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Barry Ritholtz
Co-founder, Chairman & Chief Investment Officer, Ritholtz Wealth Management

Adjusting for Credit Risk: Masters In Business with David Eichhorn | Masters in Business

📅 Nov 20, 2026 Bloomberg Podcasts 68 MIN 443 VIEWS 163 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Barry speaks with David Eichhorn, CEO and Head of Investment Strategies at NISA Investment Advisors. They discuss his early days as a quant at JPMorgan before returning home to St. Louis to work at NISA. They also discuss the risks and benefits of the private credit market, along with the dangers of private credit going into pension funds and 401Ks. They also discuss liability investment strategies for managing over $483 billion in client assets. See omnystudio.com/listener (https://omnystudio.com/listener) for privacy information. Bloomberg Radio host columnist Barry Ritholtz looks at the p...

What Barry Ritholtz said

Written from the verified transcript and checked against it. Every figure links to the moment it was said.

David Eichhorn, CEO of NISA Investment Advisors, discussed his career from JP Morgan to NISA, emphasizing the importance of early career investment and mentorship. He explained LDI strategies, distinguishing true alpha from beta disguised as skill, and highlighted NISA's focus on breadth and small bets. Eichhorn criticized private credit's leverage and fees, arguing they destroy value, and expressed concerns about pension buyouts and insurance industry risks. He analyzed current bond yields, attributing them to U.S. fiscal issues, hyperscaler demand, and sticky inflation, while noting attractive real yields in TIPS. He also touched on global markets, Social Security reform, and the importance of quantitative skills and writing for clarity.

Key takeaways

  1. NISA's alpha is pure skill-based, not beta, achieved through breadth and small bets across fixed income and equities.
  2. Current 30-year Treasury real yields near 3.5% are extraordinary and historically high, making TIPS attractive.
  3. Pension buyouts to insurers pose a systemic risk, as state guarantee associations are effectively unfunded.
  4. U.S. fiscal spending and hyperscaler debt issuance are pushing yields higher, with break-evens indicating Fed credibility.

Numbers and commitments

FigureWhat it refers toTypeAt
$483 billion NISA's client assets metric 38:10

Chapters

  1. 0:00Career beginnings and mentorship
  2. 4:57LDI strategies explained
  3. 10:13Transition to NISA and CEO role
  4. 21:27Alpha versus beta in fixed income
  5. 32:55Derivative overlays and portable alpha
  6. 38:10Current bond yield environment
  7. 51:14Private credit criticism
  8. 57:38Pension buyouts and insurance risk
  9. 59:37Personal favorites and advice

