Welcome to Galaxy Brains. I'm your host Alex Thorn. US banking system is sound and resilient. Bitcoin made a new all-time high. If you're not long, you're short. Satoshi's going to come out there, laugh his directly, go quiet, and all Bitcoin's going to be erased. Bitcoin is the best crypto asset. Bitcoin is going to zero.
Welcome to Galaxy Brains. As always, I'm your host Alex Thorn, head of firmwide research at Galaxy. Bitcoin not zero. We have a great episode for you today. I'm in Las Vegas at the Venetian Hotel and Casino Resort for Bitcoin 2026. Uh and I'm going to walk around a little bit and show you some of uh what's going on. Talk about my impressions of the conference. Of course, I'll head on back to the room, get on the live stream with Tim Beanie from Galaxy Trading, talk about markets. Before we get to all that, I need to remind you, please refer to the link to the disclaimer in the podcast notes and note that none of the information in this podcast constitutes investment advice or an offer, recommendation, or solicitation by Galaxy or any of its affiliates to buy any securities. Let's walk around check out the conference.
There's been big talks from Michael Saylor from the SEC and CFTC chairs were both here, which I think is statement about how how clear the regulatory picture is becoming in Bitcoin and in digital assets. Um and there's some really good panels today. I'm on two of them, one about Bitcoin and AI and one about quantum, Bitcoin's readiness for a quantum world. Um and I don't know, if we just take a look like this is full. This is full. And it's pretty impressive Pulse given that uh Consensus is in Miami next week.
All right, we've walked the floor. Uh we've talked to all our friends. We checked out all the booths. We've been hanging out at the conference, but I have a big panel on the main stage right now. How real is the quantum threat? I'm moderating. Four great panelists, uh Brandon Black, James O'Beirne, Hunter Beast, and Alex Prud'homme from Project 11, who we recorded an episode on Galaxy Brains just a few weeks ago. Let's go to the panel and show you guys some clips.
Um I'm Alex Thorn from Galaxy. I've got Brandon Black, James O'Beirne, Hunter Beast, and Alex Prud'homme. Uh this is the talk of the town like Greg said. This is a big topic. A lot of people are asking a lot of things about it. I hear about it and from our institutional counterparties, what's the deal with quantum? Uh we're going to get into some of these things. We're going to talk about the urgency. We're going to talk about uh possible solutions and mitigations. And then we're going to talk about what to do with coins and exposed addresses such as Satoshi's coins. Before we do that, I'm going to start with you, Alex Prud'homme from Project 11. Uh you have uh raised a lot of the discussion about this in in the public. Can you give the audience a quick overview of what the potential problem is, what quantum might do to Bitcoin if it becomes real?
Uh yeah, thanks. And first of all, I don't want to take credit for raising this as a discussion topic. Hunter's done a lot of work over the last year as well as Pierre Rochard and a lot of other folks in the community. So, um first off, okay, quantum, what does it matter to this group here? Um quantum computers are a type of computer that's based on the principles of quantum mechanics uh that can perform some problems more efficiently than a classical computer could. Uh one of those problems is uh with something called the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which is the basis for the public key cryptography that we use in Bitcoin. Right? And very just quickly, what does that mean? You know, as uh yeah, yeah, the public key crypto system, as the name implies, the public key is meant to be public and you shouldn't be able to recover the private key from just knowing the public key. And this private key is used to sign messages, right? And a quantum computer running Shor's algorithm uh enables you to do just that, right? And so, what is the impact on Bitcoin? Well, it enables me to go the kind of the the wrong way down the one-way road. If I have a public key in my possession, I can recover your private key or someone's private key, the the corresponding private key, and then sign a message uh to basically, you know, show that I or I too appear to be the one that owns the private key, right? And what does this mean practically? It breaks the concept of ownership that basically the public key cryptography in Bitcoin is meant to ensure.
That's a good overview. I don't know, Brandon, you want to offer any any differences in the way you would characterize it from Alex here or how do you think about it?
Well, I think it's I mean that's the right answer, like yes, it breaks the cryptography, you can reverse the elliptic curve discrete log. The only thing I would add really is that that's if we can build a quantum computer that can run Shor's algorithm, which has not yet been demonstrated.
How close are we, Brandon or James, in your mind to building one?
