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Donald Boudreaux
Professor of Economics, George Mason University

Capitalism Myths with Professor Donald Boudreaux | IEA Interview

📅 Nov 05, 2025 Institute of Economic Affairs 47 MIN 1708 VIEWS 49 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
In this Institute of Economic Affairs podcast, Managing Editor Daniel Freeman interviews Professor Donald Boudreaux, who is a professor of economics at George Mason University, a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center, and a member of the IEA’s Academic Advisory Council. The conversation focuses on Boudreaux’s new book, The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Myths of American Capitalism, co-authored with former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm. They discuss why these economic myths persist and how they distort policy debates in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The interview e...

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 1:14So, to start with quite a basic question, why did you decide to write this book?
  2. 3:33Now, where do you think this myth, as you call it, comes from?
  3. 6:37Doesn't also quite a lot of the data say it takes a while for this to transfer through to workers?
  4. 8:39Does British trade policy or British foreign policy more generally play any role, do you think, in why wages — why the data seems to be fuzzier, to say the least, on wages?
  5. 9:54And is the story of American industrialization similar, albeit slightly delayed, or is there a slightly different dynamic there?
  6. 17:27Is that the sort of argument?
  7. 19:22Was it not just the hangover from the lack of government intervention in the 1920s?
  8. 22:33Is this because people are pulling their money out of banks because they think the bank is going to go under, and yet the Fed is also pursuing contractionary monetary policy as well?
  9. 29:50Although isn't one of George Selgin's arguments that one of the issues was that FDR was very nervous about fiscal expansion?
  10. 32:11Could you get into that a bit?
  11. 37:27Would you accept there have been any particular regions that have seen their manufacturing hollowed out as a result of trade?
  12. 42:03... say, "Ah, yes, but for national security reasons, it's very important that we maintain a large manufacturing sector because what if we go to war with China, for example?" How do you deal with that question of national security and trading?
Donald Boudreaux 0:00 ↗
There were no border controls at all. Now the Trump people and the MAGA people in America, they don't talk about that. They'll say, "Oh, well, you know, the 19th century is a period of high growth. We had high tariffs. Therefore, high tariffs work." Rich capitalists, these textile mill owners, they ground the workers into the dust and they extracted profit from them, and that's how we got our riches today. And it's just false. The Fed allowed the money supply to contract.
Daniel Freeman 0:33 ↗
Hello and welcome to the Institute of Economic Affairs. I'm Daniel Freeman, managing editor here at the IEA. Today we'll be discussing a very interesting new book on economic history titled The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Myths of American Capitalism. So, I'm delighted to be joined by Professor Donald Boudreaux, who is one of the authors of the book. Donald is also a professor of economics at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center, as well as being a member of the IEA's academic advisory council. Don, thanks so much for joining.
Donald Boudreaux 1:13 ↗
It's my pleasure to be here.
Daniel Freeman 1:14 ↗
Great. So, to start with quite a basic question, why did you decide to write this book?
Donald Boudreaux 1:20 ↗
So the idea came from my co-author, former US Senator Phil Gramm, who was a major figure in the Republican party in the US in the 1980s throughout the 1990s. He was a fiscal hawk. He was an ardent free trader. Even before he changed parties, he was a Democrat, but even as a Democrat, he helped to shape Ronald Reagan's first budgets. And he's a professional economist, he has a PhD in economics, and his colleague when he was still teaching later became my dissertation adviser. So, that's how I got to know him. The idea was Phil Gramm's. He called me, he left Congress more than 20 years ago. He called me in the summer of 2023 and said, "Look, I have this idea for a book. I've been writing lots of things" — this is him now for the Wall Street Journal — "basically debunking fallacies that people have about economic history, both a long time ago and relatively recently. And I want to put this into a book, and I'm told, he tells me, that you're the person who can really help me do it." And so we talked about the project and I liked the project and so we agreed to do it and it worked out really well. And he is a professional economist. He had a lot of academic success before entering Congress. I'm a professional economist, but we both enjoy writing for the general public and so we wrote this book not for our fellow economists, although we hope they read it. We wrote it for the general public. And the idea was to take seven fallacies that he and I agree play a major role in, we believe, distorting economic policy today, particularly in the United States. And it's a work of half and half. It's really 50/50, written by him, written by me. So it was his idea, but it was a very satisfying project to work on.
