Well, thank you for that introduction, and thank you everybody for joining me. I'm going to do about 45 minutes of conversation, and the period that I enjoy more is the questions that you have on your minds about the topic. I'm happy to actually be back at Brown. I know Dave from going way back, actually, before even the Ukraine war, where Brown partnered with the Naval War College to hold civilian harm mitigation conferences. I did not know where my career would take me at that point. I was already solely focused on the history of urban warfare and the reality of it in Iraq and other places, the fight against ISIS. But the world has definitely changed from then, and my experiences have changed from that.
One of the reasons I am called one of the world's leading experts on urban warfare is because there's nobody else. So it's pretty much a process of elimination, and it's both in academia and in the military you'll find there are few people who have either chosen or been allowed to — especially with the military — solely focus on combat in urban areas. And that's, I fell into almost a PhD candidate's dream of finding something that nobody's done before, and because of that I have been working on this for over 10 years. And I'm a student, so I actually learn something every day. Most people don't understand that my podcast is just my research for other people to listen into, because I have the commanders who have fought in battles, the experts in smart cities, feral cities, you name it, all on my podcast. And I'm just learning from them and advancing my own scholarly topic because this field is so evolving.
I usually start with a definition so we know what we're talking about: urban warfare, that is not separate than war, which I taught strategy at West Point, which helps me a lot actually when I do a lot of news now. But urban warfare — an urban environment is defined by the U.S. military as a man-made terrain with a population and infrastructure to support it. It's called the urban triad, and that's what you have to have. Which really, if you're a military, if you take all the people out of an area, it's not technically urban warfare because it's not those three key components of it. And then warfare is actually the fighting. So that's armed resistance fighting in an urban area, fighting in cities, and is a shortcut.
Now, why is it so hard? Which really gets to — I really, really like the topic of this lecture, the paradox of urban warfare. Why is it so hard? Of course, it's hard because the physical terrain, right? Three-dimensional physical terrain of urban environments. I started my work back in 2014 looking at megacities, which is any city of over 10 million, and they're rapidly rising around the world. Rapid population growth, which causes political instability. But just from a why is it so hard — the physical terrain of cities, urban areas in general, is already ready-made hard to fight in. If you're a defender, it makes it easier to do your job. Usually you would spend years if not decades preparing. Let's say you take an open piece of ground like in Ukraine. You got to dig trenches, you got to build foxholes, you got to do all this. In the urban environment, it's all there. You have concrete, subterranean, three dimensions, you know, skyscrapers, you name it. Just from the physical aspect, we say it's harder. We don't say hard — I say more complex than any other environment. So yeah, the physical terrain, the presence of civilians.
Despite the history of urban warfare, you've never been able to get 100% of the civilians no matter how long you wait. There's usually — and I know the numbers matter — about 10% that stay no matter what happens. And there have been battles like the Battle of Aachen during World War II that both the Germans and the Americans evacuated the city four times, and there's still 10% of the civilian population, just for whatever reasons they can't or won't leave. So the presence of a population makes it harder to do what a military should be doing: distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant, and all of that. And then the infrastructure in of itself adds to the complexity, because if a piece of infrastructure is destroyed, you really don't know the second- and third-order effects of it. So just the three attributes of the urban terrain make it harder to fight in, or depending on what side you're on.
But really, when you get into the urban environment — which leads to there's nobody else doing it — is because we militaries don't want to do it. We literally wrote into our doctrine, until I started helping rewrite it about six years ago, avoid and bypass as much as possible. Do not do it, because — which I'm sure we'll talk about — the evolution of the laws of war. They mainly go back centuries. Of course, they've been involved strongly, they evolve — is about protecting those not involved in the conflict. So, you know, whether it's distinction, proportionality, caution — all of them are about the civilians. So yes, you militaries have your fights, and there are rules about what militaries can do to other militaries, but once you enter the urban terrain, it's already... while yes, fighting in the Himalayas is hard, and I've studied that, and fighting in swamps and jungles, I did that. It's all hard. But when you enter the urban environment, it's the first and the best, most difficult place, because there's already restrictions on the use of force, what you can and can't do as a military based on us, the world making agreements on here's the things we won't do.
