Hey, this is Steve Eisman. Welcome to another episode of The Real Eisman Playbook. So, today we're going to go back and talk about Iran. And I know the war is very polarizing. A lot of Americans are for it. Many, many Americans are against it. I keep coming back to this topic about the war in Iran because it is fundamentally important to markets. Whether you agree with the war or disagree with the war, either way, it's important to markets and it's important to understand exactly what's going on. And it is unclear from reading all the various newspapers out there exactly what's going on. Is the US winning? How much is it winning by? What's Iran's strategy? All that's important. And so today's guest is someone who I have followed on X for many, many years. His name is John Spencer. He is a military war strategist and historian.
And I think he's one of the best people that we could talk to to just understand what is actually happening because the headlines are so contradictory. And I think John's going to have some insights that will really help illuminate what's actually happening, what's possible, what's not possible, and what the future could eventually be. And afterwards, I'll come back to talk about lessons learned.
Hi, this is Steve Eisman. Welcome to another episode of The Real Eisman Playbook. It's April 6. President Trump has just had a press conference giving an update on the war. He discussed the rescue of the pilot over the weekend and the news on the war continues. It's front and center in the markets and for someone such as myself and I would imagine most of our viewers who are not experts in war, it's very, very difficult to try and figure out what exactly is going on. There are some headlines that say the US is winning. There are headlines out there, plenty of them, that say actually Iran is winning. And so we need someone to help us uncover what's actually going on. So today we have a wonderful guest, John Spencer. Welcome, John, to our show. And let me read just a little bit of his bio so you can understand who he is. John Spencer is a retired United States Army officer. He's a researcher of urban warfare and an author. I've read him quite extensively. He currently serves as chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute and he has taught strategy at West Point. So John, I think they call it the fog of war or maybe in this case they call it the fog of headlines. So I want to make this as apolitical as possible. Whether you're for the war, you're against the war, you should still be curious as to what actually is going on. So, war has been on for five weeks. Tell us what you think the US and Israel have accomplished. What's true and what's not true? A small question.
That's right. What an easy one. Just I'll lob you a softball. That's right. Thanks. Amazing to be with you. So, as the old professor in me almost always has to start with, I of course try to do as objective research as possible, but war is political by its very nature. It's the pursuit of political goals, which I hope we really get into because that's like the, I don't know, Orwellian world I'm living in no matter how many times... But let's just start with what has happened. Forget about the goals. What has happened, what's been accomplished, what has not been accomplished, what are the issues. Let's start with the apolitical stuff.
Yeah, so on February 28th, the United States started Operation Epic Fury in Iran with four objectives that haven't changed since the beginning. Destroy Iran's missile stockpile and its manufacturing capability. Destroy its navy. Destroy its ability to develop a nuclear program. And the proxy program. So, four goals. That's right. Now they'll use, actually I've gone back and found every time they've stated the goals, sometimes they'll say eliminate the navy, destroy it, things like these matter to me as a strategist because they say definitions really matter.
So in your world those different words mean something. Because to people like us it just sounds like a different adjective.
That's right. And maybe to political leaders they do as well where he says I want to wipe it off the face of the planet. Okay. He means destroy. Okay. And I don't interpret but when they normally stay the same. Now if you have a completely different objective and that's a completely different objective but for the war on February 28th that's what it starts with. The opening moment starts with something that's historic and I've written about this. I mean there's a lot of research about a decapitation strike, not what it does. That's not necessarily what the United States and Israel did on the opening moment. They killed, of course, the supreme leader and the head of the IRGC and 40 other individuals in charge of the political and military apparatus of Iran, which is historic and war never happened and we...
Never happened, not even imagined. So if we teach the great military theorists that kind of are the foundation of military science of strategy, whether it's Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Napoleon, the citizens, then you get into air power like Warden, all those, none of them could have imagined being able to have... Entire leadership. And not just a military leader, not just one leader that's kind of a decapitation, like if you could kill Hitler. But the analogy I wrote in my article is what if you could have killed Hitler, his successor, all of his field marshals, all of them at once.