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 1:41Mostly the career plan was, you know, pay bills honestly and try to work through school and all that, right?
  2. 6:53I say way too much, so who knows what?
  3. 17:23You know, if Jess were here, I think we'd both say, when exactly did I become effective CEO?
  4. 22:10And so a common thing — so in fixed — what does that mean in fixed income space?
  5. 26:59And I think because there's an inherent humility in breadth, right, that we really want to have a lot of small bets across our portfolio because then we don't need to be right very often, right?
  6. 32:20So — and again, and that it's a key element of the strategy, that humility that says — and it's fundamental law of active management, right?
  7. 34:45It kind of comes back to what we believe is really critical, is that sometimes alpha can be found in areas where you don't want the beta associated with it, right?
  8. 42:43So what that means is, what then, if yields are going up, what has to move?
  9. 46:09I mean, if you can reduce your tax bill, that's return, right?
  10. 48:48But we of course have to compare and contrast that because global markets, again, they bleed everywhere, right?
  11. 55:04And particularly with our clients, because of that derivative overlay — why this is relevant, like why does Eichhorn get writing about this, why do I care?
  12. 1:05:08It's humbling because like, I know this, and how can I not make this clearer, this point clearer?
Barry Ritholtz 0:00 ↗
Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio, news.
Strap yourself in for another banger. I sit down with the head of NISA Investment Advisors. They run a half a trillion dollars or so in institutional assets. David Eichhorn has been CEO there for a few years as well as the head of investment strategies. He's not just a fixed income and pension fund investor. He's a quant. He has a deep understanding of what drives liability-based strategies as well as the bond market, geopolitics, everything that's going on. What really produces alpha as opposed to just excess risk and leverage. I thought this conversation was fascinating and I think you will too. With no further ado, my conversation with NISA's David Eichhorn.
David Eichhorn, welcome to Bloomberg.
David Eichhorn 1:09 ↗
Barry, I'm delighted to be here. Love the show and excited to chat today.
Barry Ritholtz 1:13 ↗
I'm delighted to have you. What you guys do is really fascinating and so unusual. We're going to delve into that, but before we get there, I want to spend a little time talking about your background. You get a bachelor of science degree in business administration, majors in finance and mathematics from Washington University in St. Louis. That sounds like investing was the original career plan. Was that it from the start?
David Eichhorn 1:41 ↗
Mostly the career plan was, you know, pay bills honestly and try to work through school and all that, right? So, but yeah, I've always considered myself a quant at heart. And so it was a really nice and fortunate combination. I'd love to say there was a great plan in it. But I'm a first-generation college grad. I didn't know that was even a thing until some number of years ago that became popular to kind of talk about that.
Barry Ritholtz 2:04 ↗
First one in your family to go to college.
David Eichhorn 2:06 ↗
No, all my brothers and sisters, but our gen was the first, you know, and so it certainly was great being local at Washington University. I grew up in St. Louis. I was a commuter, which isn't even allowed anymore. Probably a regrettable decision from a college life experience, but had to work a lot to pay the bills of WashU when it was still possible kind of to pay for college still back then.
But the math really was the superpower that I think supercharged the finance degree, frankly. So I met, you know, Phil Dybvig, who I love to describe now as Nobel laureate Phil Dybvig at Washington University. Because of the math degree, he took a shine to me, for lack of a better term. And, you know, it's more one of those, you know, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.
I had some programming background. I knew how to — I knew, I'll say, relatively sophisticated math for what was in the finance department. And he really helped get me my first job at JP Morgan. And I'm eternally grateful for Phil, and he remains a great friend to this day.
Barry Ritholtz 3:08 ↗
You spent your first three years after college at JP Morgan. Again, working on the institutional side, helping clients develop investment policies, strategic asset allocations, and perhaps most importantly, asset liability management strategies. Tell us about your JP Morgan experience.
David Eichhorn 3:26 ↗
Well, I'll probably come back to the theme many times, but serendipity has struck a lot in my career. So Phil connected me with Mike Grenito at JP Morgan who ran this what they called the strategic investment advisory group. Dumb lucked into that. That was a group of I think at the time 17, 18 PhDs and a couple of us were the first ever undergrad hires and even within that group, lucked into as opposed to cleansing databases and god-awful work that the quants needed. I somehow got put in a client-facing role very quickly. We advised — we shared free consulting, you know, maybe air quotes, you know, free consulting to our large clients on various, you know, classic mean-variance optimization style analysis of managers, things that were, you know, newer for the time to roll out to clients. And so I got a great background in that. And at that time, while most people weren't doing it, we started really pushing the concept of asset liability managing and really what became, I'd say, the forerunner to LDI-type strategies. How do you — amongst other things, but certainly for large corporate pensions, how do you manage risk as opposed to in an absolute context? How do you manage it vis-à-vis liability? Whether that be how you think about your equity allocation, but maybe most importantly, how you think about your fixed income allocation. How does it mitigate some of the liabilities inherent — interest rate risk? And again, not many people listened in the late 90s and that kind of continued on into the early at NISA. But it was setting the groundwork for what ultimately became kind of known as LDI.
