CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
John Spencer
Executive Director, Urban Warfare Institute; Chair of Urban Warfare Studies, Modern War Institute at West Point, Urban Warfare Institute

The Overlooked Battlefield Transforming Global Conflict | John Spencer

📅 Sep 05, 2026 American Thought Leaders - The Epoch Times and The Epoch Times 58 MIN 101912 VIEWS 127 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
πŸ”΄ Order Jan's new book "Killed to Order": http://killedtoorder.com/ Underground and urban warfare have become the decisive battlegrounds of modern warfare, yet for a long time, military doctrine has been built to avoid both, says John Spencer, a retired U.S. Army major and Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute. He’s repeatedly embedded himself in active warzones, from Gaza to Ukraine, and personally walked through the nearly two-mile-long Hamas tunnel, wide enough to drive a truck through, that led from Gaza City right up to the Israel-Gaza border wall. A lea...

What John Spencer said

Written from the verified transcript and checked against it. Every figure links to the moment it was said.

John Spencer, a retired US Army major and urban warfare scholar, discussed the centrality of urban and underground warfare, drawing on his experiences in Gaza, Ukraine, and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. He argued that militaries avoid urban combat despite it being where decisive battles occur, and that non-state actors like Hamas use human shields and lawfare against Western democracies. Spencer defended Israel's actions in Gaza as the opposite of genocide, citing civilian harm mitigation measures and rejecting famine claims. He criticized the West's misreading of the 2020 Karabakh war as a drone war, emphasizing the role of infantry and artillery. He also discussed information warfare, the need for digital literacy, and the importance of deterrence and adhering to the laws of war.

Key takeaways

  1. Spencer said Israel implemented more civilian harm mitigation measures than any military in history, making genocide claims false.
  2. He argued the 2020 Karabakh war was won by ground forces and artillery, not drones, contrary to Western belief.
  3. Spencer claimed Hamas built over 600 miles of tunnels in Gaza, with a strategy of using civilian deaths for political goals.
  4. He stated the IPC famine report on Gaza was based on changed metrics and later data showed nutrition was higher than in other Middle East regions.
  5. Spencer said the laws of war are not a suicide pact and war is legal for self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Numbers and commitments

FigureWhat it refers toTypeAt
600 miles Length of Hamas tunnels in Gaza metric 3:33
2.2 million Population of Gaza metric 9:55
70,000 Deaths in Gaza according to Hamas Gaza Health Ministry metric 22:16
$10,000, $40,000 Cost of cheap drones price 34:56
400 feet Height of cliffs scaled in Karabakh war metric 32:06
11 Number of air bases India struck in 2020 war metric 46:17
December of 2023 Time of Spencer's tunnel visit in Gaza timeline 1:25
2014 Year Spencer started studying urban warfare timeline 4:23

Chapters

  1. 0:00Tunnel warfare in Gaza
  2. 3:57Why urban warfare is understudied
  3. 8:36Hamas human shield strategy
  4. 10:28Lawfare and the laws of war
  5. 12:39Information warfare and narrative control
  6. 17:22Genocide claims and Israel's actions
  7. 30:14Karabakh war and drone myth
  8. 42:41Famine statistics and IPC report
  9. 50:29Just war and deterrence

