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John Spencer
Executive Director, Urban Warfare Institute; Chair of Urban Warfare Studies, Modern War Institute at West Point, Urban Warfare Institute

Subterra 101 with Traysar Industries

📅 Jul 03, 2026 The War Scholar with John Spencer 182 MIN 1135 VIEWS 296 SEGMENTS · 3 SPEAKERS
John Spencer, Executive Director of the Urban Warfare Institute and founding member of the International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare sits down with Asher Katz, CEO and co-founder of Traysar Industries and a former member of the Israel Defense Forces' elite Yahalom unit and Greg Johnson, Principal Engineer at Traysar Industries to discuss all things "subterra" domain.

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 4:37We were kind of helping and doing all this stuff, and then a few months into that they kind of asked me, hey, do you want to come over here and like just help us, you know, do this thing?
  2. 15:04... the way in order to get to the bigger goal, which I'm, you know, that's still, there's still some of those things happening now, but I think now it's a lot closer to like him getting to do the things that he really wants to do, right?
  3. 20:06It's about how do we protect ourselves underground? How do we maneuver underground?
  4. 33:29Where is where you're trying to hit?
  5. 1:15:00And then if you're trying to hide those, that becomes a whole different challenge, right?
  6. 1:18:19Although this one was powered pneumatically, right?
  7. 1:23:26But I mean, I think a lot of other aspects it may not be a requirement, right?
  8. 1:24:54And what are the scientific barriers that could be, if assigned to somebody, thought through differently to try to overcome those scientific barriers?
  9. 1:26:25But if it's a domain, there has to be many products, right?
  10. 1:36:34It's a limit of just how much munitions you have. Is it?
  11. 1:38:15I mean, Greg, you want to talk about?
  12. 2:28:25You know, I think speed is probably still the biggest one, right?
John Spencer 0:00 ↗
Yeah. So, Asher, Greg, what a special honor to be here to interview you guys in person. I think Asher and I recorded an episode for my Modern War Institute at West Point podcast, but we've quickly figured out this is a topic that deserves a long-form podcast. My editors don't let me do that. So, thanks for joining me.
Thank you. I'm really excited to get into underground warfare 101, explain how we define it, the challenges, everything. Really excited, and I hope I know that I'm going to learn despite how long I've looked at this. I thought we could go around since we're going to post this on all of our mediums. Quick bios. So I'm John Spencer, of course, chair of urban warfare studies, the Modern War Institute at West Point. I know that I've been a student, enthusiast of underground warfare as long as I have been urban warfare because it's hard to disconnect the two. And usually in any war studies teaching strategy at West Point, there's an underground component if you look hard enough from ancient warfare, World War I, World War II to today. And I know we're going to talk a lot about that. I probably been, of course, I served for 25 years in the US Army infantry, had my own experiences actually in Iraq with bunker systems and things like that we were going into, and then academically about a decade of studying a lot of work in Israel, which I know we're going to get into from way before October 7th actually. People think I for some reason started studying anything on October 7th, but was doing a ton of conferences with IDC Herzliya, visiting Yahalom's old base, new base, getting into Hezbullah tunnels in the north, Hamas tunnels in the south. So of course, most people that have ever listened to my podcast know that I kind of geek out on this, and what better people to geek out with than some other experts.
Asher 2:04 ↗
Yeah, it's going to be fun.
John Spencer 2:05 ↗
So, Asher, can you give us a bio and we'll pass it to you, Greg, as well?
Asher 2:09 ↗
Yeah. So, thank you, John. And as I told you, I've been a huge fan of your work before October 7th. So I think that's a source of pride. But you know, I think even in Israel we weren't doing enough work of building a doctrine, and many times you were almost the one that was doing it from the outside, even though you were coming and learning from our own experience. So it's an honor to be here with you. So yeah, born dual citizen, American and Israeli, born and raised in Israel. I served in the tunnel detection lab that worked with Yahalom, and basically my job was then in 2014-15 we realized we don't have enough methodologies to map out tunnels, so my job was to go to the civilian world, see utility mapping, see oil finding methodologies, and see how we implement them with teams on the field to detect tunnels. And during my service we found over 20 tunnels crossing over from Gaza into Israel and another seven crossing over from Lebanon into Israel. Following that I moved to the US. I was working there actually in education. I thought that would be my passion in life, and October 7th hit and came back, and you know, then so many things in October 7th that we were sure of changed, and a big part of it was subterranean warfare and realizing what a network and system they've created. And for the past almost three years already I've been mostly in reserve, trying to map out all the tunnels, Gaza, Lebanon, other locations around the world, working a lot on how to destroy them. And through this experience we founded together with my co-founders Yadin Sofur and Galadin Traar and work Subterra Prime, and our goal is to give the West subterra abilities, and we'll talk about this term soon. So to bring back Western technological supremacy and not let our adversaries take advantage of this terrain, to not let us win battles, and that's my mission and what I'm trying to do in life today.
John Spencer 4:13 ↗
Amazing. I saw the article on WIRED, I think, yeah, with one of the founders, and I saw Yadin's kind of almost TED talk that was really, really impressive. Kudos to you guys on that.
Asher 4:24 ↗
Thank you. Thank you.
John Spencer 4:25 ↗
I'm really excited to talk about your work and the potential of it. But Greg, nice to meet you. We haven't met before. He got a kind of a softball intro conversation and you didn't.
Greg 4:37 ↗
All good, all good. Well, yeah, pleasure. Pleasure to meet you and thanks for having me on as well. Yeah, just a little bit about myself. I think, you know, I might, you know, I never thought of it this way, but it might be that everything I've done so far was just kind of leading to this moment and, you know, joining Traar. But yeah, my background, you know, career-wise was kind of revolved a lot around welding. That's kind of where I got into my career and trades. But you know, learned a lot of different things along the way. I mean, heavily revolved around being hands-on with welding, but you know, I took information from everybody that I worked for and learned from along the way. And started in structural steel, and then I did commercial diving, underwater welding, and I went all over the world doing that. Went to some 20-odd countries. So it was actually a good young to mid-20s experience seeing the world and doing that and working on a lot of things. But then went to SpaceX after that and was with SpaceX 2012 to 2017, and you know, became a lead welder there. Did a lot of things, ground support equipment, building lots of different stuff for SpaceX. And again, you know, maybe more so than what I did was, you know, who I got to work with and who I got to learn from and, you know, get a lot of experience from that. And then about five or so years into that, the Boring Company kicked off, and it just so happened they started right across the street from SpaceX, and just happened that, you know, I had some relationships with some people that were involved early on there, and they were coming to me for help. And, you know, SpaceX was okay with that. We were kind of helping and doing all this stuff, and then a few months into that they kind of asked me, hey, do you want to come over here and like just help us, you know, do this thing? I was like, yeah. So I just kind of jumped at that opportunity at the time, and that was a great opportunity to kind of start some things from scratch over there. And again, so that kind of morphed into, you know, a lot more learning and a lot more engineering and team building and just kind of building things from scratch, which was really great. So and then the opportunity from there was that we moved to Texas, and I kind of had a big part in that as well. And then, you know, just last year, I kind of get a random phone call, so to speak, from, you know, you can say a blast from the past. There were some connections there, but it kind of led me to this opportunity with Traar. And I think, you know, beyond just a work opportunity, was kind of the mission that is driving them, and, you know, my experiences and skills and whatnot, you know, that kind of needed to be there for them to want me. But then I think for, you know, for me to want them, I think, you know, a lot of things aligned with, you know, the goals that you guys touched on a little bit already, and, you know, the driving factor behind the need for what Traar is doing. So I'm super, super excited to be a part of that and, you know, bring whatever I've learned and, you know, experienced over my career to, you know, hopefully take Traar to where, you know, where they want to be, and, you know, definitely excited to be a part of that. So.
John Spencer 8:04 ↗
Okay, so I'm going to do a second round, as having learned that my 15-year-old son didn't know what SpaceX was, and I had to explain to him. He asked me like, what is SpaceX after seeing some rockets, and we talked about, you know, catching the rockets and all that cool thing. So I'm going to do another round, but with questions in case just doesn't know. So one, I'm a part of the international working group on subterranean warfare, and one of my partners would die that he's not here to ask you some really technical questions. He's the chief, well, he was the chief geologist for the British Army. So when we started talking about subterranean, he was, when we went like into the Hezbollah tunnel in the north they left open, he geeked out with his mining gear and like talking about the rock and how different it is if you drive to northern Israel and you're in southern Lebanon aspect versus the sediment of Gaza along the border, the clay and all of that. And one, suck it, Drew, that you're not here. So you said, and I know we talked about it on the podcast, but for our listeners on this one, what is Yahalom? When did it start? What's its mission?
Asher 9:15 ↗
So yes, so Yahalom is a very special unit because basically its mission and goal is to combine the world of engineering with elite combat skills. And basically it's bridging this gap that a lot of military needs that require very high level of technology, very high level of expertise, really engineering level of knowledge and technological use, just like you, you know, described a geologist who knows how to be, you know, the sapper geologist, would big fan as well, I'm sad you're not here. So it's that same type of methodology. So what Yahalom does is they combine both of that together. They take soldiers that show capabilities of being tier one fighters, but also knowledgeable, smart. And they go through first training set, they go through basic training, basic engineering, core training, but then more tier one level combat training. And when they finish that, then they go and they're divided into different capabilities. So it could be bomb squads, bomb demolition, it could be biological warfare, God forbid, just so that there's a preparedness there. Actually, the Canadians are the ones that really trained us on that. And we also have, and this is today one of the biggest sections within the unit, is the tunnel fighting unit, and their job is to take probably, I would say over by now if you put everything together, over 100 different types of technologies from drones or anything of that to detection to mapping to maneuvering and above and beyond and implement it in tunnel warfare in doing it. So, important to say I'm not a classic soldier in that unit, but I've done, you know, most of the work I've done in trying to implement and bring into this unit tunnel mapping, tunnel detection capabilities has been through them. And many times, you know, it would be taking some university professor with a crazy idea and figuring out with them how we're now going to be in the middle of the field and something that can't be seen and still be able to map out and detect the tunnel. So, for example, the tunnel up north, you know, a lot of that was, you know, being with Yahalom and some very funny and crazy stories of being able to find those tunnels over there and doing it. So, that's the unit.