If war has three things that will never change, what we call the enduring nature. It's political, it's human, and it's uncertain. So, you can't take the human factor. War isn't a spreadsheet, right? Which we can get into like you asked me, what have they accomplished? So, of course, they open the war with this elimination of the senior leader. Leaders. That's right. That's right. And all the military leaders and start that strike and then they started systematically attacking all of the objectives at once, right? So the missile program, the nuclear program, the navy and the proxy networks, which you can get into even the ability to get things to the proxies. Most people don't remember that Iran sent a billion dollars to Hezbollah, its proxy in southern Lebanon, the biggest terror army ever created. Just last year it sent them a billion dollars. Last year. So that's after what Israel already did to Hezbollah, killing Nasrallah, their leadership and doing this pager operation that also is historic in military history. And some people I've gotten almost tired of saying unprecedented, historic, even though I study military history because these things never happened.
Is it these things have ever happened because the technology has gone to such a level that you can now do things you couldn't have imagined even five years ago that you could do?
Correct. And I actually, for I have my own podcast. So like I did my last episode was on the attack of Baghdad in 2003 that I was a part of. I jumped into northern Iraq as a paratrooper.
What level when you were in Baghdad? What did you serve at? What rank were you back then?
I was a lieutenant. So in charge of 40 men, paratroopers, jumped into northern Iraq, part of the invasion force that overthrew Saddam. An unlimited objective as we call them, or overthrowing a regime, which I know we're going to get into. But that time the entire corps, right, so if a division is 10,000, maybe a corps is 20,000 soldiers attacking Baghdad to achieve the goal, they had one drone.
Now I imagine today, so you're right, it's the reason that none of these things were even imagined in science fiction is because of the advancement in technology. So there is that element but there's also intelligence penetration, not just with human intelligence, but the way they got the supreme leader was also they say now was tapping into the highway cameras in Tehran and other places to be able to use those as sensors to track somebody. Those level of technologies, the precision guided munitions capability, the ability to hit people underground. You know, the supreme leader and his group was having a meeting underground during the daylight which is unique as well because usually we attack at night. All of these things combined create this capability that not everybody has it and I wrote that in an article as well. The United States and Israel seem to have this solely in the world and it should put fear in every enemy that...
To penetrate an enemy airspace with such overwhelming power but also with the intelligence penetration to be able to find their leadership, all of them. And just think Steve, what Clausewitz said is that everything in war is simple but even the simple is difficult. That opening day of Operation Epic Fury almost seems like a hind, you know, like an afterthought thing right now, like okay great it started really, really well. Just synchronize Israeli airplanes, Tomahawk missiles coming off navies to synchronize all of that so everything's exploding at once is also a capability that no other military does, just don't have it. Russia doesn't have that ability. China's never even tried to have that capability. The ability to do all that in the opening moments of a war. As a strategist, as somebody who teaches strategy, I can tell you none of the military theory even imagined that capability to achieve the goals.
We're going to come back to that because there are implications for what our enemies are thinking about. Okay. So, let's just get back to what's been accomplished. Okay. So, there was the decapitation day one. After that, what's happened?
Yeah. So, then we get into kind of the spreadsheets is what people want to track the war because, you know, you can call balls and strikes and I think we'll talk about them. It's interesting. I live in this world where you can't tell where an expert's expertise ends and his bias or selectiveness begins. So, we all have the same in this war, you know, open source despite Clausewitz's fog. Like I write pieces about how much we don't know, like we don't know what the strength of the regime is. We don't know what they're left of the missiles. So we have to track, of course we can track the number of flights that the US and Israel have been able to do, also unprecedented with precision. So if you go back to the first Gulf War, you know, the first Persian Gulf War when we attacked Saddam to get him out of Kuwait, we dropped over 250,000 bombs and missiles on him in 43 days. 250,000 bombs in...
10% of those were precision. 10% almost 100% of the 15,000 targets that have been struck in Iran are precision. So they're hitting what they're meant to hit.
Okay. That's another ball game.
