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Barry Ritholtz
Co-founder, Chairman & Chief Investment Officer, Ritholtz Wealth Management

Barry Ritholtz of Ritholtz Wealth Management on investing in a volatile world

📅 Jun 23, 2025 GowerCrowd 79 MIN 941 VIEWS 144 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
In my conversation with Barry Ritholtz, chairman of Ritholtz Wealth Management and host of Bloomberg’s “Masters in Business” podcast, we explored market and real estate cycles, caution, and capital allocation in today’s increasingly unpredictable economic environment. Below are the most actionable and provocative takeaways for real estate investors, both passive and professional, drawn from Barry’s decades of lessons and market observations. Origins of Insight: From Blog to Bloomberg Ritholtz didn’t set out to run a multi-billion-dollar firm. What started as daily trading notes eventually evo...

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 3:20But why don't you tell me a little bit about your background and how you got to Ritholtz Wealth Management?
  2. 7:41So you did say we got the top and bottom of the financial crisis, right?
  3. 15:26So you were vindicated, but for a while — did you feel that you were a lonely voice talking about the downturn? How did that feel?
  4. 24:08What is the impact of that, in your view, to the long-term perspective actually?
  5. 29:50It's got a date on it, right?
  6. 32:03Doesn't he know about the economy?
  7. 42:30How are we doing for time?
  8. 50:26When are we taking over Greenland and the Panama Canal?
  9. 51:10Also, a thousand pages long, right?
  10. 56:13Is it because they're politically... politicians are cowards?
  11. 1:06:27I mean, you again just kind of leaning into this idea that 15% chance of a depression. What do you want?
  12. 1:14:42Any political or market developments are you tracking that could cause you to rethink your assumptions about where the market's going?
Barry Ritholtz 0:00 ↗
Anytime someone says, "I'm moving to cash, I'm getting out," the three questions that always come up are: A, what's your specific set of indicators that's going to allow you to get in? B, if you wait for the dust to clear, you're too late — the market's already sussed that out and run up. And then lastly, and perhaps most importantly, do you have the temperament, the discipline, the ability to get back in when every instinct in your body is telling you to run away? We evolved as social cooperative primates. And when everybody else in the troop of chimpanzees in the trees are running away, to stay and say, "No, no, I don't think that's a leopard. I want to stay here because there are bananas here." Every piece of your wetware, your instinct, your evolutionary adaptive subroutines is to join the group and run away.
Adam Gower 1:05 ↗
Hi, Adam Gower here, founder of gcrowd.com and host of this podcast and YouTube series, Real Estate Market Watch — current events through a real estate lens. My guest today is Barry Ritholtz, who is chairman and CIO of Ritholtz Wealth Management, a multi-billion dollar RIA firm based out of New York. And I contacted Barry because I really did want this perspective of what's going on in the market from a wealth management angle.
So our conversation actually is very broad, and Barry speaks to a large range of extremely interesting people on his podcast that is produced by Bloomberg. It's called Masters in Business. And so he has some very interesting insights from conversations that he's had through his podcast. And we talk about history as an indicator of where we are today and what's going on today. I was interested in understanding his views on exiting the market in preparation for some kind of downturn, what his views were on the likelihood of a downturn, what the impact of tariffs are, the impact of de-dollarization, etc. And we talked about all of these topics, and you'll hear from Barry his perspective as a wealth manager, particularly with a focus on the equity markets, but we do also lean into real estate as well.
If you've not already done so, please go to gcrowd.com and subscribe to my newsletter, which covers these conversations that I'm having in more detail, summarizing in written form the highlights of our conversations. And if you've got a moment, go ahead and connect with me on LinkedIn as well. I've been writing a lot on LinkedIn and actually really enjoying that process. So, gcrowd.com to subscribe to the newsletter, and LinkedIn if you get a chance to connect with me there.
All right, let's move on. I have a — it's quite a long conversation with Barry. His podcasts typically run two hours. We don't go quite that long, but it's definitely worth tuning in all the way to the end. Barry is a very interesting and insightful fellow. Let's hear from him right now. Here he is. Barry, huge pleasure to meet you. I've been reading your posts on LinkedIn a lot and following you, and from what you were telling me a few moments ago, it sounds like you're a professional podcaster. But why don't you tell me a little bit about your background and how you got to Ritholtz Wealth Management? You've done some interesting things and continue to do some interesting things.
Barry Ritholtz 4:01 ↗
Sure. So, none of this was ever part of my plan. It just kind of happened. I started out in the finance industry as a trader, and as you can see from my office, I've got like piles of books and junk lined up and I'm super disorganized. And to compensate for that, I would put together a list of things each day. Here are the earnings calls that are coming out. Here's the economic data that's expected to come out. Here's the consensus, here's the range. And I learned on a trading desk I didn't want somebody's voice in my head when I'm making risk-reward decisions. So I put together a list of these are the 10 most interesting-looking articles that I'm going to read on the train on the way home. I don't want to read beforehand. And I would literally tape it up to my monitor back in the day when monitors were big CRTs, not flat screens.
