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Alex Thorn
Head of Firmwide Research, Galaxy Digital

A Bitcoin Wallet Bug Just Drained $100M w/ Alex Thorn | Galaxy Grid

📅 Aug 04, 2026 Galaxy 42 MIN 2883 VIEWS 42 SEGMENTS · 4 SPEAKERS
In this emergency episode of Galaxy Grid, we break down the massive CoinKite Coldcard hardware wallet exploit that has compromised over 1,500 BTC ($100M+) across multiple attack waves. Alex Thorn delivers an exclusive play-by-play tracing the silent March 2021 RNG firmware bug, while Will Owens details how he successfully baited an automated drainer bot and won an RBF fee race to rescue his funds. Finally, we examine how open-source AI models were used to operationalize the attack and what this breach means for the future of Bitcoin self-custody versus institutional ETFs. Timestamps 0:00 Int...

Questions asked in this interview

9
  1. 0:09Like give us a rundown. Like what's going on?
  2. 14:49A lot of them are just sitting in a few wallets, right?
  3. 19:49... on to what the exploit is and figuring out their own ways to do it, and you and Will actually did like your own exploit of an exploiter by kind of phishing one of the attackers into trying to take some of Will's keys. Is that right?
  4. 20:22Like I checked, it was actually just sitting in the mempool unconfirmed, because, you know, the attacker basically — the fee the attacker paid was one sat per vByte, so, you know, pretty crazy low fee, right?
  5. 23:41So, Alex was talking about this morning, I think it was like an automated bot, right?
  6. 27:32You know, Alex, what are you kind of seeing in terms of like what are the main debates?
  7. 33:44Yeah, everyone was self-custodying and now everyone's like leaving self-custody to like add their coins to exchanges, right?
  8. 35:25I mean, it'll definitely lead to renewed calls to give like Project Glass Wing to like basically every single crypto-related entity that, you know, is at a high enough level where they can implement protections, right?
  9. 36:42Or is this something that you think is like a long-term stain?
Lucas Cheyne 0:09 ↗
GM GM GM, welcome back to Galaxy Brain. I'm Lucas Cheyne, joined today by Alex Thorn, Zach Piccorney, and Will Owens. Before we begin, I need to remind you to please refer to the link to the disclaimer in the show notes and note that none of the information in this show constitutes investment advice or an offer, recommendation, or solicitation by Galaxy or any of its affiliates to buy or sell any securities. All right, we've got kind of a special episode today. We're just going to get right into it. It's a topic that's on everyone's mind and we've got kind of like the man to talk about it with, Alex, who has just been on an absolute tear covering the CoinKite Coldcard Bitcoin hardware wallet hack over the past few days. So, you know, just real quick timeline context for those who have not been paying attention. You know, last Thursday an exploit was discovered. There was a sweep of about 1,082 Bitcoin, roughly, you know, $70 million from about 1,200 wallets in a 41-minute window, and it kind of set off this whole alarm of, oh shoot, has there been a hack? What's the source of it? It appears that there was an exploit in a specific wallet by CoinKite called Coldcard. And over the past few days the hacks have continued. Alex has been documenting them very closely in these different waves. And so, so far it looks like there's been about four waves. We've got what, over 1,500 Bitcoin, over $100 million basically. And important to note, like the attack is still going on, right? So, if you're listening to this and you use it, like be sure to go look at Galaxy Research Twitter and get online and, you know, secure your coins. But, you know, Alex, I'm going to just kind of start it with you. Like give us a rundown. Like what's going on? Like kind of give us the play-by-play of kind of what happened over the past few days from your eyes.