John Spencer 11:31 ↗
I can't wait to get into like why, how hard it is to find and the different types of radar, penetrating radar, things like that. The one thing you said is that like an operator versus the scientific realm. So, one, as somebody again who studied this for a little while, most militaries discount the subterranean, that it's episodic and they treat it as an extension of the surface, which we'll talk about. But as far as I know, outside of the special operations community, they have like a hard target defeat, like that deep buried targets, or really a category for a military target which they specialize in. There's no army in the world who has committed resources for a long period of time. I mean, the US Army, I think I sent it to you, a training video of, of course, we had a lot of experience with tunnels in Vietnam. There's about a thousand miles of different variations of tunnels, of course, the tunnels of Cu Chi. We're going to talk about some of that history, but it was episodic. There was a school in Leavenworth that closed it. Yahalom, and why I kept returning to Israel, is the only army who has committed over a brigade special forces engineering unit and one just for expertise, which we'll talk about, like that's one of the gaps in all militaries of the world is expertise. And usually when somebody wants to do something then they outsource, like they did in World War I. They grab all those coal miners to start digging and try to get the civilian network to give them the expertise. But you mentioned about, you know, technology, and what I've been impressed, one, of course, is a commitment of a brigade-sized formation for a very long time. So you have expertise just in operators but also in the technical aspects of what are the needs that we're going to get into and the R&D, which I think is vital, and I'm excited to hear about some of the research and development that you guys have been doing. But that's not normal for us in the US military or other militaries to have that capability inherent in the unit and R&D capability. Some special units have it, but about that really keyed to me. Okay, Greg, big question. What is SpaceX? And then we'll go to the Boring Company.
Greg 13:38 ↗
Oh, you know, I was like a blip on the SpaceX map for sure. And, you know, obviously I think most people know what SpaceX is now. You know, when I started in 2012 and told people that I worked there, it was still at the point where most people were like, who, where, what, you know. I think, you know, ULA still had a monopoly on the market at the time and SpaceX was yet to take hold of that. But, you know, obviously SpaceX is doing some big things as everybody knows and sees. You know, I haven't been very involved in that in a while. Again, I left there in 2017, but yeah, I mean, I'm probably not the right one to say what is SpaceX, but I can continue on that, but I mean, obviously...
John Spencer 14:20 ↗
Sure. I mean, I can, one, I point people to Elon's biography, whether he loves it or not. It details the why, when President Obama basically kind of closed NASA and commercialized it. Yeah. And then Elon gets into rocket development. And the story is in that book, but that's what I, here's the answer I told my son is that it's basically NASA commercialized and has figured out how to do space, you know, get into space at a much cheaper and efficient way, but they make rockets and they're in space exploration. Of course, Elon has greater aspirations in space and he's actually changed those, but I just say it's like NASA for commercial.
Greg 15:04 ↗
Yeah, definitely. And I think that was always the goal. I mean, there are certain things that have to be done along the way in order to get to the bigger goal, which I'm, you know, that's still, there's still some of those things happening now, but I think now it's a lot closer to like him getting to do the things that he really wants to do, right? Because early on obviously there's a lot of missions that are like, oh, you do this to make some money because you need to, or you need to prove out the technology, which was a big part of it. And obviously I think early on just getting that tech reliable was a huge part of that, which obviously they've become one of the most reliable, you know, rocket companies in history if not, you know, already for sure, but...
John Spencer 15:43 ↗
And that's what really when we talk about Traar as a company startup, I mean, again, I've heard Elon doesn't like the book, but it's a great information piece about the development of all the different companies from PayPal to SpaceX to Tesla and what were the challenges and how many rockets failed. Yeah. In SpaceX, it was on the verge of collapse, and actually literally a Tesla was driving in front of me when I'm having this conversation with my son. Boring Company though, I think less people would recognize that name. I of course know it one for Elon's famous quote while he was a part of it saying that really we can dig at the pace of a snail. And that quote stuck with me and I use it all the time. Yeah. Although I'm sure that's talking about the big dig versus, you know, a Hamas guy with a hand tool being able to dig tunnels every day for 20 years. So what is the Boring Company?
Greg 16:35 ↗
Yeah. Well, actually, on that note, I think the goal is to still catch a snail. Like, so in theory, I don't think we can go as fast as a snail. I think it's not at any given moment, but if you took the average speed of a snail, if you can continue that speed continuously, like you would be digging miles a day sort of thing, right? But so that's still a challenge, I think, chasing a snail. But yeah, the Boring Company is, you know, I think as maybe not everybody knows, but yeah, started as kind of like a seemingly joke from Elon. You know, being from California, I'm very familiar with the soul-destroying traffic of like the 405 freeway or whatever freeway in Southern California, you name it. But yeah, I think, you know, I think he famously tweeted like, oh, you know, I'm going to start digging tunnels or whatever. And then sure enough they buy a boring machine and start digging tunnels. So, but yeah, I mean, the goal of the Boring Company is to, you know, alleviate traffic, create new transportation systems that kind of have gone untouched, you know, along the lines of, you know, similar of what we're trying to do is like, you know, touch an area that is, you know, more or less untouched. But for Boring, I think it's, yeah, it's alleviating traffic and, you know, trying to make transportation better, easier, you know, all sorts of things that are, you know, good in nature. So, and I think, I don't think that's it, it didn't start with any technological advancement. It started with an existing technology that they wanted to get better at and push the limits of, which it's a similar mindset that we're going to have at Traar. You know, we're not trying to reinvent a wheel, especially on the onset. You know, we're going to take things that exist and push them and break them and, you know, try to make them better and maybe use them in areas that are not currently used. But yeah, so I guess that's, yeah, that's that.
John Spencer 18:36 ↗
I love the, and now we're going to shift into the actual topic of underground warfare, but I love the big hairy audacious goal that often comes out of some of Elon's work, like those, or, you know, reinventing electric vehicles and the battery and all these challenges. It makes me almost think of like a Philadelphia project if you have that land on the moon kind of ideal. And I think in the subterra, as we're going to talk about, I think it's convincing people that there is a challenge to be solved, not a problem, but there's actually a cognitive that's almost for people, and hopefully we'll talk about the challenges. But Asher, I want to go back to you. One, I'll start with the indirect question of how do you, I know you created a term that I'm probably going to be using a lot. I'll try to trademark it for you, like where it came from. But as somebody who's dealt with this space to help, to include help write the US military doctrine on underground warfare, subterranean, a lot of people use the words interchangeably. Do you use underground warfare, subterranean warfare, tunnel warfare, and subterra interchangeably? But I know you have a new word that try to help us understand the actual magnitude of it.
Asher 20:06 ↗
Yeah. Do you use all the words interchangeably? So I do, and you know, it's actually, it wasn't me, but it was someone that we were working with that pointed out this problem, and he was just reflecting to me that, you know, and he was reflecting this to me for a while, that so many things that for me were obvious are not obvious to the, you know, even people in the military who aren't in this area. But I'll kind of skip to the end is, you know, we're trying to bring this term called subterra, and no need for credit as long as people are using it. But the reason this term, we're so insistent on it and we believe it's so important is because our big belief is that subterra, and the definition of subterra is that anything that has to do with warfare underground is a realm of warfare in itself, and it's not a tactical side element of a battle. And this is kind of where, you know, to go back to your question, is today when we talk about aerial warfare, when someone says, oh, I'm working on aerial warfare, no one is asking him, wait, are you attacking planes or are you shooting missiles from planes? Are you delivering logistics? Are you delivering troops? It's very obvious to people that there's a whole domain that has a whole set of capabilities and advantages that it gives militaries by using this domain that change the way warfare is fought. And this is where we really believe that subterra is taking us. Subterra isn't just about tunnel warfare, maneuvering within a tunnel. It's not just about penetration and trying to hit an enemy tunnel. It's about how do we protect ourselves underground? How do we maneuver underground? How do we do, and especially in today's world where we're seeing what's happening in aerial warfare, this domain is going to become a whole set of skills that I do believe, and if Traar sticks to their mission and we work hard, that at the end of the day when someone says subterra warfare, it's obvious to people that this means a whole set of capabilities that militaries have both to prevent our adversaries of using this domain to their strategic advantage, which is what's been happening until today, and we'll talk about it, but also how our militaries are using this to protect our critical infrastructure and our troops to do it. And that's kind of the overall domain name that we're trying to bring so that 10 years from today you'll be hearing people say air, land, sea, space, and subterra.
John Spencer 22:22 ↗
So you've already convinced me that we misnamed the podcast. So Underground Warfare 101 maybe should be Subterra 101, because even if I give a lecture on tunnel warfare, you cognitively already put somebody at what they know they can think of, culture, you know, pop culture, what they've heard of. I mean, the tunnels of Cu Chi is like the number one thing you'll get from like a military person, but I think that's one of the beauties of it too, because I mean, words have meaning, so subterranean just takes too long to say, and then somebody's like, what is that? I think you could actually break ground, and I've been around for a long time and nobody else has tried to do that, break the cognitive hurdles that we're going to talk about by renaming it, and then, you know, whether it's the whole book like Tipping Point or Sticking, if it sticks, by just naming this podcast Underground Warfare 101. I think I did it to you again.
Asher 23:23 ↗
Now we're evolving. We're all evolving. We're going to evolve just like our military as well.
John Spencer 23:28 ↗
So, how do you define, and I know I saw again that the Traar kind of TED talk thing, it was really cool. How do you define subterra?
Asher 23:37 ↗
So, I think I'll start by just almost describing the journey of, you know, my personal journey within this, and I think that will also define the domain. Mostly during October 7th, the main thing that I really felt, and going on into battles in Lebanon and afterwards dealing with Iran and till today I feel it, you know, all the time, is that we have this unbelievable technological supremacy, air, land, and sea, and we have overwhelming force in those areas. I've personally experienced many times where, you know, a lot of times, I mean, this, I might have some idea of soldiers that'll be mad at me, but a lot of times when people imagine IDF soldiers fighting in Gaza, they're imagining door-to-door. But most of the time when we would have any sort of threat, you know, coming our way, we would just hide behind somewhere and let the air force or one of our drones take care of it and take out the threat. So I probably most of the times I've been in Gaza, I've never shot my gun once. I mean, and that was amazing. But on the other hand, it was very, very noticeable that although we have this overwhelming strength, the investment of our adversaries in subterra at a very, very low tech, nothing impressive technological breakthrough, just, you know, day-to-day, and we'll talk about this, the time element and how it affects wars, didn't enable us to have any sort of decisive win. Until today we're still dealing with this problem in Gaza. And we see it also today in Iran where I think people underestimate and don't understand how much the subterra is directly connected to the Hormuz strategy because it's a timing element and the US is paying huge prices of Strait of Hormuz closed, and thereby Iran just has to survive underground enough time for the US to break and say, well, this is costing us too much, and both of these are interconnected. So the journey really started of feeling this frustration at on one hand feeling the might of our military and on the other hand our inability to win and have a decisive battle. But the more, you know, we do, we kind of dove into this and really went into it, what we realized is that we're missing the greatest part of it is that if our adversaries are using this domain and it's giving them such a strategic advantage, and in a world where, you know, especially when you see Ukraine and Russia and you see how suddenly military might and economic might is not giving decisive battle abilities because of the aerial domain, and that we're entering an era, and again we could talk about this more and more, but we're entering an era of an arms race where the technology is pretty much equivalent one to another, that this is also the domain, the best domain in which we could start protecting our troops and changing the way we fight, so that we won't be at a huge disadvantage in the next major battles that we'll be facing and that we're preparing for. Hopefully that will never happen. I'm not hoping for it to happen, but that we have to be prepared for and ready for. So to go back to the question, I think the domain of subterra is the maneuver underground. It's the ability to feel comfortable in using technology to move and position yourself underground. And I'll give you even a small example. You know, a lot of times one of the big questions that I think in a lot of tier one, and, you know, I won't go too much into detail with this, but the obvious one is that there's blast doors in a lot of the strategic infrastructure. Even, you know, the operation that was advertised of the Israeli unit Shaldag that went into, in Syria, into a huge weapon manufacturer. There's a very big question of these blast doors. It's, you know, there's, I won't go into the technical specificities, but it's basically a lot of steel and then a lot of cement and then rebar in the middle and then more cement and more steel. And Greg, you as a welder could know how challenging that could be to do that in an underground tunnel. And everyone were trying to come up with different solutions to do that. And one of the things that I'm still passionate about, maybe I'm hinting here to one of our products, but it was like, why don't we maybe just dig underneath the blast door and, you know, pop up from the other side. So I think that this is what subterra is. It's the moment militaries have a mentality, have a doctrine, have the technology that makes them feel comfortable in this type of maneuver and usage underground, just like you would fly over something if it was an obstacle and not in fact have to go completely through it. That's what subterra is. It's the domain of moving in the, I think Palmer Luckey, as much as he made it sound scientifically, he made a huge contribution in willing to speak in these terms to say, yes, we're going to maneuver in the crust of the earth. We're going to move things in the crust of the earth, and that's what this domain is.
