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Meb Faber is the co-founder and chief investment officer at Cambria Investment Management. Due to industry regulations, he will not discuss any of Cambria's funds on this podcast. All opinions expressed by podcast participants are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Cambria Investment or its affiliates. For more information, visit cambriainvestments.com.
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Welcome back, everybody. It's Friday. We got another awesome show today. Our guest is none other than Barry Ritholtz, chairman, CIO of Ritholtz Wealth Management, manages over five billion for over 3,000 families. He just published a new book called How Not to Invest, which offers a blueprint to help you make better decisions, achieve financial success. Barry, welcome to the show.
Well, thanks, Meb. Thanks for having me. I read an early version of this book, and then I was reading the newest one, the print in bed the other night. My wife's like, 'What are you reading?' And I said, 'Technically, it's supposed to be called Debunking Investment Bull, but this is the alt cover.' And she's like, 'Barry, we met those guys, New York, da da da.' And I was like, 'Yeah, you know, this is a lot of prep because he's written over 40,000 articles.' And she goes, 'Who has that much to say?' And I go, 'You don't know Barry. Barry's got that much to say.' So it's a thousand columns in Bloomberg and the Washington Post and thestreet.com. It's 43,000 blog posts. But you remember back in the days of blogging, it's like just taking a shower, you know? All right, here in my morning links, out they go. It's just part of my daily routine. And once a week, there's like a 500 to a thousand-word thoughtful piece.
It's funny you say that. To me, I see guys like our buddy David, or when you look at like Epsilon Theory, like these are 5,000-word pieces. I don't know who has time for those because I just want to say what I want to say. Hey, have you seen this? Here's what's interesting about it, and get out. The good news is we got enough training material now where we can just do Barry AI 2000 and just queue up what you might say anyway. Horrifying. Anyway, we're going to get into a bunch of stuff today, looking back and reflecting. There's a story you tell in the book about learning Italian. You know that story? You want to relate it because I have somewhere I want to go with it.
Sure, buddy. Just out of nowhere announced, 'I've decided to study Italian.' And I'm like, 'Really? How long is it going to take before you're fluent in Italian?' I asked. He goes, 'Five years.' I said, 'Five years is a long time.' And the response was, 'Five years are going to go by whether I'm studying Italian or not.' And I found that perspective to be both eye-opening and refreshing. And it makes you realize your stock and currency is nothing but time. You're born, you don't know how much time you have, but you know it's finite. What are you going to do with your time? How are you going to spend it? Are you going to use it wisely or not? And where do you go from there? And it was just one of those things that, you know, aha.
It feels like just yesterday you were kind of on the forefront starting the podcast, Barry. It's been like 10 years, July 2014.
Yeah, we're coming up on 11. The funny thing is the podcast follows the blog, which started on Yahoo GeoCities in 1998, and then moved to TypePad in '03, and then WordPress in '08. The podcast started because I was writing for the Washington Post after Bailout Nation, and Bloomberg came knocking and said, 'We'd love to have you write for us.' And I'm like, 'What does it really matter? Bloomberg, Washington Post, the internet, a click is a click.' And the new HQ is amazing, which is now about 10, 15 years old. We have these great studios. 'How do you feel about a television show?' And my immediate answer was hard pass. Financial television, I would come out each night and say, 'Own a broadly diversified portfolio of low-cost indexes, rebalance every few years. See you tomorrow.' So they said, 'What might you want to do in media besides print?' And I said, 'You know, I just had this experience watching a fund manager on TV on a different channel, and they just ask the worst questions: Where's the Dow going to be in a year? What's your favorite stock? When's the Fed going to cut?' And the shelf life of those answers are about two seconds after the guy leaves the building. And so they said, 'What sort of questions would you want to ask?' And I said, 'Who are you? How'd you get that way? What do you attribute to your success? Who are your mentors? What books do you read? What are some of your favorites? What do you know today that would