Alex Thorn 1:51 ↗
It's been an eventful few days. Very, I would say, depressing for a lot of Bitcoiners, even those who are not impacted directly. So at the core, a hardware wallet when it generates your new keys, right? Which is your private keys and your public keys, it requires randomness, right? And hardware wallets use a random number generator to introduce that entropy into the key generation. Now Coldcard, until March 17th, 2021, when they did an upgrade, was using one random number generator that was working great. They introduced their own random number generator, which apparently may have also worked, but they wired it incorrectly so that when you went to generate, rather than using the new random number generator, it defaulted to a crappy one that was on there, but it failed silently. So nobody knew and there was no warning, 'Oh no, your keys are generated by this, you know, low entropy random number generator.' Now how that didn't go undetected for 5 years is a huge question that comes out of this and it's going to reshape how Bitcoin security audits work. But the result was that anyone that generated a key set on the Coldcards after March 17th, 2021's firmware upgrade, and didn't themselves introduce other entropy — you can with dice rolling and other things — and didn't have a strong passphrase, which is additional words entered into the seed, their addresses are totally vulnerable to being cracked effectively. So, and this was discovered... Well, I mean, the first, as Lucas said, wave one as we call it, was basically early morning on July 30th, UTC time, for 41 minutes. That is still the bulk of the confirmed hacks. So, yeah, this was the wave one, the first post here that we made.
Yeah, so, an attacker — and I can describe how the attack actually works a little bit — but basically started sweeping addresses from vulnerable public keys, right? And so, these are individuals who generated their addresses in cold storage and are in single-signature hardware wallet generated addresses. This is not people at an exchange that got hacked or a smart contract in DeFi that got hacked, and these people did not drop their keys on the street. They didn't post their private keys accidentally on the web, right? They did nothing to leak their keys, and that's partly what makes this so devastating. So, and I'll get back to that in a second, but this pattern that let us fingerprint what we call wave one was identified by engineers at Block — right? Cash App, Square, Spiral, Bakkt. They have great security engineers. They identified the pattern here, which includes things like signature type, dormancy of coins, all fully swept in one transaction, etc., right? And so I took their pattern and extrapolated it across the chain and found the full set, right? You can see there the fixed fee if you go back, I think, one, Lucas, or maybe forward. This one, right? So, you know, they're all paying like crazy high fees, right? There were ways to pattern match, and that's how we identified sort of the totality of the wave one hack, and then victims have come and reported to me their funds being stolen inside of this hack, which further confirmed it, right?
So then wave two and three, which we've mapped and have high confidence in, which are the blue and the purple there, we did not know about these patterns. These are solely the result of victims coming forward to me, and then me looking at those patterns and extrapolating. And we have extremely high confidence that these are two additional sets of coordinated attacks. But it's important to say like why I've been on X like encouraging victims to come forward. When new attackers emerge, I can use the victims' addresses and transaction IDs to try to establish a pattern and find other victims and attackers, right? And then we've been reporting the victim and attacker addresses to federal authorities, to other crypto exchanges, to SEAL, to Crypto ISAC, to Chainalysis and TRM, etc., etc. So, the hope being that, you know, where these funds end up, those attacker addresses, should the attackers ever move those coins to any centralized intermediary, they could be frozen and maybe, you know, returned ultimately to victims. Just some interesting stuff here. Wave one and two look pretty similar and they ultimately consolidate into just a few pooled attacker addresses. Wave three is materially different. Every theft transaction, all the inputs into the transaction are from one victim. Whereas some of these wave one and two, like they have the keys for a bunch of coins and they're spending them all together on the input side of a transaction. Wave three is one transaction per victim, consolidating their stolen coins into one, we call a park address, like an intermediate address. The intermediate ones in wave one and two are collector addresses because they're consolidating for many people. And then in wave three, from the park address, every victim, their funds are moved, not commingled, into a corresponding vault, basically these pay-to-witness-script-hash addresses. We don't know if those are multi-sigs. They haven't spent, so when the script is revealed on chain, we'll be able — like if they do spend, we'll be able to see what type. But the difference being that rather than being pooled into these big pooled attacker addresses, the wave three attacker is holding each victim separately in like 293 vaults. Different pattern there. Maybe means a different attacker. Could be the same attacker with a new methodology. You know, it could be three. We're pretty sure that wave one is all one attacker, wave two is all one attacker, and wave three is all one attacker, but we're not certain whether any of them are the same attacker. And these, we have extremely high confidence in this, like almost 1,400 Bitcoin. There are now, which...
