All right, welcome everyone. We're delighted to have Senator Gramm and Don Boudreaux talk about their new book. So let me begin by introducing the panelists, the two authors as well as the moderator John Cochrane, and then they'll be talking about The Triumph of Economic Freedom, debunking the seven great myths of American capitalism.
So, Don Boudreaux is a professor of economics at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at George Mason's Mercatus Center. He blogs daily at Cafe Hayek, cafehayek.com.
Senator Gramm served six years in the US House and 18 years in the US Senate. His legislative record includes landmark bills such as the 1981 Reagan budget, the Gramm-Lautman budget, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. He has been vice chair of Lonestar Funds since 2012. He served as vice chairman of UBS Investment Bank from December 2002 to December 2011. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a PhD from the University of Georgia in economics, the subject he taught at Texas A&M University for 12 years.
Our moderator will be our own John Cochrane, who is the Rosemary and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Previously, he was professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He has published many, many academic articles and books. He currently writes the Grumpy Economist Substack at grumpyeconomist.com. John earned a bachelor's degree in physics at MIT and a PhD in economics at the University of California, Berkeley.
So, we're delighted to have Don and Senator Gramm talk about The Triumph of Economic Freedom, debunking the seven great myths of American capitalism. So, I'll let John take it over.
Fantastic. Thank you both for coming. Thank all of you for coming, and our many people on Zoom who are watching, I hope. This is a great book. We just applaud.
Yeah, from two of my favorite writers. So I must call out, you got to watch Phil, especially his op-eds at the Wall Street Journal. I always admire not just the substance but the writing, which I know how hard it is. And Don is also a fantastic writer, but I'll point out most people don't notice, but anytime somebody says something stupid in the Wall Street Journal, there will be a letter from Don Boudreaux that comes in the next day saying, 'Hey, that was dumb.' And I applaud both your energy for doing that and for keeping the libertarian mantle going.
Why do I love this book so much? In part from my own ruminations, there's a book that comes out about once a month that says free markets are wonderful, and they're usually beautifully written, and I go 'hurrah, hurrah,' and it comes out and nobody pays any attention whatsoever. How do we break through and do something better? I think this book has a chance because every good piece of writing has a concept, and you don't just vomit out everything you know on a topic. You have a defined concept, and this one has a brilliant defined concept: the founding myths.
There are these myths that we're all taught at school, which we're going to get into, and some of them I have to admit I have heard even repeated inside the hallowed walls of the Hoover Institution on things like inequality and China and so forth, and these myths are false. It is true that each ideology has a set of founding myths, often which are quite false, and develops them.
There's an old saying that says you're entitled to your own opinions, you're not entitled to your own facts. Turns out that saying is utterly false as well. Everybody seems to be entitled to their own facts. And this set of myths really supports opinions. But what I love especially about Phil's career, we can make progress together, we can come to some agreement, and perhaps if we can say, 'Hey, what really are the facts,' then we can learn to come to more agreement on opinions. So with that preface and agitation, let's move right on to some myths.
The Industrial Revolution: dark satanic mills, exploited workers left behind the charming bucolic life of the countryside that for some reason they don't return to, suffering horribly, exploited by capitalists until labor unions and progressive politicians came and saved the workers by re-slicing the pie. What's wrong with that?
Well, everything. Well, first of all, the Industrial Revolution, like all dramatic changes, was a wave of creative destruction. And the creative part shows up in British statistics and American statistics.
And the creative part is from 1830 to 1900 in Britain, in a world where for a thousand years there had been virtually no economic growth, and since the 1300s we had good economic data on wages, and wages had not grown except during the Black Death since 1300.
Suddenly, about 1830, the per capita income of Britain started to rise and took the income of the world with it, and it's never stopped rising. So no people who ever breathed the breath of life on this planet saw their well-being grow faster than in Britain from 1830 until in America from 1865 to 1900.
The problem, as Marx noted, capitalism created more productive forces than all previous generations combined in a hundred years. But it tore asunder, as he said, the medieval feudal system which had bound man to his superiors and left the relationship between man and man based on naked self-interest and cash payments. Now we call that economic freedom, but he saw it as a fruitful area for exploitation.
And from that, all the British literature is about how terrible the Industrial Revolution was and how harmful it was. And if you pick up any American high school or college textbook, the history that is contained is from the British literature and American literature, not from the statistical agencies.
So, but the mills were pretty dark and satanic.
Compared to today, they were. Yes.