I think based on the evidence, not very close at all, if it's even possible, um given things like you know, we don't really know how long we can entangle qubits. We haven't passed qubits through circuits of depth anything resembling, you know, what would actually execute Shor's, and every demonstration cited as being some kind of evidence toward cryptographically relevant quantum computer is either sort of a slight of hand or an outright hoax, as in the case of what we saw from Alex's organization recently, where a pre-computing step is done by a classical computer that is then encoded into the quantum circuit and used as some kind of fodder to say, "Oh, well, we're we're making such great progress. We've cracked 16-bit ECDSA." When in actuality, doing something like that in a classical context is fairly trivial, and then dressing it up with quantum window dressing is kind of a you know, meaningless gesture.
Well, James, I appreciate you giving me the opportunity to talk about Project 11's product, the random number generator that's quantum powered. Uh but no, in all seriousness, I really I I appreciate the opportunity to address that. Look, I think there's a consensus at this point that the Q-Day prize, which is what you're referring to, is not evidence of a, you know, progress towards a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, right? And a skeptic like you cites the absence of this progress as reasons to not believe that this is possible. But I think, you know, if you look at the literature, specifically Google's paper that came out in the last couple of months, or Atom's paper, so these are leading academics in the field of quantum physics that have been working on error correction, the ability to basically make the reason why these, you know, the the Q-Day prize contestant is not able to do anything interesting is because they don't have error-corrected quantum computers. And I don't think it's right to say that there's been no progress on quantum computing. There has actually been demonstrated error correction, Google's paper in 2024, below threshold. So, I think the question is if it's not the Q-Day prize, then what is the right benchmark that would convince a skeptic like you? And the reason I think this is important is because we don't want to throw away cryptography that is securing trillions of dollars and has for years, right? But at the same time, there is a risk that a crypto a cryptographically relevant quantum computer can be built, and I think that risk is potentially existential to Bitcoin.
If you guys are quantum experts, why did you market that demo as a break of ECDSA on the basis of a quantum computer? Shouldn't Shouldn't you know enough to know that that wasn't actually anything of the sort?
I want to make this panel about quantum, and so I want to let the moderator, Alex there, kind of drive it. Uh we can debate whether or not we have the authority to talk about it, but I want to make sure this uh the value for this audience is to learn about this topic. Well, maybe to get back on topic, can you tell the audience how many qubits, how many Tofoli gates are necessary to run Shor's algorithm?
Uh well, it depends on the specific paper and resource estimate that you're looking at, right? So, you take the Google the Google paper, I believe they cite 70 million Toffoli gates, right? And so, by the way, we're cited in that paper. Our work is in there. And so, yeah, so I you know, there there are there's a space-time trade-off and it kind of depends on how you plan to build this quantum computer. I think this is maybe something for the audience to take in mind. You know, there's multiple tech trees to building these systems. You have superconducting computers, which is what IBM and Google basically give you an interface to use. But, the kind of next generation of computers that have the potential to be very efficient cryptographically or, you know, potential to break the cryptography underlying Bitcoin use different approaches, right? And that's why I don't think it's right to say that just because one approach fails, all the others will, too.
All right, gentlemen, let's let me give Hunter a chance to get in here. Hunter from Surmount Systems also uh one of the authors of Bit 360. What what's your perspective on this part of the conversation, Hunter?
Well, I think we need to do our best to seek truth here and be intellectually honest. And uh the intellectual honest answer is that there is no hard evidence that would point to definitively disproving or proving the threat yet. And so, I think in this time of uncertainty, we need to fall back on first principles and we need to do the work to build the the tools we need to convince people with proof and evidence that the threat could maybe be imminent. Also, I'm not sure if it's the right question to be asking. I think one of the most depressing things I think about is just like, are we going to be coming back here year after year having done nothing to address the concern and just keep bickering about this and doing nothing productive in a way that's its own grift, right? Like we could if if quantum computers really are impossible, we could come back here 5 years, 10 years, build a whole career on this just bickering over this grip.
Well, you know, and so I would like, in my opinion, to just put the fud to rest. Do the work. It's an engineering problem. And present evidence and strategies and give people the opportunity to change their minds based on new input. I don't think people are particularly unreasonable or intransigent in the Bitcoin community as people like to think. I think we are we we we've gotten this far based on evidence and reason and not on ideology and coercion.