Barry Ritholtz 4:57 ↗
And so I think the average layperson hears liability and they're thinking car accident. Explain, especially from a pension fund manager's perspective, what do future liabilities mean in plain English?
David Eichhorn 5:10 ↗
Well, you know, our industry uses some funny terminology like liability. It is a liability ultimately to the corporation. I kind of think of it a little differently. It's a promise by the corporation to its participants and its employees to pay them a benefit in the future. And of course there's a lot of rules around these promises and the ability to how to fund them over time because of a lot of issues that have occurred in past decades. So these are pension trusts where assets are set aside to pay off, quote, these liabilities. But what the liability represents is pensions that have been very much earned by the participants that are owed a retirement benefit. Typically classic defined benefit structures or a retirement benefit for life when you've retired, often that have some portion of it will outlive you if your spouse outlives you, etc. So they're very long-dated, really bonds effectively, and that's kind of what we wanted to point out. Certainly in our early days at NISA, we were pointing out these liabilities and in pension funds, think of it as a short position in a bond. You owe someone money for a long, long time. So if interest rates fall, that makes that liability more valuable, i.e., all else equal, it's harder to pay off, all else equal, and if interest rates go up, vice versa. So a natural mitigation strategy is to own bonds, own very long bonds like zero-coupon Treasury strips. That was kind of some of our early innovation at NISA. And then over time, as folks got more and more comfortable with derivative strategies using things like Treasury futures, interest rate swaps, a whole host of things to hedge more and more of that interest rate risk with a derivative instrument to offset the volatility of that liability.
Barry Ritholtz 6:48 ↗
And there's a quote of yours that I found, okay, with my buddy.
David Eichhorn 6:53 ↗
I say way too much, so who knows what?
Barry Ritholtz 6:55 ↗
You said the best career advice you've ever received was to quote, 'Treat your career like a financial investment. The earlier you accumulate knowledge, the longer it compounds.'
David Eichhorn 7:07 ↗
Yes. Yes. It's what I tell our new hires all the time, you know, and I always say that because it's funny. It's like, you know, work a lot of hours, invest a lot in your time, but you know, just work a lot, work really hard right out of school, you know, comma says the CEO, right? You know, of course I want that out of my — Yeah, exactly. You know, and of course I — but I'm very upfront on these issues. Yeah. I get a dividend from that. If you do that early in your career, there's no doubt. But and I hope you're staying at NISA for the rest of your career as well. But you get a dividend the remainder of your career when you — and I'd love to say I had like that perfect vision, but that's exactly what happened to me at JP Morgan with the breadth I got and then when I joined at NISA it was less breadth but crazy depth and particularly in the bond market, etc. So I had that opportunity if I — as I leaned in, I built this, I think, a lot of intellectual capital early in my career that now I'm taking a lot of debits from that big — those big early investments. And I always point out to folks because, you know, life's always complicated, but it's never going to get easier than straight out of school. You know, life gets harder as it goes on. So when folks ask me and they're young about work-life balance, I kind of giggle. And I giggle partly because that's not how I almost view the world, but I also think about it more from your entire career. And I mean, I'm a bond guy, right? NPV work-life balance over your whole career probably means overloading the beginning of your career. It sets you off to have a really great balance because there'll be times where you do need to take — you have kids, you have things going on in life, parents, where you have to take a little bit of withdrawal from that balance. But you've already built it. And so that's — that to me is, again, I'd love to say that's how I thought of it when I was 21 years old coming out of school. It's just how it worked out. I at least have the sense to realize how it worked for me.
Barry Ritholtz 8:50 ↗
And certainly in between what the investment bankers at Goldman doing 100, 120 hours a week and the folks in France with August and July off and 30 hours a week.
David Eichhorn 9:02 ↗
You said that, not me, but okay.
Barry Ritholtz 9:03 ↗
Somewhere in the middle is something that's rational right out of college. Whether that's 50 or 60 hours a week.
David Eichhorn 9:10 ↗
Yeah,
Barry Ritholtz 9:10 ↗
you build up that knowledge base and that's what compounds.
David Eichhorn 9:13 ↗
There's no doubt. And but — and but you know, it's also — I mentioned New York, you know, I was probably — so I was never an investment banker, never those 120 hours or whatever. But you know, it's probably 80 hours a week. But you know, honest — you know, it's sad to admit, but tell my kids as I get older I can't be embarrassed anymore. It's sad, you know, I didn't know anybody in New York. I was kind of with a group of folks that were a lot older than me, PhDs and whatever. Made a couple great friends, but I didn't have much else to do, which is a funny thing to say in New York, and maybe a little lonely. And then the other thing is I got to say one of my two checks went to rent every month, even at a well-paid JP Morgan, you know, where I chose to live. So if you stayed after 8:00 at JP, you got fed. And so put you in the car and I thought getting Chinese, you know, was just the best thing ever. I walked. I was close enough to walk. So I didn't need the car. But so lo and behold, suddenly you then you come in every once on the weekend and then it adds up to 80 hours.