But this vision of the bucolic rural life that had been left behind, was that in fact something reasonable, or was that a similar fable?
Life expectancy at birth was low. It started to rise in the early 19th century. This is a standard story, John. The mills are visible, and there had been nothing like those before. What was invisible to the people who were looking at the mills were the subsistence farms in which people were often injured and disease was rampant. The people lived in huts with thatched roofs in these bucolic areas, and that had been the way of humanity for generations, and people took that for granted.
But now they see these new mills, which do look different. Again, by our standards today, they're pretty hard. But people were voluntarily leaving the countryside in order to work in these mills, and the wages in those mills were higher, and living standards started to rise.
Yeah. Just two additions to that. One, the average lifespan grew by 22% in 70 years. And also, the big complaint of the era was that unless you gave your house servants in London at least every other Sunday afternoon off, they would all quit and go work in the textile mills.
Yes. It provided competition against servitude. We need to remember that. And yes, from modern standards it seems horrible, but just look at especially a landless laborer. You know, there were wealthy farmers, but if you were a laborer on farms, it was just a dreadful life. And we forget that choices occur between alternatives, and the alternative was awful.
Let me ask you. I think the two great unanswered questions of economics are, of course, why did the Roman Empire fall, but why did the Industrial Revolution start? And I picked up some things from your book. Now we have lots of ideas; the problem is we have too many causes. Science came, the Enlightenment came, and so forth. But you mentioned the freeing up of the economy, that you could now incorporate versus demand a royal charter, that you have legal freedoms, the legal freedom to leave the land if you want to. Socially, the regard for merchants and businessmen rose. That seemed to be a new angle, or maybe just an angle that I'm learning more. What insight did you get on important causes of this Industrial Revolution?
The most important thing that has ever happened to humanity, at least outside of religious events.
Right. So that last idea about giving ordinary mercantile activities, ordinary business activities, and by implication then the creative destruction that they bring.
I get that idea from Deirdre McCloskey, and I think Deirdre is correct. I think she's made a pretty strong case that it wasn't really until the 18th century in northwestern Europe, Holland, and then Britain, when people began to look on mercantile activities as something honorable, and when something becomes honorable, more people are willing to engage in it. I think you need other things. I think Deirdre maybe doesn't give the institutions the importance they deserve. You had to have the right institutions in place, a non-predatory state, for example. But I do believe that this change in ideas played an important role in sparking the Industrial Revolution.
One other thing, let me add just one thing to that. In the Middle Ages, the worker owed fealty to the king, to the guild, to the church, to the village, and they all became predators on the worker's earnings. So that by the time the worker got the residual, the incentives to really work were gone.
And the Enlightenment, as Adam Smith has on his grave, the Enlightenment changed the nature of the relationship of people so that people own their own labor. It was the fundamental part of property rights: your property and your own labor. And this was a revolutionary idea. And I think it proves that ideas are very powerful things. And when people own the fruits of their own labor, it unleashed an energy the world had never known, and it changed everything.
And I think you're right to point out we take that so for granted.
This was a revolutionary idea. For about 10,000 years since we stopped being hunter-gatherers, your labor belonged to somebody else, not just a slave, but a peasant, a serf, a villein, or whatever.
Another thing I love about your book and your attitude is you try to understand how it is that people believe what they believe. It's part of why you're going after these founding myths. And I loved your analysis of the UK in the 19th century. Two things struck me. One is that if you live in the city, the poverty of rural workers is just not visible to you. When they're in the factory, you go, 'Oh my god, that factory looks dirty and awful. How terrible.' And also, if you're a landlord, an aristocrat, all of a sudden all your farmers are leaving and you have to pay higher wages. These factories must be terrible, mustn't they? You can tell what people believe by which side their bread is buttered on. Both of those, and you describe the development of the cultural view that this factory and industrialization was terrible, and those two ingredients of where it came from. I thought that was very enlightening.
One of the interesting things that I found in researching the book, and Phil really liked this, we found that book by Emma Griffin. Emma Griffin's a historian in Britain, and she found these diaries that were written by ordinary workers in Britain in the early and mid 19th century. And all these diaries show that these workers, they understood that their lives were not easy. They also understood their lives were better than they had been a generation earlier.
Yeah. And I think a lot of people reading the textbooks today, the idea that the average person worked 10 to 12 hours a day, six and a half days a week, and that was their lot in life, no matter where they worked, is just so unbelievable. If they don't take the lesson, how wonderful a world we live in, that we don't have to live that way and have our children die.
