Welcome to the Liberty + Leadership Podcast, a conversation with TFAS alumni, faculty and friends who are making an impact today. I'm your host, Roger Ream.
Well, my guest today on the Liberty and Leadership podcast is Professor Donald J. Boudreaux. Don's a longtime friend of mine and of TFAS. He's taught for us since 2010 in our Summer Programs, a course called "Economics for the Citizen." He's also a fellow at the Mercatus Center, which is aligned with George Mason University. He's the past president of the Foundation for Economic Education, and is the author, co-author, of a great new book called "The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Great Myths of American Capitalism," co-authored with Senator Phil Gramm. It's a great book, and Don's here today to talk about this book and other topics in economics that are very timely. My first question is, how do you come up with seven myths? I'm sure you probably had a list that was much longer, but you certainly picked some of the most important ones.
The idea for the number was Phil Gramm's, and he said, "You know, seven's a famous number." It wasn't a superstitious thing, but the seven myths, we wanted to keep the book to a readable length, and I think we've managed to do that. The seven that we tackle are indeed important, and the failure to grasp them plays an important role in making public policy. So we chose those seven. I suppose if there was a looming eighth that deserved to be in there, we would have included it. It was Phil's idea to have just seven.
Well, the myths you've selected are very common myths, and they're held not just by those who may have a more progressive or left-leaning orientation, but even many who are on the right side of the political spectrum, who even support capitalism, share some of these myths.
Yeah, I'd like to tackle them. But first of all, why do you think that we look back at the same events that occurred at a particular time in history and we reach such different conclusions so often?
As we say in the introduction to the book, everyone interprets the historical record and the facts they encounter through a particular theoretical lens. You might not realize you have a particular theoretical lens in your head, but you do. How you make sense of this very complex reality of which we are a part has to be filtered through some theory that you have of how the world works. And our theory — both Phil Gramm and I are professional economists — and so our theoretical lens is supplied by basic economics, not elaborate economics, but just basic, I think, common sense, straightforward fundamental principles of economics. The second reason is people do have a surprisingly wide misunderstanding of the factual record. They just don't know what happened, just basic facts are not known, or even worse, basic fallacies about the past are believed that simply have no basis in reality. It was the latter that we really set out to tackle with the book. The fallacies that we tackle are not incredibly nuanced or complicated ones. They are commonplace fallacies that we believe, and I think we showed in the book, can be debunked just by going to the historical record, and you don't have to nuance or massage the data or the historical record at all. Just present the facts, and our hope is that just presenting the facts in the way that we do will persuade people that a lot of what they believe about the past is incorrect.
Let's look at some of these myths that you've selected and that you discuss in the book. The first being that the industrial revolution harmed the conditions of the working man and made people miserable. Much of that conveyed through literature, Charles Dickens, and not so much through the economics, but you take on that myth. Talk about that one.
The myth is that, well, okay, yes, no one doubts the Industrial Revolution was real and that it certainly increased overall prosperity. The fallacy is that the increase in prosperity came by the capitalists crushing the proletariat. And so you had these happy peasants — they weren't rich by our standards, but they were doing okay, they were frolicking in the countryside and their lives were clean and healthy and wholesome. And then these factories came along and basically sucked these people into the bowels of the factories, and the wealth that was created by the Industrial Revolution was extracted from the blood, sweat, and tears of the peasants who worked in the factories. And it's simply wrong. You can look at the change in real wages, look at indicia of living standards, life expectancy, reductions in maternal mortality. A number of indicators of standard of living of ordinary people during the industrial revolutions of the mid-18th century through the mid-19th century, their lives were improving. By our standards today, those lives were still very poor. By the standards of the alternatives these people would have done had there been no factory system, by that standard, the workers were doing pretty well.
Yeah, they voluntarily chose to work in the factories because it was better than what they had as an alternative.
One of the things we mentioned in the book, there was this wonderful book written about ten years ago by English historian Emma Griffin, where she found several diaries written by ordinary workers during that era, and the book's called "Liberty's Dawn." And what these diary entries show is that these ordinary workers themselves accounted — they described their experience, and overwhelmingly these diaries show that these workers understood that their lives were being made better off by the opportunity to work in the towns that were industrializing.
