redtail, there's just a ton of different companies that create a software layer that allows a client to identify exactly how well am I doing today, year to date, month to date, since inception, etc. And the whole idea behind that is by putting these into three distinct entities, nobody can make up that the money isn't here and the money hasn't done what this entity has said it's done. So it's there for all sorts of investor protection. So that's why you have a distinct custodian and you have a separate reporting entity. That doesn't mean that a custodian can't give you analytics on what's been going on, and it doesn't mean that you can't run your own set of numbers on the portfolio, but at the very least to meet the regulatory requirements, there are three separate entities: the advisor, the custodian, and then the data analytics reporting. But when you look at the big custodians, TD was a little newer, but they got bought by Schwab. Fidelity's been around forever. These are big, giant companies that have a ton of legacy hardware and software, and it's really hard to do anything new, different, interesting with them. Jason Wenk, who's been on the podcast earlier this summer, is a serial entrepreneur. He's an engineer. He's built a number of successful companies, and about a decade ago, he came to the conclusion that, hey, the way the custodians are using technology is kind of old, and if we were to build a new platform from scratch, we could do all of these amazing things that the legacy entities, the legacy players can't do. By the way, there's more custodians. There's Pershing and BNY, and there's a bunch of others, but from my perspective, it's Schwab and Fidelity have been the biggest players in the RIA space. Interestingly, Vanguard has never really done custodianship. So myself and my partners had met the folks at Altruist a bunch of years ago, and hey, you know, best of luck, whatever happens. Right now, we're good with TD, Schwab, and Fidelity. Eventually that became TD Schwab, and so you always want to have more options. And so a few years ago, my partner Josh became an advisor to Altruist. I'm very friendly with former Vanguard CEO Bill McNabb, who was a big fan of the company and an investor into them. And so we all became investors individually and through our firm's fund. And they just got bought by Vanguard for an unreported dollar amount, of which I think the Wall Street Journal suggested it was about $4 billion. So, and they have tens of billions of dollars in assets on their platform. I want to say Schwab has something like $15 trillion. I'm doing this from memory, so don't hold me to that number. And Fidelity is something like $19 trillion. And Vanguard has not entered that space because, you know, it's a tough, low-margin business to be in. And I want to say Schwab, it was '23 or '24, I don't remember which year, 57% of their profits came from float. Meaning they have a couple of bucks that the clients haven't had invested, and they'll put it into something where they can generate a safe return. And so you end up with what historically has been a low-margin business, but the thing that Jason Wenk and Altruist did that was so significant is from day one they built in a layer of AI to be able to do all these things from the ground up. Schwab really can't retrofit that onto their platform. Schwab is a great custodian. When we launched, we had been with TD and we hadn't been with Schwab, but enough people had said, hey, I'll go with you guys, I can leave the money at Schwab. Like that sort of customer loyalty to a custodian is unheard of. So we added Schwab as a custodian, and it's always good to have more than one in just in case. And so when Schwab bought TD, we added Fidelity, so we still had two, and we were just so impressed with Wenk and Altruist and what they were doing. We don't have a robo-advisor, but we have what we call digital platforms. One is something we set up with Betterment, and that's for clients. We have no minimum. Less than $250,000 we set you up on Liftoff, which is our entry-level thing, and it's 50 basis points. You get a full financial plan, a portfolio allocation, and an advisor that you can speak to whenever you want. The next tier up is something that we bought from BlackRock about 5 years ago. They had bought FutureAdvisor in 2015 thinking that was the future of ETF distribution, and it turned out not so much, and they realized, hey, this is outside of our core competency, let's get rid of it. And so we bought it from them with the promise that we would take really good care of the clients and keep the fees low and give them a good allocation and portfolio. And so that's our other digital platform with a dedicated advisor to those clients. And then a million and up, we call them Prime, Preserve, and Family Office are each of the tiers. And the higher up you go, the lower the costs are in terms of percentage. And at the same time, when we were setting up FutureAdvisor, we began working with Altruist to see if we can provide more services at a very low price point for those clients. Their AI tool is called Hazel. All the people in the firm who work with Altruist and Hazel just rave about it. When you're built for AI from the ground up, you could do really great things very fast, quickly, efficiently, as opposed to, you know, think about when the legacy firms launched 30, 50, 60 years ago. Nobody was thinking about software-driven decision making. No one was thinking about how to onboard a client, how to allocate their capital efficiently, how to create a plan, how to do all these things as quickly and efficiently and inexpensively as possible. And the idea that you can offer a full range of services to clients with no minimum and for 50 basis points is something that just didn't exist 10, 20 years ago.