Looking back, things look so terrible in an Industrial Revolution. And if you've ever seen poverty as an aristocrat, it was from the veranda of the manor house across the creek, and that hut with a big manure pile in front of it looked romantic. But when all those people came to the city, one, they took away vast amounts of your wealth by being gone and not being in servitude to you. Cash wages came with the Industrial Revolution.
But secondly, you saw them. They were on the streets. They were visible. And so it was a mixture of self-interest from the landed gentry that controlled the parliament and that either wrote the history and the literature or funded the people who did.
And even their... let me just give you one example. Charles Dickens, when he wrote in Christmas Carol about the poverty and want and how they were going to destroy the world, the only world he knew was looking backwards. And to him, the only way that those problems could ever be solved was through charity. And Ebenezer Scrooge was non-charitable. He couldn't conceive at that very moment in 1843, in December when he published the book, that the growth of income in Britain had already turned up and the solution was being built through economic growth. It was something he couldn't see.
And we, looking back, the poverty looks so oppressive that we revolt against it. But to the people who were living it, they were living in a golden age. And the people who left the country and went to the factory, as Don was pointing out, Emma Griffin, the historian who did this, became the first, I guess, the first woman ever to be president of the Royal Economic Society.
She blew away the historical society. Yeah. She blew away the notion that life was better in the rural area by simply looking at what newly literate people were telling their grandchildren through written documents about how they were happier than they'd ever been in their lives. They were free.
Well, let's move on to the Gilded Age, when, of course, as we all know, the rich grew richer, the poor grew poorer. Inequality skyrocketed. Evil robber barons like our own Leland Stanford, John D. Rockefeller formed monopolies and trusts, raised prices, screwed the little guy. The meat packers foisted rotten sausages on us until Upton Sinclair and Teddy Roosevelt came along. Antitrust, the FDA, Wilson, the regulatory state came and made everything right again. What is something wrong with that?
Again, pretty much everything. First of all, you know, John D. Rockefeller, he was the richest person in the world a hundred years ago. He was born in a hardscrabble farm in upstate New York. He was very poor, who got very rich. You did, of course, have lots of fortunes made back then, but all these so-called monopolies, Standard Oil, the Chicago meat packers, they were taking advantage of economies of scale made possible by the railroads, by the telephone and telegraph technologies that weren't available before. Real wages are rising in the US.
The things that were called the practices or the industrial organizations that were called monopolistic, they weren't at all, if by monopolistic you mean they're cutting output and raising prices. So if you look at the actual data of these so-called monopolists, they were raising outputs faster than the output rose generally in the US economy. They were cutting, not inflation-adjusted, deflation-adjusted prices faster than the price decline in the price level throughout the economy. That's not what monopolists do. They were highly competitive.
What was going on is these new forms of businesses and these new entrepreneurs, it's creative destruction. They're putting out of business older forms of enterprise. And it's these older forms of enterprise that got hold of some political power and agitated in favor, especially in favor of antitrust.
Let me add two things. The 20 years before the Sherman Act, production grew faster in the so-called trusts and prices fell further than the 20 years after the Sherman Act. And Upton Sinclair, in his Jungle book, gave rise very quickly to federal intervention in the food production industry. And the very agencies that it created, in their first investigation, investigated the Chicago meat packers.
And their first report from an agency that his book created concluded that the book was a fraud and that there was no evidence found in analyzing the products of the meat packers to substantiate any claim he made. And that in fact the company had hundreds of thousands of visitors come through the meat packer every year. And so the idea that they had rats running around and rat waste falling into the food and workers falling into the meat grinder was just wonderful literature, beautifully written book, but no foundation in fact whatsoever.
In fact, the bad meat packing was in the small meat packers and in the back room of the shop where really the danger existed, which the Chicago meat packers eliminated.
Yeah, it was a work of fiction.
That's right. Totally.
Can I real quickly? I was astonished. In doing the research for this, I buried myself in the George Mason library and I dug out every high school textbook, history textbook, college history textbook. An astonishing number of them would quote Upton Sinclair as factual evidence of the conditions in the Chicago meat packing plants. They thought it was evidence. It's just they knew it was a work of fiction, but they chose to treat it as a work of nonfiction.
Book for you guys to write at some point of how stories get passed along even among supposedly reputable historians. If you track down their citations, often they're just citing each other and nobody goes and checks.
Well, cites the literature of the Industrial Revolution as evidence on the argument that their descriptions are so vivid that they had to have seen it. It couldn't be fiction.
