Barry, before we get into how not to invest, a nod to your other book, Bailout Nation, where you argue that markets gradually became conditioned to expect government and central bank intervention during crisis, do you think that expectation fundamentally changed investor behavior?
For sure. It certainly changed behaviors of traders and others. Arguably, if you're an investor — and by investor I mean a 10-plus-year time horizon — bailouts aren't really at the top of your list. But if we just look at the history of every time a company got into trouble and had a friend in the administration, somehow it always became systemically important. The Lockheed bailout in '73, in the midst of the Vietnam War, is an obvious example. And then we go through Chrysler in 1980 in a presidential election. And each time, you know, the expression, the camel's nose in the tent — why don't you let a little bit of the camel in? Pretty soon the whole camel comes in.
And one of the fascinating data points I discovered while writing and researching this book, which by the way was mostly written in real time on the blog, The Big Picture, as things were happening, was if the Treasury Secretary was an industrialist, which very often they were, especially in the early parts of the 20th century, well, banks would be shown the door — the bankruptcy court. When they ran into trouble, they weren't bailed out. Hey, that's what those nice buildings with the columns downtown are for. Go there. And conversely, when the Treasury Secretary came from finance, came from banking or Wall Street, well then the industrial side would be shown the bankruptcy court.
So, just think about: wait, you're going to send Chrysler and GM to bankruptcy, but you're going to bail out Citigroup for the what, the fourth time? You're going to bail out all these big banks like AIG and Bear Stearns and go down the list. Lehman wasn't bailed out because not only had they been engaging in fraud, but they were legitimately insolvent. It wasn't just a liquidity issue. They were worth much less than their liabilities, and hence that's what the bankruptcy court is for. So we got one of the many bailouts right, but other than Lehman, everything else was a mistake.
And to give the current president a little credit, what he did with Intel, what he's done with some of the quantum computing in exchange for bailouts or funding, taking a big piece — we should have done that with every bank. Anybody that received federal taxpayer money as part of their bailout, the government should have said, 'We're going to take 40%. The alternative is you go bankrupt, and over the next decade we will spin it back out to the public.' But it should have been a zero-cost situation. Just tear the band-aid off and be done with it. Just holding on to these companies and keeping them alive through the grace of the government, hanging on by their fingernails — never a great strategy.