have been useful to know, you know, 25 years ago?' A lot of young students today listen to the podcast, so I always ask, 'What advice would you give to a recent grad that was interested in your field?' And I said, 'Long form.' And they're like, 'What do you mean? Like eight minutes, 10 minutes?' Because TV is like a three-minute hit and you're out. Like, no, like two hours. And when everybody finished laughing at me, they said, 'Tell you what, you get us 32 minutes. That plus traffic, news, sports, weather, commercials is an hour of radio. Everything else we'll put up online. You could do whatever you want with it.' The first year, from prepping it in the end of 2013 and doing some practice sessions early 2014, it took a lot of begging and pleading to get people to come on the show. And I am the first to admit the first year is just, holy, maybe the first 30, 40 episodes totally unlistenable, just horrible. I literally had the head of radio pull me aside one day, Al Mayers, since retired, and said, 'Listen, when you have a guest tell you that he murdered his wife and buried the body in the basement, don't just go on to the next question. Say, how did you get away with it? Why did you kill her? What was the background? Follow up.' It's all caffeine and adrenaline. The list of questions was a crutch, and it turns out that interviewing is a skill, and it's a skill that requires listening. So it took me about a year to figure that out.
Well, I think I was one of those terrible interviews, and I've told you this personally, and I think I've even mentioned it here, but for one time and one time only, I developed an audio tick in on the show, which of course they didn't edit out, and listeners, you can go back and listen to and see what it is. But I listened to it once, and it was the most cringeworthy thing I've ever heard in my life. So thankfully, it was only one and done. Let's talk about the book a little bit, and we'll come full circle to some of the topics on content. In classic Barry style, you come out swinging, you don't pull any punches. Listeners who can see it, I got a lot of dog-eared kind of quotes here, but one, you start talking about the experts, the people, and I actually read this to my wife. I thought this was really funny. We were talking about some of the reviews. The Beatles, oh my God, how amazing is that? But there's one, and it's everyone, it's Boston Globe, New York Times, LA Times, um, New York Herald Tribune, but there's one review that I thought was so funny where the Boston Globe watched him on Ed Sullivan, and they already set records for number of tickets requested, but the review was, 'Don't let the Beatles bother you. If you don't think about them, they will go away. In a few more years, they will probably be bald.' What does that have to do with anything? It's like the funniest. Anyway, so you're talking about experts. Why should we be wary about some of these big names prognosticating and telling you what the future holds?
Well, first, what is an expert is the first question. And by the way, experts have their place, and it's important for certain things to rely on people who know an area really well and have studied and have practiced it. You know, there's a great New Yorker cartoon about a guy standing up in the aisle of a commercial, like a big jet, a 747, 'I'm tired of these pilots telling us what to do. We should fly the plane ourselves. Who's with me?' And it sort of was a pushback to all the anti-experts during the pandemic. But the reality is, it doesn't matter if you're a fund manager or an economist or a market strategist, there are things those folks do really well, and there are things that are problematic, and it's true in every field. And you know, I love the Paul Graham quote, which is, 'Experts have developed their expertise in the way the world used to be,' and this is true for all of us. And then we could get into the details of how cognitively expensive it is constructing a mental model of the world, which you start from childhood, from infancy, and how loath we are to change that expensively built model. But when you take experts, there are things they know, there are things they don't know, and there are things they think they know, but turns out they're wrong. And when you extrapolate these things out into the future, it leads to a lot of errors. That's separate and apart from the underlying modeling issue, which every quant who deals with a model has to confront the question of, hey, does this model assume that the future is going to look like the past? Because I'm building it based on historical data, and what happens if the future is different than the past? Which, as we've seen, has led to so many firms either underperforming or blowing up.