John Spencer 28:07 ↗
Yeah. And I want to get to Palmer's statement. Interesting about the going underneath the blast doors, again, as the geeking out on this. I mean, again, our good friend on X, Sapper Geologist. The term sapper comes from the era of attacking castles and the sappers trying to dig underneath the fortifications, or actually what they would do is dig up to it and then try to get it to and set fires underneath the wall and have it collapse down to create the opening for the forlorn hope to surge through that. And again, I'm having kind of revelations as I love the term subdomain or subterra domain because subterra is one thing, but the fact that you want to make it a domain as much so as air, sea, land, space, cyber, subterra, because having again a knowledge of where militaries confine themselves with the words, if you open up like the US military's public subterranean operations doctrine, it will define subterranean in categories. It starts with naturally formed crevices, caves, things like that. And then it goes up to kind of, there are different variations of civil underground infrastructure like the Boring Company's and tunnels, highways, rivers, things like that. And then, you know, of course, that high category of military. But it doesn't really lend itself that we're talking about anything below what? Anything below the surface of the earth, whether it's one foot or how far?
Asher 29:48 ↗
Thousands of feet.
John Spencer 29:49 ↗
Yeah. Thousands of feet. Right.
And I think that that is when you take subterra domain is you open up the field, right? I'm not going to constrain myself to these three categories. Because, and as you were talking of the examples, which I want to do around the world of what are the examples of subterra, if we want to, and this is why I love a long-form podcast, I can't do on my show, is like, well, we're going to go that way, we're going to go over to history, we're going to go this way, we're going to go around the world. And I'll pose this to you, we can start with you and going around the world, and Greg, please. There's always been an aspect of put what you want to protect underground, again going back to the subterranean operations. We're going to start calling it subterra domain. It's a thing. If you value something, whether it's your strategic nuclear command, I live somewhere really close to where we put some stuff in the mountain to survive nuclear destruction. That's as old as warfare is, as much so is fighting underground. But if especially today, if you're a military, a state, a terrorist, whatever, if you want to protect something, then, you know, you need to put it underground. And you talked about though, which I was just at a conference discussing, is that's present, and when we do it around the world, we'll talk about just the scale of the subterra that nobody really discusses, and the fact that we don't have a unit in the US military, we don't have companies, good on you, with patents and all that where subterra is almost ridiculous, to be frank. There are specialists, and I would love to talk to Greg about this actually, my friend Joe Vega, like there are even countries who specialize in digging, like the Netherlands or something, like he said if you see some people traveling from the Netherlands, be worried. And of course some of our enemies, North Korea helping Hezbollah dig tunnels, things like that, they build expertise. I would wonder within our military who are our experts, and of course we have our civilians putting things underground to protect it, not new. I think what you described about our enemies doing it is they've figured out the Western way of warfare, and it was a big conference I was at, they reverse engineer it saying usually they want to finish their thing quickly. So whether I'm Hamas, which was, you know, trying to buy time for the international community to stop Israel, even at the one superpower of the world, some of our enemies have figured out if I can just survive 80, 90 days, then there's going to be issues within the democracy of the people depending on what the context of the war is. I think that aspect, from what I'm hearing, is one of the reasons that energized you about, of course, working in the subterra domain, is that the enemy is not only investing in it, but they're using it at a strategy level. And I wrote this for Hamas's political strategies. One of the first wars that I've studied where the enemy cares more about the subterra than he does the surface. Of course, they built that. But as a strategic, as a strategy and defined in war as to achieve my political goals, the subterra matters to me more than the surface because our enemies, of course, that's Israel's enemy, has figured out how long it takes before things start to change in the strategic environment. Well, now we're seeing Iran, we can talk about some other places who have figured out the same. It's not only to protect their things, but it's about buying time in war. If we do it around the world, where do you want to start?
Asher 33:29 ↗
I mean, maybe we start with Iran because it's most immediate, and then we'll go on a long journey around the world in less than 80 seconds. No, we're in long form. We don't have to. Less than 80 days. But yeah, I think, you know, I think the important element with, you know, I'll start with Iran because I think I'll, you know, I'll even take it one step back is what people have to realize is that the subterra complexes that Iran built, and we're talking about not one, not two, because a lot of times people like to talk about Fordow and Natanz and places that there's the real strategic nuclear abilities over there or whatever is buried under the earth that everyone are talking about. People have to realize is that this is a brilliant strategy of Iran. And I'll start with a tweet that I love giving of Trump himself in 2020. He said, Iran never won a military battle and never lost a negotiation. Now Iran are, you know, people don't know this, chess was invented in Persia. Like it's, you know, they're amazing strategists and they know that they're not going to win a military battle against Israel. They know that they're not going to win a military battle for sure against the US. But what they do know is they understand, I think, the psychology of Western civilization, just as you said, better than we understand their own psychology. And they know from the get-go how this is going to play out and how this is going to work. And I think one of the examples of that that really emphasizes to me so well is that at the beginning of the wave of attack that the US and Israel were carrying together, because we didn't have the ability to really penetrate inside their subterra complexes, and I'll soon explain why, we were bombing a lot of the entrances to all these different places. But then we saw something kind of surprising. We saw that they were purposely collapsing their own entrances to their own things. So you ask yourself, well, why were they purposely filling up with dirt and excavation machines these complexes? Another thing that we were seeing, if you look at aerial maps, you'll see that a lot of the structures that were strategic to them, they just put on the sidelines a huge amount of engineering machines, excavators, pickup trucks, things like that. But that was brilliant of them because basically what they knew that was going to happen is if those structures were open, there would be a few entrances that probably we would think of sending tier one troops to come in and try to raid and try to take out, and with very high capabilities, and probably would be able to do it. But the moment they purposely just filled it up with dirt, and again you could see here where we're struggling, they just had, you just have to fill something up with dirt. You don't even have to dig it underground. And suddenly that changes how a tier one unit could even think of approaching and coming in. Suddenly it's not a blast door, but it's tons and tons of earth just waiting there. And the day after the peace deal, their trucks are already sitting there idle, you know, 10-minute drive away, and could just start clearing out that dirt, and within a few days, you know, they could have access again to the structures of where they're trying to go. So that's number one. Number two is the way they built these structures. You know, you could say, well, maybe we bombed all the entrances, there wasn't any air, there wasn't any food access. Well, they built these complexes in ways where there was many different access points. It was very hard to know if we knew of all of them, and it was enough that we missed one entrance or one airway, and they could continue to have life support in getting where they want to go. Number three, and I think, you know, unfortunately we know like there's been all kinds of intel open source, I'm not saying anything that isn't open source, that some of our bunker busters didn't go off, and they're already reverse engineering them and understanding. And this is, by the way, also what happened in Gaza in 21, we could talk about that, is they study these bunker buster munitions, they understand how they work. And there's a whole world of civilian engineering put into this. It's not just about digging deep enough. There's concrete infrastructure that's being built around it at a certain pressure that's even, you know, much higher than hard rock. If you understand how these bunker busters work, right? They're penetrating until they sense some sort of, you know, airway or some sort of passageway that they know how to, and again I'm not an expert at bunker busting, but this is more or less what the open knowledge tells us. So if you build certain air passageways before your concrete infrastructure, maybe you're detonating this ahead of time. These aren't small infrastructures. These are, some of them are miles long. That even if you know where they are and you know where the entrance is, where is exactly where you're trying to strike? Where is where you're trying to hit? There's blast doors that are...
John Spencer 38:04 ↗
blocking the bus. So you blasted one area and it collapsed. Well, maybe none of it even penetrated through to the area that's actually strategic to them. And then if you add the time element to it, you know, the civilian underground infrastructure is something that existed for hundreds of years. So the game is brilliant because they just they're giving us very short windows to do the effect that we want to do, and then they have extremely long windows to rehabilitate, regrow during the peace deal when there's no just we feel there's no justification politically to go in again and try to block them from doing what we're doing. So I think Iran are the masters in many ways, and I'm sure they learned this from North Korea and China of subterranean strategy because it's not just oh we moved it underground as you said. There's a much deeper process and strategic process going on of saying how do we block the adversary from even thinking of trying to come in and take what's strategic to them? How do we make it extremely expensive and difficult to ever really hit our strategic assets? And then all we need to do is survive long enough to, as you say, to pinpoint that western, you know, civilian resilience to a point because it's all interconnected so that it breaks. And the moment it breaks, there's a peace deal. And the moment there's a peace deal, we have unlimited time to do stuff that in no way look, you know, militarily aggressive, right? We just have excavators, we just have trucks, these aren't tanks, these aren't planes, but these are the ones that are bringing back that whole capability yet again and the access points to these capabilities. And then you end up in, you know, day one where oh so our politicians have zero justification to go into war. Like could you imagine Trump saying, "Well, the Iranians are, you know, redigging with excavators, the underground complex. I'm going to fight back in Iran." The if people don't understand what that means, that there's an excavator and a truck in Shiraz and that that deliberately has to do with access to nuclear capabilities, people won't be giving the justification to these types of fights. So I think this is all you know in many ways what's happening in Iran and what we'll see in other areas.