I'll here point out there's a great another book, maybe we'll have this as a future book talk, by Vincent Geloso, just came out on inequality during the Gilded Age that turns out to be another story that gets passed around and is completely false. The poor were actually doing much better as well because, of course, these are productive industries that hire people and need them.
And Rockefeller, I think, is a wonderful example. We tell the story of the evil monopolist. But Rockefeller, not just economies of scale, technical innovation was driving prices down. And the complaint about him is that he was bankrupting smaller competitors who are less efficient. The smaller competitors go to Washington and say, 'Stop him from pushing us out of business and lowering prices too much for the benefit of consumers.' Economists come in and invent a theory of monopoly to justify antitrust, which is the theory of natural monopoly, declining costs, and then the monopolist raises prices and screws consumers, and somehow this theory justifies the whole regulation.
I think the contemporary scholarship on antitrust has actually... nobody pays attention, the fable once made is there forever, but it is no longer, I think, regarded as true that Rockefeller was at all a monopolist and that there was any consumer damage due to Standard Oil. In fact, this may have been all a big mistake.
That's absolutely true. The data are overwhelming. Standard Oil is highly competitive. It acted like a highly competitive firm, it was innovative, it cut prices and was losing market share when it was broken up.
Yeah. But fun fact, Ida Tarbell, the great muckraking journalist, who wrote the book in 1904, I think, against Rockefeller, accusing him of being... that's where the predatory pricing myth began. Her father was an oil refiner who was put out of business by Standard Oil and didn't like John D. Rockefeller because of that.
Well, and that gave rise to the regulations that were repealed by Jimmy Carter and Ted Kennedy because they were crippling the... You got to remember, in 1975, the post-war period was over. The first Toyota Corolla had rolled off the ship in Los Angeles, California. And suddenly we were in competition.
And the Carter administration, much to its credit, moved against these Progressive Era regulations that crippled transportation and communication. And when you look back, John, the deregulation of the Carter era set the foundation for the modern era. It's hard to conceive that what is happening in the communications era today could not have occurred without the Carter deregulation. And then Reagan built on that deregulation.
Now there's a lesson here. So for a hundred years now, for 120 years, every economics textbook starts with maybe one week of, oh yeah, the hypothetical free market. And then we start in on a list of things. And the first one we start in on, monopoly must be stopped and we need an FTC. Even though historically I don't think there's ever been a durable monopoly other than the ones granted by the government. We tell the story of evil John Rockefeller, except where's the consumer damage? And now we have an antitrust system and an FTC that seem to have brought them back a little bit. But now the idea of consumer welfare as the standard seems to have been forgotten. It's just sort of political blessing on anything you want to do under this guise. And we're still teaching the same story of the benevolent regulator in economics classes. How do we escape, guys?
Well, if you don't follow the consumer welfare standard, the antitrust laws are a license to do whatever the hell you want to do. They're very, very dangerous. You take away the... you've got to prove that the consumer would be benefited by the regulation and is being harmed by the system, and then they can do anything. And that's what the current administration has let the regulators do.
Blessing mergers seems to be, you've got to vote for me, say good things about me, and buy about a couple billion dollars of crypto, and then you get your merger approved.
And it says to TV networks, we can either do this the easy way or the hard way.
The language of the mafia.
Well, let's move on to the big one, the Great Depression. Now, of course, as you all know, untrammeled capitalism under Coolidge led to excesses and overproduction. The stock market crashed. Hoover sat around helplessly, as the story goes, until finally Roosevelt came in and the New Deal and all his interventions and fiscal stimulus saved us. Right.
No. No. Well, my mother went to the grave believing that.
But the Federal Reserve Bank, which had been established to provide liquidity after the panic of 1907, sat by and failed to inject liquidity when one-third of the banks in the country went out of business. The money supply fell faster than prices.
I'm not going to say anything negative about Hoover of all places on earth here, but the idea that Hoover was a non-interventionist is a fiction.
Roosevelt came in and scared investors out of investing in America. And then with a series of mistakes, we really didn't recover from the depression until Eisenhower was president. In fact, the stock market didn't reach its '29 level until 1952, I think it was.
Yeah. We rely in the book on some of the research of Bob Higgs, who has a term, regime uncertainty, and he argues that the uncertainty created by these new interventionist policies combined with the growing hostility of Roosevelt toward private markets and toward investors just kept investors on the sideline. Throughout the entire 1930s, net investment was below zero, and an economy cannot recover when...