I haven't really fully reported on because it's just ballooning, at least like 13 or 14 likely other attackers with different patterns that are typically much smaller than these. And that's established by victim reports. Again, I've received like about 70 unique reports from victims. When I receive those, I'm running their addresses and their transaction IDs. In some cases, they're giving me their master public keys, which lets me fully derive all of their possible addresses, which, you know, you wouldn't normally give to a third party because they can see your entire transaction history. But again, you know, I obviously disclose that to them before they give those to me, but, you know, if they don't have any transactions from the past they want to hide, and they're never using this wallet again, so there's a very low risk. So, you know, I think I'm up to footprint L. We call these footprints because I'm not confident enough yet to actually promote them into these totals and call them, you know, waves. But, you know, we're up to footprint L. And those we're tracking. Those are, you know, we have confirmed losses from victims. So it's a matter of trying to decide if the other... if they're confirmed losses inside of a transaction that looks like wave one with many other inputs that aren't the victims, then we feel pretty confident that it's a genuine attack. In some cases, like it could be more like wave three where, you know, the victim in, say, like footprint XYZ, we only see one transaction. We don't see any other addresses other than the reported victims. I have gone and said, 'Okay, we'll take the properties of that transaction and look across the recent blocks and in the mempool. Are there any others that look like it?' Like those I've sort of identified, but I lack confirmation. Finally, I'll just say like people may have seen I sent a very urgent tweet yesterday, or I guess I should say on Sunday, about a potential wave four. This was solely the result of pattern identification on confirmed transactions. At the time that I sent it, like these were at the chain tip. So these were occurring right then. And there were a bunch of similar-looking ones in the mempool unconfirmed. I've followed up on this thread with a couple caveats since, but largely this still holds. For example, there were some multisig transactions in there that my friends at Nunchuk, a multisig provider, pointed out. Like those were likely legitimate by the users. There's no evidence of a single multisig transaction in waves one through three. One, two, or three. Because if you can think about it, like unless your multi-sig has Coldcards that can, just with Coldcards, reach a signature signing threshold, it wouldn't matter if you had one Coldcard and two Trezors, right? If you had a two-of-three, for example. So, this is still unconfirmed. Wave four, if it does get confirmed, it will balloon what we consider high-confidence value of the whole hack even higher. I'm working to confirm this. We're seeking victims to continue coming forward to me on X. If I get multiple victims that their transactions are in this suspected set, like we'll start considering this very, very likely. So, yeah, and, you know, we're sharing, like I said, with law enforcement, and I'm providing to any victims that come forth a report that traces all of their funds and they can use to themselves report to local authorities and federal law enforcement. Right, we recommend that victims report to their local police and to the FBI's IC3. And if they're not in the US, any other similar cybercrime or cyberfraud federal organization. I tell everyone that establishing your victimhood is essential. The nature of this attack is such that you cannot establish definitively your ownership of the stolen coins by cryptography because your cryptography has been broken. So, you know, filing reports with authorities early is essential. And I tell everyone there's no shame in this. Like, they did nothing wrong. This is not — you weren't like sloppy, you know? This was a matter of a hardware wallet like basically not doing what it was supposed to do. And so, I know people tend to, you know, be ashamed when this type of thing happens, but, you know, I encourage everyone to know there is no shame here. You did nothing wrong. Continue to report, and, you know, if you are using Coldcard still, you know, there's a lot of nuance that, you know, if you go on X, this great Bitcoiner Wicked has been running like 96-hour long Q&As on Spaces. Like, you know, if you get in it with the top, you know, Bitcoin minds, there are nuances. There are instances where using Coldcard and you would not be vulnerable. But, you know, I think for the average person, if you're holding funds in a Coldcard, even if you rolled dice or have a strong passphrase, go ahead and make plans to migrate your funds off those devices. You know, don't panic. If you have an old device, a single-sig Coldcard with no passphrase, and you don't remember rolling a bunch of dice, I would move them off immediately. But if you did have dice, your passphrase, it's part of a multi-sig quorum, you know, I still think the safest option is to move them out. If you don't have a good new self-custody setup ready, send them to Coinbase, send them to River, send them to an exchange or custodian that you trust and use, and then make plans from there. I'll stop there. I could go on and on talking.