And it has evolved, and I get this all the time. Post-World War II, of course, we have the Geneva Convention, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention, which talks about protecting those not involved — the protected populations, the protected sites, all of that. So we don't do things like bombing cities to try to convince their governments to — we just don't do that anymore. But it makes it extremely hard, and it's a paradox, but most importantly because of that aspect that militaries don't want to do it — they'll avoid it and bypass. And that's the paradox for me as somebody who's been doing this for a long time. I'm an advocate absolutely for civilian harm mitigation that we'll talk about, but I'm an advocate for militaries training, manning, preparing, and exercising urban warfare. Not because I want job security — I have that. It's because I want them to get better at it so that they can make the operation go quicker, because that's really the goal of the military operation: achieve the goal as quickly as possible with the least amount of harm to civilians and the infrastructure.
So the paradox is militaries don't want to do it, don't prepare for it, but if they did, they would see less of it. And that's why we've actually seen a rise of urban warfare over the last — if not the last four years, but if you go even to the period with ISIS, we saw more and more protracted siege battles than we had in history. Across the history of warfare, there is absolutely a history of urban fighting, really, that if you go back to the Peloponnesian Wars, things like that. It's about the cities. We as humans have a long history of fighting for cities, but not in cities. And that changed for many reasons as the evolution of cities in general. There's just more urbanized terrain, right? In 2008, the world became more urbanized than rural. And if we get into definitions, which I hope we don't, even the United Nations struggles with defining urban. They define it as anything that's not rural, which makes it hard.
But we have more and more urban warfare for a bunch of reasons, especially the asymmetric element that somebody vying for political power, whether you're a non-state actor or state actor, can use the urban terrain for an exponential advantage. We call urban terrain the great equalizer because it doesn't matter how good your military — and I'm sure we're going to talk about it — how good your military is. If I can get you into the urban terrain, you have already equalized your capabilities against the attacker because of that urban terrain. It negates weapons, it negates all the world's best ISR, your weapons effects. All of it starts to equalize. It's not the great equalizer, but it definitely detracts. And really the only science there is about making that not possible is to get to the urban terrain first.
Really, as we saw in my unique research — is field research. I was studying, and I still am studying, almost every urban battle that's happened. So I understand the U.S. military has very, actually very little urban warfare history. You go to World War II, there start to be a few events. Of course other militaries do as well, but I am not U.S.-centric. I actually do case studies, and I think that's amazing, and we'll talk about doing comparative analysis when you have actually uniqueness in the modern battles of today like Gaza. There's a lot of uniqueness to it, but we do like to do comparative analysis to be able to compare to what is the realm of possible, what's happened in the past. The American military really has but few of what we really call intense urban operations. Of course there's the Battle of Aachen, there's the Battle of Manila that I'll talk about, and then across the different wars you get into Hue City in Vietnam. And then you have Mogadishu in 1993, which was traumatic for the U.S. military, and I just released a podcast about the 2003 attack of Baghdad.
And we were talking during lunch with the military fellows about, you know, we have these things in the Army that everybody thinks we have everything called doctrine, which is the books. You have little-d doctrine of what militaries write in their books, and then you have big-D doctrine, which is the way they do things, and the way they do things can actually be strongly influenced by their history and culture. And when we attacked into — I jumped into northern Iraq, a part of the 2003 Iraq invasion — but when we took Baghdad, how much the Mogadishu experience in 1993 dominated the American military's thinking towards attacking the city of Baghdad.
But really, we talked about understanding, and that's what I hope I help people do, is how do you even think about urban warfare today? Of course you have to define it so you can tell people: yes, war against drugs, yes, even counterinsurgency, counterterrorism — there may be urban elements of it, but I'm talking about urban warfare, so fighting in urban terrain. And really, in order to understand that — and this is why I have a lot of work to do and learning that I do every day — is because in order to understand urban warfare today, you of course — and if I was to build a pedagogy, which I have, I've built courses for the militaries on if you want to understand urban operations, here are the things you have to be able to do first: you of course have to understand urban warfare history, know what's happened in the past, what went right, what went wrong. That's my case studies that I love to do, despite the labor of love of what we think happened versus what actually happened, and that is a part of, I'm sure, history in general. Sometimes they say the victor writes the history. I say the writer writes the history.