Barry Ritholtz 10:02 ↗
Yeah. No doubt about it.
David Eichhorn 10:03 ↗
But I think I benefited from that far more. This is my point. Like JP Morgan got something out of that. I know. I got —
Barry Ritholtz 10:08 ↗
You got a lot more over time.
David Eichhorn 10:09 ↗
Got a lot more. It was almost like stealing, honestly, what I got out of that.
Barry Ritholtz 10:13 ↗
Amazing. Almost like stealing. I want to keep progressing through your career. After three years you jump from JP Morgan, which is a giant platform, to what at least at the time was a much smaller one in 1999. What motivated that transition?
David Eichhorn 10:34 ↗
Well, certainly nothing against JP Morgan. It was a wonderful firm and it is an amazing firm and I think continue to marvel at what that organization has been able to accomplish. So, loved my time there. Deeply appreciative of Mike and the whole team for my time, you know, working at JP Morgan. And again, it honestly supercharged my career. The exposure I got was just outsized for a kid straight out of school with a lowly BSBA, you know, degree. But a couple things, you know, was interested, you know, certainly had, you know, at the time it was the dot-com bubble kind of brewing and everyone was talking about employee ownership and, you know, being at a quote startup. NISA felt like a startup and it kind of was. It was only five years old when I went there. But being really honest, I was a little homesick. I loved my time in New York. I'll never say a bad word about New York. I enjoyed it, but I knew I wouldn't live there the rest of my life. And my then girlfriend, now wife, was in St. Louis. We met in college. Actually, we worked at the same frozen custard stand. That's how we met. And it was time to make a decision and ultimately moved back to St. Louis and started talking to Jess Yawitz, prior CEO, dear friend to this day. He was reluctant to hire me, I always like to say, because he thought I'd have gotten a little too much exposure for only three years in and I could be a problem child at NISA. But we worked that out over time and it was a great story ever since.
Barry Ritholtz 12:00 ↗
So you work with the founders of NISA as effectively an apprentice for 20 years. Is that a fair number?
David Eichhorn 12:08 ↗
I guess it depends on how you want to carbon date it and when exactly, you know, who is the apprentice and who's the master. But it's funny you use that term. Very — I don't know if you — that's great due diligence on me or I don't know if I've ever made that public, but I refer to having the great luxury of apprenticing under a number of really masters of their craft and whether it be Jess or Bill or —
Barry Ritholtz 12:28 ↗
So Jess Yawitz is one of the founders and Bill — Bill Marshall, they started —
David Eichhorn 12:34 ↗
Co-founders. They started — they were both professors at Washington University and went to Goldman Sachs mid-80s, really the first quant revolution. They went there actually to build effectively Goldman's competitor to Marty Leibowitz's group over at Salomon. And so built a huge quant group. Unlike me, Jess truly hated New York with a white-hot passion. So he always wanted to get back to St. Louis. And ultimately did that. He was actually — Jess was, I don't know if his official title was CIO, but when they started GSAM, Jess was effectively the first CIO of GSAM.
Barry Ritholtz 13:04 ↗
Oh, no kidding.
David Eichhorn 13:05 ↗
And so but disliked New York, etc. Ultimately moved back to St. Louis in '90 and effectively bought what — a management buyout of a company called National Investment Services of America, which became NISA, formerly as it's known today, in 1994.
Barry Ritholtz 13:20 ↗
So he's at Goldman Sachs in '90.
David Eichhorn 13:23 ↗
Yes.
Barry Ritholtz 13:24 ↗
Around the same time as people like Leon Cooperman and Cliff Asness, and there were a run of folks running GSAM.
David Eichhorn 13:31 ↗
I could be wrong. Yeah, I could be wrong. I think maybe Bill hired Cliff. I could be wrong on that. But it's funny you say Leon Cooperman was Jess's first boss. I think he was officially the boss of GSAM. And I think when Jess left, surprisingly, I think that wasn't well-liked. I don't — I think words were exchanged, but I know they are good friends these days. It may have taken a little cooling off.
Barry Ritholtz 13:56 ↗
Leon doesn't hesitate to say what's on his mind.
David Eichhorn 13:59 ↗
That's what everyone says. I've never met him personally.
Barry Ritholtz 14:02 ↗
And so I've had him on the podcast. I know Cliff very well. He's one of my favorite quants in the world because he also is endlessly amusing and again witty and I appreciate people who don't have that filter. I share that affliction. So when I see it in someone else, I'm like, 'Oh, you got to watch that because that's not a great thing for you to be saying.' Cliff can get away with it much more than I can.
David Eichhorn 14:28 ↗
Yeah, absolutely. And I always enjoy his podcast because there's always something I learn.
Barry Ritholtz 14:32 ↗
You're apprenticing with the two co-founders for 20 years. In 2018, you become head of investment strategies. That's a substantial position and certainly a giant promotion from where you began. Tell us a little bit about that transition. What were the challenges and surprises that awaited?
David Eichhorn 14:52 ↗