Again, this is a level of air, like a level of dominance on an enemy. This isn't asymmetric warfare. This is state on state. This is symmetric warfare. Of course, everybody uses asymmetric methodologies, but this is not asymmetric warfare.
What do you mean asymmetric warfare?
Yeah. So, some people don't have shared definitions, but they'll say whether you use terror or guerrilla tactics or usually it means you're not attacking the other person the same way they're attacking you. So, symmetrically...
So one side is fighting conventional, the other side's fighting guerrilla warfare.
Could be. And that's what people try to claim that Iran's asymmetric strategy is working. Like it's conventional versus conventional. Let's be straight. Just because they can't do things doesn't mean they're not trying to do conventional things like lob ballistic missiles. That's not an asymmetric tactic to launch ballistic missiles at whatever infrastructure that you're trying to attack.
Okay. From going back to the spreadsheet, so 15,000 targets eliminated, there's been new intelligence about how much missiles have been launched or how many that they have.
So Iran had about 2,500 ballistic missiles after the 12-day war in June. Of course, they wanted to get to 8,000, which is kind of the urgency that needed to do the operation. At one point, they said that 75% was knocked out. Now there's new intelligence saying it's 50%. What we can measure is how effective are they able to project power and I know that one of your past guests talked about that. So 90% of the missile launches and drone launches are stopped at this point which gets you to...
And what was it before? Was it 90% though two weeks ago or was...
No, in the opening days they were doing volleys of 300 per day and they're down to like 30 to it fluctuates if you track how many they get off depending on what they're shooting at and where they go. It's interesting also as a strategist people track what gets out and what hits. They don't track like what were they aiming at.
Explain that. I'm not quite sure I understand what you meant by that.
So if let's say Iran pushes, which they do, the button and they launch 300 missiles across in a day.
Okay. And we'll track which ones hit. Some people say, okay, 10% of those got through before we knocked them down. That's right. Okay. And then some of them will get knocked down. Some of them will be allowed to hit in the open field, right? So then we'll assess like, hey, they shot at a school or a residential building. But for intent-wise though, what really matters is where were all 300 of those missiles headed? Were they headed at military targets? Were they headed at civilian targets? Are they cluster munitions? It's just an aside on how we track these things on who's being successful. Nobody who objectively looks at the war could say that Israel and the United States haven't been successful at dominating Iran's military at this point. They've eliminated the leadership. They've taken out their capabilities.
Because as Clausewitz has taught us, a nation's ability to wage war relies on their means and will.
Of course, we've been attacking both their means and the will since February 28th, right? That's also not to be argued. You can argue about, which I'm sure we will, like, oh, they'll fight to the death. They might, but the United States has been attacking their means. And then most people discount this. So, we can of course say how many missiles have gotten off, how many have been intercepted, things like that. But if you look at the 15,000 strikes that the United States and Israel have been making, they're not just attacking the means as in what they have today. They're of course like the missile manufacturing site, like every part, the factory, the factories, the sources of fuel, the research centers, the nuclear scientists, if you, they're still hitting nuclear sites right now.
So let me put it this way. If you were to compare where Iran was the day before the decapitation to where it is now. I mean clearly there's been degradation. I don't even think anybody would disagree with that. The question is in your view how much degradation has there been?
So that gets again, I unlike some other analysts, I'll come with a whole bunch of humbleness on what I don't know from what we can tell. This is the estimate that everybody talks about. They clearly have less than 50% of what they started but if you go to like the Navy, they have 95% less of a navy today than they did on February 28th. We can argue about the missiles because some of it is underground. Not that that can't be touched. But so it's means and will. So means is a little bit easier to track. Although we don't have the intelligence, I can say that 150 Iranian naval vessels are sitting at the bottom of the sea and they have about less than 50 of those left. You can say 90% of them. This isn't again going back to war. War isn't about destroying all of the enemy's stuff. Yes, if you take away their means, they're more likely to capitulate or change their behavior. And that's kind of been, well, you go back to Napoleon, I mean, Alexander the Great. Yes, if you destroy their army on the field of battle, they have a lot less things to fight you with and they decide to give up or die, which is what we just talked about. But in this case, we really have to assess the goal based on what is the United States trying to do. We can talk about Israel as well because it is a joint operation, historic as well for the United States to have an ally so capable flying in almost unheard of...