All right. So, we can and we will I know we will and maybe we'll do it for the next five Bitcoin conferences debate the urgency of the problem. But if we grant that it could be possible, let's say even a 1% chance, I want to talk a little bit about some of the work that is being done as mitigations or solutions or that could be done or the difficulty in enacting something on the Bitcoin protocol if something was to be done. Maybe sticking with you, Hunter. BIP 360 is one of the most reviewed BIPs and also more advanced that has been proposed as a mitigating solution. Could you give a high level of what the proposal is?
Yeah, so BIP 360, and not to be confused with BIP 361, it's a very different BIP. So, BIP 360 exists as essentially a opt-in new output type in Bitcoin. An output type is kind of similar to an address for the plebs, right? And so, this allows us to essentially have a like a a first step for wallet optionality on how you wish to spend your coins. And you might commit to a path that lets you spend them with elliptic curve cryptography as it currently exists. It will also allow you to maybe spend the post-quantum gravity at some future date and commit to a script path in your wallet before that's even active on mainnet. And we might even combine that with elliptic curve cryptography so that there's no reduction in security assumptions of what we currently understand is safe. And so we need to be very rigorous and conservative in solving this problem. And I think we should in in a bare minimum activate BIP 54, which is the great consensus cleanup that is very uncontroversial. We need to do that. It protects us against a number of other threats. We also need to activate BIP 360 and maybe not any other post-quantum cryptography, but BIP 360 and BIP 54 50 4 are both very solid, uncontroversial, conservative approaches to solving these problem this problem. And hopefully maybe even another another thing that we've been working on for BIP 360 to hopefully bridge the gap and divide amongst Bitcoiners around, you know, a lot of the things we're talking about. I would like to make BIP 360 compatible with BIP 110. And that that takes a lot of engineering effort, but we've been doing it and I think I know I know I know there's some BIP 110 skeptics out there. I think, you know what? These people have enough shared common values with us. We should we should focus on the fact that Bitcoin is a direct challenge to nation-state monetary sovereignty and we need to remember our mission to separate money from state.
Honor Honor bridge builder beast, we're not going to get into BIP 110, but I appreciate those comments a lot. What were you going to say, Alex?
I was just going to say I think it's it's kind of hard to separate the urgency of the problem from the potential solution, right? Because if you think, you know, there's a lot of aspects here at risk, right? So, Bit360, among other things, it kind of disables a way to reveal your public key.
Um It doesn't disable anything.
Well, it I mean, it it basically helps mitigate a potential risk of public key, you know, reuse or or exposure, right? But, I think there's obviously a world in which if a quantum computer is coming sooner, then there needs to be more aggressive actions to mitigate, right? And so, this again brings it back to like, "Hey, what is the right benchmark? How do we know?" Look, I think uh you know, just today you had Scott Aaronson, noted quantum researcher, on the Coinbase advisory panel. He published a blog post that said, "This is your warning. A quantum computer may arrive by the time by the time this decade is out." I mean, he said it as definitively as he could because he doesn't want to be blamed doesn't want to be blamed for not doing enough. So, look, I think again, to your framing, Alex, I think if there's even a 1% chance, we should proactively move forward and you know, from a, you know, kind of a top-to-bottom way address this problem to make it so that the quantum topic is not viewed as fud. I don't think it's right to frame it as fud. I think this is about mitigating one of the most existential risks to Bitcoin.
The shortcoming to that framing is that there are many risks to Bitcoin, and there's a finite amount of engineering effort that we have to distribute over those risks.
Well, what's a more existential risk than this? Scaling.
Scaling is existential? If we can't scale,
Centralization will make Bitcoin completely fail and then
Absolutely. How about the particular parameters around supply distribution and the fact you guys scare up all of institutional investors and whip everybody into a frenzy because they're reminded that they don't actually understand the cryptographic bedrock, and they're in doubt, and they're delaying their adoption of Bitcoin, then by the time the security spend on Bitcoin has been reduced by twice and then again 8 years from now, um we may be in a in a very uncomfortable position in terms of the net security spend on mining.
I think the only I mean, there is no way that anything I could say could threaten the cryptographic bedrock of Bitcoin.
I think that's the point of it's a bedrock, but a quantum computer might threaten that bedrock.