Maybe I was '18. I don't remember exactly the timetable. So when I joined, I was actually in the client service group. And so NISA's style of how we work with clients has always been highly consultative. We're only an asset manager. We don't have consulting fees, anything like that, but highly consultative, like engineered solutions. Almost everything is in a separately managed account. So our client service team would — or are investment professionals that deeply know our strategies and deeply know how to customize them. Over time as we started to catch some growth, particularly in LDI, there was a natural reason to have still that same model of client service but then a group dedicated to like, okay, one more level of depth that focuses on custom design of strategies, etc. And that's when we formed the investment strategy group. I honestly don't — I would have been in the mid — as what have you. And that's what has now grown as really like a parallel group that the client service and investment strategies group work in amazing tandem together of being highly client-centric. Our client team is amazing at how they connect with clients, work with them very closely, understand what they're trying to accomplish. And then the investment strategy team, among some other things they do, really operate almost like a SWAT team where depending on a particular client issue, strategy, something we're trying to solve — in some cases, to be very clear, we can't solve it. It just doesn't work. But that group will swoop in to see if we can design something highly bespoke that hopefully in markets that are very hard help solve some of those client issues.
Barry Ritholtz 16:19 ↗
Coming up, we continue our conversation with David Eichhorn, chief executive officer and head of investment strategies at NISA, discussing how he helped build the firm into a nearly half-trillion-dollar manager. I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.
I'm Barry Ritholtz. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is David Eichhorn. He is chief executive officer and head of investment strategies at NISA Investment Advisors, an institutional manager running nearly half a trillion dollars in client assets. So we mentioned you became head of investment strategies in around 2018. 2021, as Yawitz and Marshall stepped back, you become CEO.
First question about that. What was the reaction from clients? You've been there for 20 years. Did you have to demonstrate, hey, I'm up to the job, or did they know that you were ready?
David Eichhorn 17:23 ↗
Well, there's a few things to unpack there. First, actually a really important date, and we can come back to employee ownership, but actually maybe the most seminal moment, more than certainly me becoming CEO, was on January 1st of '19 we effected a management buyout of Jess and Bill. So that was, you know, it's hard to go from gen one to gen two. I always joke I'm more like gen 1.23, two, three or something, right? That's close to the beginning, but I'm not a founder to be sure. So that transition of staying employee-held, which is not easy to do in our industry, was really 100% employee-held without outside capital, no private equity stakes, no etc. That was not easy to pull off and that was a big event in our history and one we're really, really proud of because of the — we think being employee-held is undoubtedly an enormous competitive advantage. And we talked about doing it forever, but, you know, everybody says they're going to stay employee-held and then not everyone does. So I think that was probably more momentous. You know, a client once said to me and Jess, like, you know, when I see companies sell, it's always obvious to me why it's good for the owners. It's rarely been obvious why it's good for me. And so — and that's our intention to stay that way, which remains hard. So, you know, business is hard. So that was a real seminal moment. And I guess because of that, by the time — you know, the other thing about being — one of the great things about being employee-held is that we just answer to ourselves. We don't have outside shareholders. So it was, to pick an industry term, it was such a gradual glide path. You know, if Jess were here, I think we'd both say, when exactly did I become effective CEO? And we really wouldn't know, but it was before that date. And one, I had the luxury of working with all of our clients for so long and really getting to know them. So it's not like I was an unknown entity and I think the writing was very much on the wall. Somewhere along the way I think I got the title of president, which kind of made it clear there's a succession plan. I don't even know the years because they honestly, Barry, they just kind of blur together. And honestly, you know, if I have one regret, you know, I think maybe in other times or place or other people, maybe I could have — and Jess will probably, you know, watch this — could have tried to push him out of the CEO spot sooner and whatever, but just had no desire to because just loved working with him all the years. And so I think if we probably both have any regret, I wish he was a couple years younger and he stuck around a little longer.
Barry Ritholtz 19:43 ↗
Really, really interesting. And I want to compare notes. We did the same thing. 100% employee-owned succession plan with my partners. We did it because I'm turning 65 this year. And it was time. I mean, I've been saying I'm going to do it sooner than later, and it always seems like you could keep kicking the can down the road. The way we structured it was a 10-year plan. With a chunk of equity at the end to be disposed with as needed. All employee-financed, no outside private equity. With an outside line of credit if needed. Okay. Curious how you went about doing this.
David Eichhorn 20:24 ↗