So absolutely, it's so hard to do this shortly, right, to take all the areas. So I quickly for me I'll go to China because we you for us military we start with China. Yeah, and we kind of work our way down, right? China, of course, has thousands of miles of military and civilian underground on purpose for survivability, things like that. They call it the you they have the Great Wall of China. They call it the Great Underground Wall of China. It's thousands of miles. You of course Iran, most people now, Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, pickaxe mountain, missile cities. I don't know. I have actually never heard of an estimate, but they've been investing in a long time. And this is the evolution of warfare is when anybody's engaged in a war, everybody's watching. We're watching what capabilities work, what capabilities don't work. So, if you look at even, you know, our first Gulf War, you know, the great 83 day victory and the bunker busters we were using at the time, a lot of people are watching and seeing how those were effective. And the GBU-57 that was used against for Operation Midnight Hammer was designed specifically for that site. It's not like they didn't know and the precision it takes that you get to a depth where and you said you're right. It's not just the depth, it's the engineering, it's the blast wave. I you know open source because I know like you said I'll go back to going down the hierarchy of countries but you mentioned but what Hamas learned from Operation Guardian of the Walls 2021. I was there on the ground right afterwards and after October 7th they found the memo where Yahya authorized the $250,000 to put in more blast doors which is about stopping that concussion because during Operation Guardian of the Walls you dropped some bunker busters and it followed the path of the tunnel and knocked down a I think it was a school or that that it's just because of how Swiss cheese underneath Gaza these tunnels and so he started placing more blast doors. Okay, China, great underground wall of China. Iran, of course, we know, like I said, and of course these there are missile cities and all these things. There's stuff along the ports, all of this, like you said, they've learned North Korea.
So, the reason that the US military cared about underground warfare is what we call it time for a little while. They spent because somebody looked at our plans for, you know, a course of action if North Korea happened. North Korea of course has hundreds of miles of deep buried military sole purposed spaces and some of the people look at the war plan saying that there are so many that you don't have enough special teams. Of course, you don't have enough Yahalom which becomes a scale capacity of people specialized in this subterranean domain. It's not if you name it and classify it kind of like we did Space Command, you recognize that it isn't a this special thing for people. It's an entire domain that you have to prepare to operate in and we're going to talk about what those challenges are. But in about 2018 in North Korea, we realized we didn't have the US military didn't have enough capabilities. So we went around training all of our brigades in basically how to enter a tunnel and how to clear a tunnel with a little bit of breaching capabilities in there. We spent almost half a billion dollars to do it and then we wrote the manual that we have now and as you can see it hasn't been updated since. North Korea. So, we're gonna go to Russia, Ukraine.
So, where are we seeing it? You mentioned it, but I'll highlight, of course, everybody says like in Ukraine, but most people talk about the drones and the dead man zone that goes from 15 to 50 kilometers where you can't operate on the surface or you're a threat. And they're starting to do operations where they literally send one guy at a time out to go into the city. And that's how they try to form a formation by sending one person at a time into an area because the surface is so lethal with all the range of drones and robotics. What an article that I've been writing on and maybe we talk about doing it together is the underground world that is in that dead man zone. So everybody talks about that's a dead man zone. There's so what both sides have invested heavily in the last two years in creating underground spaces. Not just and we talked about this which I think is a great example. I was on the ground when Ukraine was starting to dig trenches and working with some people and okay let's collect what's out there on trenches. No military had any doctrine left over on how to dig a trench like a true trench. Of course we all know how to dig a foxhole but like a trench line with the you know the elbows and why do you have those elbows and if you take a trench and you cover it does it become a tunnel. But of course that was a long time ago, but it's an example of we don't have all the lessons that we learned the US military like in Vietnam with it, they're gone. They're just gone. So the trench warfare, how to dig a trench was gone and all the special the specialty of that because I know a little bit enough though if you dig a hole and you put stuff on top of it, that's not endless. If you put more and more dirt on top of it, then you're going to start compressing the blowouts. Actually, I bought some land in Colorado because I wanted to dig and like what does it take to brace and I couldn't dig because it was all rock, but I wanted to bore that in Russia Ukraine. They are hiring both sides construction companies. At first it was just excavators and they were excavating to create trenches but then they were creating underground spaces and they started hiring their of course it's an existential war for Ukraine. So they started using construction companies to create underground hospitals, underground drone manufacturing plants, connecting roads underground, just completely going because of that lethality of the surface. I know we're going to talk about that later. Going underground, Russia is the same thing. Russia has highways underground. Of course, there have been a couple battles. Of course, the battle of Kyiv that I've studied, the battle of Bakhmut and all those that had naturally formed already spaces, but I think that aspect of what's going on in Russia Ukraine is underappreciated.
You mentioned Syria. Of course, I wrote about the amazing historic operation that Israel did to fly Israeli special forces because no bunker buster could have gotten it done. Fly them to one deep I think it called operation deep buried or it had like a weird deep buried target name, blow special forces to enter it, blow it up from inside and use forklifts that they knew were there for some of it was really cool operation. But in Syria most people didn't know until this really since October 7th that there were these massive tunnel highways to be able to feed Hezbollah its rocket supplies. They found massive ones and they've actually found them on the east side of Syria. They on these massive tunnels as really around once ISIS and all this stuff really in the Middle East, all those that weren't already invested in tunnels started to go deep into even in the battle of Mosul they found boring machines, little personal boring machines that for two years ISIS tried to create subterranean spaces and they would fill all the houses with dirt to hide the spoil which goes back to how do you know somebody's digging a tunnel?
Asher 47:36 ↗
Yep.
John Spencer 47:36 ↗
Hopefully that's enough of around the world. Of course Vietnam.
Asher 47:40 ↗
Mexican border.
John Spencer 47:41 ↗
Mexican border, absolutely. Most of the time those don't get reported. I did an article about how many have been reported. And along when you talk about really cross-border which is actually was Israel's so that's an evolution I don't want to get into of Israel's specialty in tunnels and what it cared about tunnels for a long time it was just that cross-border tunnel that they cared about and once they built the iron wall that most people know about, once they built the wall between Gaza and Israel that had a subterranean component with sensors all the way down to the water table, then it becomes it causes people to not get complacent but they've kind of solved the cross-border aspect once they develop that technology. And I wrote that there are places in the southern border we need it because you're as you have more and more visibility to see the surface enemies go, but you're right this is not just about combating enemies. Even during the Gaza war which I wrote about, Israel changed its culture towards the subterranean domain in the battle of Khan Yunis and started going into the tunnels to maneuver into the tunnels before Hamas knew you were there and then maneuver on the surface at the same time. So the first time in modern history anybody's ever used on the attack the subterranean domain and the surface at the same time to do that. Okay, hopefully that's enough for people, although we could go into each one of those areas of the world. It just to put it lightly, it's pervasive.
Asher 49:07 ↗
Yeah.
And I could talk about just some of the underground sites we have here because we care about things, we put it underground, but it's just pervasive. And let alone in the civil industry, I just got back from India. Massive historic level tunneling through mountains to connect great vast pieces of land that never been connected before. It's pervasive and the fact that the militaries aren't focused on it. But let's get to even a funner topic of what are the challenges of operating in the subterranean domain.
So yeah, so I think that what people mostly miss in subterranean warfare, and this is also what always worries me when we're training troops to fight, is doing the mistake of seeing this as if it's some is a regular urban warfare challenge, a maneuvering within a building or something like that. And you know, we spoke about this also, but I think it's so much to understand that the domain and the terrain itself, that's your biggest enemy, your biggest threat more than the enemy himself. And Hamas were actually masters of that, of sometimes almost scaring us so much of what would happen in that tunnel that we were risking ourselves more by how we were maneuvering through it. So I'll start just with you know like I'll go from like the psychology to the methodologies in general. So first of all the moment you're going into a tunnel you're in complete tunnel vision. It's hard you know a lot of these tunnels do these very light turns and it's hard to even understand where you are at a certain point. Now what that causes a few things. Number one is sometimes you could enter a tunnel and this has happened to me where you enter a tunnel and you end up in a loop, meaning you're almost where you started and you see someone in front of you that you think this is a terrorist I've been looking for and it's actually your friend who's maneuvering right behind you and you were sure the whole time that you were going completely straight. Now the next thing is when you're about to go into a building even if you don't have the blueprints of the building you know more or less the size of the building. You know that if you're on the flank right there's very likely there isn't going to be a trapdoor going in. But if you're maneuvering through a tunnel, you never know where the next access point and where the next entry is going to be. So we and you were talking about Khan Yunis, there were instances where literally soldiers were drilling a hole in every side of a tunnel as they were moving forward to make sure that there wasn't some sort of trap door that was about to go in. So you could maneuver very deep inside and someone could just go from the side. Someone could implement an explosive from above that collapses the tunnel behind you. So there's that. Then you have the communication. The moment you take a few 90 degree turns in a tunnel and for example Hamas realized this and purposely created many many 90 degree turns in a tunnel you're completely losing communication unless you're in a mesh system and relying on a mesh system means that the moment you know one is cut off you're completely cut off and you don't know how to communicate how to locate know where you are if you're in command and control back you don't know where your soldier is to rescue. Now we're entering the terrain itself. So first of all there's the air. You know if you're even shooting a few bullets in a very small confined tunnel you're already in loss of air. If an explosion goes off a lot of times it sends on gases. You know a lot of the bunker busting munitions that we were using in Gaza. It wasn't the explosion itself that was a threat but a lot of times it would just you know there were so many elements that were now in the air that people you know were dying from suction of air, lack of oxygen etc. So, it's so dangerous to use any sort of violent act within a tunnel because the moment you're doing it, you're risking yourself more than many times if you especially if you don't know what's in front of you. You don't just want to shoot or you don't just want to bomb because then you know you're damaging yourself many times more than anything else. Then there's you know just the structural integrity of the whole tunnel. So anything you're doing you're at a risk of actually collapsing it on yourself. There are many instances where you don't want to go in to fight the adversary, not because he's stronger than you, but because by you having to use violence in order to get to him, you're actually threatening yourself of something collapsing over you. Not to talk about how do you rescue someone out of a tunnel structure. It's not like again in a building where you could just blast a hole in a wall and someone could you know zipline you down or someone a helicopter or any sort of thing like that. But how do you dig access without hurting someone when you're trying to get to where you're trying to get? So that's a whole other element in itself. So basically you and then there's the blast. So if a blast goes off, it's going to go through the easiest way. So it's going to clear through the tunnel. So any sort of blast that goes in a tunnel is actually much more threatening than a smaller blast. So you have to think very well what sort of explosive you're using. If you're at a blast door and you want to now blow up the blast door. So number one, are you creating a blast that could implement you way back? What's happening to the air the moment you blow through that blast door? What's happening to the structural integrity above you? Do you even want to blow through a blast door if you're doing it? So you know as I defined it is you're fighting the terrain more than you're fighting the adversary in underground warfare. And that's why, and this is again, you know, one of the missions that I see for our company is, and this is the example of the blast door as well, is sometimes it's so much smarter to dig your own tunnel to where you need to get to to face your adversary rather than maneuver through the adversary's domain because he's going to be in way more control of what you're doing. And that's, you know, a part of it.