I think we need to talk really seriously about like what is the threat of quantum computer and the reality is that most people's UTXOs are safe forever because a quantum computer, even if it isn't invented, is going to be expensive for a long time. So, if it costs $50,000 to break a public key into a private key, every UTXO worth less than $50,000 is safe forever. Right? We we can't like panic about this. The fact that it can break a public key doesn't mean every public key can get broken. And so, it really depends. It depends what the evidence shows. It depends which kind of quantum computer we have out there. If it's a neutral atom computer, it'll never give the short-range attack. It'll never break a key faster than a week or so on a neutral atom, but it will on a superconducting. So, we really have to look at the evidence of what's happening on real quantum computers. And of course, as James just said, the evidence today is that no real quantum computer has ever run Shor's algorithm. And so, it does not make sense to take any action beyond the P360, which is good for other reasons, too, on Bitcoin today.
I guess the question is how do you know you're like how how will we know that we'll get that evidence? In fact, so Craig Gidney, noted Google cryptanalyst who was also nice enough to take time out of his Saturday to flame me this weekend, you know, he he said I asked him this question. I said, "Look, okay, if this is not it, then what is the benchmark, right?" I don't have a good answer. There's not a good benchmark. I think, you know, in the Google paper itself says, "Hey, when we get to the point where we can factor a 32-bit number, it's over." And this is the risk here. And by the way, these post-quantum cryptographic migrations have to be handled with care. They should not be rushed. And that's exactly why I think even if there's a 1% chance, we need to be conservative and act, you know, in the best interest of Bitcoin, which is I think is proactively address this threat. Go ahead, Hunter.
I I think it's also important to point out that it if we don't come up with a good evidence-based comprehensive solution that essentially puts the fud to rest, that opens up the door for essentially fraudsters and grifters to capitalize on that fear and sell us solutions based on trust me bro to cryptography. We just saw a wallet here at this conference called Castle with a Q and their whole freaking thing is like, "Oh, we have a black box that generates a really great with secret key for you and trust me bro, use our private key that we'll give you in your wallet." And really there's no secure way in my mind that you can do that with that like essentially isn't just, you know, non-custodial in a different form. And so I really do think it's important that we keep keep bearing in mind that as the fear and temperature around this argument continues to build, that opens the door, that leaves open the door for fraudsters and grifters to sell us broken solutions and capitalize on that.
And and not just I would add too, I agree with that and it's also alternate cryptocurrencies that perhaps have much more centralized development ecosystems or even foundations or for-profit companies supporting them are likely to roll out their own. I think so long as I just announced their quantum roadmap, Ethereum's been talking about it like in the halls of, you know, investment world that might benefit them at the expense of Bitcoin if there isn't something Ironically ironically the the Ethereum plan is so complex that I kind of wonder if it might take them as long as it did for them to implement and merge plus was it proof of stake?
Uh like like they took them 7 years from the announcement of Casper to like the merge. And I'm just thinking like they're going to overshoot this. I'm not confident they're going to nail it in time.
Really, in Bitcoin, our cryptography our our cryptographic situation is orders of magnitude simpler. The governance, I'm not as worried about. I think people will change their mind if they're presented with good reasons to take action.
So, one thing that I think we should all be honest about is that there are tons of new cryptographic primitives being developed regularly uh for Bitcoin uh that are post-quantum. I I like to talk about it just post secp256k1. That's the current encryption that we or the cryptography we use for Bitcoin. And even if a quantum computer never happens, which I think it never will, that cryptography will break someday. So, of course, the Bitcoin community is actively day in and day out researching new crypto systems. And I think all I would say is we will activate new cryptography for Bitcoin when it is suitable. As of this time right now, there is not a suitable alternative to secp256k1, but when there is, we will activate it. And it doesn't matter whether it's for quantum or just because we should have a backup system, right? So, I Well, we're talking about quantum here. Bitcoin is always researching and moving forward and and will be ready for these things.