That could be a whole long conversation, but I'd say a couple things. One, the two generations have to kind of like each other to have reasonable — and clearly you have and you've done that at your place. I think a big element of that is also the generation that's leaving. Either you're going to need to borrow a lot because they want cash on the barrelhead, which is a reasonable thing. We did not do that. Or that gen has to have the confidence that they can be paid out over a reasonably long time. So I'll call it effectively longer than 10 years. We'll just say that. But a preferred payout that's, you know, again, I'll call deep in our capital structure. It's the only thing other than our owners that I would say they should feel pretty good that that's highly secured. But it's got a very long tail to it. I think that another liability —
Barry Ritholtz 21:09 ↗
Another liability.
David Eichhorn 21:11 ↗
And that undoubtedly is a liability of NISA's, but, you know, luckily we were in the midst of some meaningful growth and so even versus where we started, we've had growth in earnings, etc., that have put that, I'll say, even at a more secure level. So I think everyone's been very, very happy with that outcome.
Barry Ritholtz 21:27 ↗
So let's talk a little bit exactly how NISA earns its daily bread. You've talked about how the industry calls things fixed income alpha, but really it's beta in disguise. Tell us a little bit about that.
David Eichhorn 21:44 ↗
You have found a number of my little bugaboos. Yes. So, you know, I think beta — you can get beta very cheaply, you know, particularly in this day and age. And what I mean by — I'm using obviously an equity term, but whether we're talking fixed income or equity or what have you, but for a manager to just take extra risk, extra compensated market risk, and try to pass that off as alpha, it's just anathema to us, right?
Barry Ritholtz 22:07 ↗
It's beta plus risk, not truly alpha.
David Eichhorn 22:10 ↗
Yeah. And so a common thing — so in fixed — what does that mean in fixed income space? Let's say you're running against something like the Bloomberg Aggregate Index. Half the index or something is Treasuries. That represents an amazing attractive nuisance to managers that say, well, Treasuries, it's hard to enhance those, so I'm going to buy, you know, maybe some ABS, maybe some credit, maybe high — you know, short-duration high yield, whatever it is, to out-earn. But all those things are just beta. They're just extra risk that we look at clients and we try to point out, well, if that's what you want us to do, let's change our benchmark and not have that attractive nuisance of 50% of Treasuries and make it hard. And then what we deliver is then what we believe to be true alpha. So — and the data supports.
Barry Ritholtz 22:49 ↗
In other words, skill, not skill risk.
David Eichhorn 22:51 ↗
Yeah. And it's a word we use a lot, skill, which then ties in — we can talk about information ratios and what we target in that space. You know, information ratio being our targeted excess return over the volatility we take to get it. But importantly, though, that, you know, it's not just my conjecture or complaining about the industry. The data supports it. If you look at the — again, pick a benchmark, the Bloomberg Aggregate. If you look at managers in that space and you look at their excess performance — and note I didn't call it alpha, just their excess performance, which is often quite meaningful, particularly in the credit environment we've been in now kind of forever, great credit environment, they've meaningfully outperformed. When I regress it, however, that excess performance on the credit markets or for that matter the S&P, suddenly that excess performance shrinks a lot, or said differently, they're just systematically long credit. And I'll say there's nothing wrong with that, but I don't know that you should pay active management fees, right? You can get an ETF that's a credit ETF for next to nothing these days. So our strategies, when you look at our alpha, which to be very clear can be, depending on the environment, more modest than some of those — than the excess return provided by other managers. But when you regress it and you look at it, no, that's pure alpha, pure what we believe skill-based excess return that we believe you should pay for as opposed to beta.
Barry Ritholtz 24:09 ↗
I want to dive into that deeper, but I want to start by pushing back a little bit. Please. So, the equity side, we know how hard it is to beat the market, to beat a broad cap-weighted index is over long periods of time. Seems like we know the half dozen people that have done it over decades. On the fixed income side, say traditional bond managers, the potential for beating the index — the Bloomberg Agg — is relatively easy. It's fertile. You get rid of the worst quarter, decile, third, whatever you want to chop, of the worst credit risk. You're aware of duration when rates are going up and you extend duration when rates are going down. It doesn't seem that hard to generate what the industry calls fixed income alpha.
David Eichhorn 25:02 ↗
Yes.
Barry Ritholtz 25:02 ↗
You're saying, 'Hey, man, that's not really alpha.'
David Eichhorn 25:05 ↗
And to be clear, there are some — so there are some managers that also have that beta component and you regress it out and like, wow, that's impressive alpha on top of it. So I'm not saying it doesn't exist.
Barry Ritholtz 25:15 ↗
Not leverage, not additional risk.
David Eichhorn 25:17 ↗
Agreed. Yeah. And the leverage — private credit and leverage there, but I'm talking about investment-grade kind of classic bond engagements. There are some that do it and they do it exceptionally well. They're relatively few. The vast majority of managers, some actually when you look at it, net of the beta, they're long on average, they have negative alpha, not even positive alpha left over. So yes, it is a fertile space to beat with excess performance because it's — unlike equities, great counter example, unlike equities, it's easy to get long beta to that. And again, long — really it's long spread. It's buying spreadier assets or selling your Treasuries and buying, you know, buying corporates or whatever. It's easy to deliver that excess return. It's not easy to deliver genuine alpha. And there are few and far between out there.