Perhaps the biggest myth that you debunk in your book is the Great Depression. And there's several myths surrounding that, of course. One is what caused it? Was it a failure of capitalism that plunged our economy into a depression? And then also what ended it? Was it New Deal policies that came along under FDR that brought us out? Or was it World War II? Did that end the depression? There are a lot of interpretations of what caused it. Talk about that issue as one myth that seems to be so ingrained in the minds of Americans.
Yeah. So let's talk about what caused the Great Depression.
1929. Yeah, the formal recession began in August of 1929, so a few months before the stock market crash. The basic myth is that, okay, in the 1920s, income inequality grew. We had this complete laissez-faire free-for-all. Speculation was running wild. The growing income inequality by having more income in the hands of rich people, and rich people don't spend as large a share of their incomes as do poorer people, so consumption was too low. By the end of the 1920s, all of this caught up with the American economy. And so the stock market crashed when the speculative boom declined. Herbert Hoover, of course, was president then, continuing with the myth, and the myth is that Herbert Hoover was a do-nothing president. He just sat around in the White House being a devotee of laissez-faire, hoping things would improve. Well, of course they didn't improve. The worst years of the Depression were '32 and '33. The election of '32 comes along, and of course Hoover gets booted out along with the Republicans in Congress, and Roosevelt comes in, the Democratic Congress comes in with a New Deal. The myth continues that, well, you know, it wasn't perfect. The New Deal was a bit of experimentation, but eventually the New Deal helped improve things, and the final push to get us out of the Great Depression came with the increased spending during World War II. That's the standard story. First of all, in the 1920s, there was no increased income inequality. In fact, the working classes got a larger share, as shown by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets, of GDP. They had a larger share at the end of the 1920s than they had at the beginning of the 1920s. Spending on consumer goods was on pace. There was no additional or extra stock market speculation. What happened was the Federal Reserve was created in 1913 to be a lender of last resort. And there were some imperfections in the U.S. banking system, mostly legislatively created. There was this downturn in the economy that began in the summer of 1929. Some banks began to fail, and the biggest failure was the Fed. The Fed failed to do what it was established to do, to serve as a lender of last resort. It allowed the money supply from 1929 through early 1933 to decrease by more than 30%. This is what Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz call the Great Contraction. There is no way any industrial economy can survive unscathed when the money supply is allowed to fall that far. That's what caused the Great Depression. What caused the Great Depression to last, however, was Herbert Hoover's interventions, because he was not, in fact, a devotee of laissez-faire, made worse by FDR's interventions. So we spend a lot of time in the book talking about the work of the economic historian Robert Higgs, who has this idea of what he calls regime uncertainty. And so the interventions of Hoover and especially of FDR, these were unprecedented. The investors were frightened by the degree to which the government was becoming involved in the economy, and when investors become frightened, they stay on the sidelines. And they continued to stay on the sidelines until the breakout of World War II. Roosevelt needed the business people to be on board to help fight the war effort. So when World War II breaks out, Roosevelt becomes a bit more business friendly. He has to tone down his anti-business stuff. But we're now in a wartime economy, and all the resources are being directed by the government into the war effort. And whether you think that was great or terrible, that means living standards fell even further in the private domestic economy. We did not get out of the Depression by any measurable metric until the second half of the 1940s. After the war, in part because Roosevelt had died, Truman was nowhere nearly the anti-capitalist firebrand that Roosevelt became toward the end of the 1930s. The Republicans, surprisingly, took control of both houses of Congress in the November 1946 elections, and Republicans, of course, were more business-friendly than the Democrats were. Those developments returned calm to the economy, and so investors came off the sidelines and began investing again.
Now, one thing you didn't mention, which may be part of the story, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff under Hoover.
In June of 1930, the Smoot-Hawley tariff certainly made things worse. I should have mentioned it, being very interested in trade as I am, it was just a calamitous trade tariff act. It made things worse. No serious economist believes that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff caused the depression, but it did worsen the depression for a variety of reasons, not least because it caused our trading partners to retaliate against us, but it wasn't the cause. But again, it did make things worse.