And so that started getting xeroxed and shared around the office, and then that became an email list, and then that became a post on Yahoo GeoCities. I want to say like '98, something like that. And eventually I moved the GeoCities post to TypePad, my first blog. I named The Big Picture after a book from William Goldman in '08. That became a WordPress blog. I wrote my first book, Bailout Nation, on the blog, with the help of hundreds of readers back in the golden age of blogs where comments were useful, not just spam and trolls. That led to the Washington Post column. That led to Bailout Nation and the Washington Post column, which eventually led to Bloomberg.
All of this media stuff has kind of been my side hustle. My actual job was I was market strategist for Maxim Group, which was a big, big shop. That was a roll-up of Herzog and Ernst and a bunch of other companies. I ran a software division of a quantitative shop for a few years, and more or less through a combination of hard work, skill, smarts, and a whole lot of luck, got to the top and bottom of the financial crisis more or less, right? And so that led to people just throwing money at us, throwing money at me. And so we launched — me and my partners launched Ritholtz Wealth Management in 2013. That was, you know, 5.5, 6 billion dollars ago.
Adam Gower 6:41 ↗
Really? Oh my goodness. That's a lot of AUM you have.
Barry Ritholtz 6:46 ↗
You know what? I have this conversation with family members like at holiday dinners and stuff, and it's like, no, that's walking-around change. That a few billion dollars is 0.00001% market share. Not only are there firms with 50 and 100 billion dollars, there's something like 20 firms in the US with more than a trillion dollars, 30-something firms really globally with more than a trillion dollars. Vanguard is 10 trillion. BlackRock is coming up on 12 trillion. I think these guys spend more money on pencils and toilet paper than our total AUM. That's how insignificant — it sounds like a big number, but in the scheme of things, we're small potatoes.
Adam Gower 7:35 ↗
You're very modest.
Barry Ritholtz 7:38 ↗
It's just math. It's just really true.
Adam Gower 7:41 ↗
Okay, so let me ask you this then. So you did say we got the top and bottom of the financial crisis, right? Tell me what you mean by that exactly, because you've also talked about looking at prior crises to read what's coming on now. So just tell me about your experience of the global financial crisis, and let's dovetail into history.
Barry Ritholtz 8:04 ↗
Sure. So I am neither an MBA nor a CFA. My background started out applied mathematics and physics in college. By the time I'm a senior, I'm like, this isn't for me. I switch to political science and philosophy. Go to law school. Do really well. Me and some friends all graduate cum laude, pass the New York New Jersey bar first time out. Loved law school, discovered I hated the practice of law. Just not a surprise for a guy whose blog is The Big Picture. "Hey, how do you feel about tedious minutia and agonizing detail?" Not for me.
So because my mom was in real estate, and because I didn't go through the usual MBA process, I looked at data a little differently, and I was very aware that all models are wrong but some are useful, to quote the British statistician George E. Box. And so you can't get too upset about the typical data series. You can't overly focus on it. On the trading desk, I found myself fascinated by why different people were either making money or losing money each week. They're all doing more or less the same thing. And in the mid-90s, like I remember the Netscape IPO — "Hey newbie, no trading the Netscape IPO today." That kind of sent me down the rabbit hole of behavioral finance before all the cool kids discovered it.
And so Thomas Gilovich, probably early 90s, book How We Know What Isn't So, and then that led to Shiller and Thaler, and that led to Kahneman and Tversky, and that led to David Dunning and the whole — and Meir Statman.
Adam Gower 9:54 ↗
Well, hang on, who are all those people? Wait a second. So those are all — that is that field of thought somehow? So Kahneman and Tversky are the key drivers of the entire —
Barry Ritholtz 10:03 ↗
Two psychologists from Israel. Tversky died previous to 2001 when Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in economics for their work. Pretty much everybody else I mentioned in that list — Dick Thaler at University of Chicago won the Nobel Prize for his work driving behavioral finance. Bob Shiller at Yale, another Nobel laureate. All, by the way, guests on the podcast over the past year, few years. My dirty little podcast secret is that I just interview people I want to sit and have a conversation with. If nobody else listened, I honestly — wait, Bob Shiller and Dick Thaler are going to give me two hours? Here's who's listening.
Adam Gower 10:50 ↗
These are — this is exactly my approach to podcasting as well, but I think it's the right approach.