Lucas Cheyne 14:49 ↗
No, no, I mean, thanks. That's incredibly helpful. And I mean, I guess just the first follow-up is, so in terms of the coins that have been exploited, you know, what are we seeing? What are they... A lot of them are just sitting in a few wallets, right? But I know you also were reporting that some of it's been gone through ThorChain and stuff like that.
Alex Thorn 15:07 ↗
Yeah. Yeah, waves one, two, and three, which are the bulk, right? I think — and I should say, like, there are... I haven't yet... Both from the confirmed victim reports that are in other footprints, I have it now at around 1,600 Bitcoin. I feel very confident is part of this attack. So, over $100 million now. I'll, you know, when I get to it — I'm right now still helping victims and triaging and building the set and sending addresses to authorities, but haven't had a moment really yet to fully update the Galaxy research threads. But when I do, you'll see that number rise. I think waves 1, 2, and 3 still comprise the bulk of this attack and none of those funds have moved from attacker addresses. So, they're all sitting unspent, right? So, waves 1 and 2 and a couple collected at, you know, pooled addresses. 293 vaulted addresses for wave 3. They haven't moved. They haven't moved since like that graphic that you showed Lucas, the Sankey graphic, those are called. That's still accurate for waves 1, 2, and 3. They have not moved anywhere, let alone off Bitcoin. There are, like I said, like I don't know if we want to call them copycats or smaller operators. They are doing different things. And there was one, yes, that I tweeted about because the victim and I were quite upset. Funds were swept through ThorChain onto ETH, deposited into duel.com, a casino. duel.com had originally told the victim they needed a police report to do any freezing. This was after midnight on Saturday. There's obviously no way to get that. You know, I was quite upset with this. They claimed that, 'Well, you know, we promise instant withdrawals and it would be unfair not knowing, you know, not being sure to freeze them.' You know, this is a website that, you know, has no discernible jurisdiction. And as far as I can tell, most of their casino dealers are OnlyFans models. And while they did reply to me, and I give them credit for that, and they did say they would retain any records and respond to any future law enforcement request. I think when it comes to, you know, US firms will at least temporarily freeze when compelling evidence is presented to them. Doesn't mean they'll seize them, right? And I understand that like a random researcher or possible victim appearing out of nowhere saying, 'Hey, those are my coins. You have to freeze them,' is problematic for a centralized intermediary. But nonetheless, you know, we see this a lot, especially with like the offshore, you know, this is like — I don't even know. Their domain's registered in Iceland. Their AML thing said they're in like one of those like countries that like can't even name. It's like an island near like Mauritius, you know, like I literally don't even know the name. I looked at it. I can't even remember it. I've never heard of it, right? In these itty-bitty jurisdictions.
So, we have seen some of that, but that has been typically these much more bespoke, smaller hacks. And, you know, we can expect these to continue. And because the way that they're doing this is they're looking at the seed generation in the Coldcard. And, you know, one, the vulnerability was probably discovered with AI, though it certainly didn't need AI to be discovered. There have been bugs in random number generation many times in the past. This is one of the most confounding things about it, how this went 5 years without being found. A huge, huge problem for the Bitcoin security community that should have been found. And I can say now there are red teams like burning millions of tokens and tens of thousands of dollars to examine all known hardware wallet source code, all like open-source source code. I can say that those red teams have reported that the other major hardware wallets do not have bugs like this. This is like — I can't say they have no bugs, obviously, but this is truly isolated to the Coldcard at the moment, like this incident. But I think the Bitcoin security community has woken up here that a substantially larger amount of work needs to be done, and that extends to like all of crypto.