Yeah, you're saying either could even be risk that, you know, current ECDSA becomes vulnerable for a classical reason. It's battle-tested now, but in that case, there will be more others. If we think about post-quantum crypto specifically, one of the big issues is with the current schema that like if existed and there were constantly improvements on this side of the thing, but the the signatures are very large, right? And I've even seen them come down already, but they're still quite large. And Bitcoin block space is quite scarce. And so, uh is it Would Would the panel agree that, you know, if people are working on compressing better post-quantum cryptography, whether or not we actually add it to Bitcoin yet, but if it's, you know, sitting in the repo, reviewed, it's got eyes on it, right? It's not rolling our own crypto, it's been around, that that's beneficial to have. Would that solve some of the fears? And then we hit the threshold, and then
We can't possibly agree here, cuz we have to debate this, Alex. No, I'm just joking. Uh in all seriousness, I think what you said is absolutely reasonable, and I think this is, again, going back to the point that we don't want to throw the time-trusted algorithms that we have in the bin for nothing. We don't want to grab something off the shelf and stick it in Bitcoin, and then it breaks classically. And that would be the stupidest thing to do, right? And so, I think there are a lot of different post-quantum schemes out there. Uh some of them are well studied, or some of them are based on well-studied assumptions, some are not, some are performant, some are not. And I think Bitcoin should have, you know, look at all of these. And that's, in fact, exactly what's happening. And one of the things that I've been amazed by in the last year, since, you know, I think there was one panel or two panels on this topic, I mean, it's the theme of the conference, basically. There's been a ton of researchers on the open-source stage presenting their work, and that's amazing. And I think people should continue to do that. I mean, there are inevitably going to be tradeoffs. But as Reardon pointed out, you know, Bitcoin can never rely on the security of one crypto system forever. Even if you don't
believe that a quantum computer is going to happen, which I do think it might. I think it will happen. I think that's the consensus of physicists out there, too. You know, I still think, at the end of the day, you know, you need to be ready to be agile in the face of future threats.
I think there are a few caveats on that. It's obviously good if we come up with new crypto systems that have different assumptions and say are predicated on things like SHA-256, but again, there are some caveats. Number one, what is that coming at the expense of? You know, what could we have been working on that we weren't working on? Number two, I think the really important thing to do in this situation is challenge the premise of the argument. I think cryptographically relevant quantum computers are science fiction at this point, and that needs to be re-underwritten rigorously, because if we go and spend a bunch of time and devote really smart guys like Jonas Nick to coming up with new hash-based schemes, we're re-underwriting the concern and we're messaging to the world that, oh no, this is actually something we're kind of worried about, when again, in reality, I think there are much bigger fish to fry and quantum is fan fiction.
I mean, no one on this panel is a quantum physicist. Not me, not you, not any of us. But there are many prominent quantum physicists, including Scott Aaronson, who I just referenced, that would argue strongly against your claim that it is science fiction. Now, it hasn't been proven to...
Many prominent climate scientists say that the ocean was going to overflow Florida.
I mean, sure, but that doesn't necessarily mean like this is not necessarily apples to apples, right? I think, in fact, you actually can look at the testable predictions of quantum computing and error correction, which people predicted and then theorized and then ultimately experimentally demonstrated, right? So I don't think it's right to say that some pseudo-scientific claims about climate are equivalent to the actual demonstration of progress in the lab. Go ahead, Hunter.
Like one thing I just want to make clear is that I don't think we should trust the experts in this regard, either for or against. I don't think academia is particularly well suited for essentially answering questions on the frontier of what we know and do not know, unfortunately, for better or worse. And since 1973, Nature has mandated peer review, and although peer review is really nice, what it does is it essentially creates an incentive, a perverse incentive, to be deliberately conservative in what can be proven. And unfortunately, for some kind of break on this level, we really cannot know even if the capability could exist today and we're just not being told.
The two biggest players in quantum computers are the NSA and the PLA. These are nation-state level actors. We need to take nation-state level threats seriously. Now, that said, am I saying that we should be irresponsible and not be rigorous? Of course not. But I do think that we should not even like we need to question every assumption, including the assumption that we even need a quantum computer to enact an attack on this level. I mean, there are possibly ways where we do not need necessarily a Hilbert space of unbounded precision if we can just come up with an approximate solution for keys of sufficient length.
Okay, let's... This has been very exciting. We don't have too much more time, but I want to get into one of the big questions that people ask about. Um, Alex, you referenced like the bare public key coins. Project 11 has a good data website, and then on the Q-day clock...
Yeah, and then well the risk list, have the risk list, which shows basically all the exposed public keys that have been exposed in a variety of ways, whether they're P2PK outputs or whether there was a double spend somewhere in the history of the blockchain.