John Spencer 54:54 ↗
So much to talk about. Yeah. But also I really want to get into like why I was so fascinated with the 98th division in Khan Yunis that put this he actually put a mission. So General Goldfus not the only one ever thought about but gave the idea of a mission like I want to be able to use that space underground. I know it's there to my advantage. I want to use it. So he changed the mental framework. But so a couple things you've said in our last podcast and you just said, but I think these mental models really help people. One is that as soon as you enter the underground, you're in a war with the environment or you're in a as soon as you enter the underground, you're in a fight with the environment even before you're in a fight with the enemy. And it's much more important. I think that's important. This is the analogy that I've given people is that a lot of soldiers, anybody you talk to, especially if it's outside of civil engineering, which we'll talk about, even coal miners, they get some of the challenges because it's a profession and they mitigate for it and but it's really a highly dangerous work is that it is not an extension of the surface. So that gets a lot of people in trouble when they think, you know, even a basement in a house or a tunnel that is not that deep, they just view it as an extension of the surface. And the analogy that I've been within our international working group at subterranean warfare is that it's the mental model of against the sea domain. Nobody treats the surface of the ocean the same way they do as soon as you go under water because it's completely different and everything you need to even think about once you go underwater. You talking about deep sea or submarine warfare, everybody respects it as it's its own profession, its own domain, it's everything. That's where I think that the subterranean domain is. It is not an extension of the surface. It is analogous to surface warfare, which is actually a name for the Navy guys, all the ships on the surface and all that that involves very complex and navigating and stuff. We don't like the Navy because we're army. But if you go underwater, then it's a whole different. So of those two categories that I try to put people, one is if you could write a book and just spend so much time talking about the challenges. One is as soon as you stick a human into the underground, there's a whole list of challenges, right? I actually wrote a book recently and one of the titles is called a canary in their coal mine which we get from you know the coal miners taking a canary with them into the coal mine because the air is so dangerous is that if the canary dies you have a clock you got to get out of there because you're about to die because that's how fast the air can go bad. But with I know enough again from talking to people who like special forces guys confined spaces training. So how quickly and you don't even know until you stick a human underground whether they can even do it. Is that they get claustrophobic, they can get vertigo lose all sense of direction and time quickly. It isn't like there's a clock like hey you can stick any soldier down there for a certain amount of time and they're good until this mark. No, no. You can stick one guy based on their background and they immediately get freak out. And my friend Joe Vega is like really big like you know linebacker dudes starting to freak out underground. So I think that element of course the air like you mentioned not especially if we're talking about truly sticking a human underground at what depth under what quality is the air. And then if you have to have a contained breathing apparatus and that is a whole host of complications. Or as even I saw in the tunnels that I were in Hamas, you know, they think through it, not that good of it, but they have ventilation and ventilation shafts as much as they did in Vietnam and hoses and all these things that because I don't want to just think about entering the enemy's tunnels. I want you guys to start thinking about making tunnels rapidly that I can use to surprise the enemy and go underneath their fortress. Because Sun Tzu like I'm the professor Sun Tzu what Iran has done is attacked our strategy. The next strategy as Sun Tzu said was attack your allies and then the next one is attack the military, fight the military and lastly attack a walled city but he didn't have the ability to go under the city. Within this human physiology aspect is also the contaminants that are down there. As I know the IDF have learned, there are special types of contaminants depend on when that underground surface I mean there's like if we start going deep underground there's stuff that and bacteria and things like that we aren't really as prepared for and they had a soldier I think the IDF got a cut and
Asher 1:00:00 ↗
there was like sewage under the underground and it was really like a flesh-eating bacteria.
If my friend Drew was talking would talk about the different types of sensors you would have to have for like air quality and contaminants and things like that. And then again, this is it's more like going scuba diving than it is I'm just going to pop down there from the surface.
John Spencer 1:00:21 ↗
By the way, I could hint that some of the equipment we ended up using were stuff that were more Navy Seals.
Asher 1:00:28 ↗
Oh, diving. Let's just say commercial diver. We don't give Navy Seals any credit.
John Spencer 1:00:32 ↗
Yeah. Okay. Yeah.
Okay. So if we talk about the human challenges right that you have to solve and there's a huge category for just the physics and engineering that I want to get into but from a military domain although I think if you really want to own subterranean you're encompassing all of it because you have to know what the civil advancements are know what the challenges are for the military though. So if you stick a human down there and let's not say fight but operate. All right. So, you covered shoot, right? Which and this is what I tell people and I actually didn't used to just use what you do about if you fire your weapon, it sucks oxygen and it replaces harmful chemicals, right? And this is why you go to a shooting range and a pregnant woman can't go in. You know that like in our pregnant people can't go in a shooting range because the lead is in the air and you can have really good HVAC system that's sucking it out. But as soon as you start shooting anything that you're right, it sucks the oxygen and it replaces harmful chemicals. What I usually play with shoot is because of the again like going scuba diving is it's a pressurized environment. So you can't just use one layer of earplugs. Most operators who are prepared to shoot underground have either special hearing plugs or they have double layered because you can give yourself concussion by firing your weapon underground because of the pressures if you just think about it. So shooting is hard. You mentioned communicating, right? So this gets to the technological aspect I cover in some of my writings that what I usually tell people when I go out to visit them is that everything you're carrying soldier won't work underground because it's usually relying on some type of satellite, some type of radio frequency line of sight that's exchanging. Like you said, the mesh network is a solution to it. But I mean it's just a really great way to everything that they have wasn't made for and most likely won't work especially for communicate but we do shoot move and communicate. So, moving so just knowing where you're going. And it's not, again, we're going to operate underground. So, it's not just knowing where you are, the soldier or the formation, which there is no GPS because it's satellite enabled. Usually, I mean, you pull the string with you. So, there's some firefighting techniques I've learned from New York City about the different techniques how they try to keep track of the soldiers. But, that's the other element is not only knowing where that soldier is, it's knowing who's commanding that element, knowing where that formation is. And I actually asked this of again going back to the 98s kind of flipping the script is like how did you keep track and then my friend Joe like you know you're leaving people or a mesh network at every turn everything like that. So you're trying to command somebody underground. Although we have an element of the sub training, if you know the submarine warfare for our nuclear, they're true masters of the ocean and nobody knows where they're at and they'll come up to send a signal. Again, it goes back to that's very similar to what you would need in a subterranean, but how do you command and control an element that's in that domain and know where they are, especially if you're maneuvering on the surface or dropping things on a surface or things like that? So that whole element and then lastly I said the other challenge of operating underground is there is no dispersion right so that's why one bad guy at the end of one tunnel can hold it because all I got to do is point and spray it I don't have to be a marksman and if it's a machine gun and I have HVAC I guess it's going to release a lot there's no dispersion so how do you operate in that environment there's this long list of challenges but Greg I know you've been so patient.
Oh, it's all good.
John Spencer 1:04:12 ↗
I want to talk about because this is usually where we'll stop in the military. We'll stop there like yeah but what if you want to dig a tunnel like what are the challenges of creating subterranean for you to operate and I know I know of a few but I'm sure I'm clueless.
Yeah. I mean you know obviously one of the challenges is time right? So I mean we talked about that how quickly do you need something right? Enough obviously in certain cases when you need it is one of those challenges. So and that's something where I think pushing this now is that's one of the things right because okay now we can determine and hopefully get people on board with and some of these things will have the aspect of time on your side where okay we could put some time into planning and we could start implementing some things you know with time on our side but obviously on the other side of things is just the challenges of the digging in general right the different geological challenges right so obviously the earth's crust is full of different geologies, right? And those will cause some different challenges and most of which like we probably don't know of and we're about to start getting into ourselves and pushing the limits on some of these things. But obviously yeah, getting through rock or soft soil or sand, right? You've got everything to deal with there. So I mean thankfully a lot of these things you know we don't a lot of them we don't have to solve like you know a lot of great engineering has been done before us right and so you know there's a lot of good information out there for us to kind of start with and then you know we're going to probably hit some limits and push them and try to learn from them and maybe implement some different solutions but yeah I mean that like I think the known challenges are there and they're somewhat obvious. Right. And I think you know I started with time and that's one of the things that people probably think of like oh well it's going to be so slow to do whatever it is you need to do. And I think on that forefront we're going to start exploring different not necessarily new methodologies but implementing you know obviously smaller diameter things can potentially go faster than larger diameter things right less soil to remove. You know, there's certain things where you know, certain methods where you know, you don't need to remove the spoils at all. Whether that's just from using you know, compressive tools, compaction, different things that can move the soil around them and not have to actually dis or displacement tools rather. And obviously those come with other limitations whether you know if they're powered by pneumatics, right? Pneumatics can only take you so far. But there's lots of different things that we're going to start testing and exploring to kind of achieve different results. So and again I think depending on what you need that will kind of form how we approach the attack. But implementing you know underground structures whether from you know using TBMs or different tools like that obviously and those vary in size right you know you can there's micro TBMs from a couple feet wide to you know I think 50 feet or you know so in diameter so yeah lots to explore there and definitely go down for sure.
Asher 1:07:36 ↗
I'll just add sorry that I think that's been like a lot of the interesting work that we've been doing in Tra is, you know, many times I feel like my work with Greg is, you know, Greg is kind of like, well, tell me what you need and we'll figure it out. And then, you know, what you start realizing is that, you know, and you were kind of mentioning this, you were talking about like the way people understand is you compare it to submarines or you compare it to planes. There's whole industries that, you know, and you know, this is we were talking about Elon Companies. You don't reinvent the wheel. You go in and you understand what exists and you build off of it. So, you know, a lot of times when we're kind of digging deep in what exists and what is out there,
what you just see is that the financial incentive and the methodology bases the whole technology on two elements. It bases it on time. Meaning many times almost the financial incentive in the civilian infrastructure world is rewarded by it taking time. Meaning it's not for a fact that a lot of companies would want things to go faster. This is kind of where I feel I mean Greg could talk about this more. Boring Company kind of changed an approach you know disrupting the market but also logistical footprint above ground and then you know the moment you have limitless ability to place generators and you know all kinds of other elements so a lot of times you know what our work is is I need to go and explain military constraints right if we're in a battlefield we're not going to build a factory in the battlefield or we're not going to take three months to build access so it's almost the two elements that in the civilian world have been the biggest advantage where it was like you know what this we're not going to focus on this. This is exactly where we as a company have to focus and that means we're going to pay prices in other areas and we're going to solve it in that area. So it's almost a switch around from the civilian to the military where my job is to bring you know the military approach and you know I think also John you've been really helping with that and like okay let's think about this in military terms and then our engineers could really understand you know at the start be horrified by the ramifications of that but then start building interesting technology to solve it.