I'm going to read another quote from an extremely famous person. Not going to say his name, but it rhymes with Moschin, but has a massive, massive audience, probably more than almost any influencer in the world. And so when you have this sort of platform, you got to be careful, I think, particularly when you're talking about things like investing, because you have a responsibility not to give really terrible advice. Anyway, here's the quote: 'Right now is a time you might want to take some stocks off the table in the stock market, especially if they're in manufacturing or retail or banking or, God forbid, home building and housing. I would feel bad if I didn't warn you, one of the biggest bubbles in history is blowing up now.' And that was in 2010. So here we are, ten bagger later. Who's the GOAT of like terrible prognostications? It's got to be Kiyosaki at this point.
There's a few people. So the problem that we run into, let's unpack a little bit of that because there's three or four different things that happen. So the first thing that happens anytime you have somebody who's achieved great success in one space, the first challenge you run into is the halo effect. People believe them, hey, this guy is wildly successful in this area, and so we have a tendency, even if it's in a completely unrelated area, like I give the example of Sam Zell, one of the greatest real estate investors of all time, nicknamed the Gravedancer. He would go out and buy property when people were just desperate to unload it, and he has his history of forecasting recessions. Zell was a billionaire. He made his money buying distressed assets on the cheap and holding it for decades at a time. He never made a penny forecasting the recession, but because he's so successful, people had a tendency to believe him. You could sort of see, all right, this guy's a successful real estate investor, he must certainly understand rates, and he probably understands the economy. So you could see why people might buy into that. But when you start to see folks, forget the political folks, we could talk about that later, but when you see folks like Tony Robbins, who is just a legendary personal guru, you know, Awaken the Giant Within has sold tens of millions of copies. I know lots of people who personally have enormously benefited from his advice as to get off your ass and go live your life, and no one's better than him. But why would he tell us in 2010, following a 57% market crash, to sell stocks? So the second thing to unpack is just the recency effect, that how dramatically we're impacted by what just happened. Doesn't matter if it's a data series, a market crash that bottomed the year before, the PTSD from that is still affecting people, they're still feeling it. But the bigger psychological risk in addition to the halo effect is a term called epistemic trespass, where you have people with an expertise in a given space, and I kind of learned this phrase from David Dunning of Dunning-Kruger, whose specialty is metacognition and our ability to evaluate our own skill set. But it turns out that Nathan Ballantyne is a professor, I think in Arizona, and it turns out that lots of experts take their skill, knowledge, expertise in a given area where they've spent decades researching and writing and studying, and they kind of move a few things over. So if you're a personal coach and you move over to market timing, the odds of you succeeding there are really, really slim. But what's so dangerous is that the audience, the halo effect, the audience tends to believe you. And ironically, it wasn't just that Robbins was wrong about the market, the market screamed higher. The three areas that he pointed out each outperformed the broad index by a substantial margin. Like he couldn't have been more wrong if he tried. And what we're actually witnessing is just the collective angst post-crash, post-recession. The typical post-credit crisis recovery usually includes a very weak jobs recovery, no wage gains, negative consumer sentiment, poor spending, and we had for, I don't know, till, you know, the market finally made new highs in 2013, four years after the bottom, broke out from that 13-year range, and the economy started to pick up in '14, '15, '16, but still, that's a long, slow recovery, and it feels terrible. But the market doesn't care what you're feeling. The market is just looking at power, stocks price relative to bonds, and future discounted flows, and the psychology that underlies buyers and sellers. You know, when you end up in March '09 with this massive capitulation, the technicians call it a seller's exhaustion because no one's left to sell. And so that's a really significant issue, which I know people love Tony Robbins. I didn't want to single him out. I have a lot of respect for what he does, as long as it's in his space that he has an expertise. I hate when people say stay in your lane. I'm not saying that. I'm saying his expertise, there's none better than him in his area, but market timing turns out not to be that area.