So who wrote that historical record? And that's what I've found is even battles I took part in. I took part in the 2008 Battle of Sadr City as a commander, a very unique battle against a neighborhood of Baghdad of two million that we weren't allowed to go into, but then still assigned the mission — a mission to achieve, which is to get rockets to stop emanating out of that city. Its own history, but I participated in it and then went back to write the history of it, and I realized how little I knew at that level. And then interviewing all the commanders was so, so important. So understanding the history, which has really become very important for some of the operations going on right now, is people comparing past historical events that weren't the right ones to choose, right? And that's, I'm sure, in academic studies, right? You got to have the right apples to the right oranges, part of that.
The next thing is understanding the law of war. If you don't — you probably have heard, maybe you haven't — that the U.S. military doesn't use the term international humanitarian law. We use the term law of armed conflict. And there's a reason. The Europeans use more IHL, international humanitarian law. I don't, because it actually starts to mix a lot of voices or theories or laws that are humanitarian rules or humanitarian law. And then you mix international humanitarian law, which is talking about the law of armed conflict, you allow people that are human rights activists or human rights lawyers even to intermix the two. I like to say focus on the law of armed conflict. What does the law that we say — and of course there are many areas of this. There are the foundational principles like distinction, proportionality, the necessity — these foundational laws of war is the other terminology.
And then there are of course customary laws. There are prohibitions that we all agree to, whether that's chemical warfare, whether that's cluster munitions prohibitions, things like that. And there is customary law. All that big bucket. I've found as an urban warfare student that a lot of people — there are a lot of beliefs about the law of war. And I've spent, especially in the new information age, I do a lot of law 101 for mass media because some of the world will actually get convinced about what can and can't happen. One example is Amnesty International during the war, Russia's war against Ukraine in the early days, came out with a report saying that it was illegal for the Ukrainians to be in the cities they were defending, that it put the civilians at risk. But they actually made that bold statement despite, like, peer review saying that if a defender can't be near civilian objects if he's defending — like, but it's their city, of course they should be in their city defending it.
I do a lot of basic war 101 in order to start to understand urban warfare, especially in the modern battlefield where a lot of the enemies try to intermix between civilians and try to do what's called lawfare, which is they're really good at understanding the laws of war and reverse-engineer their strategies to use the laws of war against somebody that might attack them. Famously called — one of the aspects is human shielding, which I used to use Hamas as an example. We can talk about that, but that's using the evolutions of the law of war against the attacking military to restrict you from using force against them, but also then violating the laws of war by using protected sites and protected populations as part of your military strategy. So in order to understand urban warfare, you have to have a really good depth of knowledge on what the law of armed conflict says you can and can't do. When somebody's making a big assessment like white phosphorus is a war crime — no, it's not. White phosphorus in urban terrain is a war crime — no, it's not. That has been a big part of my work in order to understand.
Next, you would have to — so you have to understand the history, you have to understand the laws of armed conflict, especially pertaining to urban combat. Then you have to understand really tactics, techniques, and procedures: how would a military attack a city, defend a city, whatever the mission they're trying to do. There are ways that have been an evolution to include the technologies. This has also been like what's the difference between a dumb bomb and a precision-guided munition? What's the probable error in these things, and what can be used, what can't be used? And that's a big field of my research as well, is how do you do urban warfare and how could you do it better? What could you do differently? And if you don't have that part of the puzzle, then it really makes it hard to understand what's going on if you don't understand what would be the correct military tactic to use in this case.
Lastly, probably more importantly — if Dave was here, civilian harm mitigation — you would have to have a good depth of understanding. So these four things. Lastly, civilian harm mitigation. It's inherent in the law of armed conflict, right? It's part of precaution. It's part of proportionality assessments. Which, if you don't know proportionality — I'm sure everybody in the room knows, but I've had to teach a lot of people — proportionality is never quantitative. It's qualitative. It's based on what the commander knows. It's an assessment of one having a valid military target objective, call it what you want, that is concrete, a real military objective, and then you do a calculation based on if you take an action that the collateral damage can't be excessive to the value of that military target based on the mission. So it's literally a qualitative assessment of what the commander knows, and then taking all the reasonable and feasible actions that the commander could take to lower that calculation of excessive damage. That's proportionality assessment. I think it's beautifully written. It actually requires this thought process before an operation.