One of the things, as I recall from Murray Rothbard's book "America's Great Depression," that Hoover did that was counterproductive is bringing business leaders to the White House and pressuring them to keep wages up at a time when, in order to keep employment widespread, you needed to lower wages.
It was a fabulous fallacy that Hoover believed in. And so this is an example of interpreting the real world through a bad set of theoretical lenses. Hoover knew that there was a high correlation between prosperity and high wages. Hoover believed that high wages caused the high prosperity. In fact, it was high prosperity that caused the high wages, and so Hoover was putting the cart before the horse. So he, well, okay, let's just push wages up through government diktat. And of course that didn't work, that made things worse. Unfortunately, Franklin Roosevelt had pretty much the same idea. If you have to identify the single most calamitous of Roosevelt's policies, it's probably the NRA, the National Recovery Act, which was finally declared unconstitutional in 1935. But the whole idea behind the NRA was to allow American producers to cartelize in order to raise prices — well, at least high prices, allegedly. We're going to bring recovery, because everyone knows when an economy is doing well, prices are buoyed, they're kept high. But again, this is an example of putting the cart before the horse. They had the causality all wrong. And so by restricting output, which is what cartels do, during a depression, that's the worst thing you can do. People in the depression were literally going hungry. And then the government is slaughtering pigs and telling farmers not to grow food. It was just completely counterproductive.
Well, in a number of chapters, you tackle the question of income inequality. And I know Senator Phil Gramm has co-authored a book just a few years ago on that subject as well, "The Myth of American Inequality." And there's a lot of bad information out there about income inequality. You quote in there, I think, three Nobel Prize-winning economists who express deep concern about American inequality and think it's undermining our economic system in our country. But you tell a different story. Can you summarize that topic for us, and especially how the Census Bureau and other official statistics misrepresent that subject?
The conventional measures today of income inequality are of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes. And so if you look at what people make before they pay taxes, and you look at what people take home before they receive government transfers, then you get huge measures of inequality. But that's illegitimate. In order to measure how the economy is doing, you have to take account of the existing government policies, which affect economic activity. When you do that, when you look at post-tax income, so you don't look at the income that some hedge fund manager makes before he or she pays taxes, you look at the income the person takes home after. You don't just look at the market income they earn, they're receiving a great deal of government transfer, a great deal of government income from the income taken from the richer people, the higher income earners. When you do that, the measured income inequality, the differences in income, fall dramatically. They're still there, but they're nowhere nearly as high as are reported in the mainstream media, as reported by the economist Thomas Piketty in his bestselling 2014 book, and as taken as gospel by these three Nobel Prize winners who you mentioned. If you want to tell a terrible story about income inequality corroding the American economy, you look at these pre-tax and pre-transfer numbers, but those are just not the right numbers to look at. You have to look at the post-tax, post-transfer numbers, and they tell a completely different story.
Moving on to the issue of trade, which is a sweet spot of yours, there's probably no one in this country, perhaps internationally as well, who writes more about free trade than you. You've been a big defender of the freedom to exchange, and particularly internationally across borders, yet this has been a very bumpy year since President Trump was inaugurated. Not that we didn't have a lot of protectionism before that, but we've heard lots of reasons why the president wants tariffs. You hear contradictory reasons: to raise revenue, to bring back manufacturing jobs, to negotiate with other countries to lower their barriers. What about the idea of using it as a weapon to try to get other countries to lower their barriers? Do you think that'll work?
Look, in principle, it would be good if other countries lowered their trade barriers. The main beneficiaries of that, however, would be citizens of other countries. Now, we would benefit too, our manufacturers would, to the extent that they get to export more, but economically, it's a bit questionable to make us poorer by imposing restrictions on how we can spend our money in order to get other countries to treat their citizens better. So it's ironic that President Trump, who truly believes that he's putting America first when he bargains with these other countries, basically what he's saying is to these other governments: "Look, I'm going to impoverish my people, I'm going to make my fellow Americans poorer until and unless you make your citizens richer." He's putting Canada first, he's putting China first, he's putting Paraguay first. So he doesn't understand the very basics of trade, which is a very frustrating fact.