Although it was interestingly, it was a very innovative age at least in theory, but it didn't get to practice. I'm also... so Roosevelt did one good thing, I think, which was getting off the gold standard, which I think solved some of the monetary problems. But here I'll also point to Amity Shlaes's wonderful biography as well as some work by Lee Ohanian, who's here at Hoover.
All the, let's call them, microeconomic interventions. The idea that we have deflation, so the way we solve it is we monopolize every industry so they can each raise relative prices. That one just mucked the industry up. Raising tax rates, marginal tax rate, which Calvin Coolidge had gotten down from 70 down to 20%, back up to 70%. The war on capital, which only ended when he realized he kind of needed the capitalist to fight World War II. The microeconomic damage of the New Deal, I think, is something that I know is in historical scholarship, but is not anywhere in the patriotic myth.
Didn't finally World War II fiscal spending, didn't that prove that stimulus was always...
What's interesting, and I give Don full credit for this, is that it's so tempting to say with the depression, that following the depression, the war ended the depression. And certainly when you draft 14 million people into the military, you have a big impact on employment. But the reality is that it didn't end the recession if you define it as the production of civilian goods and services.
And in fact, there was a huge debate as we sort of reached the point at which it was clear we're going to win the war. You had this massive debate that unless the government started New Deal spending again, that we were going to go right back into the depression when the war was over. Truman didn't buy it, and we didn't do the spending, and of course, the economy took off.
Yeah, that is, you know, Keynesians keep saying, oh, it was the stimulus of the war that ended the depression. They were loudly saying, when that stimulus ends, we will go right back to the Great Depression. And somehow that prediction, which of course we boom, it's inflation and a boom, that one gets forgotten, whereas the coincidence of the spending and the recovery does not.
Well, in our book we remind people that Paul Samuelson made that prediction.
Thank you. A number of predictions that went wrong there. But Roosevelt won the rhetorical war. So you are men of words as well as men of wisdom and economics. It is amazing what a good job he did. And I notice our current economic rhetoric is stuck in 1933.
Politicians say we need to have jobs. Excuse me, we have a 4% unemployment rate. Anybody in the US who wants a job has one. If you create a thousand jobs here, you must destroy a thousand jobs there. What are you talking about? We need jobs. We need people can't put food on the table in these hard economic times. What are you talking about? This is the highest income per capita ever recorded in all human history. The problem in America is obesity, not starvation. But somehow that economic rhetoric has stuck with us forever along with the fable of what happened.
Well, the fables are so emotionally appealing that people forget that the Census Bureau does not count in-kind transfers as income. So in looking at the income of low-income Americans, the census doesn't count food stamps, doesn't count Medicaid, doesn't count housing subsidies, whereas the average middle-class family spends about half its income on those three items.
And if you add up in 2025 all of the government benefits that go to the average household in the bottom 20% of the income distribution, it adds up to over $55,000 a year. So in fact, since 1967, the income of the bottom quintile has risen faster than the income of the top quintile because of government transfers.
The problem is the employment level has fallen from 78% to 36%. So we've eliminated poverty, but we have created idleness, and we've taken all of these people out of the one system that creates progress, and that's the market.
Well, you anticipated a little bit, what about now, Piketty and Saez and exploding inequality, and the poor are getting poorer and the middle class has been wiped out. I think you just answered that question, part of it. Let me answer the other part and I'll be quiet for a minute.
All of these studies that talk about this massive inequality do a bait and switch. The ProPublica expose where they stole the rich folks' tax returns. What they do is in their comparisons they don't count any government transfers as income. So immediately you take away over 90% of the income of the bottom 20 percentile.
They don't take taxes into account, and over 70% of the taxes paid by the top two quintiles. And they don't measure income for high-income people in the comparison. They measure what your income would be if you sold all the assets you owned and paid taxes on it. Well, you know where they had the deal about Warren Buffett doesn't pay any taxes. If Warren Buffett sold all the assets he owned every year, he doesn't pay a lot of taxes. But so they made up a phony income in the ProPublica study.
And finally, Piketty compares a top one-tenth of 1%, where you're talking about a tiny group of people, as if somehow that tells you something. In fact, why do we call the Industrial Revolution the Gilded Age? Because of the obsession with the fact that by 1896 there were 4,600 millionaire families in America. And the people that are so obsessed on that turn a blind eye to the fact that 66 million people were better off than they'd ever been in the history of the world.