But over the last 30 years, through militaries fighting counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism operations, the realm of possible in civilian harm mitigation has evolved. And that's why Brown and the Naval War College had this annual conference, trying to bring people together going, look, urban warfare is on the rise, literally. And I have a graph — I didn't do PowerPoint this time — but just showing how much of just city battles were on the rise from World War II on, much more frequent. And just the city battles where somebody gets in there and you got to get them out. But so the militaries, especially Western militaries, those that follow the law of armed conflict — there are some that don't. And I can tell you about those situations like Grozny of the various Chechen wars, where there are tactics that have been used in the past that wouldn't be acceptable today, and they're not following the laws of war, not distinction, not any of the precautions.
You have to have an understanding of the realm of civilian harm mitigation. Like, what have militaries done over the last 30 years? Because this terminology is really a new terminology: civilian harm mitigation measures. And we come here, we have conferences, we have reports on this is what commanders could do. I've been a part of writing actually commander handbooks on here's a better way, whether that's in targeting, because that's one area where people think there's civilian harm mitigation, which actually would be if you're following proportionality, that reasonable and feasible steps to take in order to lessen civilian harm. But where people try to cut and paste because they're not informed about the evolution of what's called civilian harm mitigation, which is actually separate than the laws of armed conflict, is that they're misapplying what the best practice might be in a certain context of a war. Not all wars are the same. Not all cities are the same. Like the practice that during the Obama campaign in Afghanistan, he made a rule that zero civilians could die if a terrorist was struck. It was just a policy. And that's not a civilian harm mitigation measure. That's a policy, which would be part of the urban warfare history.
As I continue my studies, I deal a lot with these. I'm really digging down in my history part, and we'll have another book out sooner about urban warfare history so you can understand the trajectory of what's ever come before. But of course, I do field research. So I got on the ground in Ukraine weeks after the Russians pulled out of Kyiv, because the Battle of Kyiv is probably the most decisive battle of modern history, where the Russians attacked it with around 50,000 forces. There were only 3,000 military inside of the city. But the civilian population turned themselves into combatants and they defended the city over a three-month period. It was probably the most decisive urban battle that I've ever studied because it changed the strategic trajectory of the war. Had the Ukrainians lost Kyiv, it wouldn't be Kyiv today. It would probably be something else. And had the Russians not been defeated, again, the strategic goals would have changed either way. That's the decisive battle, when it changes the course of the war.
I got on the ground there. I started doing research on why they failed. I wrote that report. Because I have been doing Israel research for a long time, because I've been doing this for a decade. I also do underground warfare because it's another area where there's nobody doing it. So jump right in there. I've been in tunnels all around the world, from North Korea to Azerbaijan to, of course, Gaza, Lebanon, all of that. When that war started, I had one — found out that we don't have war watchers anymore. If you understand the history of war, it was a common practice for other countries to go in and observe people's wars just to have an understanding of the character of warfare, whether that's the — you know, the creation of the minié ball and things like that. During our Civil War, the Germans were here, the British were here, the French were here, just observing. And across time, the United States did the same thing. We were observing the Japanese-China War. We had people on the ground getting an assessment of that.
Over time that became politically basically a practice we couldn't do anymore. If you're part of the State Department, you would understand that. Some people would point to Vietnam, where observers became advisers, advisers become boots on the ground. That was a lot of scar tissue there. But I found out two things. One is that nobody does this in the American — the entire 2.8 million military members of the U.S. military, none are authorized to go inside of another combat zone to understand what's going on. Then I realized once I retired that although the State Department may put a combat zone as a Level 4 do-not-travel, and if you have any association with the U.S. government you can't go there, especially if you have a security clearance, but if you have a blue passport and you're crazy enough, then you can go anywhere you want at your own risk. So that's what I started doing in Ukraine, Azerbaijan.