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 3:57How is it that you became, I guess, one of the preeminent experts in tunnel warfare of all things?
  2. 6:01Because it seems like something that's been on the rise massively, right?
  3. 9:00When you say according to them, just spell that out for me. How come according to them?
  4. 12:39How does the information warfare fit in here?
  5. 17:47What do you mean by the opposite?
  6. 26:39How is it that you got to be doing the work that you do?
  7. 32:01What would, just in a word, what is it that we're going to learn? What was the reality?
  8. 35:25... with a, you know, battery of social media and news and, you know, legitimate skepticism against government messaging from wherever, however much you may like a government or not, how do you actually figure out some semblance of reality?
  9. 36:59So tell me about that because, you know, some people will even say, well, digital literacy, you're just telling me I need to sort of condition myself to a particular type of propaganda. Aren't you, John?
  10. 42:41Even with access to the same information that gets revealed later, right?
  11. 44:51But that's not to say that the idea was perfect or something like that, or everything about it is right, or even the strategy is correct, or any of all this, right?
  12. 47:55What would you say was the moment when you were doing your research?
John Spencer 0:00 ↗
The laws of war aren't a suicide pact. They aren't meant to handcuff every nation of the world and to outlaw war. War is not illegal. It is reserved for very special cases like self-defense.
Yana Kellig 0:13 ↗
John Spencer is a retired US Army major, a combat veteran, and a leading global scholar on urban warfare. He recently wrote a book titled 20 Times I Almost Died: Life Lessons from the Edge of Survival.
John Spencer 0:27 ↗
Name the war, you're probably going to mention a city as a battle that we remember from World War II, Civil War, I mean, American Revolution, you name it. You're going to talk about a city fight because that's where the decisive battles are.
Yana Kellig 0:39 ↗
He joins me to discuss the intricacies of modern warfare, whether just war is possible today, what people often get wrong when thinking about war. The genocide convention is two pages long. Everybody can read it, but they just want somebody to tell them what it says. This is American Thought Leaders and I'm Yana Kellig.
John Spencer, such a pleasure to have you on American Thought Leaders.
John Spencer 1:05 ↗
Oh, thanks for having me.
Yana Kellig 1:06 ↗
You open your book, which is about all these ways that you almost died among other things and lessons from them, with a descent into a large tunnel with nobody attacking. Tell me a little bit about that experience and what it taught you, because I thought it was profound.
John Spencer 1:25 ↗
Sure. So, it starts about 150 meters underground, deep in Gaza actually. And you're right, on the surface it's like, well, you weren't really facing death. Although sometimes people are facing danger, they just don't know it. So there was a little bit of a blissfulness of the people around me, as there were two IDF soldiers standing in front of us as we went into the opening of this tunnel. But knowing the underground warfare life that I've studied, what the soldiers were guarding was the abyss forward of us that they had not cleared, that went all the way back to enemy-held territory or Hamas-held territory. This is early in the Israel-Hamas war. I think it was December of 2023, so right after the October 7th attack. But what it taught me was, one, that it was a dangerous environment because of being in tunnels β€” just the air you're breathing and the contaminants.
Yana Kellig 2:20 ↗
But tell me a little bit about this tunnel. This was a very unusual one by your estimation.
John Spencer 2:25 ↗
It absolutely was. It was one that the IDF found quickly after the attack, that was an invasion tunnel that led right up to the Israel-Gaza border wall. It's called the Rez tunnel. So it was almost 2 miles long. It went from the right 100 meters really from the wall all the way back to Gaza City. It was more like one of the tunnels I've been to, like in North Korea, the invasion tunnels they found there, where you actually could drive a truck through this one. So just this massive tunnel, and I talk about in the chapter the investment that had to go into building this thing. It had lights, comms wire, of course, all the oxygen needed to not only breathe but to drive a truck down. And understanding underground warfare, I understood that. Every one of my stories is a lesson. And what really hit me, being in that tunnel with a few other people β€” actually interesting people that didn't know what they were signing up for, like Debra Messing from Will and Grace that was there with us β€” was that some of these things you can't understand, and that's the story of all my war studies, unless you go walk the ground.
So to really get a grasp of the over 600 miles of tunnels that Hamas built, that were a lot different from the ones that I was in that day or other days β€” some small, some large β€” that one was very unique in that it was meant to flow massive amounts of fighters and vehicles up to the border wall for an October 7th style invasion, although they didn't use it on the October 7th attack.
Yana Kellig 3:57 ↗
How is it that you became, I guess, one of the preeminent experts in tunnel warfare of all things?
John Spencer 4:05 ↗
Some of it's a bit of a nobody else is doing it. So people consider me the world's leading expert in urban warfare and then a leading scholar in underground warfare.