Do you think that's actually the most shocking part of this war in some way?
There have been no, since I've been studying Israel's capability development for a long time and going back to like the Yom Kippur War, their ability to innovate and things like that, but their capabilities for such a small nation of 10 million to have 200 up to 300 aircraft that can fly the same missions, altered vehicles, that's not as surprising to me honestly Steve as Iran's strategy to achieve their goals in this war of attacking all of their neighbors.
So let's talk about that for a second. So the two things that Iran has done is they've attacked their neighbors and they've closed the strait. And as a result of that, I have read headlines of people saying, and people who are, there was a headline on Friday, it was an article in Foreign Policy magazine. It was written by the editor-in-chief and the headline was Trump is losing the war. So what do you make of what Iran has accomplished or not accomplished by lobbing missiles at its neighbors and by closing the strait?
So it's almost like Iran's validated the reason, the necessity of this operation, not only attacking all of its neighbors, so validating with all of the Gulf states but also others, I mean it's attacked Turkey, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, validating to everybody that is associated with outside of Russia and China that it is a threat, period. That's pretty much, I mean there is this global international order, United Nations, all of that where national security, a nation's national security is its number one priority. All that Iran has done by attacking everybody else, I understand the strategy, right, to enforce this economic...
Why do you think they did it?
Yeah, to try to force, not a Sun Tzu way, but an indirect method to force, because it is a contest of will for these Gulf states and everybody else, to force the United States that the cost is too much to continue this operation, you need to stop now aspect of it.
And how successful do you think that's been?
As we're still talking, the operation is continuing and there is an ultimatum because war is a contest of will right now that the United States will conduct the largest bombing operation it has thus far tomorrow.
Right. Okay. What do you make of the closing of the strait? That seems to be the most successful thing that they've done.
I mean it's interesting. I've seen it's a strait question. So it is impactful. Is it impactful on the United States? No. Is it impactful on the market? That's your expertise. Yes. Absolutely.
Absolutely. Right. But the market doesn't like any instability. 100%. One of the things I've said over the years is that the market is not moral and it's not immoral. It's amoral. It just wants stability. It doesn't care what the source of that stability is. It just wants stability. And there's obviously instability right now and that makes the market upset but if tomorrow the war ends the market will go up, they'll have forgotten about it.
Yeah. So for me, the strait moves, let's talk about that. We'll draw one, it validates the objective that was set by the United States on day one. Destroy their navy. Like why would we say that? Because the navy is their main economic coercion on the world.
By the way, how are they enforcing, because I don't even understand this. How are they enforcing the closing of the strait?
Yeah. So it's really through threat. Of course they have capability left, right? So if you understand the coastline of Iran, it's massive. It's hundreds of miles long, right? They built for years for the sole purpose of doing this, threatening the world's economic stability by closing it through naval ships, through fast boats, through mine-laying boats, through drones. That's how they're, they're not doing it by attacking anything at this point, although they have attacked a couple commercial ships. They're doing it by the threat which drives up the insurance costs, right? And so now it becomes, it's not that it's closed. There's actually ships getting through. There's like a hundred that have gotten through although they need like a hundred a day. They're threatening the straits and it's threatening to a point where there is risk. Not that the United States... What's funny for me is that people say that Iran has closed the straits and the United States can't do anything about it. I just think that's just not true.
Well, if we wanted to do something about it, what do you think the US could do?
Yeah, that gets, so I wrote this article that gave a list of options and the president has now hinted at them since I wrote that about attacking things that the regime values most. It values its ability to threaten the strait right now. So, if you wanted to, this all takes resources. You could attack everything it uses, right? So, not just to continue to destroy the Navy, but the radars it would need to track a ship coming through it, the communication it would need. Could it set this toll booth system up right now where a ship comes into the strait, it communicates with an intermediary which communicates to IRGC, they validate the ship and then you could attack that entire system. You could seize islands in the Strait of Hormuz like Abu Musa. Kish Island is way up farther. It's not in the strait. But it's the economic hub. It's not near the strait, but it's the economic hub for Iran.