In order to do which really academically really gets you to who wrote that history, what were their sources. Of course, we check people on what are your sources, right? And my mentor told me, in God I trust, all others bring data. So where did those people get those data for war? I also used to do staff rides before I retired, where you would go and walk the battlefield of Gettysburg and stand in a location where, like, Pickett's Charge is running forward, but it actually dips down, so you could understand why they would not be visible and just not mowed down. I find there's something very human and tactile to visiting a war zone and seeing the physical terrain, as much as interview primary sources who actually fought there, not the filtered version of what they fought there. So that puts me in Gaza in December of 2023.
So when October 7th happened, I'll probably spend the next little bit on Gaza if you guys don't mind, and we can do questions about any area of the world. But for me it really became the case study for many reasons. But because I had been going to Israel, I wrote case studies about the '73 war, the 2002 Jenin. Israel has a long history of urban warfare and underground warfare, evolutions of it. I had already had connection. So I got on the ground. The U.S. Embassy said you can't be here. And I said, yes I can. I've done this before. And I embedded, and now I'm the only person, I would say outside of maybe an Israeli, who has embedded with the IDF in Gaza six times since October 7th. Every three or four months I go there and I embed for my research, which also removes the filter for me of even if you knew the IDF and they were telling you what they were learning, it's still going through a filter not through the lens of me who has walked a few urban battlefields. I teach urban warfare. I know what could happen, what should happen, what's the history of happening. And that's led me to being a voice about what's going on in Gaza. I've also been a voice against misinformation about laws of war or what's going on.
Let's set the stage of Gaza in general, not knowing how much everybody knows, but just as a conversation piece and doing comparative analysis. So Gaza is a strip along Israel's border, 25 miles long, 5 to 7 miles wide. Not that large an area. The first misinformation I heard about Gaza was that it was one of the densest places on Earth. Look, I study cities for a living. Whoever said that has never been to India, which I've — you know, you have literally slums that are a million people in a square mile. Gaza is not even on the top 100 list. Yes, it has highly dense parts. It's also an area made up of 24 cities. Five of those cities — three of them over 400,000. Gaza City itself over a million. It's a complete area of many cities.
But when the war after October 7th, the invasion, I knew what was about to happen would be the biggest urban-centric war. Really important that people understand there's a difference between a war and a battle, right? A battle is a pitched fight in a certain location. A war may have many battles within it. And that's what we've seen in Gaza City, right? There's been the battle of Gaza City, Khan Younis, Rafah, you name it. But we'll talk about what happens when people view it as a singular and start aggregating data versus disaggregating data. And if you're an academic, that would be a bad thing to do. But Gaza — the physical terrain is this highly urbanized area with 2.2 million civilians within that area, spread across mostly northern Gaza, but again 1.1 in northern Gaza, Gaza City, and then spread across these different cities.
But from a military history, right, these four areas I told you about — understanding urban warfare, you of course have to understand military history. Most urban battles that we talk about are meeting engagements, pretty much where two militaries have met and decided that there would be urban battle there. Like Stalingrad, one of the biggest urban battles of history, a million man versus a million man, meeting in a city with really no tactical importance. It becomes a political battle and they fight. More recently, of course, the U.S. military has a battle in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004. That's the largest battle of the entire Iraq war, larger than the battle of Baghdad, which is a city of 6 million. But this smallest city in Fallujah of 400,000 becomes the biggest battle of the entire Iraq war.
Fast forward to the 2016 Battle of Mosul. That's the largest battle since World War II, right? It's 5,000 maximum ISIS fighters in a city of a million, and it takes 100,000 security forces nine months to liberate this city. But why was it the largest battle since World War II? Really gets you to this point of understanding urban warfare history is meeting engagements, is that if you give me enough time, I can hold a city for a very long time. Like in Stalingrad, there's one sergeant that holds an apartment building for 80 days against division-level attacks, because there are some things you can do.
I actually kind of burst onto a larger stage when the Russians invaded Ukraine. I wrote a tweet thread — and I do spend probably an unhealthy amount of time on X now. I wrote a tweet thread for the Ukrainians on, hey, this is what I would do with a little bit of urban warfare history, what I would do in my city if it was being attacked. That thread was seen by 20 million people, and that thread became a PDF, which became a manual that the Ukrainians translated into Ukrainian and published hundreds of thousands of copies, seen all across Ukraine, about how you defend a city as a civilian: block the roads, stay covered, you know, all these things you can do. For me, that's amazing. And now it's in 16 different languages, because despite how many people tell you that the military's got this, there's not a lot of information about urban warfare, especially within civilians. So now it's in 16 different languages for anybody who wants to defend their urban terrain.