Yana Kellig 4:15 ↗
It's a really interesting almost PhD student dream to be in a field that there is very few other people doing.
John Spencer 4:23 ↗
So over a decade of studying urban warfare and underground warfare and writing books and articles about it, but also traveling the world doing it β€” it's the scholarship that builds that expertise. And when we created the Modern War Institute at West Point, which I helped create, I started to really focus on that. Actually, I was in a Pentagon project where I was an adviser to a four-star general who told us, go look at something that we're not thinking about, and it was urban warfare, and that was back in 2014. So I caught the bug, but also found that I'm an academic, I'm a war scholar by the very nature of it, to find something that nobody else is doing. So it's really shocking when you dig into it, like where is the body of knowledge, the repository, the experts in this, both urban and underground? It's very few.
I of course love the study of it and the history of it, and really it's the present and the future. Even if you look at underground in Iran and the challenges of attacking Iran sites, really around the world, even Russia-Ukraine, they're going underground, building bigger and bigger underground because the surface is so dangerous. But I got into it over a decade ago, starting to study it.
Yana Kellig 5:43 ↗
Is the reason there's so few people studying this, is to actually do it on the ground so to speak, risky? Is that the reason or why?
John Spencer 5:52 ↗
It's a great question, and we back in 2014 when we started studying it for the general, like why isn't there a center, a school, books?
Yana Kellig 6:01 ↗
Because it seems like something that's been on the rise massively, right? This urban and underground warfare.
John Spencer 6:07 ↗
Absolutely. I've found many reasons. Sometimes the enemy is ourselves. One of the reasons that there is no true, I think, greater body of experts is that militaries don't want to fight in cities. Militaries don't want to fight underground. So they avoid it, and actually we used to write into our books, avoid and bypass all urban areas. And it makes sense. But as the world grew, as in population growth, urbanization, but also even asymmetric enemies β€” when you rise in your strength, somebody tries to find an asymmetric advantage. And a lot of the especially non-state actors like Hamas and others move into the urban areas and use the urban areas' defensive nature, but also the civilian population to their advantage. So you just see it increasing around the world.
But also even in places like Ukraine, where the Battle of Kiev in the 1940s is the largest encirclement in military history, but it was a much smaller city than when Russia tries to attack it in 2022.
It's grown, the nature of where the urban is, it all changed. But really the big reason β€” I mean, I have a lot of job security because no matter how many people I tell, from Congress to other militaries, they just won't dedicate people to studying and training for it, which is really weird if that's where all the fighting is occurring. Even in β€” I mean, name the war, you're probably going to mention a city as a battle that we remember from World War II, Civil War, I mean, American Revolution, you name it. You're going to talk about a city fight because that's where the decisive battles are. But there's a cultural aspect of people's thoughts about war or even militaries. They plan for these big battles in the open, which does happen, right? Trench warfare going on in Ukraine and Russia. But those decisive battles are happening in the cities.
Yana Kellig 8:04 ↗
I want to dig into this a little more because it is really quite astonishing, you know, especially since these, you know, terror type actors that use the civilian populations as kind of shields β€” they don't care about them as much as, let's say, the Western force which has some kind of, I guess, you know, moral boundary there. I mean, this seems β€” is it true that this has become more and more prevalent, and is that the reason it's happening more and more in cities aside from just their expansion?
John Spencer 8:36 ↗
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, even if we take the last 30 or 40 years, I mean, non-state actors like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, others using human shields. Although Hamas is a very unique version of human sacrifice, as their goal is to actually get their people killed, according to them, and they need civilian deaths to achieve their political goals.
Yana Kellig 9:00 ↗
When you say according to them, just spell that out for me. How come according to them?
John Spencer 9:04 ↗
The Hamas leadership, whether it was Yahya Sinwar or others, the ones giving the orders, have many public statements, and actually even recently saying they need the blood of their women and elderly to achieve their goals. They said they not only want it, they need it to achieve this goal of theirs in the afterlife, right? Martyrdom and everything. So it's a really sick political strategy. I mean, we haven't seen it. I mean, even the Japanese, the Nazis, nobody β€” while they accepted civilian casualties, that wasn't their strategy, was to get their own population killed in order to achieve this political goal in the afterlife. So that's why I say in their words, because it's their public statements that anybody can reference that they have this human sacrifice strategy. And of course, their actions, right?