Yeah, and then look, I mean, to be fair, and I agree with you 100%, people love him. God bless you if you're one of those people. But I feel like if you start to write books about money and investing and you start to make recommendations, you open yourself up to criticism. And so some of his advice ended up being later when he was working with Ray Dalio, like great advice, you buy this diversified portfolio. He called it the All Seasons, which is a riff on All Weather. But then he went and launched like a high-fee individual account, and this is 10 years ago. We used to say, we say it on Twitter, and we actually, I did it back and forth with him. I was like, dude, just launch an ETF. This is so much easier. And here we are full circle because Bridgewater is launching the All Weather ETF. We'll see when it comes out and what the price is, but interesting nonetheless. But there's this seduction that everyone is looking for the guru, right? Everyone is looking for someone that can just divine the future, be right, and it's just never-ending. Like, why is everyone always consistently kind of fall for this, Barry? You guys got thousands of clients, you've spoken to a zillion people and investors over the years, how hard it is to break that temptation?
Well, you know, you're up against evolutionary history, and you're up against our wetware, and people want certainty, and they want self-confidence, and they want leadership. And we've seen a number of studies come out of academia. One in particular was looked at the people who got one big outlier call right, could be a stock, could be the market, could be the economy. And it turns out that when that happens, A, they tend to make more outlier calls, B, they tend to be much more wrong than the average forecaster, who, by the way, is terribly wrong also, but they're even worse. And most pernicious, the investing public tends to really believe them. And there are examples in the book. I mean, there's none better than Michael Burry in terms of how he navigated not just the financial crisis, and he appears in The Big Short, but over the next decade, he turned the hundred million dollars he made into a billion dollars. I mean, he is an amazing investor and an amazing trader, and yet the whole period over that decade, he was regularly forecasting an imminent crash, although Burry just occasionally tweets it out. The guy who you mentioned, Kiyosaki, who wrote the best-selling investment book of all time, did you know that Rich Dad Poor Dad sold something like 32 million copies? It's an insane, insane number. Morgan Housel's Psychology of Money is the best-selling finance book of the last decade. He sold 7 million copies. And so someone on Twitter started tracking him, called him Rich Dad Poor Reader because he just started forecasting recessions and crashes. And the golden age of finance Twitter was when people would come out of the woodwork and say, hey, here's all of Rich Dad Poor Dad's market tweets over the past 10 years, and holy, this guy has been wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong. My favorite was, I want to say it was 2018, sell U.S. real estate. You don't want to hold homes in the United States. I don't think there was a better time to buy U.S. real estate than either '09 or 2018. Everything has since doubled and tripled since then. And again, it comes back to the halo effect and epistemic trespass and just people like pounding the table on something. And the takeaway is, what are these guys selling? Well, some are selling books, and some are selling courses, and some are selling other things. What they are not is a fiduciary who is concerned about your comfortable retirement. And you just have to remember that. I remember when I was a young trader, and this is the '90s, I would listen in on quarterly calls, and back before Reg FD and before there was certain rules that you couldn't do this, I would hear from CEOs on quarterly calls, and I was an idiot. I believed everything I heard, and eventually you kind of start to recognize, oh, I can't believe anything these guys are saying. Not that assume what they're saying is if they say up, I say down, but it's that they're all selling a product, be it their company stock or whatever, their services or whatever fees they're looking for, and just recognize you are not getting objective and certainly not advice that's in your best interest. You just have to put it into a little context.
Well, it's funny, you know, and one of the reasons I'm a quant is every stock pitch sounds good to me. I used to go to the old Ira Sohn or the value investing clubs, the Barron roundtables, and each one I'm like, that sounds great. Some zero, I'm like, that sounds great, that sounds great. The shorts, same thing. And then you just realize that no one can prognosticate the future. But going back to like '08, '09, and many of the young'uns, you didn't go through this, but this was like a pretty traumatic event. And then talking about Burry, Paulson would be another good example who did amazing, but then continually for the next decades, like maybe not trying to fight the last battle, but trying to find that magic again on that one big trade, and then kind of really struggling. And it wasn't even his trade, it was Pell's trade, who left like a 90% plus year one year, a 40% the next year, the third year was like single digits, and he was like, I'm out. And then Paulson, I don't know if he's still running this fund, but for a long, long, long, long time, his big trade was gold, and I don't know if he shut that fund down or not, but here we are, gold of 3,000, so it may be finally playing out.