It's 400 miles up the coast of Iran. But if you're an enemy, you don't want to have what Clausewitz said, which is a source of power that is attackable. So yes, Kharg Island, why everybody talks about it? Because it's unique to Iran. 90% of its oil export, 60% of its revenue for a nation that is already... Comes through Kharg Island. And if you know, which a lot of people discount, why was the government near collapse in January? It wasn't because of anybody attacking them. It was because of economic decisions that they made and their entire, the banks that were failing. The economy was collapsing. They couldn't even bring essential services. They were going to move the capital of Tehran because they couldn't bring water to it. Right? So but unique to this whole thing about the regime, which I hope we talk about whether regime change is objective, Kharg Island is their center of gravity for their economic vitality.
So if the US blew it up, what would that do? It would hurt them but it would also cause suffering of the Iranian people more, but I'm sure the power would. But from a market perspective, as you said, President Trump will make comments knowing the impact. If you were to take that, you do that instability to just the energy resources, it would probably have an impact, right? If you just took out Iran, which isn't the largest producer of crude oil but it's big, it's big, and you took that out of the market in general.
Let's switch gears for a little bit about objectives. So, why don't you repeat the four official objectives. And then let's talk about whether regime change is the secret objective, hidden objective, should be the objective. Let's talk about that.
Let's repeat the four objectives again. So this is where according to the president of the United States and anybody who has thus put out the objectives, there are four objectives. Number one, destroy Iran's missile supply and production capability because that missile shield was what was protecting its behavior. Number two, eliminate the navy. Number three, deny it from ever having the ability to have a nuclear weapon, which is the ultimate why, but a why is not an objective. That's an objective. Deny them from ever getting a nuclear weapon. And number four, ensure that their proxies cannot export terrorism across the Middle East and the world. Those were the four objectives listed on February 28th, April 1st, April 13th. It is the four objectives the White House has posted on X.
So, in your view, the administration has actually been very consistent about this. Because if you read the press, it sounds like the Trump administration's all over the place about objectives.
Yeah. No. This is the weird thing. I'm not interpreting for anybody. I'm literally just a pretty critical thinker. Like I've had to send people the speeches like, here's the speech. Show me in this speech. And actually in his last speech on April 1st, the president had to say as clear as mud, the objective has never been regime change. It is not regime change. And he said it in his speech again today. My objective is not regime change. But no matter what, all of, and whether they're analysts who are trying to objectively analyze, they start with, well, you're never going to achieve a regime change this way, so you're going to lose the war. Like that's not one of the goals, right? And there's this really big one from a strategic bombing thing like you about boots on the ground, which I'm sure we'll get to, is that you can't change a regime through, there's never been in history somebody who changed a regime through strategic bombing. Okay, that's not what the United States has ever said that they're trying to do in Iran.
So, should regime change be an objective?
So, that's an entirely different question. And it's got a mixed history, right? So of course I, John Spencer, personally want this Islamic regime in Iran to change and for the Persian, I mean imagine what the markets would do to a free Persia back into the international order of not just energy resources but innovations and sciences and arts. It would be wonderful for everybody. Of course I want the regime to change. And when the president says, yeah, that gets to the goal as well, he's not saying that's a goal. And when he talks to the Iranian people at the end of his first speech saying, this is your once in a generational chance, he's not lying. But the fact is as a strategist is that the United States could achieve its four goals and there still be a theocracy and Islamic regime in Iran. I personally don't want that. Now, do you have to have that in order to achieve those four goals? Absolutely not.
So, let's repeat that. So your view is that you don't need regime change to get to those four goals. Why?