There's some key things that have been learned across history that you can do, like slow the guys down. And that's one of the things with the Russians. They were just racing to all the cities, like go block the roads, go park a dump truck, which would cause a military, no matter a tank or what, a lot of trouble. Go park a dump truck and take the battery in the middle of the street. It'll cause you a problem.
For Gaza, why is that important? Well, Mosul that I just told you about, which is the biggest battle since World War II — the reason it's the biggest is because ISIS had two years, they were in the city for two years preparing it for battle. That's a long time. And it caused troubles that people didn't even imagine. They even took our concrete that we, the U.S. military, had left behind and stacked them in rows. And there is nothing anybody could do about that. They even contacted me, which I thought was odd, but what do we do about this? They did a really good job.
So, but now you fast forward to Gaza, which has an urban warfare history from 2005. I just wrote the case study of the 2008 battle of Gaza called Operation Cast Lead. 20 years. No military since ancient warfare — which I have studied ancient warfare — no military has faced a defender who has prepared for 20 years for that battle. And that's the preparation of Gaza that the IDF was going to face. There are portions of Gaza that after 2005, when Israel disengaged and removed themselves, had never returned to, no matter how many battles there had been. And there have been frequent battles in Gaza based on the rocket supplies. As an urban warfare specialist, I knew that that meant a lot. What does that mean? Of course, just the preparation and the way that the city is built for defense, and the way that Hamas built their defenses, which gets you to the number, right?
So let's say it's ahistorical to prepare urban terrain for 20 years for war. And that means something. And of course we can point to the subterranean as the biggest indicator, like that's not normal. So I was just in Gaza City last — in October of last year, hours before the current 20-point peace plan, ceasefire, whatever you call it, was implemented, I was in Gaza City. Every one of the six times that I've been in Gaza, it is more likely, factually than not, that there's a tunnel underneath me when I was walking there. The new estimate is 600 miles of tunnels in this 25-mile-long by 5-to-7-mile-wide area, and it is just ahistorical that's ever been done.
Now there are a lot of tunnels in the world. Like you think about our Vietnam experiences, there's about 120 miles of tunnels, whether it's Cu Chi or the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In China there's thousands of miles of tunnels. North Korea, they have underground airfields, underground naval bases, you name it. But I've never studied an area where that's the — 600 miles of tunnels built underneath the civilians for the purpose of using the surface as a shield to the military underneath the civilians themselves. That's not my wording. That's the way Hamas words it.
And the one example that I give people, having been in Kyiv hours — weeks after the Russians left, is when Russia attacked, not given any notification because there's no requirement, and attacked all the cities. The civilians lived in the subway tunnels for months. They put hospitals down there, like a hundred babies born underground, and they'll have an amazing story when they're liberated. All 2.2 million people in Gaza could fit in the tunnels of Gaza with ease. But Hamas, being who they are, say that they're not for civilians or not a single civilian is ever allowed in them. But just from a strategy perspective, they could fit in this immense underground world that Hamas built that I've been into. And it's incredible, over billions of dollars invested in this subterranean network. From an urban warfare perspective, I can't find any like situation, but I'm going to give you one in a minute.
The other aspect is the trapped civilians, right? Which gets you that civilian harm mitigation aspect. If you know what the history of civilian harm mitigation and the history of warfare are, you know what everybody else has ever done to protect civilians. Number one is the notification. So the dropping of flyers on civilians. We — most people don't know, some people might, their historians know — that we dropped flyers on Nagasaki and Hiroshima saying, look, this is a military city, military objective, please leave. They called them leaflet flyers basically that were dropped. And that's a really big tactic.
If the urban warfare is always a balance, no matter what the laws of war say, there's inherent built in the spirit of the laws that it's always a balance between military necessity and humanitarian imperative, which gets to Gaza as well. Like even if it's okay to do, there's always this balance between the humanitarian imperative. So giving notification is not a requirement in the law of war. You don't tell the enemy you're coming, it actually could make it a lot harder on not only the attacking force but the civilians. But there is a notification, and then there's all these processes of whether it's targeting or other aspects that you do to limit collateral damage.