Anyway, I think he's at a family office, and the gold trade, one point in time, that fund was up to about 40 billion, and the market took off in the 2010s, and gold did nothing for five years, and I think that fund just slowly bled out assets, and then it got converted, I believe it was converted into a family office, so I don't know if he has outside money anymore.
Here's like a super heartbreaking study, and we'll put the link in the show notes, listeners, but it says a very interesting study examined what happened when freaked out investors panic sold. It was based on financial activity of over 600,000 anonymous accounts corresponding to over about 300,000 households from one of the largest brokerage firms in the U.S. Investors who are male, who are above the age of 45, or married, or have more dependents, or self-identified as having excellent investment experience or knowledge tend to freak out with greater frequency. But that buries the lead. The more important issue, those investors who panic dumped their equity portfolios, the most important takeaway was 31% of the investors who panic sell never return. And that gives me chills. Like, that's the saddest thing. And I imagine you had this conversation in 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, where a client comes in, they're still shell-shocked, and they're like, I sold in '09, I never got back in. And it's the hardest thing to read because that could be a life-changing amount of money for an individual. So not only are you missing the recovery, you're missing one of the greatest decades in market history.
And I think I get specific in the book. So at Ritholtz Wealth Management, we don't run money market timing, but the firm I was at during the financial crisis was all institutional. I had a couple of pretty good calls in '02 and '03, and I had a couple of good sector calls, and I was kind of encouraged to engage in some of the behaviors that I tell you not to do in the book. And so we moved to 100% cash in '08, and by dumb luck, and I'm the first to admit this was dumb luck, the day before the bottom, I go on Yahoo Finance with Henry Blodget and say, cover your shorts and you can buy them here. And like six hours later, the market's up some ungodly amount. And we're getting emails in 2011, 2012, 2013, hey, I followed you out of the market in '08, but when you flipped bullish in March '09, I thought you were crazy, and I've been frozen. What do I do? And so Nick Maggiulli did this study that says when you're sitting on a lump of cash, are you better off dollar-cost averaging in or lump-sum investing it? And the answer is 66% of the time, which is meaning the market goes up two out of three time periods, whatever time period you're using, you're better off lump-summing it. But people were so traumatized, and not only did they feel dumb for selling at the lows or not getting back in anywhere near the lows, and then missing the recovery, that the fear is as soon as I put money back into the market, the market's going to humiliate me again. And so the way to work around that is, hey, let's just take this lump sum and break it into 12 pieces, and we'll get you back in. And if the market starts to sell off, well, great, we have more money to put to work as it gets cheaper. And if the market keeps going higher, well, great, you can pyramid the way up. Neither of which is the right way to think about this from a mathematical perspective, but it's the only way to get past the trauma and the psychological damage and get them back on track.