Barry Ritholtz 26:03 ↗
On the equity side, the closet indexers, you're not really getting what you pay for and you're paying high fees for it. It sounds like you could get away with it more on the bond side if you're a closet indexer. You'd be a closet indexer with a very modest overweight of spread and look attractive all the time. And only now when we finally hit the air pocket it'll be very clear what you were doing, you know, right? So even if it's modest, and you saw that in the financial crisis, you saw it briefly in COVID until the Fed, for inexplicably frankly, bailed investors out way too quickly in my opinion, but —
David Eichhorn 26:42 ↗
Well, it's what they've learned today.
Barry Ritholtz 26:44 ↗
They've bubble-wrapped the economy so you can't make a mistake. 2022. What did — what do we see in 500 basis points of rate hikes? Bonds got shellacked. Was that a revealing moment of —
David Eichhorn 26:59 ↗
No, because credit spreads were — I mean, credit — a little bit. Yeah, early '22 a little bit. But credit spreads held in there. You know, the equity market actually had a rough go for a bit but then quickly recovered. So it wasn't enough of really a downdraft, but there was a — if you're paying attention you would have seen this exact issue, but it wasn't as obvious as the GFC. Certainly wasn't as obvious as several weeks within COVID again when the Fed decided they're going to start buying corporate bonds and whatever, well, everyone was safe, so it came out pretty quickly. But so really, really — you can see it when it's there, but you ultimately need to have a more distressed environment and we haven't had a business cycle kind of in forever. And so — and the other challenge with that, Barry, is if a big part of how you outperform is overweighting spread product, well, spreads have been grinding in because this has been a great credit environment. So to get the same excess performance, you need to own more of that lower-spread asset, which sets you up very poorly for if an air pocket occurs. So the spring winds tighter and tighter. You know, this is the nature of our industry, etc. But I do want — on the equity comment can make — so the equities are funny because we've launched actually a quantitative equity strategy now within the last year or so. What's interesting about equities is it's very hard to just be long beta. So that's a hard thing to do. But really all of our strategies that we manage, whether it be fixed income or equities, we believe in breadth. And I think because there's an inherent humility in breadth, right, that we really want to have a lot of small bets across our portfolio because then we don't need to be right very often, right? If you make one bet, you have to be right on that one bet. The equities — what's interesting about equity markets, particularly with how concentrated they've gotten, if you don't give a manager ability to short a little bit, doesn't have to be a lot, then the amount of surface area they've lost of expressing negative views on stocks is just shrunk. It just dramatically shrunk. So to us a key — and you can kind of see this ties into our derivative heritage and what have you. For us, the only way really to have success in the equity active space is have a lot of small bets. We don't believe in concentrated fundamental management there. And we need permission to short modestly so that we can — and what's nice, most of the industry isn't — a lot, most managers don't short or aren't allowed to. So we actually think the short book is actually got the highest potential, and modest shorts, because there's a lot of small bets. But that really gives us the potential to add meaningful alpha.
Barry Ritholtz 29:33 ↗
So when you talk about breadth on the equity side, a lot of small and I'm assuming non-correlated or low-correlated type of positions. What does it mean? What does breadth mean on the fixed income side?
David Eichhorn 29:47 ↗
Really quite similar. So our equity strategy is capital-S systematic. Our credit strategy that we've had since the inception of the firm is highly quantitative, but I wouldn't — it is not systematic in the classic sense. But it's similar. You know, we have a highly diverse — so any benchmark that has, you know, corporate securities in it, we run against a lot of investment-grade benchmarks, we're going to own, you know, several, typically three, four, 500 issuers against that and have a lot of very small active positions, a little overweight issuer, a little underweight. Again, that's how you get breadth. And what you're seeking is to have just as you point out a lot of uncorrelated bets. The neat thing about fixed income — I'm just a fixed income — I'm a geek at heart. But I'm certainly a fixed income geek at heart — is also unlike equities, there's a lot of CUSIPs under one issuer. So you can have a name in the index, AT&T, that's got one stock in the S&P, but it may have 50, 50, 60, whatever underlying bonds in our index. And what's beautiful about the fixed income market, because it is strictly over-the-counter, all of those trade at slightly different spreads. They should trade at different spreads, but what we do is we watch and many times we think they trade at slightly the wrong spread, a little rich or a little cheap. So there's actually real value to be added by actually trading within the complex of one issuer. That is some of the highest information ratio alpha we deliver because we're trading one AT&T for another AT&T. It's the same credit risk, but we're picking up yield because we're moving from a rich bond to a cheap bond, etc. That's really been the DNA, big part of our fixed income strategy and why we, I think, we seek some of the highest information ratios in the industry.