Barry Ritholtz 10:56 ↗
So to answer your question with this ridiculous digression: because my mom was a real estate agent, because I was paying attention to how the economic cycle in its fullness developed and unspooled — hey, normal economic cycles are the economy does better, more people get hired, more people get raises, then they go out and buy a house, and then that house is filled with durable goods. And you know, that's a usual cycle. But what we noticed, what I noticed post-9/11, post-dot-com implosion is, wait, we've seen wages lag for 30-plus years, we've seen the upper end of the economic strata do really well, but not the lower end.
The demand for product with a high yield was driving all this securitized product. People were doing all these cash-out refis. I'll never forget the first house we owned. We refinanced our mortgage, and I'm not exaggerating — it was a little house. I think we paid 260 on Long Island for it. We did a cash-out refi. The guy pulls up, screeches into the driveway, throws the door open, leaves the engine running, comes in waving like a stack of papers. "Sign here. Sign here. Initial. Initial." Tears off the check. "Here's 30 grand. I apologize, I have a closing down the road." Jumped in his car and ran out. I want to say that was like '04. And I remember looking at my wife and saying, "Strange things are afoot at the Circle K. This is a terrible, terrible thing we just experienced."
If this is being reproduced over and over again, I got to dive deep into what's going on in mortgages, HELOCs. And I wrote a couple of commentaries: "The Backwards Real Estate-Driven Economy" and then "The Rising Risk of Derivative Problems." And I eventually took a Reinhart and Rogoff research paper where they found leverage-based financial crises across five areas — I think it was Helsinki, Japan, Mexico, the Depression — I always forget this different thing, right? Well, that eventually became that book, 800 Years of Financial Folly. But 32% is the average real estate crash.
I kind of reverse-engineered the Dow and said, what happens — we're at about 14,000 — what happens if real estate falls 32%? And I ended up with a number like 6,800, which was my entry in the Businessweek annual forecasting nonsense, which I didn't want to do but kind of got talked into. I pitched them on, let's run a counterprogramming on how silly all these forecasts are. The editor says, "It's a double issue. We sell a ton of ads. Do you want to participate or not?" So for about a year, I was an idiot. 6,800, the market's going higher. It peaked in '07. By January, February, March of '08, suddenly, oh, that guy Ritholtz, he doesn't look like such an idiot anymore.
Told a buddy, don't let me double down if we get anywhere near 7,000. You've seen these guys — 10,000, 5,000, 2,500. What the reason I mentioned this was so much dumb luck was: A, my mom was a real estate agent, otherwise I wouldn't have been looking at this, and B, my wife is a teacher. We go on vacation based on the school schedule that I have nothing to do with. The vacation in '09 in March just happened to coincide with the dates when we were on a cruise somewhere. The Dow fell through 6,800. Back from vacation, there's a voicemail. This is pre-iPhone days, like early iPhone days. So there's a voicemail on our machine at home: "Hey Ritholtz, we just crossed 6,800. You told me to kick your ass when we get here. Here's your phone call."
So I write up a "Cover Your Shorts and Go Long Here." Everything I look at is as deeply oversold as it ever gets. That goes out Sunday night. Immediate response: Henry Blodget, "Hey, come on TV tomorrow. Let's talk about this." So I want to say that was like a Monday, and then it broadcast that afternoon or the next morning, and that was the bottom. I could have come home a month earlier, a month later, it would have been the same exact thing.
Adam Gower 15:26 ↗
So you were vindicated, but for a while — did you feel that you were a lonely voice talking about the downturn? How did that feel? Because I'll tell you a very funny story — Peter Boockvar, funny to me anyway.
Barry Ritholtz 15:43 ↗
Peter Boockvar, who now runs his own research shop but used to be at a bigger firm. The two of us had done CNBC at the Madison Avenue office, and my office was like 44th between Madison and Fifth, and his office was a block or two away. And we both had been on CNBC like late fall '07, and the anchors literally laughed at us on the air, like it was unthinkable. And I don't do forecasts. I said the whole Dow 6,800 thing was, hey, there are a whole lot of embedded risks in derivatives, in these securitized products, and all these subprime products. I don't think the average investor is aware of how much risk is out there. They just think that, hey, 0% rates, we're going up forever.
And Peter and I walked back to our offices after the CNBC hit and kind of were astonished that we were laughed at live on TV. And I said, "That kind of encourages me." Because it's one thing for someone to say, "You raised some valid points, but..." I've had this argument with people who say passive is going to cause a crash in the market. I've been having this argument with people for 20 years, and I'm like, well, I understand your point, but I just don't see passive having that sort of negative impact.
Adam Gower 17:15 ↗
What's passive?
Barry Ritholtz 17:17 ↗
Well, what's passive? Broad indexing — the move away from active mutual funds towards broad indexes, the S&P 500 or the VTI, the Vanguard Total Market, or BlackRock. You know, now 51% of mutual funds and ETFs are managed in a broad index style rather than an active [style].