So, hey, better to have missed '09 to '13 or '14 than miss '09 to '19 or '29, because that 31% number, it's 15 years later, and these poor sons of... hey, finally, my Schwab money market is at four and a half percent. Woohoo! That's like what's really going on, and it's really damaging to a 401... hopefully it's not 401ks, but a portfolio, it's going to leave a mark. There's a lot of guardrails around this, and you talk about this in the book. You talk about a lot of things not to do, and then in the kind of end of the book, you're like, here's how to go about it. And there's some very obvious ones: have a financial advisor, that's one. Have a fiduciary financial advisor, not a used car salesman who's dumping insurance and shitty product on you, right? But the temptation and the amount of times I've experienced this in my career, and not just with individuals, listeners, like this is pros too, who they only want to think in binary terms, and it's not just about one asset class, what's the stock market doing, but about funds. And so like, you know, obviously we're a fund manager, and the amount of times I talk with people that have the keys to billions and billions of dollars where they're talking about one of our funds, you know, should we buy it, should we sell it, how do we get in, should we time it, you know, this week, should we wait till next quarter, I'm going to wait for it to dip, I'm going to wait for it to pull back, I'm going to wait for it to go up, all these mental accounting things. And we often say exactly what you said. We say, look, the correct answer, if you're going to play blackjack, or statistically speaking, the correct answer, you know, invest now, but totally fine if you think about dollar-cost averaging in or not. There's people, they're sweating so much about, should I sell this stock, should I sell this fund, and I'm always just like, look, if you're sweating, just sell half, sell a third, sell a quarter, you know, whatever it may be. Or they're like, should I buy this one or that one? They just buy both, and people hate, hate that advice.
There is not an advisor, an individual out there that has almost ever taken this advice because it's so unsatisfying. It's like going to watch Yankees-Mets and cheering for, I hope they both do well, because they want to look back and going back to the Tony Robbins comment, and I can't remember who said this, but they said there's nothing more that people like, you go to dinner, you have a cocktail this weekend, your friends or family Thanksgiving table, than being right. The only thing they like more than being right is saying, I told you so, which is being right squared. I told you to buy Bitcoin next year, it went up, I told you so, you should have done it. That's like being right times two. And the same thing with these investments, like the least satisfying answer is often the best.
So there's so much stuff in that to talk about.
So first, I say the only thing worse than being wrong is being right, because when you have clients and they don't listen to you, you can't say, putz, I told you to get rid of that. You just absolutely can't. But in the book, I tell a story of a buddy from law school and the regret minimization framework. So he was working, my buddy Jeff was working for, we both a few years out of law school, hated the practice of law and went to different areas. He went into technology and content management systems and leaves, I don't know if you know, Brill's Content, Connect is sort of the legal version of Bloomberg. It's Bloomberg for attorneys and not nearly as lucrative. He leaves there to join a startup, and I'm not exaggerating, he starts on a Monday, fully vested, Friday they get bought by Yahoo. And like that stroke of luck, and this is '96, if you remember the '90s, it was just insane money, just everything went up and up and up. He relocates to Palo Alto, and three years later his stock vests, and like a chunk of money, I think it was the first 25 or 30% of his stock vested, and then let's say the remaining 70% vested at like 2% a month or 3% a month, something like that for the next three years. So 30% back when people are going to be shocked when Yahoo was $200, $250, $300, and that's before the reverse split, it was just a life-changing amount of money. And they had a couple of professional advisors from major Wall Street firms, and the California dudes, the advice didn't sit well. It just felt too slick to East Coast. So we had a conversation, and I just said, well, stop thinking like this, like you're a fund manager or a family office, and let's put our regret minimization hat on for a second. And I don't care about the middle of the bell curve, let's look at the tails, right? Let's look at the end. So either the stock goes up 10x from here, or the stock drops 90%. That's effectively the same thing from where we are today. If you sell and it goes up 10x, how do you feel? He's like, I still got another 70, 75%. I don't care. I rang the bell, I paid a bunch of bills, I'm great. All right, what happens if you don't sell and it drops 90%? He's like, that would be terrible. I would have left an ungodly amount of money on the table. And keep in mind, when you're selling 30% of $75 million worth of stock, you pay off your mortgage, you buy the ski house, you put money away for your kids' college, for their kids' college, your retirement, like you're funded for a generation or two, like 20, 30, $40 million in the 1990s, it's real money. So when you framework it that way, when you say, let's look at the best and worst case scenarios, how do you feel if this happens? And the caveat is the odds are that neither of these extremes are likely to happen. You're somewhere in the middle, but the same rules apply. If you sell it and you're only selling 30% or 25% of your total holdings and it keeps going up, it doesn't matter. You want to live now, enjoy now, and just get rid of that stress. Hey, how nice is it to know your kids' colleges are paid for, your house is paid for, your retirement is paid for, everything from there is gravy. And what actually happened was the left tail dropped 90%. Thank goodness he rang the bell. And I've heard stories from him about people that were sitting on 10x the share count of him and they didn't sell a share. It's the story in Enron of the Enron board member who rode their shares down $2 billion. It's amazing.