Because this is about changing the regime's behavior and capabilities. So saying what the capabilities they can't have. You can't have a nuclear weapons development program. All of that can be decisions of the current leadership out of interest for their survival, which is also, that is strategy, the will, attacking their will. And for the Islamic regime in Iran, I'm telling you based on their statements, they really want to stay in power. So, they're going to make decisions once they believe that that's threatened. And that's what the United States has been doing. It hasn't been just attacking means. It's been systematically attacking the ability for the regime not only to have those things, missile program, nuclear program, navy, but its ability to survive. And that's why they attacked the Basij, their internal police, their communication, all these other things that they used to suppress the population that would set the population up for success afterwards and also contribute towards achieving the goals, but it is not necessary. You could have a change in the regime's behavior. That's not what I want to see. But in order to achieve those four goals, you could absolutely have the same what I would call really bad people in charge of Iran and they make a decision and guarantee that decision, which you have to trust but verify, to do these four things that the United States is saying for the stability of the world you need to do.
Okay. So let's talk about leaving aside regime change, still given what you know about the Iranian regime. What do you think they have to, for this to work they have to capitulate in a sense? In other words what you're saying is we'll leave you in charge but you have to change your conduct. So for that to happen the Iranian regime has to capitulate in a sense. What do you think the likelihood of that is?
I think it's more likely than anybody else will probably tell you. Based on everything that I...
Why would everybody else tell you that it's not likely? And why do you think it's more likely?
Yeah. Why would they say? Because they keep saying that the regime cannot be defeated this way. The whole foundation of somebody else's argument that I've talked to is regime change can't happen this way. Like okay, one, nobody can predict the future. I know in this case there are so many variables of uncertainty. The entire vote of the population hasn't been enacted yet. It's, you know, and most people overestimate, I don't know, there's about 20% of the 90 million that support the regime. There's about 50% that do not and then there's about 30% that are kind of indifferent and just want to live their lives. That's this, which is the other, you know, the benefit of having fought in Iran and studied a lot of wars is that context really matters and Iran is not Libya, Iran is not Iraq, it's not Afghanistan, it's not Vietnam, it's got its own differences. From what I know of the stability of the regime, which is what people will discount in this, let's do some critical thinking, and what are the data, right, in God I trust, all others bring data, what's the data you're saying that the regime is strong, right? I put up the graphic on X just of what the United States and Israel has done to the entire apparatus of the Islamic regime that includes the political leaders, the spiritual leaders, the IRGC and others on the elimination of those personnel and it's been significant. I don't...
The number of people who have been killed.
Eliminated. Yes. It's vast and they just killed today as we were talking the head of the IRGC's intelligence because the IRGC is not the army of Iran, most people...
It's the other army meant to keep in power, right.
It's like the Praetorian Guard in Rome.
Or the SS of Hitler, the people that...
And this is what dictators do is they separate powers, which but also gives you fissures to, just like the Iranian revolution when the protectors of the Shah did, the military didn't come out to fight the protest, was a contributing factor towards regime change. Then from everything that I know about the Iranian regime, I can't predict what will happen, is that they're not as stable as those that will argue that this is, they're strong right now. It's just not true. Every element from the fact that, and I believe President Trump, and yes he talks creatively when he is in interviews, when he says we're talking to people, like, does anybody actually think he's not talking to anybody? He's just lying about that.
Yeah, there are people who think that. For sure. For sure.
That's crazy. This is where I, I've been studying war for a very long time but I'm also like a common sense guy. Like I believe he's talking to somebody. I believe there are different factions because of the fact that the president of Iran says one thing and then the IRGC spokesman says another. Like there isn't...
There are definitely different factions.
Different factions, different powers. By the way, they set it up. It's designed...
To have different powers. Of course, the IRGC is one of the most powerful. Then you have the Basij, and you add these elements of strength. But then to discount — this is what when people argue with me, they'll discount all this other stuff that doesn't support their hypothesis, right? They discount how much attacks have been happening to the Basij, to the IRGC, to the leaders. We haven't even heard from the leader, supposedly the new one — the Ayatollah's son. No, no one's seen him. I mean, it's like Weekend at Bernie's. There's like this cardboard thing on TV. But so like who's calling the shots, right? It's actually not clear. It's not clear. There's the, you know, the former IRGC guy who became the speaker of the parliament that we think it is, but President Trump, rightfully so, is — I'm not going to tell you who I'm talking to because that causes problems for that person.