So as we're walking back to our offices, I'm like, hey, it's one thing if they would say, "You raised some valid points. I disagree with you." But that's not what we got. What we got was, "That's hilarious. It's unthinkable that there's any risk in the market. Buy the dip." Like, that was literally the whole attitude. It's like, okay, okay, so you guys — it's not that you disagree with me. You simply cannot imagine that there's any risk embedded in a market, which by the way has just about doubled off of the '02-'03 lows, driven by low rates, not driven by the normal economic gains. And so it encouraged me to be a lonely voice. It was not discouraging.
Adam Gower 18:27 ↗
Are you a lonely voice today? What are your views on what's going on today?
Barry Ritholtz 18:33 ↗
So sometimes I feel like I'm a lonely voice.
Adam Gower 18:36 ↗
So what are you saying that sounds like — that is getting those chuckles and ripples of derision from...
Barry Ritholtz 18:46 ↗
You know, I'll give you two recent examples. So, and a lot of this has to do with people's information diet — what they consume, how they...
Adam Gower 18:56 ↗
Oh, I see. Right, not what they had — diet.
Barry Ritholtz 19:00 ↗
So there's a lot of noise in February and March after the new administration was sworn in. And a lot of Sturm und Drang, and then, you know, tariffs are coming, here comes Liberation Day. And I wrote a piece where I said, "Tune Out the Noise." Listen, if you don't need your money for 5, 10, 20 years, what happens in 2025 isn't relevant to you. This administration clearly is very noisy. There are a lot of new policies, a lot of policy reversals. It's going to be up and down, up and down.
Hold aside the previous commentary — hey, back-to-back 25% years, such a small data set. We had to look at back-to-back 20% years. You tend to end up with, you know, lower your return expectations following six years of gains in 24 months. And I got a lot of pushback. "How could you tell people to tune out the noise? Crazy stuff is happening. Democracy under assault." I go, true, but is this worse than the pandemic? Is this worse than the Great Financial Crisis, the dot-com implosion and 9/11? Is this worse than the '87 crash? I don't think so. And you know, that was March. We had the selloff in April. We're now back above levels where that "Tune Out the Noise" piece came out. I had to change the headline from "Tune Out" to "Manage the Noise." So it feels like that's sort of a lonely position.
And then this week I wrote "Never Take Candy From Strangers" — that your mom was right. Growing up as I did in the '70s and '80s, we were latchkey kids. It wasn't — you didn't have helicopter parents and just all these after-school activities. You'd come home, get something to eat, go to the schoolyard, play basketball or stickball or whatever. And my parents gave me, and every other kid of my generation got, these three rules. And the rules were: let us know where you're going to be after school, be home at six o'clock for dinner, and never take candy from strangers. Those were the three rules.
And the iPhone has made the first two rules — you know, they've replaced it because parents know exactly where their kids are, literally to within a foot or two. "Hey, I'm going to be late for dinner." You could text. But the same rule — don't take candy from strangers — applies, especially in today's environment of 24/7 financial news, TV, radio, Substacks, Beehiiv, blogs, and most importantly, social media. So if you wouldn't take candy from a stranger, why would you listen to somebody who doesn't know who you are, what your tax bracket is, what your income is, what your zip code is, what your financial goals are? They're all selling a product.
And I put this in a blog post and I said, "Hey, let me tell you what I'm selling. I want you to read my blog post and I want you to buy my new book, How Not to Invest." It's not that all these embedded sales are so nefarious. It's the opposite. It's that they've become so ubiquitous, we don't even realize these people are going on TV, hosting Substacks, hosting a podcast because somebody is selling a product somewhere.
Don't be like I was early in my career where I believed everything I saw and heard. I was a sucker for every smooth-talking salesman. Be a little less naive. Be a little less gullible. And if you're going to pay attention to somebody, to their Substack, to their podcast, you should know a little bit about who they are. What's their process? Is it rational? I get these pitches all the time for "allow us to use your horoscope to pick stocks." Hard pass. Is their process rational? Do they have like a reasonable temperament, or every time there's a 7% pullback they're running around with their hair on fire? Have they lived through a few cycles? Have they been more right than wrong? Hey, once you figure out who these people are, put together a team of your favorite people who have demonstrated they're worthy of your time and attention.
The other — Ted Sturgeon was a science fiction writer in the 1950s and '60s. People used to ask him, "How come so much science fiction is bad?" And he would say, "90% of everything is crap." And you know what? Sturgeon's Law applies to everything in finance. Most mutual funds are not good. Most alternatives are not worth your time. The vast majority of the noise you see everywhere probably could be safely ignored. Even stocks — the vast majority of stocks don't contribute to your portfolio. And so we need to be a little more thoughtful and a little more selective.