And there's endless amounts of those stories. You know, the late Charlie Munger, when they talk about what caused people to lose all their money or blow up, and he's like, liquor, ladies, and leverage, right? Like leverage, concentration, and I kind of put them together. There's so many examples, but it's funny because you know so many people, you learn as you get the scars. I used to say on Twitter, particularly in 2021, everyone loves to brag on Twitter, and the internet in general has kind of been the great revealer where you see kind of people disclose not just their intentions but kind of who they are, and so much of the grandstanding of investors. But I often say it's like if I could pick one trait, if I was going to give a money manager, an advisor money, it's like humility. It's like, hey, like you've been through this, you're okay being wrong, you know, you're going to have mistakes.
That was one of the biggest and most surprising insights that kind of found its way throughout the book, which was recognizing how little we actually know about today. Like today, forget that we don't know anything about next year. You know, I use the examples in the book, nobody in their January 2020 forecast for the year had global pandemic shutting the economy. Nobody had in January 2022, Russia invades Ukraine, and by the way, stocks and bonds both down double digits for the first time since 1981. The October 7th attack and the Israeli-Gaza war, that was in nobody's forecast. And so when we look at the history of how people think about the future, it demands humility. The problem in finance is that when you're coming up as a youth, when you're young and inexperienced, there's very much a fake it till you make it sort of philosophy. I mean, we've all done that. I'm kind of fascinated by the concept of time as a human construct, and it's led me to a lifelong fascination with interesting and unusual watches. But one of the watches I always hated in the '90s was the Rolex Submariner because every jackass stockbroker who was faking it till he made it was wearing that watch, which back then was about two grand as a flex. I worked with a lot of these guys, and they were super slick salesmen, but zero humility. And ultimately, you come to recognize the more you acknowledge how little you actually know, and I'm not going back to Aristotle, the only thing I know is that I know nothing, but recognizing what do you know, what don't you know, what do you think you know that...
you're probably wrong about and wholly unaware of, and you begin to realize, oh, here's the problem. And this comes back to Dunning-Kruger: is our ability to manage our skill set itself a discrete skill that is separate from the underlying skill? So why do newbie investors get into so much trouble? This is more than just mere overconfidence. This is, oh, I'm pretty good at this, and I think, ah, those guys, they don't know what the hell they're doing. I'll show them what's up, and that always ends spectacularly.
Let's dig into a couple more topics while we're bouncing around the book and ideas. Thinking about risk, there was a couple good quotes. One was from Elroy Dimson, author of arguably my favorite investing book, Triumph of the Optimists. And usually by the time this comes out, the annual Global Investment Returns Yearbook should be out, listeners, so we'll put a link in the show notes. There's like 10 years of it; they're free online, always a must-read. Anyway, he says, risk means more things can happen than will happen. And there's a nice follow-up from Mauboussin where he says, you know, risk occurs when we don't know what is going to happen next, but we do know what the distribution looks like. And uncertainty, on the other hand, occurs when we have no idea what's going to happen next and we don't know what the probability distribution looks like. And in thinking about the future, it's almost like a calming effect to say, you know what, I don't know what the future is going to bring, I'm okay being wrong. But I think it's hard for a lot of people to accept that mindset. Do you think, in a way, the ability to say I don't know requires a little bit of self-confidence in your intellect and your investment thinking and the theories and philosophies that guide your hand?