A lot of people are trusting and not verifying, and they don't have the capability to verify. So like others who do have the capability need to be verifying. And they are now for sure. I mean, there's a huge effort underway behind the scenes. Yeah, so I did — I forgot what the question was here, Lucas.
Lucas Cheyne 19:49 ↗
That was perfect. I mean, I do want to talk a little bit about like the broader response from the Bitcoin and crypto community in terms of what this means for self-custody and stuff like that, but just before we do, like real quick, you've mentioned how it looks like other attackers are basically catching on to what the exploit is and figuring out their own ways to do it, and you and Will actually did like your own exploit of an exploiter by kind of phishing one of the attackers into trying to take some of Will's keys. Is that right? Well, maybe just give us a quick overview of what went down here.
Will Owens 20:22 ↗
Yeah, I wasn't even expecting it to play out like this, to be honest. Like on Thursday afternoon, basically I was in the office with Tad and we like initially saw this tweet from Jameson Lopp talking about like, you know, he's hearing unverified reports of partial Bitcoin wallet thefts. You know, I got into Bitcoin like at Bitcoin Park in November of 2022. The first time I ever went there, they gifted me a Coldcard when I went in there and, you know, I was like, okay, this is sick, right? Like this, you know, ultra-secure hardware wallet. So then I started DCA-ing Bitcoin. This is right after FTX, so Bitcoin was like 16K. I was DCA-ing with my roommate and just throwing it on my Coldcard. And, you know, I've kept it there ever since, right? Because it's, you know, in my mind it was like the most secure place I could possibly store my Bitcoin was this air-gapped Coldcard. And then I see this, right? And it's Thursday night. I'm actually like at a bar with my friends, and then I see on Twitter like, you know, it's much more urgent than I thought. Like I thought it was kind of just people talking about it, and then it was like all of a sudden I'm like, 'Yo, I actually got to like go back to my apartment and migrate my funds ASAP.' And, you know, it's air-gapped, right? So, in order to migrate your funds, you basically need to — like for me, I needed to put an SD or a microSD card into my computer, open Sparrow wallet, create a transaction, and then eject the microSD, put it into my Coldcard, unlock my Coldcard, sign the transaction, eject the microSD from my Coldcard, put it back into my computer, open Sparrow wallet again, and then broadcast it to the Bitcoin network. Right? So, it's kind of like, you know, you saw people who were like less advanced in Bitcoin kind of crashing out on the timeline because they couldn't even figure out how to move their funds because they'd like never had to do this before. But yeah, so I moved — so basically I moved all my funds except for, you know, around like $150 of Bitcoin. I didn't even have this like crazy elaborate strategy. I was kind of just like curious like when I would get drained. I was like, 'I'm just going to leave this here and see if I'll get drained,' right? And then yesterday morning I was at a coffee shop drinking coffee in NoDa, and I check my BlueWallet app on my phone, which is like a view-only wallet, right? And I see this transaction, right? Like I got drained. Like that was not my transaction, and it was, you know, it said pending. Like I checked, it was actually just sitting in the mempool unconfirmed, because, you know, the attacker basically — the fee the attacker paid was one sat per vByte, so, you know, pretty crazy low fee, right? And I message Alex and I'm like, 'Yo, I just got drained. Like I left my Bitcoin on my Coldcard to see when it would get drained.' And he's like, 'You can actually, you know, you can just use RBF, right?' And so, this is replaced-by-fee, which is like a node policy that allows an unconfirmed transaction in a mempool to be replaced with a different transaction. That essentially like basically...
Alex Thorn 23:29 ↗
...transaction that spends the same funds, but has a higher fee. Ultimately, only one can be confirmed, to be clear. But it's like you can bump it with a higher fee. So, you could change the destination.