Daniel Freeman 3:33 ↗
Yeah. I mean, it's called the seven great myths of American capitalism, but so much of it seems very applicable to the debate in the UK as well, particularly thinking in terms of your first chapter, your first myth that you want to attack, which is the idea that the industrial revolution, which of course starts off in Britain, impoverishes workers. Now, where do you think this myth, as you call it, comes from?
Donald Boudreaux 4:08 ↗
Well, you know, the Marxists in the 19th century had it. It dates back a long time. People in Britain, while they were living through it, had the impression that they were being immiserated. That chapter that you referred to, that's the opening substantive chapter of the book, and it's really mostly about Britain and not about the US. We have a little bit about the US, but it's about the industrial revolution, which is a British phenomenon. And you know the fallacies that, well, yes, we may be rich today, but that was all because these rich capitalists, these textile mill owners, they ground the workers into the dust and they extracted profit from them, and that's how we got our riches today. And it's just false. And so we look at the best economic research done by serious economists in top journals and books, and we just report that there's no question that, starting no later than the 1840s — that's the latest date, but there are lots of estimates that go back a century earlier — the real wages of ordinary workers in England and the lands of Scotland began to rise as industrialization improved, living standards went up, real wages went up, life expectancy improved. By our standards today, of course, most people were very poor by the standards of history, the millennia that preceded them. But they were becoming a lot richer, which is why Adam Smith could write in 1776, just as this is really beginning to be noticed, he can write An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, right? He noticed that there was something happening around him, and he had traveled of course on the continent and saw that ordinary people in France and elsewhere in the continent, they didn't live quite as well as ordinary people in England and in the lands of Scotland. Something's going on. That's what prompted Smith to write the book. And so it's just a fallacy that the data on the industrial revolution in Britain are overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition that they elevated economically the lower classes, the working classes. They did not suppress them.
Daniel Freeman 6:37 ↗
Yeah. Although, I totally agree with that in outline. Doesn't also quite a lot of the data say it takes a while for this to transfer through to workers? So you have this idea of the Engels pause, where the industrial revolution starts to get going in the 1760s, but it's not really until the 1830s that we see consistently higher wages among workers.
Donald Boudreaux 7:07 ↗
Yeah. Again, the data — there's a little bit of disagreement in the data. Some data say it does start before that, there's some data that say it starts in the 18th century. But one of the things that's happening is as town and urban industries get going, that attracts workers from the countryside. That does keep those wages lower than they would otherwise be. But this is the result of choices of people being attracted out of the countryside from really desperate living standards into urban and town areas to work in the factories. So I think there's a little bit of a bias in the data that we have much better data on wage rates from the 19th century and late 18th century in the towns and cities than we have in terms of quantitative form of wages in the countryside. But we know that people were leaving the countryside voluntarily to move to the towns and cities, which indicates, because they're voting with their feet, that they believe their economic prospects were better in the urban areas. It wasn't perfect by any means, but I do think when you look at the data in full and honestly, we get economic improvements starting for ordinary men and women, not all but typical, in the mid to late 18th century.
Daniel Freeman 8:39 ↗
Okay. Does British trade policy or British foreign policy more generally play any role, do you think, in why wages — why the data seems to be fuzzier, to say the least, on wages?
Donald Boudreaux 8:57 ↗
Yeah, of course. Britain still was protectionist. This is what Adam Smith of course was railing against in his great 1776 book. And perhaps it's no coincidence that the data become unambiguously positive for economic growth for ordinary people in the 1840s, which is of course the decade in which the Corn Laws were repealed, and Britain from that time through really the 1930s, for 90 years, became what is, you know, a free trade nation. And so certainly the mercantilist trade restrictions dampened the economic growth that would have otherwise happened had those trade restrictions in Britain not been in place. And when they were gotten rid of in the 1840s, I think then we saw a real release of the entrepreneurial energy and creativity of the industrial revolution.
Daniel Freeman 9:54 ↗
Yeah. And is the story of American industrialization similar, albeit slightly delayed, or is there a slightly different dynamic there?
Donald Boudreaux 10:04 ↗