I'll add a little bit to you on this. The fact of widening income inequality is simply not a fact. As you mentioned, if you ignore taxes paid and transfers received, you have created a problem that is immune to the prescribed solution because you can tax the rich more and give to the poor more. But you defined it pre-tax, it's not going to change no matter what you do.
Most of the wealth inequality we see is mark-to-market wealth of people's stock portfolios. We do not see consumption inequality. And you've got to think about what is wealth left reinvested in factories and businesses really, really harming people. And the numbers are full of lying, cheating, and stealing. For example, household income may have gotten more income different, but households aren't households anymore. You used to have mom, dad, and three kids. That's a household. Now you have mom and two kids as a household. Well, you know, households are different. And when you do household inequality... So I agree, and there's O'Toole and Splinter, for example, at the CBO, have done a great job on this.
But boy, is that a... the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer is such a time-honored fable. I think every age has always told itself that fable along with saying this is going to lead to a revolution.
Let me go back a little bit on the same topic because we got ahead of ourselves to the current age, which we will come back to a little more. How about how great the 1950s were? What a wonderful economy. Never mind GDP per capita was $15,000 then, it's $80,000 now. But I'm getting ahead of myself. That's your answer, not mine. But then China rose and Japan rose and hollowed out our industry from their predatory trading practices, impoverishing us thereby.
I've actually heard in the hallowed halls of Hoover somebody say letting China into the WTO was the worst mistake the US ever made. The left-behind places are sitting around in horrible poverty. Right.
No, no. So the data here are really overwhelming. If you look at, let's start with industrial capacity, you know, the capacity to produce industrial output. Well, I mean, our industries have been hollowed out. Industrial capacity today, or 2020 sometime recently, all-time high.
If you look at the growth in real median family income today, it's at an all-time high. If you look at the commuting zones that Dorn and Hansen identified as being especially affected by the China shock, we have a George Mason econ alum, Jeremy Horpit, who went back and actually looked at those areas and said, okay, how are they doing now? Well, real income is higher in those places now than it has ever been.
Yeah, of course, when economic conditions change, when there's creative destruction, some people, their wages fall, some regions decline, but they recover. And that's what's happened in the China shock case. You look at manufacturing output, industrial capacity, industrial output, no matter how you measure it, none of that declined or slowed after NAFTA, didn't decline or slow when China joined the WTO.
If you're going to find a period where it declined a bit or the growth slowed, it's right after the Great Recession with Biden's policies, not China.
Let me just add that, I mean, people get caught up in this decline in manufacturing employment, which I guess peaked in '79 and has been declining ever since. And that's happening all over the world, including in China.
And if you look at agriculture as sort of our guide to what's likely to happen in manufacturing, we had 39% of all Americans worked on the farm in 1900. That's now 1.5%.
Are they out in the streets dying?
Well, people saying we've hollowed out agriculture. Hell, we feed ourselves and half the world. It would be laughable to say agriculture's been hollowed out.
Fewer people are producing more manufactured products because of growth in productivity and improvements in our production system and machines. And there's no reason to think that that process is going to stop. So if you're betting the future of the country in terms of employment, when we're already down to 8% of the people that work in manufacturing, you're betting on an industry in terms of employment, not production.
That is, at least employment is declining. But some of that is definitional. In around 2000, the Labor Department had to decide whether programming was manufacturing or services. And they decided it was services.
And so you go out and you buy a high-end car now, say a top-line Suburban, half the value of the vehicle is in the gadgets, and they're provided by subcontractors, and none of those people are counted as being in manufacturing. So some of this is definitional. I mean, the trend is there, but I'm just saying it's always good to be a little skeptical about these numbers.
It's also back to my point about the 1933 rhetoric, 4% unemployment rate. I mean, in some sense, who cares what they work at? You have to be a New York Times columnist and never have actually visited a factory to be nostalgic for factory employment, which only 20 minutes ago we were just crying as dark satanic mills. I mean, let's spend eight hours a day doing this. Does that sound like fun, or does that sound like more fun?
Those, especially in the 1950s, union job in an auto plant was a horrible job. Thank goodness that Americans don't have to do that anymore. But...
Well, and remember in that era, you didn't want to buy a car that was made on Friday because they were thinking about the weekend. You want to buy one that was made on Monday because they were hung over from the weekend. And so suddenly when that Toyota Corolla rolled off, the world was changed, and it changed because the '50s weren't realistic.