Adam Gower 24:08 ↗
Barry, you've talked about — so, you know, kind of higher-level macro perspective. You've talked about dollar weakness, and I'm not sure if you've used the term de-dollarization, but there's clearly an erosion of trust in the US from overseas. A lot of our international investors looking at what's happening to institutions in terms of the tariffs, to law and order in America. What is the impact of that, in your view, to the long-term perspective actually?
Barry Ritholtz 24:42 ↗
So, you know, a big part of what I've been writing and what I wrote in the book is "nobody knows anything," to channel William Goldman, two-time Oscar-winning screenwriter — All the President's Men, Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, famously wrote the screenplay to The Princess Bride. And he was talking about Hollywood: everybody passed on Star Wars, everybody passed on Raiders of the Lost Ark. It was just one error after another. And when we pretend to know what's going to happen, we tend to make policy mistakes. So I try not to give binary predictions. I try and say, let's war-game this and lay out a range of scenarios from best case to worst case scenario. And my best case scenario is kind of the TACO trade.
Adam Gower 25:32 ↗
All right. Explain what that is for those that don't know what the TACO is.
Barry Ritholtz 25:38 ↗
That's a meme from the Financial Times that spread like wildfire through trading desks everywhere: Trump Always Chickens Out. Here's a tariff. No, the tariff's off. Mexico tariff gone. Canada tariff gone. 135% tariff on China — just kidding. No, we're going to have this tariff on Europe — JK. And just on and on. So I think the market has kind of become inured. It happened in his first term also. The market has kind of gotten tired of this, but that's the best case scenario.
I'm fond of saying, if you really want to know if things are going to be good, just ask yourself who is the last person to whisper in the president's ear. If it was Scott Bessent, a Wall Street guy, we're going to be great. If it was Peter Navarro, a fourth-tier economist at a third-tier school that was found by Jared Kushner because the president in his first term said, "Find me an economist who supports tariffs," and the only idiot who agreed that Smoot-Hawley was a good thing in the 1930s was Peter Navarro. So he's our trade advisor. If he's the last guy to whisper in the ear, well, that's a bad thing for markets and for the economy. So that's the good case, medium case.
The worst case scenario, I'm going to outsource that to Ben Hunt at Epsilon Theory. I try and make him a little happier; he tries to make me a little more dour. So we kind of swap ideas all the time. He had a post immediately after April 2nd called "The End of Pax Americana" that talked about all of the amazing benefits that the US has enjoyed since the end of World War II — political, economic, military leadership, the wealthiest country in the world, our exorbitant privilege of the dollar as the reserve currency, right? And he says all that's going to hell courtesy of Liberation Day. Now, he's walked that back a little since we've seen TACO. But basically, I don't know what the future holds. Here's a dirty little secret: neither does anybody else. So that's why I always want to say best — you know, there's a million gradations, but here's your best case scenario, describe worst case scenario.
Adam Gower 27:56 ↗
What is worst case scenario?
Barry Ritholtz 27:58 ↗
So the worst case scenario is the end of the dollar as the global reserve currency, a repatriation of foreign investments in the US, rates spiking, inability to finance our debt, economic recession, and then a depression — all a self-inflicted unforced error, right? And I spend a lot of time in the book talking about the best thing investors can do is, yeah, I know you think you're going to find the next Nvidia or Microsoft. The odds are you're not. So rather than try and hit home runs, how about just make fewer strikeouts, just make less unforced errors? And I wish not only that investors would do that, I'm wishing that the administration would perhaps do fewer unforced errors as well.
Adam Gower 28:47 ↗
Right. So from an investing perspective, so the worst case scenario — and I know you've said you don't make predictions, and that's fine. You know, the hardest thing to make predictions about, as they say, of course, is the future. But you know, from a real estate perspective, when you do look back at history, and you've alluded to this and you talked about the GFC, there are periods in time when the market does — and again, my focus is very heavily on commercial real estate — when the market does tank, right? I mean, it really crashes, and then it takes years and years and years to recover. And there's a lot of — there's a period of wealth transfer where people lose their assets. And then there's a slow buildup, and those that come back in later actually do exceptionally well, but they have to go into the downturn with cash flow and very low debt. So it's a different approach than when you're coming out of a downturn.
If your goal is not to lose money, wouldn't — and you think that there is — I mean, the very fact that you talk about a worst case scenario as being another depression right now is telling. Wouldn't it make sense to go to cash now, reduce debt, and wait and see? Like, what's the downsides? For example, my view, if I was going to go out with my lonely voice, right, I think that we're going to see very significant market correction before the midterms. It's got a date on it, right? It's going to happen before the midterms. So there's a limited period of time, and the best option right now is to go to cash, wait, watch, and then come back in. As far as I'm concerned, the downside to that — maybe I don't grab the upside for the next 12 months. Okay, I can live with that, but at least I'm not going to lose everything.