And this is the strategy aspect. Everybody just wants to say, okay, this is how many missiles, all this stuff. They're not — the strategy of the United States is not working. Well, one, nobody knows truly what's going on. But just from what we know about the stability of the regime in January, not even going back to the 12-day war in June of 2025, what we know what the regime was struggling with, to include in the signals intelligence or communication amongst themselves, what we know right now on their ability not to do combined operations. So right now the IRGC and the political wing, right? There was this guy named Al-... who was the kind of the number two in Iran who after the opening days was out on the street boasting about nothing's wrong, almost like a Baghdad Bob scenario if you remember back to Iraq, and he was killed two days later. The people that believe that the regime is strong right now are just — I don't know if they're clouded by their own selective confirmation bias.
But there is enough data to show that, according to the United States, and this is what everybody tells me, the military guy, like yes, tactical success but no strategic failure. What's your measure of strategic failure? The Strait of Hormuz. The fact that the United States hasn't made that its top priority, and then it gets back to his statements, like the president said, like it's disabling the market. But who is really suffering right now? Because the Strait of Hormuz is closed, China gets 50% of its oil from the Gulf. Right, so it takes 90% of Iran's oil, but that's only 10% of its imports. But if you add up Qatar, Saudi Arabia and others, it's 50%. You take Venezuela off, which is about 3 to 4%.
The biggest person who's hurting from the Strait of Hormuz being closed right now is China.
Oh, I didn't know that. Yeah, of course the market's hurting because you're taking supply out, but the 50% is China's oil. And then you have other countries, you have India, you have Europe, you have others.
But is that the measure of the success of this war or not, is whether the Strait of Hormuz is open at this moment? Not that the United States — the United States could start taking every tanker that comes out of it. It has an entire aircraft carrier group right there. It could take every tanker if it wanted to. But then, as the world's only superpower, of course, President Trump, when he sits around the table, it's not just him and General Kane, the head of the military. It's the entire national security team. It's the Treasury Secretary, the Department of State, you know, it's all of them. That's why this strategy is not, you know, it's the pursuit of political goals. It's not a checklist that the military gave the president and whether he's doing it or not. Every day it could change based on the enemy gets a vote and what are the priorities. It's so much frustrating, but the Strait of Hormuz needs to be open. Of course, I actually wrote a piece on — we also need to really think about the Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Hormuz is the second most important strait in the world economically. The Malacca Strait is the most important.
Off of China and the Indo-Pacific. By sheer volume, it's more important. But this isn't the last time, right? Iran has been telling us what it wants to do for years. And a matter of fact, after the Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s, it tried to close the straits again. We did — President Reagan did Operation Earnest Will, where we escorted commercial shipping through the strait for a year.
And actually one of our ships got hit. So we did Operation Praying Mantis and we made Iran pay for that.
I personally think — I know you have one person on that said that the next investment will be hardened facilities in all the Gulf states because they'll be scared of being attacked again.
Which is all the more reason to continue the operation. I don't think that's true. I think the investments will be in more of the pipelines.
Pipelines to alleviate relying so much on the Strait.
Right, because it's — I mean, again, going back to regime change, you don't — that's — regime change is what we want. We want Iran to be plugged into the international order. Coexistence, you know, with your neighbors, all of this stuff, not trying to get a nuclear weapon so it can not only export terrorism but attack people with those. If it's the worst thing we could ever want. I think the Strait should eventually become less important because what President Trump is trying to do is achieve these four goals, but he also doesn't want somebody to have to come do it a couple years from now. So what has it been since the last time Iran closed the Strait and the impact on the economy? It was high and that cost a lot. So you can make an investment now or you can just keep kicking the can down the road.
Okay. Let's talk about Israel just for a second. Do you think that the objectives of Israel are the same as the US, or are there differences?
So since it's — I truly believe that the reason the United States did this, it was because it was an imminent threat, right? The nuclear —
You believe the imminent threat? Absolutely. And what was the imminent threat?
Their continued development of longer-range ballistic missile program to be a shield for the development of a nuclear program.