Will Owens 23:41 ↗
Exactly. And so, I was outside, I wasn't at my apartment at the time. And so, I kind of like go back to my apartment really quickly, you know, do the same kind of user flow of the air-gapped transaction, but this time I make sure to, you know, three sats per vByte fee, and then my transaction gets confirmed. And so, the attacker lost, right? So, Alex was talking about this morning, I think it was like an automated bot, right? That probably is hitting a lot of different addresses and minimizing fees across a large surface. And so, like technically, you know, we both have identical spending authority. So, you know, they could have RBF'd back because they had like the same key. But nobody was really watching because it was probably automated. And so, like that's probably why I like won like the fee auction, essentially. Yeah. But no, it was sick. I mean, obviously, I don't think there's any way to prove this unless somebody comes out and says so, but I think I might be like the only person to have done that in like the Coldcard exploit. So, that's — it's kind of cool.
Alex Thorn 24:52 ↗
I haven't seen — well, because you have to basically catch the attacker before the draining transaction is still unconfirmed in the mempool, right? So, many of these Coldcard — the demographic of the Coldcard user, to Will's point, right? He's not sitting at home looking at his Coldcard. These are like cold storage long-term self-custody sat stackers. A lot of them like have to go through significant lengths just to get the wallet, you know what I'm saying? So, but I want to point out about Will's RBF, what was very helpful to us about him actually baiting — although it would have been frankly, I think, just as helpful if the attacker had gotten...
Will Owens 25:37 ↗
Yeah, had gotten the funds.
Alex Thorn 25:39 ↗
But this was an attacker that I'm calling drainer bot. It is not part of any of the waves that we have mapped. It's its own entity. And so it's net new, right? So it's a net new attacker that we're now tracking. This one stupidly seems — this is a script kiddie, I'm almost sure, because the destination is not a fresh address. It's been reused. It has inputs and outputs from well before the Coldcard attack. I wasn't able to find any attribution of any funds related to that, like upstream related to this, like, you know, it's not like Coinbase sent it to it that I could see. But this was sloppy and it is an attacker and it's a net new one. So again, like whether the fact that Will was able to raise his and protect — I mean, you had left those, I'm going to call it dust, but 150 bucks, not literally dust, but you'd left those funds there as bait anyway.
Will Owens 26:34 ↗
Yeah, exactly. I was literally just curious. Like I just wanted to see when I would get drained. Like how long it would take.
Alex Thorn 26:42 ↗
You had an MK3 with no passphrase and no dice rolls.
Will Owens 26:45 ↗
I got exact — 100%, yeah, exactly. I got it in November 2022. And yeah, Coldcard MK3. So which is like...
Alex Thorn 26:55 ↗
And you don't recall like rolling 100 dice and typing in those numbers?
Will Owens 26:58 ↗
No, I did not do that. Yeah, yeah.
Alex Thorn 27:03 ↗
Yeah, so that's the most vulnerable type of address that we'll have, right? It's a matter of time before all of those will be hacked.
Will Owens 27:11 ↗
Yeah, and it's extra scary too because I was almost out of town this weekend. Like I almost went to — like I almost left New York just for the weekend. And if I would have done that, you know, I don't take my Coldcard with me like when I'm traveling. So I would have just lost all the Bitcoin that was on the device.

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APA

Thorn, A. (2026, August 4). A Bitcoin Wallet Bug Just Drained $100M w/ Alex Thorn | Galaxy Grid [Interview transcript]. Galaxy. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265647/

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Alex Thorn. "A Bitcoin Wallet Bug Just Drained $100M w/ Alex Thorn | Galaxy Grid." Galaxy, 4 Aug. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265647/.

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@misc{thorn2026_3265647,
  author       = {Alex Thorn},
  title        = {A Bitcoin Wallet Bug Just Drained $100M w/ Alex Thorn | Galaxy Grid},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Galaxy. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {aug},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265647/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}