Thank you all. It is a real pleasure to be here. I have some pretty pictures to show you. One that I don't have that I wish I would have started my PowerPoint with is a picture of my Virginia license plate. I drive a foreign-made car in Virginia, and in Virginia you get a vanity tag and you can get as many as seven characters in one space. This is all by way of full disclosure, letting you know your speaker's biases. And my license plate reads FREETRADE. So those are my biases.
I didn't emerge from my mother's womb a free trader. I became one by studying economics, and it is one of the few — there are actually more than just a handful — but it is probably the topic on which most economists are in most widespread agreement. No matter where the economist sits politically or ideologically, the vast majority of economists agree with the policy of free trade. So nothing that I say here would be shocking to an economist. That doesn't make it correct. But anyway, so as Tim mentioned, back on April 2nd of this year, Phil Gramm and I had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal called Liberation Day One Year Later, because Liberation Day was April 2nd, 2025. That's when President Trump announced unprecedented — well, unprecedented for the past century — tariff hikes. And we've heard since then all of the wonders that these tariffs would do for America. And so Senator Gramm and I decided, well, let's just look at the data and see what we can conclude. So let me begin now. Let's see.
There we go. So if we want to assess how the first year of the Liberation Day tariffs stack up, we need to compare it to something. What are the possible comparisons? One is what would the past year, 2025, have looked like had we not had the tariffs? Another is the final year of the Biden administration, the year before the Liberation Day tariffs were imposed. Another possibility is, and I think this is the best one actually, is the first year of Trump's first term, a year without any tariff hikes. During Trump 1.0, tariffs were not — he didn't touch tariffs until the beginning of 2018. Now, people knew they were coming because he was tariff man, but there were no tariff hikes. And so let's look at — well, we can't unfortunately, we can't look at the first one because we can't run a counterfactual history. We had the tariffs. So we can't say for sure what 2025 would have looked like had there been no Liberation Day tariffs. So let's do the other two. Let's compare 2025 to 2024.
So here are some — obviously the number of possible pieces of data to choose is practically countless. So I think I picked here some of the more relevant ones. One is the growth in non-farm employment. So in 2024, the last year of Biden's administration, non-farm employment grew by 1.2%. In 2025, it grew by only a half a percent. So on that front, 2025 doesn't stack up very well to the preceding year. Manufacturing employment, as you probably know, manufacturing — not just manufacturing output, manufacturing employment — restoring manufacturing employment is a major goal of Trump's trade policy. We need more manufacturing jobs. We're going to bring these jobs back to America after they have been offshored. And so on that front, how does this stack up? Well, in 2024, manufacturing employment fell by 0.7%, and in 2025 it fell by 0.7%. So no improvement on the manufacturing job front.
Real median household income in 2024, that grew by 1.1%. In 2025, it grew by a little bit more. So on that score, Trump in 2025 did a little bit better than the previous year. Industrial production in 2024, it fell by 0.7%. In 2025 it rose by 2%. It scored another one for President Trump in 2025. In 2024, real private non-residential fixed — that's a mouthful, right? We want to measure investment that matters for the economy excluding households. And so in 2024 that rose by 2.9%. Last year it rose by 4.1%. Significantly better last year than in 2024.
And in 2024, real — I think in a way this is probably the single most important figure — but in 2024, real per capita GDP, so per person GDP, rose by 1.9%, in 2025 it rose by 1.6%. So a little bit worse then. This is not so far a picture of unalloyed success of President Trump's protectionism.
What about stock indices? One of the virtues of the financial markets is that they are forward-looking. Investors are spending their own money anticipating the future. They can get it wrong. They often do, but they're very reliable by and large. And so, if we look at the performance of each of the three major indices, the Dow Jones Industrial Index, the S&P 500, and the NASDAQ over the course of those two years, what do we find? Well, in 2024 the Dow Jones rose by 13%. 2025 it rose by only 13%. So the same with the Dow Jones. The S&P rose by more in 2024 than in 2025. And the same is true for the Nasdaq. It too rose by more in the previous year than it did in 2025.
And so let's look at how the first full calendar year of Trump 2.0, with huge tariff increases, compares to the first full year of Trump 1.0, with no tariff increases. Non-farm employment grew in 2017 by 1.6%, in 2025 by 0.5%. So non-farm employment grew by a lot more during the first year of Trump 1.0. Manufacturing employment grew during the first year of Trump's first term. It fell, as you recall, during the first year of Trump's second term. Real median household income rose by almost 2% — I should say in 2017 — and in 2025 it rose by only 1.4%. Industrial production, a real measure of how the real economy, the economy that produces tangible things, is performing. In 2017, industrial production rose by 2.5% and in 2025 by only 2%.