Barry Ritholtz 30:50 ↗
So let's — are we talking about real estate or are we talking about equities?
Adam Gower 30:54 ↗
Yeah, so real estate, both. My focus is very heavily on commercial real estate, if you're comfortable talking about real estate.
Barry Ritholtz 30:59 ↗
Sure, absolutely. So there's a lot to unpack in that. Let's do that. And I can't remember whose quote I'm stealing, but I love the line — I hope it's mine — "Market crashes are where capital gets returned to its rightful owners," right? I love that line. And it totally applies to leverage and real estate. So I'm trying not to constantly reference the book, but there are two chapters in the book that are just...
Adam Gower 31:27 ↗
Remind me the name of the book.
Barry Ritholtz 31:30 ↗
So the name of the book is How Not to Invest: The Ideas, Numbers, and Behaviors That Destroy Wealth and How to Avoid Them.
Adam Gower 31:38 ↗
Okay.
Barry Ritholtz 31:40 ↗
So one of the examples I talk about, Sam Zell, legendary real estate investor. I had a buddy who was a bond manager at Fidelity. When Zell would show up, the conference room would be filled, the overflow auditorium would be filled. Everybody wants to hear Sam Zell's prognostications. And it turns out that Zell is a pretty crappy economic forecaster.
Adam Gower 32:03 ↗
Wait, this guy is a billionaire real estate investor. Doesn't he know about the economy?
Barry Ritholtz 32:10 ↗
And if you objectively look at how he made his money, Zell bought really outstanding properties at distressed fire-sale prices and then held on to them for decades. He used leverage intelligently. He was never out over his skis — I hope everybody understands that reference. He never was excessively leveraged. He always was very savvy in how he constructed his investments. Literally, there are properties he held for half a century. So he was long-term, he used modest amounts of leverage, and he bought great properties at even better prices. So if you imitate Sam Zell, you'll be fine.
On the other hand, we've seen a ton of people in the financial crisis on the residential side. Showed us that — I love the scene in the movie The Big Short where Steve Carell is talking to the stripper and he's explaining 2/28 variable mortgages and what happens when rates go up, and he says, "You can lose your house if you put nothing down and you're doing this." She goes, "House? I own six houses." And he immediately — she technically didn't own those houses. My bank credit buddy Josh Rosner used to call that — these were people who were renters with an option to default, and that's literally what happened.
So the Sam Zell story: if you have a little bit of leverage — hey, listen, a lot of those models that were used on Wall Street assumed that real estate never went down. We know real estate went down in the late '80s, early '90s. If you were buying in Manhattan, you bought '88-'89, that was peak real estate, then rates came down, and it took about 10 years to get back to break even. Obviously during the Great Depression, real estate prices crashed in some areas 80, 90%. So just a really weird, silly model assumption.
The other thing that's kind of an interesting example about real estate is, you know, Robert Kiyosaki wrote Rich Dad Poor Dad, arguably the best-selling financial book in history, something like 30-plus million copies. Here's a guy who's been forecasting a crash — forecasting a stock market crash, a bond crash. 2018: sell residential real estate, sell commercial real estate, you want to exit US real estate as soon as possible. And I'm hard-pressed to find a better time to buy US real estate other than the depth of the financial crisis in modern history, certainly in this millennium, than 2018. Everything has since doubled and then some from there.
Adam Gower 35:06 ↗
Oh, I see.
Barry Ritholtz 35:09 ↗
So there are two charts in the book that show there's always a reason to sell, and it applies to stocks. It equally applies to real estate. Every year there's something terrible happening, and every year things are fine. I mean, maybe we're a little spoiled. We've had so few recessions in the past 25 years, and we're probably overdue for a healthy recession at some time in the future. And yet this economy seems to be doing so well. There's so much cash sloshing through the system. There aren't enough homes.
Commercial real estate is different because — are we talking about office space? And then there's A and super-A versus everybody else. Medical and biotech is a growing area. Warehousing, obviously, AI and data centers. So commercial real estate — where, what part of the country, what sector? Really, multifamily has done okay. Office space, B office space is still fairly cheap. Europe has had a much higher return-to-office success rate than we have in the United States, and so there are a lot of questions there. But the big question to me is anytime — and my frame of reference is equity more than real estate, but okay — anytime someone says, "I'm moving to cash, I'm getting out," the three questions that always come up are: A, what's your specific set of indicators that's going to allow you to get in, right? B, if you wait for the dust to clear, you're too late. The market's already sussed that out and run up. And then lastly, and perhaps most importantly, do you have the temperament, the discipline, the ability to get back in when every instinct in your body is telling you to run away? So that's the challenge.