John Spencer 1:09:41 ↗
I think that's exactly right. So even if we I don't think we're done listing all the challenges then we can address how has the civilian world addressed that challenge and then some of them they just haven't and I forgot to talk about survive in the underground so you shoot move communicate survive for the military so the aid if you have a casualty down there how do you get the casualty out. I've been a part of now it's been years from now experiments and one they did some experimenting shoving soldiers underground and the one thing they said they was winches. So if they found which you could create if you thought about it differently if they found a in order to pass resupply or to take casualties that they would just find a shaft if you most people are familiar with and then but they needed something on the surface that they could drop a winch down to pull it out. So they figured out in that experiment that we did that one of the things that we needed that we didn't have was a winch on every vehicle so that if you needed to drop resupply or pull somebody out, you could have a military winch. I'm fascinated if we really were to shift people's minds about need to be able to create subterranean based on survivability as much. All right. One, you mentioned something I think is vital and I was talking about this weekend as well. I was working for a four-star general. We were looking at everything for the military as adviser for a four-star. And one of the other four stars that came in that dealt with kind of procurement and acquisitions, which I never want to be in that world. He goes, "Everybody wants to talk about thinking about outside the box. Most people don't know what's in the box." So, this is what we're going to talk a long time about what really what's in the box. And then we're going to talk about how you're trying to get outside the box. But there just because of the lack of military expertise, very few people know what's in the box, let alone know what's outside the our box in the civilian world's box. And this is the expertise that's missing.
You mentioned time which I think is great because depending on what scale we talked about the snail of course if you think about the boring company if somebody you google that you're talking these massive civilian boring machines to dig tunnels you can drive through. Time is always going to be a factor which is I think can be played with on I've always asked sapper geologists well how fast does it take to dig a tunnel like well where right and this you know how fast if it's a you know Vietnam or some parts of Gaza not all parts of Gaza actually but some parts if it's that clay that doesn't need to be or the bracing is less complex of as you dig and how you brace and I know the boring machine that was a big challenge is as you're digging, you know, something has to replace that void to be the security of it. And Hamas created a long time ago this very standardized three section bracing element of the wall and the moon on the top. Geology of course being the challenge of creating a new void in the space. I think the tools that you have available would be another big challenge that you have to address because in tools becomes you know the size of it the cost of it the specialization of it you know it's a specialized piece of equipment is not commercial off the shelf although I know hopefully we get to talk about some of the mining equipment that you guys went to the environment like you said if it's a contested environment it's going to be harder to get things. But some of the things that I know a little bit about, Greg, but I know that when creating a new void, there is that issue you talked about which is displacement because I always get this about why didn't they know that Hamas was digging? Where they putting the dirt? Because everybody if they know a little bit about digging is if you create a void, you got to do something with the spoil.
That's done. And then so I want to ask you about kind of your thoughts about that aspect of displacement and spoil or that from digging the hole and heat depending on what device you are. I've heard that if we're talking about like some serious digging, it creates heat at the point of where you're digging. If it's not a, you know, a guy digging with his hand or something.
Yeah. No, it's a great question. Obviously on the displacement front, I think like in the civilian market I want to say it's limited in diameter. So, I mean and that could be something that we continue exploring at Tra. I think we're looking at drilling right now, but we've done a little bit of testing with soil displacement tools as well.
John Spencer 1:14:25 ↗
It's like a sometimes it's just a conveyor belt, right, of like in the coal mine. I just think about the rocks just like
Yeah. So, as far as like if you're pulling the spoils out, people use conveyor belts. Some people use like train cars and actual like muck cars and you just kind of fill up a box and move it out. So definitely different methods there. Conveyor belts seem to be one of the more ideal ones for long distances.
John Spencer 1:14:53 ↗
Can you pulverize it and like vaporize it?
You can, you know, I guess depending on what method you're using.
Mean, and then also what soil you're in. If you're in rock, it's normally kind of coming out and crumbles on a conveyor belt or whatever. In clay, you might be mixing with bentonite or some other polymers or something like that and kind of getting it to more of a liquid substance. So you could either convey it out or pump it out. But yeah, definitely lots of challenges there for sure. And then if you're trying to hide those, that becomes a whole different challenge, right? If you're not, you know...
John Spencer 1:15:27 ↗
Right. I guess this is a different challenge as I start to go to the sci-fi and not get ahead of myself. I was a part of the DARPA Underminer project as a historical advisor, and whether it was meeting a warfighting challenge, the DARPA Underminer project was about punching a small diameter hole up to 400 meters. I think it was very limited in scale. Their idea was the Mogadishu, Battle of Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down, soldiers were dying because they ran out of blood. They couldn't get them to this. They said that they could create a certain size of a hole. It wasn't far though. They're literally talking from like cut off block to cut off block. And they did, you know, they do a call out and these are the key performance indicators, the specifications of the challenge because they think, and then the different types of ways you would dig that hole. But if the Underminer comes from one of my kids' favorite movies, of course, Incredibles, where there's this guy who's digging, he has a machine that he's digging, but it isn't The Boring Company because he doesn't want to leave a void behind him for anything. He just wants to get that thing somewhere. Can you talk to me about the difference and the challenges of just trying to, like if you were to drop an Underminer robot, which is the Palmer Luckey kind of conversation was about, of course he believes in the next 5 to 10 years, and we're already there. I mean, the surface will become so lethal that we'll be fighting in the crust of the earth. But he also remembers back to the Soviet army that wanted to create this. If you look at the picture, I don't know if that's where the Incredibles got it or vice versa, but the Incredibles Underminer machine looks exactly like this Soviet nuclear-powered digger. My question, thinking through the subterranean challenge, is that that's not meant to do the boring machine create a highway. And I don't know if you have, have you ever been to the North Korean tunnel? I want to go.
Yeah, the tunnel number three.
John Spencer 1:17:24 ↗
Which is really, when I was in the third tunnel, it's an invasion tunnel. So North Korea dug, they say, up to seven invasion tunnels, these massive, almost boring machine level, that you could flow tens of thousands of troops through, and they left one open as like a tourist site. Literally, it's a tourist site you can go watch. It's really cool. And I really enjoyed it. But I know that that has to be different of what it would take to have a machine like the boring machine that creates a space that big. I'm sure that's not what North Korea used versus the Underminer, which was about getting a device through the crust of the earth, but he doesn't care about the spoil. So is that feasible to have a digging machine that's digging underground at a certain depth and you don't have to care about where the spoil goes because it's just creating a path and it collapses behind him?
Mhm. Well, yeah. I mean, you know, I think we're, you know, we might be getting into the futuristic, which I think is part of the goal. But I think along the lines of, you know, the existing displacement tools, right? They're displacing and not removing, right? So the tools exist, but I think we're going to have to push the limits on those to like get them to be, you know, I think currently, you know, we tested with a tool that can do like 150 ft where, you know, no soil needs to come out, right? You can just push this thing through the ground kind of like that. You don't need anything, right? Although this one was powered pneumatically, right? It kind of has a piston inside. But so yeah, things do exist where you can do that where that doesn't have to come out. But I think for that to be longer distance, maybe larger diameter and different things there, there's some engineering to do, I think.
John Spencer 1:19:09 ↗
Yeah, what some people miss in that belief is that the moment you're breaking apart earth, when it's underground, it's very condensed. So the moment you're breaking it, it grows in its volume much larger than the actual space it was taking when it was condensed, especially in rock. I mean, all these...
For sure, pushes like a gopher pushes the ground up.
John Spencer 1:19:32 ↗
So, you know, if the ground was too hard, in theory, that may not work, right? I mean, you know, or become a lot more difficult anyway. That's for sure. So...
So the further you go, I mean, basically the further you go, you're starting to create much more mass than what was originally there. Because unless you have a mechanism, and here we're, these are all kind of crazy conversations we've had, unless you have something that knows how to condense that back to its original formation, at some point you're creating way more mass in the structure that you just dug than what you're doing. And it fills up at a certain point. So that's, you know, a little...
But does that increase heat when it starts to fill up?
John Spencer 1:20:10 ↗
Well, it just gets blocked. It starts, you know, it starts, you know, filling up from around...
Heat would definitely increase for sure as that becomes more difficult as you dig further and yeah.
John Spencer 1:20:20 ↗
What's the normal type? So this is my few experiences with the diggers, knowing that the Hezbollah digging machine was basically a version of a diamond tip almost. Is that normal for the tips of digging machines to be made of some super concentrated...
Something hard? Yeah. I mean, generally chromium carbide is a common thing or tungsten carbide is used. I know in offshore drilling, diamond bits are used a lot. So yeah, you definitely need hard things because the ground wears, even in soft ground where it's like, oh, it's just soft ground, but like it all wears your tools out. And that's a challenge of digging and digging far. And that if your tool wears out, you can no longer dig. So that means you either need to have something that hard lasts forever, you know, we'll develop some unobtainium cutter heads, but otherwise you have to either be able to, you have to have a means of changing that. So it means you either have to be able to get to it or you have to be able to bring it back and then replace whatever has worn out because, yeah, I mean, if your tool no longer cuts, you're done. So that's a big challenge. One of the biggest challenges for sure is just, you know, the tool you're using at the front. So yeah, you want to start with something, you know, whether that's diamond, chromium carbide, or some, you know, they make some different matrices of diamond mixtures that kind of last a long time. So yeah, that's certainly a challenge for sure.
John Spencer 1:21:45 ↗
Here's one you probably didn't think of, but having understood that there's multiple elements of Russia and Ukraine that are kind of going World War I-esque, but with the modern technology aspect to it. During World War I, of course, both sides were tunneling at each other, and there were, you know, there's a Netflix show, what's the guy? Tommy.
Oh, Peaky Blinders. Peaky Blinders was a World War I tunnel digger and he has nightmares because...
John Spencer 1:22:18 ↗
They ran into each other.
Fighting in like a two-foot crawl space.
John Spencer 1:22:23 ↗
Because they had these two mining. So that's happening actually in there. There's two things happening in Russia and Ukraine that we haven't talked about. One is there's at least four different spots. Most people don't understand that eastern Ukraine is full of gas lines where Russia has tried to infiltrate again behind the fortress of the, not just the dead man zone, but actually to get past the castle wall. They've multiple times sent soldiers through gas lines which is already present in the underground and done that. The other thing is that when they're digging, which we haven't talked about the challenge, is they have to dig it quietly because of the advancements in acoustics. And if you know World War I, what happened is they developed acoustic, they would put their ear, some soldier was assigned to stop and see if they could hear the other people digging. And you know, again, Peaky Blinders, they ran into each other. How does that impact some of the things you're developing? Are you even thinking about digging quietly?