Real private nonresidential fixed investment rose in 2017 by 4.6%, which is higher than the 4.1% rise that we experienced in 2025. And finally, real per capita GDP — real meaning of course inflation-adjusted — rose by 1.8% in 2017 and by less, 1.6%, in 2025. By all these measures, 2017 performed — the economy performed better than it did in 2025. It doesn't prove that the tariffs are responsible for that difference, but it certainly doesn't provide consolation to people who want to point to the tariffs and say, 'See, look at all the wonderful things they're doing for the United States.' Let's look at some other — so, here's the stock indices, 2017 to 2025.
All three stock indices in 2017 rose by a larger percentage than was true in 2025. Again, stock indices — these are forward-looking. So that says that investors, at any rate, were more optimistic about the future of the American economy over the course of President Trump's first year during his first term than was true during President Trump's first year of his second term. Just really briefly, some people will say, 'Well, you can't —' Let's go back to election day because that's when these forward-looking stock markets start anticipating things. So what I've done here is look at the close of the market on election day 2016 and election day 2024 and see how the market performed through that day and the end of the following year. So, by that measure, the Dow Jones, during Trump's first term, the Dow Jones Industrial Index was up by 35% from election day 2016 through December 31st, 2017. The S&P was up by 25%, the NASDAQ up by 33%.
In Trump's second term, from election day through the end of 2025, each of those indices were up, but up by significantly less than was true during Trump's first term.
What about unemployment? Unemployment over the past 10 years has been remarkably low. It's been close to, and some will argue even below, what economists call the full employment rate. In December of 2016, the unemployment rate stood at 4.7%. A year later, after President Trump's first term — again, with no tariff increases during that year — the unemployment rate had fallen to 4.1%. In 2025, the unemployment rate rose slightly. Now, it's still low, but the end of 2024 was at 4.1%, and in December of last year it stood at 4.4%. So, on the unemployment front, Trump 2.0 is doing worse than Trump 1.0.
President Trump is obsessed with the trade deficit. And I have to pause for a moment and confess that there is no concept in all of economics or economic policy that drives me more batty than the trade deficit. I wish the concept had never been invented. It's completely misleading. It's a source of unending confusion. Deficit sounds bad. No one wants to be in deficit. No one says, 'I'm looking forward to being in deficit.' So the trade deficit gets reported — just to make sure we're all on the same page, a trade deficit is the difference between the amount we import during some period of time, a month or a year, and the amount that we export during that same period of time, assuming the imports are greater than the exports. There are some young people in this room, so I'm going to take you on a time travel. If you look really closely at me, you can tell I'm several months older than you.
I graduated from high school in 1976. I reached the official retirement age of 65 in 2023. During that entire period, every year, the United States ran a trade deficit. We have had — now, and we're still running them — we have had 50 solid years of trade deficits. It sounds bad. Wow. How can we survive as a nation running all these trade deficits? So, President Trump thinks that the trade deficit is the ultimate scorecard for how we're doing with respect to trade. So let's just — I'll say a few more words about the trade deficit in just a moment, but let's just look at the data. So in 2017, over the course of that calendar year, the trade deficit rose by 8%.
In 2024, the last year of President Biden's time in the White House, it rose by 14%. In 2025, it rose by only 3.1%. So it rose, but President Trump might say, 'Well, look, it rose by a lot less than it did during my predecessor's final year, President Biden, and it rose by less than it did in 2017.' And so a success — or is it? There's a lot to say. I don't have time to say it. But perhaps the single most telling component of the trade deficit, or a reflection of the trade deficit, is what economists call FDI. I couldn't give a presentation without throwing at least one acronym at you to prove my creds. FDI: foreign direct investment. That's when foreigners take some of their funds, they come to America and they invest them. They have controlling interest in some businesses here in the United States.
And in 2025 dollars, the amount of foreign direct investment in the US in 2017 was pretty impressive. It was $358 billion. That's pretty large. 2024 was $155 billion. 2025 was $288 billion. I think that is an impressively good measure of how to compare President Trump's second term to his first term. Foreigners, global investors, were a lot more willing to invest in America in 2017 than they were in 2025. Again, those figures are adjusted for inflation. So, what is the connection? I kind of threw it at you. What is the connection between the trade deficit and foreign direct investment?