There's 600 miles of tunnels in Gaza as one example. There's 2.2 million people there. All of them could fit in their tunnels with ease and escape the surface, what's going on on the surface. But Hamas actually makes written and public statements saying these are not for the civilians and civilians are not allowed, and you don't see civilians trying to get in the underground. Where if I go to Ukraine, where I've been many times, as in while we're talking, the civilians go into the subways to seek refuge from the bombings that are happening on the surface. That's a very unique thing.
Why do people keep using human shield strategy? It is because there are those that follow the law of armed conflict, and there's a history of this, post-WWII conventions, things that even all nations say we won't do this anymore, we won't target civilians, which is one of the fundamentals of the law of war, but actually built this thing that we call lawfare, which is when a non-state actor or a state actor actually says, 'Not only do I not care about the laws of war, I'm going to use them against that Western democracy that is following the laws.' And that's where you get Hamas occupying hospitals, schools, mosques, all of it, because they know that those are protected sites and that in order to strike them, there are special things that have to be done. That's a war crime in of itself.
But it's this reverse engineering of the rules of war, which I believe in actually, that these non-state actors have done in many locations. ISIS did it as well, Al Qaeda. But there is a variation too of some of these non-state actors needing the population, like a Maoist, you know, fish in the sea, to hide amongst the population. Then you get into counterinsurgency theory, which is of course some of my experiences in Iraq, and separating the people from the population.
Yana Kellig 11:48 ↗
But most people don't want to have β€” separating the people from the population. What do you mean? So if you're engaged in an urban combat, I mean, one of the goals is...
John Spencer 11:57 ↗
Is to, of course, one of the fundamentals of the law of war is don't target civilians, target the enemy.
Yana Kellig 12:02 ↗
Yes. And there's proportionality where there's a collateral damage assessment.
John Spencer 12:06 ↗
In a counterinsurgency where you have an insurgent within a population, it may be 10%, 1% of the population like we faced in Iraq.
Yana Kellig 12:13 ↗
I see.
John Spencer 12:13 ↗
The goal is β€” they're relying on the population's support to hide amongst the population. And so not only do you want to, of course, separate civilians, non-combatants from those that you're targeting, combatants, in order to win a counterinsurgency, you also have to separate the insurgent from the population that it relies on for support so that they start reporting on them. They don't give them ammunition, refuge, all these things.
Yana Kellig 12:39 ↗
You know, the other thing that strikes me β€” you know, where I want to get back into some of the amazing lessons you have in the book β€” but you know, an increasing feature. There's always been information war as part of warfare obviously, right? Messaging and so forth. But it seems as technology has changed, as social media has risen, as the ability to kind of, I don't know, create memes, viral memes around issues and things like that has increased, it has seemed to have become much more of a part of warfare. I don't know if that's actually accurate, but it seems to me like it has. And that somehow changes the dimensions about these decisions. Like if it's a counterinsurgency, how do you use the civilian population if you are this non-state actor or even state actor in some cases, in case of China or something like this? How does the information warfare fit in here?
John Spencer 13:33 ↗
Absolutely. I mean, it's in the book too, is one of the reasons that I've had my character tested is when I was willing to go to war zones, report on what I was seeing against what would be the popular opinion. So, whether was I going to stand up for the truth, and many times I've had to take personal, you know, liability almost, to say the things that matter. And I think we should live in that world.
You're right though, information warfare has always been a part of war. I mean, the reason we run marathons is because a guy was running back from a battle to explain what had happened. In even Roman times, you know, the senators would hear how a battle's going, you sack a general, that aspect, it's always been there, but we live in a different world. And even some of the past wars, whether it was World War II, Korean War, whatever, had we had this algorithm-driven social media instant access to the battlefields, I think wars might have gone differently. It's a present.
So that aspect of anybody fighting a war, especially in an urban area where there's all the cell phones, and we saw this in Gaza where Hamas would actually create content based on what was trending and try to use that. Towards the other aspect of information warfare is narrative warfare. So who's controlling the narrative? Where I cover wars like between India and Pakistan, where what the world took from it is almost the opposite of what actually happened.
That is a new nature of warfare that nations and populations have never had to deal with, that instant, ubiquitous but also algorithm-driven content. To where of course war is hell, war is awful, it's death and destruction. So to get fed the brutality of war to every phone of a population, if it's the United States, it's our population or others. And you're right, China developing the tools of information warfare in order to be able to do that, to influence a population. And it's not new, right? Vietnam War, you can win every battle, but you can lose the war.