It was an artificial period where we had a monopoly on heavy manufacturing because the war had destroyed the industrial capacity of the rest of the world and killed 50 million of their most skilled workers. And when Europe and Japan came back, suddenly we were in competition, but we benefited from that competition, and we didn't lose in that competition.
Now, we tend to be free traders, but one great thing about Hoover is I talk to national security people who kind of roll their eyes and say, 'Oh, John, how kind of you,' because of course national defense. We must be able to produce our own ships. We have to produce our own solar cells and windmills. Our medicines, China could cut those off at any time. We have to produce our food or we might starve. Rare earths, oh my gosh, they're all made in China. Ships, we need to build ships. We need to have a car industry here even though BYD can make them at half the price, because as actually one Hoover person said, we need to be able to turn those car factories into B-2 factories when war with China comes. We must have the Jones Act, of course, to produce lots of shipping for the US. Isn't national defense an exemption?
Well, I was on the Armed Services Committee when I first went to the Senate because they didn't want me on the Finance Committee. And there is a legitimate national defense argument, but it is the most overused and abused argument in American government. We buy cotton underwear made in the United States and pay three times the price. And so that's money that's not available to buy things that we really need.
When I came to Washington, my wife, I didn't want her to go into government because I thought there was a stigma, until Reagan came and she went to work for the Institute for Defense...
Analysis, and her first job was figuring out what to do with all of the stuff we had bought post-World War II to fight World War II again. And as it turned out, when Stockman came and we joined up and we did the Reagan budget, I tried to sell that stuff, but it was so inefficient to go out and pick it up and put it in trucks. We had coal. We bought and stored coal. We had all kinds of minerals that were critical in World War II that we had bought and held all those years, squandering resources. So again, there is an argument. I believe in the argument, but it's so easy to abuse it, and you know, not buying steel and aluminum from Mexico and Canada is just outrageous.
Can I say two things? Please keep going. Two things about it: I too believe there's a national defense exception to the case for free trade, right? But I do wish people who make it — I would take them more seriously, actually, if they raised at least two points or recognized at least two points. Number one, right? You're going to artificially stimulate this industry. What industry then do you want less of or suffer a decline, right? You cannot increase U.S. auto production without causing a decline in production in some other industries. People pretend that the growth in the industry stimulated for national defense purposes is free. It's not. So I'd like to see some recognition of, you know, what's the trade-off. Second thing: even if you do that, also recognize that when you protect an industry, you make it lazy. And if that industry is really essential to the national defense, that's a really big trade-off because now you're making that essential industry less innovative and lazier over time. And I just wish people who raised this particular exception would take those points and others, but certainly those two points.
Exactly right. And the Jones Act is the classic example. We destroyed American shipbuilding. In fact, I like stockpiles because stockpiles are better than an eternally protected industry. You can then buy the stuff on the margin in the best places.
Well, we ship oil from Saudi Arabia — or did before the blockade — from Saudi Arabia to New York because it's cheaper than shipping it from Houston to New York.
On Jones Act ships. That's correct.
Actually, I'll share a proposal I have for you. Fine, national security, fine. I'll tell you what: you can have a hundred billion dollars. Let's put it on the defense budget. You want a chip factory? Hundred billion dollar subsidy, you can have that. Or you can have 10 aircraft carriers — you only get a hundred billion. So which one do you want? And if it were all in the defense budget where we could see it, maybe we'd start making some real trade-offs here.
Yeah, we'd make it more honest.
I mean, Mexican washing machines, which are now tariffed at, I think, 50% under national security.
I don't think that's really threatening our boys over in the China Sea.
Um, let's see. Oh boy, I have so many great questions for you guys. I want to go back to the inequality thing because there's something in your last book that really struck me. When you add up all the phase-outs of our means-tested programs, the marginal tax rate from 0 to $60,000 is about 100%. So in some sense, is not that barrier to opportunity, together with the disaster of the public schools, the problem we should be focusing on if you're worried about — not the inequality, but the misfortunes, the genuine misfortunes of those on the lower end of America's income level?
The cumulative value of welfare benefits are now so big that unless you have skill or unless you have some real ambition, you're about as well off taking the welfare as you are working. And the net result is that you've had millions of people take you up on it. And the great tragedy of our welfare system is there are poor people, but they're basically people that have fallen through the cracks because of drug and alcohol addiction and for numerous other reasons. And raising food stamps or refundable tax credits is going to have no effect on those people whatsoever. By any real definition, now about 80% of the people getting welfare benefits are not poor and haven't been poor for 25 years.