So this can get very complicated very quickly and I don't want to do that. There's a more technical concept called the current account, and the trade account is part of the current account, but for practical purposes we can here use them as synonyms. They're not really synonymous, but they're close enough. And so if a country is running a trade deficit, that means it's running a current account deficit, or vice versa. The last year America ran a trade surplus was 1975. As I said, the first year we started running a trade deficit was the year I graduated from high school, in 1976. The United States last had a current account balance in 1983. Anyway, this was put together actually by a native Minnesotan and a former graduate student of mine, Mark Perry, who is an emeritus professor now at the University of Michigan at Flint. And it shows something all economists know. The blue line down at the bottom is trade deficits or current account deficits going down. The further down, the worse the deficit.
The top line is capital. It's called the capital account. The capital account surplus. It's investment coming into the United States. You can tell if you flip those two lines over on each other, you fold them right at that orange line, they exactly match. Whenever you hear the term trade deficit, or if you read a more advanced treatise, current account deficit, whenever you hear that term, you can substitute in your mind capital account surplus, and it's the same thing.
When we run a trade deficit, what that means is foreigners — they earn dollars by selling us stuff. They could take all of those dollars and use them to buy American exports, and there would be no American trade deficit. Problem avoided. But instead, what do they do? And what have they done for 50 solid years now? They sell us some imports. They get our dollars. They spend some of the dollars buying our exports, but they say, 'You know what? I think America has a promising economy. I want to invest my money in America.' Foreigners are just like you. If they want to invest some money, they can't spend it all on consumption goods. They have to not spend it all buying our exports in order to have some to invest. So when the United States runs a trade deficit, what that means is global investors are sending capital to the United States. We are a net recipient of capital.
Why we should be upset at a trade deficit is beyond me, except for the mere sound or valence of the term deficit. Again, another name for trade deficit is capital account surplus. If news reporters, bloggers, Twitterers or Xers, whatever they may be called now, instead used the term capital account surplus rather than trade deficit, a lot less fear about trade would be stirred up among Americans.
One claim that is often made about trade — again, trade deficit sounds bad. It sounds like wealth is draining from our economy. If that were true, if it were true that trade deficits necessarily drain wealth from our economy, we should find evidence for it in the data. Well, let's look. I adjusted — you can get using various Federal Reserve and other government sites pretty good information on household net worth, not income, net worth. And I adjusted it for inflation. And at the end of 2024, so before President Trump's current trade war, before Liberation Day, the end of 2024, the average US household's real net worth, so assets minus liabilities, it was 80% higher than in 2001. In 2010, that's the year China joined the World Trade Organization.
At the end of 2024, the average American household had a real net worth that was 142% higher than in 1994, the year NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, went into effect. And at the end of 2024, the average US household had a real net worth that's 236% higher, excuse me, than it was in 1975, the last year America ran a trade surplus.
So there's no — you cannot find evidence in the data that trade deficits reduce Americans' net worth. You can tell a story, by the way, that it's possible for America to run a trade deficit and have our net worth decline. If it were the case that we were selling off all of our assets, borrowing money, getting funds from abroad, and having a wild party — well, that would reduce our net worth. But that's not what's happening. In fact, what's happening, and what the data show us, is that foreigners look at the United States and they say that is a promising economy, at least relative to the rest of the world. It's big. It's entrepreneurial. Property rights are secure, the courts aren't corrupt. That's a place I want to invest. Labor markets are flexible. And so those funds come in, and it generates trade deficits, which unfortunately generates excuses for people who don't know basic economics to drum up fear about what's happening tradewise.
Let me — before I leave the — I'm almost done — leave the concept of trade deficits. I have to express frustration with a lot of the discussion that often takes place today in Washington, particularly from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest. President Trump and the Trump administration boast about how President Trump's trade deals are attracting foreign investment to America. And I think it's great to attract foreign investment. Now, I think it should be attracted by market forces rather than political forces. But I like foreign investment coming to America. I think that's good. The frustrating part is if President Trump's goal — and he states it often — if one of his goals is to use trade policy, high tariffs, to eliminate America's trade deficits, then he shouldn't be bragging about attracting foreign investment to America. Because every cent of foreign investment that President Trump attracts to the United States in negotiations with foreign companies and foreign governments, every cent that comes into the US as foreign investment is a cent that increases America's trade deficit.