It's slightly delayed. Obviously there was industry in the US in the 18th century, but Britain was much more industrialized. I think the data for Britain at the end of the 18th century, I think just about 50% of British workers were in agriculture, the other 50% were in towns and industry. For the United States, it was 80 to 90%. The US, you know, was a land-rich country and so it was still very agricultural. So the US industrial revolution, if you want to call it that, the great surge of industry really didn't occur until after the US Civil War, which ended in 1865. So you're looking now at the latter half of the 19th century. Now Americans were rich even before that because the agricultural output of the US economy was amazing and the commercial contacts that Americans had with the rest of the world was also very enriching. But starting after the US Civil War, the railroads for the first time in 1869 created a transcontinental economy for the US. California was connected to the east coast for the first time by rail. The telegraph comes along so you get instantaneous communication, later the telephone, refrigeration emerges, and what happened in the US in this latter third of the 19th century is these technological innovations combined with — there wasn't a perfect economy by any means — but combined with largely a laissez-faire national government in the United States.
Daniel Freeman 11:45 ↗
Except when it comes to trade policy.
Donald Boudreaux 11:47 ↗
Except, well, that was the biggest intervention for sure. But even that's a little bit misunderstood too. There were periods where the trade policy got more restrictive and then less restrictive. And Phil Gramm — it's not really in this book so much, but we've written several things for the Wall Street Journal over the past couple of years, and one of the things that we've written is on 19th century US trade policy. And what we found — this is a diversion now, but it's relevant given what you said — what we found is that the growth of industrial output in the US, it was very fast throughout the entire 19th century. It would dip during periods of banking crisis, but it was an incredible period of economic growth, there's no doubt about it, but it was inversely correlated, that rate of growth, with tariffs. So as tariff rates were rising, that rate of industrial growth was falling. As tariff rates were falling, the rate of industrial growth was rising. Keep in mind the United States, except for a very brief period during the Civil War, the United States didn't have an income tax until well after Britain. We didn't get an income tax until the 1910s. And customs revenue was usually the major source of revenue for the US government. So that itself put a constraint on how high the tariffs could go, because if you raise tariffs too high for protection purposes, you'll keep a lot of goods out and that's going to lower your tax revenues. And so the US wasn't quite the protectionist monster that a lot of people today believe it is. The story is a lot more subtle, but the data are certainly clear that industrial output growth slowed when tariff rates were rising and rose when tariff rates were falling.
Daniel Freeman 13:42 ↗
That's really interesting. Because I had Alexander Klein, who's a British-based economic historian, on for an interview a few months ago, and he's looked at the data actually on a micro level as well, and he's gone through various US industries and found that in the Gilded Age period, basically industries where you had higher levels of tariffs saw lower levels of productivity growth, and vice versa. So it's really interesting that you can track this at a macro level as well.
Donald Boudreaux 14:23 ↗
Yes, and it makes sense, right? I mean, if you protect an industry, well, the naive theory is that, okay, that's going to give these people room to grow. Well, no, it's not. I mean, it might give them room to grow, but it takes away their incentive to grow. They get lazy. I draw an analogy with my students. I say, suppose I were to tell you, don't worry about it, I guarantee you you'll get at least 85 out of 100 on any exam that you do, at least an 80. So you know you're not going to come close to failing. What do I think is going to happen to the energy and effort that my students put into studying? I don't think it's going to rise. They're not going to say, "I'm so relieved, I don't have to worry about my grades now, I'm going to study a lot harder." No, no, no, they're going to say, "Huh, I got a free ride, I don't have to compete, and so I'm going to study less." And we see that in the data. Doug Irwin, who is in my view the premier American trade scholar who's currently working, he did a very famous paper about 25 years ago now looking at the US 19th century. And what he found is that the service sector of the US economy drove a lot of economic growth and not the tariffs. And that's consistent both with the data that you just mentioned, the micro data, and with the macro data that Phil Gramm and I have found in later work.
Daniel Freeman 16:01 ↗
Yeah. No, I think that's really interesting and it's good to kind of flesh it out because people often, I suppose significantly now in the US in particular, seem to use that as a kind of excuse to support tariffs now.
Donald Boudreaux 16:20 ↗