Yana Kellig 15:38 ↗
Well, so this is that β€” I thought back as I was thinking about this. I mean, some people would argue that Vietnam was lost on the information war, and that's astonishing in a sense, right?
John Spencer 15:50 ↗
I mean, there's many reasons that we lost. I mean, basically, you know, fighting a war where the stated goals would be hard to achieve, whether it's to stand up a nation, a legitimate nation. But Vietnam is what we call the Cronkite effect, right? So the most trusted American journalist goes to Vietnam, happens to be during what was launched, the Tet Offensive, and comes back and says there's no way we can win this war.
It was at the time because he was trusted. It was a different opinion than what the government and the military was saying. I mean, the president said if we lost Cronkite, we would lose the war, and it was the start of that information warfare because all war is a contest of wills. That includes the two militaries fighting, the two governments, but also their population. So if, especially in a democracy, if the population doesn't believe that it's a just war, it's a good reason to fight it, or that there's a foreseeable way they achieve the stated goals, going back to ancient warfare, you won't be able to continue the war.
The layer that's new though is that information warfare, or in all the tools of social media, people are talking directly to the populations. A lie can spread around the world. And we've seen this in many cases in wars today where something happens, it spreads around the world as a lie on who did it, what, how many people died, if civilians died, and no matter what you do, you can't put that back in the bottle and people are convinced that that's what's happened.
As much so as β€” and when I fought strongly against this, the entire ideals about a war, and where somebody gets driven something about a single war every day, like the false claim of Israel creating genocide in Gaza, when it's all β€” I've seen mountains of evidence to the opposite, literally fields of food and soldiers doing the opposite of genocide, but the world spreads it.
Yana Kellig 17:47 ↗
When you mean the opposite of genocide, do you mean like warning the civilian population that there's going to be action or things of this nature? What do you mean by the opposite?
John Spencer 17:57 ↗
I mean, by the literal definition of genocide, it's, you know, trying to destroy in whole or in part a group, a religious group, all of that, both by intention and by action. So the opposite of genocide is your intent is the opposite of destroying the people. And that's what I've seen in my now eight trips to Israel, seven into Gaza, probably the only person outside the IDF that's been into Gaza so much.
Is that I've actually interviewed all the political leaders, all the generals, everything. Like, what are you trying to do here to answer the intent questions? Are you trying to destroy the people or are you trying to get to the hostages and destroy the enemy, which is not a β€” you know, killing the enemy in war is sometimes the goal. It's not a war crime. The other part is the actions that you talked about.
So if you can't prove the intent is to destroy all of the people of, like in this case, Gaza, then people will look at the actions. Like, you know, in Russia and Ukraine, Russia steals thousands of babies and gives them to Russian parents. That's a genocidal act according to the Genocide Convention. You can prove it through actions. And what Israel has done to try to protect civilians, right? These are those things you just mentioned that, thanks to my, you know, war scholarship before October 7th, we have. How do you prevent civilian casualties in war is a big field of study, we call it civilian harm mitigation measures.
And Israel has implemented more of these civilian harm mitigation measures, things trying to prevent civilians from getting hurt, like evacuations, you know, phone calls, flyers, all that, but also daily pauses to allow civilians to get out of harm's way, giving out their maps, tracking civilians by their cell phones, not taking airstrikes. They've actually done more of these than any military's ever tried in war, but then are accused of targeting civilians when all of the evidence, real evidence, actually there's no cases of Israel targeting civilians. Of course, there's been civilians that have died, going back to our conversation about Hamas's strategy, but also collateral damage is unfortunate, but the law says you do everything you can to minimize it.
And from the genocide claim, if Israel's intent has been stated by their political and military leaders like we are targeting Hamas, and then all of their actions to include putting their own soldiers at risk in order to give these notifications and take all these actions, it's the opposite of genocide. And actually has β€” which is a lot of people that just don't know a lot about war β€” it's protracted the war, what they've done. But also, you know, something can be brutal and a lot of death and also be the opposite of genocide.
Yana Kellig 20:38 ↗
I think that term has started. It's something that I've studied quite a bit as well and I understand. Thank you for defining it. So, you know, I guess officially, because it's a very, you know, that's a more official definition than I've heard from most people. Of course, the war in Gaza was brutal, a lot of people did die, and they say, 'Well, that's genocide.' But you're saying something like that can still be the opposite of genocide even though it's horrible. And of course, the Palestinian people have suffered greatly.