And so to complain about trade deficits on the one hand and then in the very next breath boast about basically increasing trade deficits with the additional foreign investment doesn't make any sense to me, and I confess it just drives this economist brain of mine mad. It's just very frustrating.
Just a few other pieces of data. These are more general. These sort of dispel some fallacies that people have. These are data put together — it's hard to read, I can see now — put together by an economist, Jeremy Horpedahl, who was a graduate of my institution, George Mason University. He wasn't a student of mine, but he's one of our esteemed graduates. He teaches now in Arkansas. And he gets these data from the US Census Bureau, and these are all adjusted for inflation. And what they show is that the American middle class really is disappearing. You hear it all the time: American middle class is disappearing. That is one of the many claims that's made to justify protectionist policies. 'Well, we need to put up barriers to foreign goods because, you know, if we do that, that will bring back middle class jobs to stop the American middle class from disappearing.' The problem with that story, however, is that the American middle class is disappearing into the upper class.
When you hear the American middle class is disappearing, your natural inclination is to think, oh, everybody must be getting poor, or the middle class is sinking into greater poverty. That's not the case. And so the percentage of families earning — again, these are inflation-adjusted dollars, 2024 — the percentage of American families earning $150,000 annual income or more rose from 5.2% in 1967 — that's that top light blue area — to more than a third, 33.8%, in 2024. The middle class, that middle area, has indeed shrunk. In the late '60s, it was more than half of America, that was the middle class when I was a young boy. Today, it's less than a half, 45.2%. Families earning — again, in inflation-adjusted dollars — $50,000 in annual income or less, that shrunk from nearly 40% in 1967 to just over 20% today.
I think this is testimony to how well the American economy is performing. I'm not a Pollyanna. There are a lot of problems with the American economy. In fact, I spend most of my free time complaining about the problems with the American economy. But sometimes we have to stand back and look at the larger picture, and that's a pretty good picture.
So this is a picture of inflation-adjusted real GDP, amount of income per person in America, from 1947 through the first quarter of this year. So through March of this year, it's gone steadily upward. Those gray lines there, those gray areas, those show recessions. And during those periods, as always happens, real GDP falls, but then the recession ends, real GDP kicks back up. So let's just look at just a few dates. So if you look at 1975, the last year we ran a trade surplus, well, real GDP continues to grow after that, just as it was continuing to grow before that. There's no noticeable change in the trend of the line when we started running annual trade deficits. 1994, same thing. Real GDP per person was rising before, real GDP per person continued to rise after NAFTA went into effect. 2001, real GDP continued to rise after the short recession that happened in that year. And today it's at an all-time high.
When people in the United States complain about the decline in manufacturing, 'we don't make things anymore' — that's a direct quotation from President Trump during one of his 2016 campaigns. And he's not the only person who says it. This is taken as a matter of fact, as if it's well established as any of the laws of thermodynamics. I think what they're talking about — they're misled by this. By the way, these are all publicly available data. I constructed these from the wonderful St. Louis Federal Reserve website, FRED. And this shows the share of manufacturing employment as a share of total private sector employment. It peaked, not surprisingly, during World War II. Then it fell. It stayed pretty steady until the mid-'50s. Since the mid-'50s, which was right after the Korean War, it's fallen pretty steadily, and it keeps falling. Again, the share today, it's down to less than 10%. Back during World War II, it peaked at over 45% of the percentage of workers working in manufacturing.
This is what happens in a dynamic, growing economy. The same thing is happening and has been happening in manufacturing in the United States over the past century or more. The same thing happened then is what happened a century earlier in agriculture. If we today had the same agricultural technology that we had when the Declaration of Independence was signed 250 years ago, we would have between eight and nine Americans working on farms to feed 10 Americans. Today we have just over 1% of Americans working in agriculture. The same thing is happening in manufacturing. Manufacturing productivity is skyrocketing. So we need fewer people working in manufacturing, and we get more people working in the service sector. But that doesn't mean that we produce less.
This is industrial production, producing things — things you can touch that have weight, mass, heavy. As you can see, this goes back to 1919. This is an index, so it's adjusted for inflation. It ticked up pretty steadily until the Great Recession of 2007-2008. It's been pretty much treading water since then. But it did not decline when we stopped running trade surpluses in the mid-'70s. It did not decline with NAFTA and did not decline when China joined the WTO. It's an interesting question as to why after the Great Recession it has been treading water. It's today about two or three percentage points below its all-time high, which it hit in September of 2018. I'm not sure that there's a connection, but President Trump's first term tariffs began taking effect in the spring and summer of 2018. I don't think that's the entire or even the majority of the explanation, but the point is we still produce a lot of stuff.