Yeah, yeah, we could probably go through. Again, it'll certainly depend on the application, right? Like if this is like a stealth mission, then yeah, obviously that's a huge factor because you're going to be game over before you start almost, right? But I mean, I think a lot of other aspects it may not be a requirement, right? Because we might be doing things for survivability or, you know, infrastructure-wise. But yeah, if stealth is a part of it, then...
Asher 1:23:53 ↗
I mean, it is something we spoke about, and I think that this is also in many ways our calling to the military because, you know, it's kind of funny, but as a company that believes that subterra is becoming a domain and it's not there yet in military sometimes, and this is a very bad thing, I'm the one writing almost the doctrine, right? Or, you know, I can...
John Spencer 1:24:17 ↗
Come up with the requirement, right? Yeah, this is the challenge that even DARPA, if there's not a customer, they have a really bad time of deciding to do a project because they're like, does a customer want that? Sometimes they... I love DARPA actually because they get to do cool things to try to break where are the barriers in science, which hopefully we get to talk to in this field, like the Underminer, but they also did the Subterranean Warfare Challenge, which was a five-year program about mapping, and I know you probably have a few things to say about that.
Asher 1:24:54 ↗
I was involved, like saying how important it was, and I was on the videos and kind of advising like, would the military need this, right? Because it has a search and rescue civilian application about mapping underground. But the problem with DARPA is that not a lot of their projects make it to customer because they even develop it and say, this will help you, like, I don't want that. Even though they... so it's not that the army tells them what to work on. They're actually trying to break science, which I think you're doing a little bit of both, where you, because you lived some of it, are solving real challenges that you've experienced in your career, but you're also looking at knowing where some of the barriers in both military and civilian in subterra domain are, saying like, I'd like to approach that, like Palmer mentioned with the Soviets stopped their project, like it was a nuclear-powered and the science wasn't there actually. And there's been a few places where breakthroughs will happen because somebody actually had the big hairy audacious goal. Right now, so I want to ask a two-part question. Why don't you talk to me about what you're working at Traar on creating solutions for known problems that the IDF face or other people would face today? And what are the scientific barriers that could be, if assigned to somebody, thought through differently to try to overcome those scientific barriers?
Yeah, so I'll start off and say that the strategy of Traayar, and it's actually interesting you mentioned DARPA because this has actually been very exciting for us, is DARPA just announced RFI, just closed, but we, of course, we submitted to it, about new alternatives for penetration munitions, moving away from kinetic to different shock propagation methodologies, which we have quite... I won't talk about it here in the podcast, but we have some interesting ideas there that through our technology we think we could implement and use. So that also, you know, this change in mind, and I think there's a reason why it came out right now as we could imagine and why DARPA are now proposing it. But that's definitely something that we're going to be doing. But in general, Tra's strategy, I like to call it the Pincer maneuver or scissors maneuver for those who don't know the Pincer maneuver. Basically, we have to do both. We have to go bottom up and top down. Bottom up, we have to go to end military users, understand their pain points, not limit it to subterra. Again, if I believe that subterra is a domain, thereby it's my job to prove how subterra solves problems, just like anyone in the Air Force, you know, could go and say, well, you know, the air domain will solve this. It's exactly like the Underminer project where you said, okay, let's deliver logistic support through the subterra domain. So we have to go to end users bottom up, we have to see how we're solving from them real problems through subterra technology. So I'll give like a very small example. If you have units in arctic conditions that are dealing with dispersment of energy or data and they don't know how to do it, you know, and they're looking mostly at batteries, how do you give a new approach of spreading utility lines that are protected underground quickly, you know, in quick deployment of airfields and things like that. So that's, you know, one way of doing it. And our goal here is to slowly bottom up, you know, show how subterra is solving these problems and also getting, you know, the limitations if we're going into runway denial. So how much is noise a factor, you know, how much, and then we have to consider noise and, you know, like everything in the world, everything comes at a price, but it's possible. So, you know, a lot of times the technologies that we're working on today, we can make them significantly, you know, less loud if they move slower. If we want them to move fast, many times they'll be louder and, you know, in different areas. So these are all kinds of things. These are like the nitty-gritty that are crucial, but a lot of times what our job is to show and say, hey, this is what we have. This is, you know, if we're talking TRL, this is a TRL one or two that we're working on. Now give us, you know, tell us why it's a bad idea. You know, tell us that it's bad because it's too loud and then we'll solve it for you. Or don't tell us that it's bad because it's loud, but tell us you need it a thousand feet longer, you know, to get to, and then, you know, we'll do that. So that's a lot of the bottom up that we're doing. The other thing, and this is, you know, is doing the top down. It's talking to decision makers, trying to fight leaders and really pushing this idea that subterra is a domain. And the quicker and faster that we invest in this domain, the more we'll be prepared to do it. So that's in general about, you know, our strategy. Today, you know, the technologies that we can talk about, we probably have over, I wrote already over forty technologies that are TRL two. I literally have like a spec sheet for them. But, you know, I felt like my job in many ways was if I believe this is a domain, I should be able, and I'm not satisfied enough, I think I should be coming up with another two hundred of these products. But if it's a domain, there has to be many products, right? If people invented the plane, so people invented the SAM missile, so people invented the stealth, and it's a never-ending race. If it's a domain, it will be technologies running after each other. We'll be seeing more seismic sensors being laid in the ground to detect movement, etc., etc. So that's, you know, a big part of the job. What we have today that's, you could say, at a TRL seven is just, you know, this element of maneuvering through the subterra that we were talking about, how difficult and how challenging it was. And what we did here again is actually stop and say, wait, you know, and this is a lot of times I think the army does, at least the Israeli army does this mistake, is they look at a challenge and they say, oh, let's invent a solution rather than stopping for one minute. And this is how we solve the detection. Most of the detection was solved through learning from what exists in the civilian world and implementing it for military use cases. So we did the same. We went and we said, let's see what's in the mining world. At the end of the day, the mining world have, you know, are literally maneuvering in very challenging terrains and they have to use a huge amount of force and they have to overcome literally a wall that they're digging through. So there must be areas here that we could learn from. And we found different machinery from Sweden, from Germany that's basically very small machinery that still has a force factor of regular heavy equipment. We took one of these machines, we literally strapped onto it all kinds of technologies, showed what happens. And one of the gaps that I really felt that was happening in Gaza is you see these amazing videos of like drones that go inside tunnels and are maneuvering Lebanon. That was impressive.
John Spencer 1:31:46 ↗
Incredible. Incredible.
Asher 1:31:48 ↗
And there's very high level of also flying capabilities there and really amazing work being done there. But the moment you get to like a full blast or the moment you get to, you know, Hamas are purposely collapsing, and this is also Iran, they're purposely collapsing areas because they don't want you to get access and maneuver through. So how do you bring the element of heavy engineering and force factor, not just maneuverability, into the equation? So we're building heavy machinery that's robotic based. I don't like calling it a robot, but it's basically a robotic mini excavator that could maneuver through a subterra structure. It has a very versatile arm. So it has many different use cases that it could use and could literally clear through rubble that's been purposely collapsed. It could go through a blast door through different combinations of both hammers and thermal breaching. And it could basically give the ability that regular engineering capabilities of like operating an excavator to do that within a structure. So actually what our vision is, is you're actually giving the engineering corps ability. They're the ones that are going to be maneuvering through subterra structures, not tier one units. And the reason they're the ones that are going to do it is they know how to use heavy machinery and excavators. We're going to give them the ability to operate as if they're sitting on it, you know, live, but they're going to go through structures. They're going to have different sets of tool cases that they could use and basically clear through a structure, get to where they need to do. And also, we're building demolition capabilities such as drilling that could insert explosives and things of that sort. So these are all, you know, things that we're working on on that element there. But then, you know, what we're really excited to focus on, and this is the next thing that I won't go too much into detail, is basically we're entering the drilling world. As you know, at the end of the day, in Traar we have three classes. We have excavator class, which is more maneuverability and robotics within subterra, you know, the subterra domain. But by the way, also there's a lot of things that you could do not just to fight within subterra, but you could, for example, dig your own, you know, ditches or things like that. We have the drilling world, which is smaller diameter, faster capabilities, but still that could carry payloads. And then we have the boring class, which is, you know, what we see ourselves very quickly getting into, which is larger diameter tunnels where we even see ourselves maneuvering troops and, you know, things of that sort through the crust of the earth. So right now we're focusing on the drilling world. And the idea is, and just like planes, and, you know, I said this at the beginning, no one's asking can a plane carry people or bombs or logistics. It could do all of those. That's kind of what we're creating. We're creating different vehicles that could move through the earth at different diameters and carry different payloads. Whether it's an explosive that could hit an underground structure and blow up, or could carry a logistic like you described in the underminer, or an array of sensors that could both warn troops of what's going to be ahead of them, give geologists understanding of the stability of the earth if they could even try to have tanks go through or they'll be stuck, and things of that sort. Two, quickly spreading utility lines and data centers so that, you know, we continue to have comms and communication. So right now we're working on a smaller diameter vehicle and we're going to take it to a vehicle. We hope you could come and visit and see us break stuff. Definitely going to be breaking a lot of stuff and then take it from there.
John Spencer 1:35:06 ↗
Yes, of course. I actually bought, like I said, I bought land in Colorado.
Asher 1:35:12 ↗
You would love to come in.
John Spencer 1:35:14 ↗
What you just gave me about ten things to circle back to. And this is the way my brain works. Although number one, about bunker busters. As far as my infantry grunt mind knows, there's two ways bunker busters work. One, kinetic energy, so they're really heavy, so they punch through the earth. And the other one is explosive force either in front of it, so it can go farther, or once it's punched a certain depth, you know, really heavy things. Most people, and we had to, I enjoy this when things come up that the general population wants to know, and you have to go like be able to articulate quickly about that kinetic, you know, why are they so heavy? It's not the explosives they're carrying. It's because they're trying to penetrate the ground through kinetic energy and then explode, or explode and then explode again, or you drop like four or five of them and do what I'd say Israel kind of patented, I guess, is drilling. Most, whether it's Hezbollah or whoever, but where they drop one, it goes a little bit. So like, what's the depth of one bunker buster? Well, it's this. But if you drop one and you drop another and you drop another, you can literally drill your way with bunker busters down to a depth. There is a limit. I don't know what the limit is. I'm sure there's a limit of where that will work.
It's a limit of just how much munitions you have. Is it?