John Spencer 21:08 ↗
Absolutely. I mean, and that's why I'm fighting for not allowing the name. I mean, it's a very important classification, right? We have war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Genocide being the ultimate, created after the Holocaust to define like the worst human thing you could ever do, which is trying to eliminate an entire race, religion, you name it. I don't want that word to just be synonymous with bad. Like, war is bad. War is hell. War is killing. It's awful. But we can't redefine a term trying to say, 'Well, it's really bad.' Yeah, it's really bad for many reasons.
And I could talk for a long time about why is it so bad in Gaza. Well, Hamas prepared the ground for 20 years. They are trying to get their civilians killed. Egypt wouldn't allow the civilians out, which I've never seen in a war that I've ever studied where one country could save thousands by just creating a humanitarian zone outside of the main combat area that the enemy doesn't then use to its advantage. But you're right, some people would just say, well, I mean, really bad, like a number. And there's three types of lies in my work: lies, damn lies, and statistics.
And I've had to try to fight against these. It's a really good book actually that I read in my master's degree that I never knew I'd need so much about, you know, statistics in war, like how many people died, who has, how many civilians died. And this has been the very unique thing that I don't want to continue to other wars where I can just say a number then associate it to a term like genocide. Like, okay, 70,000 people have died in Gaza according to the Hamas Gaza Health Ministry, so that means this genocide.
And that's what, as a war scholar, I don't want to see happen because that's almost a strategy for all those people that don't want to adhere to the laws of armed conflict and say, well, if we just kill enough people then everybody will be against it and we'll achieve our goals, which is not the goal of the armed conflict either.
Yana Kellig 23:08 ↗
This is so β€” you know, it's interesting how our conversation is developing, but this is something, you know, I struggle with personally because there is a lot of horror, you know, in war and so on and so forth. The point is, the moment β€” it's almost like the sharing of that has been democratized through social media. That's not a problem. I think that's actually a somewhat positive thing because, you know, in the past a lot of this stuff could be done under shroud of secrecy and so forth. And who knows, you know, how many millions of people died in, you know, Soviet Russia and communist China. It's uncountable but it's, you know, massive and massive amounts because of that shroud of secrecy.
But the flip side is that, like you said, a falsehood that seems very real can be unbelievably powerful in hitting the will of a country or a very powerful ally, right? In terms of β€” and how to solve these things, right, becomes a lot more difficult, I guess, is that's what I'm saying, because of the nature of it.
John Spencer 24:19 ↗
Yeah, that's just β€” this is the β€” I mean, it gets into like the double standard. There is, like you said, it's great. I want people to understand what are the rules of war because I believe in them, the laws of armed conflict, especially post-WWII where awful things happened so that war should be deterred. We don't want war, but there are reasons why we do believe that war is just, like defending yourself, which I believe all wars are wars of choice. You can either choose to defend yourself like Ukraine did and Ukrainians stood up and said they didn't want to be Russian, they didn't want to be invaded, or even Israel after October 7th saying we're going to defend our nation. It's a choice, but there are rules because we don't want anybody's wars, the civilians being the brunt of wars.
And that's why not targeting civilians, like Hamas did on October 7th, is what we don't want to see. And in order to uphold that, then you have to take action to stop it, which is the danger here. I want people to understand, but we also live in this don't trust anybody kind of post-COVID world where you have interpreters of war and what they're seeing, whether it's a video going, 'Look, clearly those people were innocent,' that spreads really rapidly because people want to believe certain things or they trust podcasters or things interpreting the law of war about what's legal, what's not, who's a combatant, who's not, how do numbers work. That is the dangerous space.
Again, going back to if you create a double standard for Israel in war, then it will be applied against the United States later for US.
Yana Kellig 25:57 ↗
Oh, I'm sure, I'm sure it will.
John Spencer 25:58 ↗
Yeah. I haven't studied this long enough. I've seen it already tried with like the United States during the two battles of Fallujah in 2004 where international, you know, human rights activists were saying that we were doing war crimes, that people were coming up with numbers of civilians that weren't true. It was like a mini situation and it actually had repercussions on the ground, but it didn't stick as much because of, of course, the Israel is, you know, kind of concept of everything they do is wrong, everything that they say is not true. Very few people actually have information, they just have access to these influencers and interpreters of war.
Yana Kellig 26:39 ↗
Tell me about your background. How is it that you got to be doing the work that you do?
John Spencer 26:45 ↗