Especially like being a buyer in March '09 was really, really hard. We evolved as social cooperative primates. And when everybody else in the troop of chimpanzees in the trees are running away, to stay and say, "No, no, I don't think that's a leopard. I want to stay here because there are bananas here." Every piece of your wetware, your instinct, your evolutionary adaptive subroutines is to join the group and run away.
Adam Gower 37:33 ↗
How often have you predicted — not predicted, but even talked about a worst case scenario as being a Great Depression? Seriously.
Barry Ritholtz 37:42 ↗
Very rarely. I will tell you a piece which begs this question: isn't this time different? Four most expensive words in finance, according to John Rothchild: "this time is different." So with equities, my answer is going to be a little different with equities than with real estate, because we all know leverage kills with equities.
Adam Gower 38:04 ↗
Oh, the other chapter in the book is...
Barry Ritholtz 38:07 ↗
The CEO and founder of Peloton, right? So here's a perfect example of leverage killing. So here's a guy. He buys like a $40 million house in East Hampton, some crazy number. He's living large. And then during the end of the pandemic, suddenly he's forced to sell that house. He's forced to sell another thing. I've never seen his portfolio, so I don't know what the hell is going on, but it turns out that he was with one of the big brokerage firms that loves to do stock loans. "You want to buy a house, you have a $10 million portfolio. Here's $5 million." The problem is if the market takes a hit — we know it's going to come back, but we need the cash for this loan right now because your security is no longer there. So leverage is really, really dangerous.
And the rules historically, if you want to borrow against your stock to buy more stock, it's very limited. I want to say it's about a 50% loan-to-value ratio is all you're allowed. So if the market gets cut in half, you're going to get a margin call, but for the most part, you're okay. Specific stock, really bad because they run up and run down. I'm betting this CEO leveraged a bunch of his Peloton stock, and then the stock came in, and suddenly he's selling his apartment in the city, his house in the Hamptons. You know, just — no, they did not do him a service lending him all that money.
But the discipline part is really hard when markets are rallying, be it real estate or equity, and you're offered a lot of capital very inexpensively. And hey, if my ROI is 8, 10, 12% a year using my money, imagine if I add a couple more million dollars, I could double that to 15, 20%. Which is great right up until the moment where the tide goes out.
Adam Gower 40:05 ↗
So what's unprecedented —
Barry Ritholtz 40:11 ↗
And Ray Dalio says unprecedented only means it hasn't happened in your lifetime. But we had a pandemic which was unprecedented except for the...
one in 1918. These tariffs are unprecedented except what we saw with Smoot-Hawley in 1930. And so this range of possible outcomes, the worst-case scenario, I include it not because I think it's likely, but for the sake of, hey, I'm not just a, you know, Pollyanna saying everything's going to be great. It can get really bad if we see more unforced errors and more ill-advised policies from the White House.
The 90-day tariff pause. None of us really know what happened, but I like to imagine Scott Bessent, a Wall Street guy, running into the Oval and saying to the president, "You better do something or you're going to be Hoover, too. You better figure something out because Wall Street is about to show you who's in charge." Right? And I did a post recently, the market is undefeated, talking about we had Ben Bernanke in October '08 asked for authority and money. Rand Paul gave a fiery speech. They didn't give it to him. Market sells off 10% in a week. Here's whatever you want, just make the pain stop. We saw the same thing in 2020. First quarter, Congress was debating renaming a library in DC. Talk about meaningless. And they couldn't agree on it and then the NBA shut down. Everything went south quickly and suddenly, CARES Act, the biggest fiscal stimulus since World War II as a percentage of GDP gets passed. And then again with the tariffs, markets April 2nd, April 3rd, down 5%, down 5%, down 5% like three or four days in a row. Bessent runs into the White House and basically 90-day pause. And as we've seen, the taco trade has been pretty successful. It's not that the markets are ignoring the tariffs. The markets think, "Yeah, he's not going to... the odds are three out of four we're not going to see big tariffs that cause a recession or really hurt our future prospects."
Adam Gower 42:30 ↗
Barry, yeah, I saw you looking, glancing to one side. How are we doing for time?
Barry Ritholtz 42:34 ↗
I'm fine. I just kind of side-eye Bloomberg on the TV. Oh, look, the NASDAQ's up 28 and the Dow is flat and the S&P is up a quarter percent. You know, old trade habits die hard. I have a perpetual investment horizon, but I can't help but... you know what always cracks me up is a market that gaps open high and then sells off. That's always a pretty substantial warning sign, or the reverse, gaps down and then ends up positive. Those sort of intraday reversals are worth paying attention to. And if we're, you know, we're open a couple hours, the market gapped, sold off a little bit, but still in the green, I just kind of, I can't help but notice that crap.
Adam Gower 43:26 ↗
I just, I wanted to be sure you weren't looking at the, you know, looking...