The presence of civilians in Gaza is very unique though, because all this other history to include — which everybody kept going back to, and luckily I had written the case study on the Battle of Mosul. Hey, remember what happened in Mosul? Like, yes, I remember what happened in Mosul. The government of Iraq told a million civilians, do not leave the city. I don't have a place for you to go. And there are a lot of human rights groups like CIVIC and others that come to this conference who said that's bad, you can't do that, because civilians were dying rapidly. But the Iraqi government didn't have a place for them to go, and ISIS really didn't have the ability to keep them there. In mid-battle, the Iraqi government changed the guidance and told them to evacuate, told them where to go, and a lot of the civilians got out of this area.
But in Gaza, unique to Gaza, is that Gaza is an enclosed area. It has a border with Egypt and has a border with Israel. There has been no other urban war — in general urban or battle — in which a belligerent not a part of the conflict, so not Israel, not Hamas, has stopped civilians from leaving the combat area. So if you haven't heard, Egypt — the border with Egypt, in my analysis, could have saved tens of thousands of lives. And beginning in November of 2023, the Egyptian foreign ministry actually made a post — again, my unhealthy amount of time on X — saying that they were building a humanitarian area in the Sinai desert, which if you — I try to people that aren't that aware of the area, of course you have Egypt, you have this vast Sinai desert, and then you have Gaza, and there is a border between the two.
And they initially said they were going to build one, which is the right thing to do, and what's happened in almost every other situation is you get the civilians out of harm's way and into international community-led, NGO-led humanitarian areas, and the right thing are like, okay, this is great. And then a few weeks later they decided that they wouldn't, and they launched an armor brigade towards the border with Israel, violating the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, to not only guard the border areas, to make sure they built a new wall. So there's actually three layers of wall between Gaza and Egypt. And since October 7th, Egypt built a new wall to make sure that not a single civilian got out of Gaza, this very small area where there was about to be this giant war.
Unless — and most people don't know this data point, this is more political than it is analysis — but 100,000 people have gotten out through the Egypt-Gaza border. If they had anywhere from $2,000 to $10,000, you can buy your way out of Gaza, but as a general rule, you're not allowed out of Gaza. That in itself would be an urban warfare ahistorical event, right? There's no parallel to that. Yes, there are places in Ukraine, you know, 5 million people evacuated, and there were some countries that said not us, but there was not one country with the ability to literally close the door and go, look, I don't care what goes on, you're not coming over here. And I believe that that was a major mistake, because that changes again what the military can do for getting civilians out of harm's way.
And of course, Egypt, by doing that, Israel had to build a humanitarian zone along the beach called the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone. The reason it was selected is because it's on the beach where they can't dig tunnels. So it's one of the few places in Gaza where Hamas didn't build extensive amounts of tunnels because of the water table. The closer you get to the sea, the higher the water table is, the fewer tunnels you have.
All those variables meant on October 8th what Israel was facing. There was no history to compare to — just a trapped civilian population that you can try to get out of harm's way, but ultimately the enemy, Hamas, would use that to their advantage, and they did so. So even within the safer area of the humanitarian zone, Mohammed Deif, who is the 30-year commander of Hamas forces, was killed on the edge of the humanitarian zone because Hamas, doing lawfare, used even the humanitarian zone as a shield, and that's whether it's hostages or commanders or whatever activity was happening in there.
I only have five minutes left. So I wanted to cover something I hope comes out in the questions: the book that has guided my research more than I ever knew it would. While I was at Georgetown, an EMBA program, was a book called Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics. It's a great book, talks about how you even structure a sentence with a statistic in it to make it not true, or the practice in social studies of just creating the biggest number you can, like 90% of smokers die of lung cancer, and whether it's true or not, making this statistic as big as you can so that you can make the problem as big as you can. That's what I started to see in Gaza from the very beginning.