Sure. I mean, the book is just a bunch of stories that I ended up putting, you know, that did shape me because I've had an amazing career. I was β€” some people, whether it's fortunate I had 20 times almost died or unfortunate, I view it as fortunate. I joined the Army at 17, you know, a single mom with three kids working three jobs. There wasn't much for me after high school. Joined the military, had an amazing 25-year career, from serving as a commander in Iraq twice, to my education that I got in the military, and then towards the end of my career as I transitioned into the Pentagon, working for that four-star general, started studying urban warfare.
But of course in the military you got to move on to your next job, and I moved to West Point where I was teaching strategy and I created the Modern War Institute at West Point, which is a research center for wars. That really points to like how did you get into this business of β€” I've seen more war after my military career than I did in my military career because my job is now to go into war zones, study them, and I've been β€” and this is many of the stories in very near-death situations by the very nature of the knowledge that I'm pursuing, which I do believe that you have to go get.
And we actually don't have war watchers anymore. We used to have them not that long ago. If you even think back to the American Civil War, there was the Germans were here, the French were here, the English were here, just observing the changing character of warfare, all of this. And for political reasons, we stopped doing it. But after I, you know, finished my military career, I continued this war research. So, war scholar. But I also believe that...
Continuing to study this urban underground warfare is really important for our own country, but I think for anybody to understand and be able to stand up, whether it's for a political leader, for in the news to say, just so you're clear here, what people are saying about what is happening is not right, or what is the history of this operation, because then they start doing, you know, going back to those numbers, false statistics of what's happening compared to anything else. That's how I got into it.
A great military career and now a great post-career writing books and articles about the war zones, and I have a bunch in the pipeline right now, and really exciting research as it kind of grows on itself. The more I study war, the more unfortunately there's more things to study.
Yana Kellig 29:26 ↗
No, we were speaking earlier and you were telling me you have a book coming soon about Azerbaijan and Armenia, about that conflict. It's something I've been thinking about recently. I just had the ambassador on from Armenia, just talking about the impacts of this, you know, peace agreement and this corridor, you know, created for Armenia. Well, for both, for everyone, but with Armenian great interest, right?
John Spencer 29:57 ↗
Yeah.
Yana Kellig 29:58 ↗
But we don't, there's so many of these conflicts that we don't, like, how much do we really know about that? I mean, I followed Karabakh a little bit and what happened in there, and Armenia has to deal with that reality. Can you just tell me a little bit about what you found there?
John Spencer 30:14 ↗
Sure. So it was another one of these aha moments, I think, in studying wars and what we understand in the West of what's happening, it actually isn't the reality of what happened. So I became interested because there was, of course, there was a war over this region between Azerbaijan and Armenia called Karabakh. Long history is covered in the book, and in the late 1990s Armenia takes it. In 2020, though, during the COVID period really, there's this massive war that's way undercovered, and the only thing that kind of the West takes from it is that it's a drone war, that the new drones are the future of war. It's what won the war, all of this. And now having walked every battle of that war with almost every general on both sides, understanding what happened, and it was a massive war over this region that ended, and now there's a possibility for a very strong peace between the two countries in this region.
The book that comes out in October actually will detail, unlike anything's ever before, what happened in the 2020 war, but also there's a 2023 kind of resolution of it, and how did Azerbaijan achieve a victory? Even in Armenia, if you talk to Armenians, like, yeah, they had a victory militarily, but actually linked to strategy and the thoughts about that region and the politics of it. Fascinating case study, but for me as an outsider, as a war scholar, is that everybody took this aspect of the drones, and how did we get that wrong? Through open-source intelligence.

45 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Spencer, J. (2026, September 5). The Overlooked Battlefield Transforming Global Conflict | John Spencer [Interview transcript]. American Thought Leaders - The Epoch Times and The Epoch Times. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140407/

MLA

John Spencer. "The Overlooked Battlefield Transforming Global Conflict | John Spencer." American Thought Leaders - The Epoch Times and The Epoch Times, 5 Sep. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140407/.

BibTeX
@misc{spencer2026_3140407,
  author       = {John Spencer},
  title        = {The Overlooked Battlefield Transforming Global Conflict | John Spencer},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, American Thought Leaders - The Epoch Times and The Epoch Times. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {sep},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140407/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}