Barry Ritholtz 43:30 ↗
No, I'm good. You got me for another hour till noon.
Adam Gower 43:33 ↗
All right, let's, we won't go quite that long, but let's chat a little bit more. So again, just getting back to this idea of a rarely stated worst-case scenario in your career being the possibility of a depression, right? Worst-case scenario, right? And reading into what you're saying, does this, based on what you've said, does this require the assumption that there will be, that it won't happen, that there will be no more unforced errors? Do we have to assume that Trump won't make any more unforced errors?
Barry Ritholtz 44:07 ↗
Oh, I'm going to assume, I'm going to assume we're going to just have an endless run of unforced errors. That's just, hey, you don't have to be a student of politics to say that's on brand. Unforced errors is very much on brand. But that said, it's the breadth and depth of the unforced errors and how much they affect the overall economy, the market, etc. The market did the same exact thing this time. It really has a pretty significant impact on the markets, had a significant impact on how far afield this White House has been willing to go. I kind of feel like they've chilled out a little bit, if I can say that, really.
Adam Gower 44:58 ↗
You've been watching the news this weekend about Los Angeles and...
Barry Ritholtz 45:04 ↗
Yeah. Los Angeles, is it? Remind me, what are the LA, the nonsense out there? What's that going to do to corporate profits? Not a lot. Although I will say to you, unless it spreads across the country and becomes... I expect it to spread across the country. But even still, I don't see this as the sort of 150% tariffs that we've been looking at as the March-April scare. That said, there's, it seems to me sort of an asymmetrical risk to take one bullet, put it in a six-shooter, spin the wheel, and put it up against your head with a $28 trillion economy. Yeah, there are legitimate problems. China is a bad actor. They steal intellectual property. It's not a level playing field. There are lots of other things wrong. But this degree of recklessness with a $28 trillion economy that has enjoyed the single greatest economic growth and wealth creation since the end of World War II, like, that just seems ill-advised. Yes, I know that there is wealth inequality and I know that there are other problems in the country and the wealth that's accrued to the top 10%, 1%, 0.01%, 0.001% hasn't trickled down. But even still, the middle class in the United States is far wealthier than 90-plus percent of the countries around the world. So if you want to deal with problems, well, deal with problems as opposed to engaging in behavior that creates risk that instead of making things better, you're going to make them either worse or much worse or, worst-case scenario, much, much worse. Worst economic problem in a century. I still put that at like a 10% chance, a 15% chance. These are made-up spitball numbers. But it's there. I mean, the last time I talked about this wasn't during the pan... Well, I did a piece for Businessweek during the pandemic which said go big. Spend money. We didn't do fiscal stimulus post-financial crisis. Whatever we did was insignificant. Go big. Do infrastructure. Let's pave some roads and rebuild some airports. By the way, if you haven't flown through LaGuardia, $8 billion later, it's the single best airport in the country. That's a result of people saying, "Let's spend some money." That actually predated the pandemic. But the idea that, hey, all these other countries like China have industrial policies. They're all spending a ton of money to build research centers and help their educational system and help their higher ed, their colleges. That's where all our growth has come from. If you look at the most robust, economically productive cities in the country, they all have access to human capital and an excellent higher education college or university nearby. So the sort of things that put that risk at risk. By the way, this is, you know, public policy administration 101. You don't need a PhD to figure this out. Yeah, it's a risk factor. So far, there's been some damage done. I'm hoping that most of it is not permanent, and I'm hoping that either the midterm elections or the presidential elections in 2028 sort of undo the worst instincts of this administration that has caused that you're keeping really talented overseas students out of the US. Let me remind people that half of the C-suite in Silicon Valley, in the unicorns, and in the top companies on NASDAQ were born overseas. Don't we want the best and the brightest from other countries to come here? We've always been a beacon of economic and political freedom. You know, after the January 6th insurrection, I did a post a few months later. What's the rule of law worth to markets? And the bottom line is somewhere between 25 and $50 trillion. Why would anyone put that at risk unless they simply don't understand or they have a different plan?
Adam Gower 49:31 ↗
Right, if there's an entirely different plan, but let's switch to the debt crisis. And I use that...

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APA

Ritholtz, B. (2025, June 23). Barry Ritholtz of Ritholtz Wealth Management on investing in a volatile world [Interview transcript]. GowerCrowd. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3122328/

MLA

Barry Ritholtz. "Barry Ritholtz of Ritholtz Wealth Management on investing in a volatile world." GowerCrowd, 23 Jun. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3122328/.

BibTeX
@misc{ritholtz2025_3122328,
  author       = {Barry Ritholtz},
  title        = {Barry Ritholtz of Ritholtz Wealth Management on investing in a volatile world},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, GowerCrowd. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {jun},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3122328/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}