Barry Ritholtz 31:25 ↗
You mentioned long-short. The hot long-short thing these days are the like 130/30s or the 150/50s. You say you use a modest amount. When you say modest, is that 10%?
David Eichhorn 31:39 ↗
No. Well, no. In fairness, in that range — that 130, you know, in our — see, modest is all — it's all beauty's in the eye of the beholder. I think if you're a 130 — so in that range, you know, 130/30, 150/50, things like that, in that zip code, I think why I say modest is important. If we're doing that and we're going to concentrate our short book in 20 stocks, then even 10% is kind of terrifying, frankly, right? Whereas if you're structuring the portfolio in a way where that short book may have — if we're running against a global index, we may be — you know, it may be thousands of securities where maybe the average short position is six basis points or seven basis points. So it may add to 40% in the short book, for example.
Barry Ritholtz 32:19 ↗
But there's no real risk in any one.
David Eichhorn 32:20 ↗
Even the meme events and whatever, if you're in Avis or, you know, AMC or whatever, if you happen to be short, it goes the wrong way, but we're talking a few basis points of performance as opposed to a more existential impact on your strategy. So — and again, and that it's a key element of the strategy, that humility that says — and it's fundamental law of active management, right? If I spread a lot of small, relatively uncorrelated positions, I only need to be right a little bit more often than I'm wrong. And I think that's that embedded humility in the strategies we manage.
Barry Ritholtz 32:50 ↗
Quants love that strategy, don't they?
David Eichhorn 32:52 ↗
Quants love that strategy as they should. Yeah, they should.
Barry Ritholtz 32:55 ↗
So let's talk about the derivative overlays that you guys do. You're one of the largest derivative managers, certainly on the fixed income side, in the world. Walk us through what an overlay does for the client. Why don't they just manage this in-house? It seems like it makes a lot of sense.
David Eichhorn 33:14 ↗
Well, maybe that last point and I can come back to more detail. Derivatives are operationally messy. And they seem simple at a — on a high level. They seem simple, but there's a lot of potential loss even in just execution, particularly when you start talking about over-the-counter derivatives like swaps, etc. So that operational intensity is no small part of it, but also getting best execution in derivative markets is really something we pride ourselves on. And you need to be in that market a lot. If you are a — you know, an occasional tourist in that market, I'm struggling for the word — I think the dealers know very well how to take advantage of that and that's kind of their job. So — but now why do people use derivative strategy? So I mentioned — I won't go through in detail — but in our liability-driven investing for clients where their...
fixed income isn't hedging enough of that liability risk because they still own equities for return seeking purposes, etc. That's where we step in and we use a variety of instruments: treasury futures, total return swaps, repos to add interest rate risk to — importantly, as a hedge vehicle. We're hedging that liability. So we're getting long interest rate risk to offset a liability. That's a huge portion of our derivative book. The other huge portion — and it's funny, our derivative book is quite heterogeneous. We could talk about all the sub-strategies, but the other one is, broadly speaking, portable alpha strategies. So I don't have a perfect carbon dating on when the first of those strategies were ever launched. We had to be pretty early on because I think our first strategy goes back to 2001 or 2002.
Barry Ritholtz 34:43 ↗
It's certainly become much more popular.
David Eichhorn 34:45 ↗
And it's become more interesting. We've been running them all along. It kind of comes back to what we believe is really critical, is that sometimes alpha can be found in areas where you don't want the beta associated with it, right? For whatever reason. Well, portable alpha allows us to port risk premiums of betas very, very cheaply one way or the other. So a classic portable alpha strategy would be: a client has identified some great hedge funds, they have high confidence in them, and they only have a modest allocation at a policy level to hedge funds, but they have identified more managers in that space than maybe, say, large-cap U.S. equities, for example. So they overallocate to hedge funds by taking some of that U.S. equity book away. But of course, the U.S. equity market is a great risk premium; it's delivered consistently for decades. They want that risk premium back, so we step in as the derivative overlay manager to overlay those — call them equity market-neutral hedge funds — with an S&P 500 or global equity benchmark to get them back to their policy benchmark. And that's been a really — for clients who've adopted that, that's been a really useful strategy.

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APA

Ritholtz, B. (2026, November 20). Adjusting for Credit Risk: Masters In Business with David Eichhorn | Masters in Business [Interview transcript]. Bloomberg Podcasts. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3384578/

MLA

Barry Ritholtz. "Adjusting for Credit Risk: Masters In Business with David Eichhorn | Masters in Business." Bloomberg Podcasts, 20 Nov. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3384578/.

BibTeX
@misc{ritholtz2026_3384578,
  author       = {Barry Ritholtz},
  title        = {Adjusting for Credit Risk: Masters In Business with David Eichhorn | Masters in Business},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Bloomberg Podcasts. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {nov},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3384578/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}