Yes. May I say two more points on that? So even though tariffs were high in those periods in the latter part of the 19th century — and there were a lot of exemptions from the tariffs by the way — it was also a period of extraordinarily rapid technological growth in communication and transportation. And so these things were lowering the costs of engaging in international trade. Now the cost would have been lowered even further had the tariffs not been in place. But you have to weigh the natural economic effects of the lowered cost of trading coming from steam ships as opposed to sailing ships, telephones as opposed to telegraphs, and telegraphs as opposed to no electronic communication at all, against the tariffs. And so in part it was because the actual costs of engaging in international trade were falling despite the high tariffs that it helped propel this economic growth. The second thing that — well, I forgot the second thing that I wanted to say.
Daniel Freeman 17:27 ↗
Well, I mean, that first point I think is a really, really useful one to remember, that you know the overall cost of importing things was still coming down. It's still cheaper to import British goods in 1900 than it is in 1850, even though if you purely look at a tariff chart, tariffs overall are higher in 1900 than they are in say 1850. Is that the sort of argument?
Donald Boudreaux 18:01 ↗
That's exactly correct. Yeah.
So the second thing I wanted to say, just very briefly, the United States had perfectly open immigration until early — depends how you date it — late 1870s, early 1880s. There were no border controls at all. Now the Trump people and the MAGA people in America, they don't talk about that. They'll say, "Oh, well, you know, the 19th century is a period of high growth. We had high tariffs. Therefore, high tariffs work." I never hear them say, "Therefore, totally open borders, you know, let's..." And there's no doubt that that immigration also contributed to the enormous economic growth that America experienced in the 19th century. You're bringing in minds, what Julian Simon called the ultimate resource, to the economy. And then as Matt Ridley says in his brilliant 2010 book The Rational Optimist, you know, ultimately our wealth is created by ideas having sex with each other, you know, these ideas, and the more ideas you have, the more creation you get. And that's what you had in the United States when all these immigrants were coming over from Europe.
Daniel Freeman 19:22 ↗
Right, okay, I think we should probably move into the 20th century now because there's lots more to cover in the book. So, what your third chapter is on, the Great Depression and the myth that this is a failure of laissez-faire capitalism. Why is this a myth in your view? Was it not just the hangover from the lack of government intervention in the 1920s?
Donald Boudreaux 19:57 ↗
No, you know, the United States again, it was a laissez-faire economy largely up through the 19th century, end of the 19th century, but it did have some deep imperfections, not the least of which was our unfortunate banking system. There were a lot of restrictions on banks spreading, so we had unit banks, banks couldn't really diversify. And so we would have these periodic banking crises, and they would last for a while, you know, in 1873, 1896. And private forces would tamp them down. And we had a big one in 1907, and that's what gave — and so we had a lot of private bankers chipped in to try to solve the liquidity crisis caused by this banking contraction. And then a bunch of people said, well, you know, we ought to be more — let's get a central bank. And so the Fed was created in 1913, started operating in 1914, and at first it didn't have as much power as it has now. And so we had a major downturn in 1920. For the first several months of that downturn, I think for the first six months, industrial production fell far more than what happened in the first few months of what became the Great Depression. This is what's known as the forgotten depression, because it collapsed, but then the economy recovered so quickly that like, who remembers the depression of 1920 to 21 today? It's forgotten because even though the Fed was around at that time, the Fed did not have the power to intervene as it had later. In 1923 there were various reforms to the Fed concentrating more power in the Federal Reserve Board, and that combined with the Federal Reserve Board's wacky adherence to this notion called the real bills doctrine — which is too much for us to get into here, but it was just a mistaken view of how monetary policy should be conducted — when we got a downturn in October, it started in August of 1929, the Fed overreacted. The Fed allowed the money supply to contract by more than 30%.
Daniel Freeman 22:33 ↗
Is this because people are pulling their money out of banks because they think the bank is going to go under, and yet the Fed is also pursuing contractionary monetary policy as well?

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APA

Boudreaux, D. (2025, November 5). Capitalism Myths with Professor Donald Boudreaux | IEA Interview [Interview transcript]. Institute of Economic Affairs. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3363019/

MLA

Donald Boudreaux. "Capitalism Myths with Professor Donald Boudreaux | IEA Interview." Institute of Economic Affairs, 5 Nov. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3363019/.

BibTeX
@misc{boudreaux2025_3363019,
  author       = {Donald Boudreaux},
  title        = {Capitalism Myths with Professor Donald Boudreaux | IEA Interview},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Institute of Economic Affairs. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {nov},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3363019/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}