What about industrial capacity? We need capacity to produce things. We need capacity, especially to produce things if we're going to get into a shooting war with other governments. Industrial capacity today is at an all-time high. This goes up through March of this year. So just a few weeks ago, it's at an all-time high. Our capacity to produce industrial outputs has never been higher. It has been ticking up. It leveled off a little bit, like industrial production, with the Great Recession of 15 or so years ago, but it didn't go down. In fact, it went up a little bit.
I like this. This is a ratio of — basically it shows your chances, if you're a manufacturing worker, of being discharged or laid off from your manufacturing job. These data go back to — these only go back to December of 2000. I have some other data. I don't have the graphs here to show you, you have to trust me, I have a PhD. But with these data from the FRED website and some other studies that I found, and some other intrepid research by my current graduate assistants, here's what I found. I'm going to read the whole thing to you. What it boils down to is manufacturing jobs over the years going back to 1958 — it's the year I was born, but that happens to be when we can get good data. From 1958 through today, a pattern is pretty clear: your chances of being laid off from a manufacturing job have steadily decreased. And that was true even back in the '50s and '60s and '70s, '80s, '90s.
So it isn't true that when we began trading more with Mexico and Canada and China that manufacturing jobs became more unstable, less secure. They were more unstable and less secure, interestingly enough, before we began trading more freely with those countries. I think one reason, by the way, is the percentage of imports in the United States that are used by American producers to produce things here is over 50%.
The measures vary depending on how you count the use of an import, but I know of no serious measure of US imports that does not find that more than half of them — more than half, I've seen estimates as high as 67% — but certainly more than half of all of our imports are not consumption goods that you buy at Target or on Amazon. They are inputs and capital that American producers are using in American factories and American farms to produce things. And so when we restrict those inputs, we're not just stopping Americans from having fewer dolls for their children at Christmas time. We're stopping American factories from having as many inputs and many low-cost inputs as they would otherwise have.
Just because I think this is an important point to make, it's often said that one thing that's happened since we started trading with foreigners more aggressively is that there's been a disconnect between worker productivity and pay. One of the most foundational principles in economics is that in market economies, the compensation of workers should keep track with the productivity of workers. Your productivity goes up, you get paid more. Your productivity goes down, you get paid less. And that's what we find. These are data constructed by the great Scott Winship, who's at the American Enterprise Institute. This is a paper he did just a couple of years ago, and it shows from 1947 through 2022 productivity and pay. Productivity is the blue line, worker pay is the orange line, and they keep track with one another. So, not only is worker pay keeping track of productivity, American productivity has gone up, which again is one reason why we need fewer people in manufacturing.
People get upset, people get worried about services. And 80% of the US economy today is services. I would bet a lot of money — maybe not my pension — but I'd bet a significant sum of money that every individual in this room works in the service sector. That's a pretty good bet. Maybe I should have taken that bet.
And these data go back to 1947, and they show that the service-producing sector of our economy has been the largest sector since just after World War II. That doesn't mean — so this is a share of GDP. So even though it appears as if we're producing fewer goods, we're producing fewer goods as a share of GDP. We're producing more goods in total, but as a share of GDP it's falling. When economies become richer, people want to consume more services, and more services get produced. Jeff Bezos is a lot richer than he was 30 years ago. I'm sure he doesn't buy a proportionate amount of clothing and toilet paper and automobiles. He buys services just like you do. You get richer, you buy more services. You get more health care. You get more education. You take more travel, you buy more entertainment, and services get derided.
Finally, this shows consumption expenditures. So the previous graph showed services and goods as a portion of GDP, and this shows what portion of Americans' personal consumption expenditures is spent on goods versus services. And as you can see, we started spending more on services pretty consistently back in 1970, and it has gone up ever since. Today, we spend about 69% of our disposable income on services and less than a third of our disposable income on goods, and that's what we expect to happen as a nation becomes richer.
So in sum, there's no evidence and no credible evidence that the Liberation Day tariffs have or are helping the American economy. I think the evidence by and large points in the opposite direction. And number two, a lot of the claims about the state of the American economy used to justify those tariffs, I think are factually mistaken. And I thank you for your time.