I would presume that neither of you thinks that AI is posing a job apocalypse and needs to be regulated tomorrow, together with universal basic income.
I certainly don't. History's our only guide — well, history and theory, right? And there have been disruptive technologies in the past; there always will be disruptive technologies. I don't see any — I can't see any reason why that particular technology is going to destroy jobs. Though, look, what is a job other than a means of satisfying a human want, a human desire? If AI truly were to destroy all jobs, what that means is AI would create heaven on earth. There'd be no — I'd love to live in that world. It's not going to happen, which means there'll always be jobs for some.
Yeah, I would add to that that if you went back to 1830 and looked at what was produced then, and then you look forward to productivity in 1900, you could have produced what was being produced in 1830 with maybe 20% of the labor force. And so you say, well, my God, what's going to happen to the 80%? They basically — we proved in the Industrial Revolution, and I think it proved over and over again, that our wants always outrun our ability to produce. There were new products that were created. People wanted new things. It was a new world. And so I don't worry about our ability to outproduce our ability to come up with things we want. That certainly is not going to happen in my family. And secondly, I think that we've got to recognize that compared to 1830, we work half the number of hours a week. So is that a bad thing that the average worker works about 37 hours today and worked 70 hours then, and they worked on Saturday and we don't? I think this is something we can come to grips with. But I'm not worried about destroying jobs. I think, a, it won't happen. There are a lot of things I want I don't have.
Well, I would also agree that the lesson of history is extremely clear here. Two things that people forget: that when things become cheaper to make, output expands and people think of new things to do. And actually, I was reading The Economist, who's looking at the job statistics, and says it's already happened. AI is already creating more new jobs than it is destroying old jobs, as people think of new industries and new businesses that can use AI.
I want to — we're going to run out of this section of time before... Yes, thank you for your patience. You get a chance after one more question, because I want to ask sort of the political question, because I have a master politician here, and I say that word with reverence. I think it is a noble calling to serve your country, even in politics. To be a conservative — which I'm a conservative libertarian. That's — I don't know how you guys think of yourself.
I think we all qualify. The word conservative, I think, is hallowed, and that is one believes that we live in the best economy and the best society ever, but we're always in danger that it's about to fall apart. And of course, you know, for 40 years I've been worrying about the end of growth, and we worry about just how this system might fall apart.
So our institutions seem a little afraid, and to some extent — do you think the institutions will pull through, and how can they? You were in the Senate during a period of great bipartisan reform. Great things happened. You fixed Social Security. You fixed the tax system. You were able to get together and reform rotten systems so that they would work better. Can that happen again? Or, you know, is this the precipice, or will we, 10 years from now, say, oh, America reformed itself and boomed on forwards? And if so, how?
Well, in terms of the system being in danger, of course Jefferson said the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. American exceptionalism is based on how exceptional our economy is, and anything that threatens that threatens us. It's so easy when you've been in government and left to think, well, things went to hell right after I left. I think — I noticed that, actually. I think what has happened is that what are perceived as being extreme — and in some sense I agree with the perception — among Democrats has traumatized Republicans, and among Republicans has traumatized Democrats, and the parties have moved further and further apart. So it's hard to find a middle ground. Senator Byrd and I differed on budget and anything having to do with spending money, but we were close allies on almost everything else. And he wanted more government, I wanted more freedom, but I didn't view what he wanted as a threat to the country. I think the two parties now view each other's policies as threats to the country, and that makes it more difficult. We dealt with problems when I was there — almost in a golden age. But there was a crisis. I mean, we didn't fix Social Security because we wanted to. You know, we were down to 8 months, and there was going to be a huge cut in benefits, and my mother knew my number. And so we had to make hard decisions, and we did, and we did it on a bipartisan basis. I never lost a vote on Social Security. The Reagan budget eliminated three Social Security benefits — outright killed them one day. Never was an issue in any campaign because it worked. You know, the system was safe for 50 years, which is not bad for government work. Yeah, I think we're going to a very difficult period in American government. I suspect it will get worse before it gets better. But I feel confident about the long term for the following reasons: the American voter has never tolerated a bad economy. And I feel that what I want in America — for America, because I love America, and I'm sure Bernie Sanders does too. I'm not saying that their program doesn't work. Socialism will not work, and ultimately people will reject it. Now, I think we're getting ready to have an election in November where we're going to go in the wrong direction. But I think the ship will ultimately be righted.
Well, on that good note, let's take some questions. Oh, wonderful. So your job is to get the microphone, and then you get to ask a question.