Asher 1:36:37 ↗
Yeah, there's, I mean, there's literally targets that if we would do it in that methodology, we wouldn't have any more bunker busters.
John Spencer 1:36:43 ↗
Right, because how many did we drop on, or not we, how many did Israel drop on Muhammad somewhere? It was like, wasn't it like thirty? And Nala, but it was like a certain, it was like thirty seconds of like...
Asher 1:36:55 ↗
Yeah, I mean, Australia was eighty.
John Spencer 1:36:57 ↗
Eighty.
Asher 1:36:57 ↗
And eighty was sometimes, I mean, I won't go too much into detail, that could be close to what we did in a month in certain cases.
John Spencer 1:37:03 ↗
And then on, I thought for Muhammad sir, it was like a, like fifteen and thirty seconds as well or something like...
Asher 1:37:09 ↗
Yeah, I mean, Muhammad was like so tough because he was hiding literally. I mean, this kind of brings me to like your whole weird conversation with Piers Morgan, but...
John Spencer 1:37:18 ↗
Like, yeah, I don't want to...
Asher 1:37:20 ↗
But like literally he was in a tunnel below a hospital.
John Spencer 1:37:23 ↗
Right.
Asher 1:37:24 ↗
And we know...
John Spencer 1:37:25 ↗
And the world said he wasn't, even though they pictures, they took the drone, like here's the, you know, Al-Nasser Hospital, here's the tunnel, like, nope, no proof that it was.
Asher 1:37:35 ↗
And I mean, that's always what's, you know, where you want to like, because we, I mean, I won't go too much into this, but like...
I know how much time we knew where he was, and I know when we carried out that bombing, and the difference of time is an equation of how positive we could be one hundred percent that we weren't going to harm too much that hospital, and how much we've risked in special ops lives to be sure about that. But yeah, but that's like another...
John Spencer 1:38:03 ↗
So the drilling, it literally is like drilling but with explosives.
But is the ideal that you could drop something that starts digging into the ground and then blow it up?
Asher 1:38:15 ↗
Yeah, I mean, that's, you know, that's... I mean, Greg, you want to talk about?
I mean, you know, Asher mentioned he's got this playbook of products, and that's certainly an idea. And, you know, where it goes, like, you know, I don't think we've put a ton into yet, but, you know, yeah, you drop something and then, you know, it starts, whether it has an engine of its own or motor or pneumatic attachment or something, and then can start penetrating its way down, you know, and...
John Spencer 1:38:44 ↗
Maybe you can delete the need for eighty bunker busters and this thing can, you know, get its way down there and then...
Survive the drop, though. It had to survive the kinetic energy of the drop.
Yeah, yeah. So yeah, definitely a thought and in the product line.
John Spencer 1:38:58 ↗
All right, let me do my circle here. Two, one thing you mentioned that I've covered a little bit in my different podcast to include soldiers who have been standing, not Yahalom, which I know that, and again, most people don't get this, the culture is really what you try to break as well with subterra domain. Even in the IDF, I approached that depending on who I talked to, what unit, that it was a culture of do not go into that tunnel unless you're actively pursuing somebody being taken into the tunnel. It's like get to it, stop. Which is a cultural thing. As much as in the US military, I've always, you know, some of my articles I put like a tunnel and then a soldier. Okay, like what does he have? What doctrine, training, equipment, everything. So one of the things you made me think about was just having a playbook of field expedient ways. If you treat this as a domain as much as we have now the Space Force and develop specialists in it, and you could have a playbook of field expedient, like if you don't have all that specialist, and I used to talk about wired communication, like, and I went looking, we got rid of it all, like DR, we call it DR8, and a spool of wire that you would just run wire through it, you know, people talk about the wired drones, well underground for communication, it's what used to be used literally in the eighties and nineties. We used it, we decided we don't need that anymore, but field expedient ways to communicate. You said power, so there are field expedient ways, like, well, you can also just run power. And if you were, again, you had the expertise, it's not in the doctrine of even navigating, like I said, everything from the fire departments, they specialize in confined spaces operations and contested or, you know, fire and smoke and things like that, where they have tactics of a rope that they carry. So for us, it's like a cord there. All these field expedient things. Three, which I actually want to cover before I go on to my four, five, and six. You mentioned you were part of the finding and mapping the tunnels.
If you know the Subterranean Warfare Challenge, it was about inserting a robotic into an environment to map a tunnel and communicate that back to the operator. They ended with like a cool robot dog or whatever it was that was not applicable to the military because it costs so much that you stick that down and if I'm the guy in the tunnel, I blow that thing up and now you're out. How hard is it? So it's just two questions: to find a tunnel and what are the challenges for that? There's got to be some geology, right? And some limitations. Understanding Operation Northern Shield when they found the, how much of a challenge it was from acoustics to radar to things like that. How hard is it to find a tunnel and then how hard is it to map a tunnel?
Asher 1:41:47 ↗
Yeah, so I'll just give a quick side note because you made it up and I quickly want to mention...
John Spencer 1:41:55 ↗
That's what I'm doing right here, like you...
Asher 1:41:55 ↗
Is always going back and forth. I think when you're, one of the mistakes that sometimes people do is they're excited by elite expertise, forgetting that the mission is that it's not an elite expertise. A lot of the thought that we had in creating this excavator class maneuverability, you know, robotic within a subterra structure is that you no longer, what I was seeing a lot of times in Gaza is you get, you know, a team would get to entrance and, okay, stop. Let's wait for Yahalom to come and deal with it. That's not good. No, they could be sitting stag. It takes a, the unit is exhausted because they're going, you know, especially in Gaza from one place to the other. So a lot of times to, you know, the mission is, and this is also what I think militaries have to understand is it's almost like a cycle where you want to build, build, build the expertise, but then you want to take technology to bring it back that it's no longer a specialized expertise, it's a doctrine and it's a way, you know, of fighting. So just like, you know, today every, you know, unit like also, and sorry that I say this, Marines and the Army, they have engineering capabilities of how do you clear through certain pathways, how do you, you know, lay airfields, all kinds of like things that they're already doctrine, they're not expertise. That's what we have to be doing to subterra. So that's just aside. I think that...
You know, a lot of times when we're talking about subterra warfare, so I would define it as like a process, and this is I think a lot of the things that Israel was slowly like learning this thing. So you have number one is you have how do you detect a tunnel? That's number one. It's a whole world in itself. Then you have how do you map out that tunnel? That's a whole other world. It's not the same thing.
John Spencer 1:43:38 ↗
That's right.
Asher 1:43:38 ↗
To find something is very different. A lot of times I personally, because in Gaza a lot of times what we do is we would drill holes into a tunnel. I would literally drill like I once I actually was, it was a very embarrassing incident, but like I was able to drill a hole in a tunnel and then the chief of staff of the army came and I would, we were drilling a hole like literally ten feet next to it and I said, oh yeah, this like it's just ten feet there we're going to hit. So like chief of staff of the army is there and we miss and we don't hit. So to even hit ten feet forward is a whole expertise of itself. So then you have that, then you have how to, you know, access and maneuver through that structure if you want to after you mapped it, and then you have to destroy it. These are all...
John Spencer 1:44:16 ↗
Yeah, I'm coming to destroy. That's my, that's my third one.
Asher 1:44:19 ↗
World of itself. So detection, you know, basically the way we approach detection, and I won't go, I mean people could use their imagination, but I won't give them too much ideas, is that a tunnel is not just a piece of air in the middle of the ground. It's built out of certain components. The geology works in a certain way. It is a formation of ground and then air. So you could imagine, you know, that what we're looking for is not a tunnel. We're looking for a physical, you know, a physics anomaly that we could, that there's no reason we would see it underneath the earth other than explaining that it's a tunnel. That's the way we approached finding a tunnel. And by the way, I think this is like a shift that happened in the IDF that's very cool is, you know, you have, and you have OSEN. Today in the Israeli army, we have something called FIZINT. It's how do you gather intel through physics, and that's a lot of tunnel detection is actually...
We're not looking for tunnels. We're looking for anomalies. We're looking for errors. Now, the reason that, where does that get challenging when the anomaly could be a tunnel, but a lot of times it can't be. So, for example, up north we had a million karstic caves. So a lot of times we said, oh, we see a piece of air in the middle of a mountain. Amazing. We found a tunnel. We would dig in, saw some of the coolest caves I've ever seen in my life.
John Spencer 1:45:35 ↗
But they were not tunnels, unfortunately. I wish I could still get approval to drill in them and find them, but Galatikes and stuff like that. But like, so that's, you know, challenge number one. A lot of like this, I can say a lot of the way we've changed the approach is a lot of these sensors, they're just limited by their reach of how far they could, you know, find whatever it is that they're trying to...
How deep or how far away?
Asher 1:46:00 ↗
How far away. So if you're above ground, that's how deep it is. So the moment we started bringing in drilling, so suddenly something that's eighty feet below you, we shifted it so it might be five feet next to you. So if the limitation of it was a seven or ten feet, that's how far it could find the anomaly of what you're trying to find. So you would never find it from above ground. But then if you dig it, so a lot of times the drilling, a lot of times people think the drilling was to try to get access and just punch a hole in the tunnel. No, a lot of times...
Most of the drills we do, we know we're not going to hit the tunnel, but that changes the whole vertical of it. So we're not finding something eighty feet below us, finding something five feet, two feet next to us until we're able to hit it.
John Spencer 1:46:41 ↗
Love it.
Asher 1:46:43 ↗
And then mapping, you know, that's a whole world in itself is, you know, the DARPA approach was something that moves within and is carrying the sensor, so it's slowly a lot of challenges there. Like for example, a lot of people ask me about LiDAR, well, a lot of times in a tunnel you have so much dust accumulating and so many things that...
John Spencer 1:47:03 ↗
What's the depth of LiDAR can penetrate ground radar?
Asher 1:47:06 ↗
I mean, oh, ground penetrating radar, it all depends on size. I don't know the whole definition.
John Spencer 1:47:11 ↗
I mean, LiDAR is like more, you know, what you're seeing on autonomous cars. It's shooting lasers and receiving it and then building a picture of what it has. So if you have something simply that runs through a tunnel, could give you the whole structure of the tunnel. But then if there's, it's literally shooting lasers. So if you have too much dust or all kinds of things...
About steel, if it hits steel.
Asher 1:47:29 ↗
Yeah. So all...

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Spencer, J. (2026, July 3). Subterra 101 with Traysar Industries [Interview transcript]. The War Scholar with John Spencer. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140599/

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John Spencer. "Subterra 101 with Traysar Industries." The War Scholar with John Spencer, 3 Jul. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140599/.

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@misc{spencer2026_3140599,
  author       = {John Spencer},
  title        = {Subterra 101 with Traysar Industries},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, The War Scholar with John Spencer. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {jul},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140599/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}