So I write case studies, right? I look in my case studies at the end is always any number we can find on how many of the combatants died on both sides, how many civilians died, how many buildings were destroyed. I didn't realize again how much that would dictate. If you get nothing from my lecture, get this: the law of war is préalable, not post facto. But for some reason, there's entire armies of human rights activists who I'm sure truly believe in their heart that this shouldn't be happening, war shouldn't happen, but they've tried to convince the world that the laws of war are post facto. What does that mean? That means that I can take a number that I get from somebody, doesn't matter who, and use that as the sole determinant of whether somebody was being legal, ethical, moral, even good in their conduct.
So that's like a casualty number, right? So taking a number, let's say 100,000 have died, and say, look, this proves that Israel was trying to kill civilians. That's not the way the law of war, let alone reality, works. The law of war is préalable. It is literally pages and pages of documents about what military should do with what information they have, right? That what does a commander know before he takes an...
action? What does a military know? And then you go through all this necessity, proportionality, and everything. But for some reason, the world's convinced that, 'But John, this many casualties, this many buildings destroyed. Doesn't that prove intent?' No. That's postfacto. That's not the way the war really works. What actions were taken and what did they do about it? I do urban warfare for a living. I'll give you two battles with some numbers, right? I talked to you about the 2016 to 17 battle of Mosul. Biggest battle since World War II. We believe, we don't know, that there was a maximum number of ISIS fighters in that city of 5,000, right? We, the international world, most of the Iraqis, attacked with 100,000 forces and for nine months fought to liberate that city. Now, John, what about the civilian casualties? A year later, the Iraqi government didn't know how many civilians had died. The mayor said it was 40,000. Eventually the United Nations, doing some methodologies, got it between 9 to 11,000. This is where unfortunately I birthed this saying of what is the civilian to combatant ratio, not knowing that it would backfire on me greatly because now people think that's the determination of whether somebody is doing something good. 'What is this? What is their civilian to combatant ratio?' And if you understand anything about the history, the laws of war, it has nothing to do with it. Let alone as a researcher, the elements of where do you get the number and when do you get the number. There's never been an urban battle in history, never will be, when somebody can tell you in real time what is the death rate down to the single digit. But for some reason, because of Gaza, we believe that the Gaza Health Ministry can determine within minutes how many people died and whether they were civilians or combatants. Man, I wish I had more time. That's been the other thing in this determination. So statistically, make, be very careful about one, postfacto statistics in war in real time, and aggregating and disaggregating data. Right? So if you ever hear a number about Gaza, and I know there are a lot of other urban battles happening right now, it's one big number, right? That's aggregated across now two plus years of fighting.
If we're being fair and then comparing it against some other urban battle is that you would disaggregate that to battles, right? So like the battle of Rafah where there was probably one civilian killed to 100 combatants because they got 90 plus percentage of the civilians out of harm's way in the battle of Rafah. If you went to the battle of Gaza City 1 in November of 2024, you would have a much higher civilian death rate according to the Gaza Health Ministry. But if you went fast forward it to October of 2025, you'd have a lot less. But the problem is that people aren't realizing that those are aggregated numbers when if you really wanted to do an academic research, you would disaggregate the numbers to individual battles because the context of the battles changed that how many combatants, how many missiles were being fired from enemy territory, all of that would change. But very specifically, I hope that we can talk about in your questions is that those numbers are stripped of all context of both sides. It's stripped of what did Israel do and it's stripped of what did Hamas do. And I don't want to live in a world where that's possible because that's a much more violent world. Because imagine, and I can show over across battles of ISIS, Al Qaeda, you name it, from the battle of Fallujah to the battle of Gaza, that if that's a recipe for more urban warfare, and that's the paradox. If you show somebody that if I want to win, because first battle of Fallujah, the Al Qaeda win not on the field of battle but in the media space. Same thing happened to the US military in the first battle of Fallujah. They killed Americans. We went in. Al Jazeera puts the number of civilian casualties growing every day. The American military must stop in six days. It gives a recipe for defeating people to every person that wants civilians to die. And that's what I think Gaza is. Gaza is the worst case scenario of a recipe of using our values, Western values, Western militaries, the laws of war against you to achieve a political goal. And that's the paradox is that if that is allowed to happen, if all this statistical warfare of all this algorithm-driven tick-tock thoughts about war, we'll live in a much more violent urban warfare world.