The fear of the forever war has captivated the American mind, and not without reason. 20 years in Afghanistan, nearly 9 years in Iraq, half a decade fighting ISIS. In the aftermath, Americans have turned inward. A 2023 poll showed a majority, 53% of Republicans now say the United States should stay out of world affairs. And even some of Trump's most ardent defenders have joined his critics. Kentucky Congressman Tom Massie asked, "Why are we going to war with Iran? American families in my district want to know how this is going to help them pay for groceries. How does this make them safer in schools or in their neighborhoods? How does this help them pay for housing? Have we learned nothing?" Former Georgia Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene took a similar tack. She said, "It's always a lie and it's always America last." Their critiques were echoed by Congresspeople across the aisle. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez said, "People of rational sense in this country are opposed to this senseless Iran war." Ro Khanna followed, adding, "Another war in the Middle East is not America first." But despite the outrage from some Americans and their congressmen, what does someone who's actually seen wars up close think? I sat down with John Spencer, a retired US Army major and elite combat veteran. When he's not teaching strategy at West Point, he's going into conflict zones in Ukraine, Kashmir, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, and more to study war. He's been in Gaza seven times. That's more trips into Gaza than anybody outside of the IDF. He just wrote a book about his time in and out of war zones, aptly titled 20 Times I Almost Died.
Today I sit down with him and he says we are better off from our involvement in Iran and that it is a worthwhile endeavor to set their nuclear program back that prior administrations had been kicking the can down the road. That war tests all assumptions and that we will learn from our miscalculations and that appeasement is not a strategy. We also discuss the status of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. And I ask about the challenges and debate spilling out of each conflict. Is America's missile stockpile dangerously low? Has Israel been careful or careless when it comes to Palestinian lives? Is Ukraine asking for too much in their negotiations with Russia? Has the peace deal in Gaza been successful or not? Hear all of this and more in my conversation with John Spencer. John Spencer, thank you so much for being here.
Oh man, amazing to be here. Thanks for having me.
Of course. I think a lot of our audience will already know you, but just in case, I'm going to introduce you. You served 25 years in the army, two combat deployments in Iraq, taught strategy at West Point. You're now the director, executive director, excuse me, of the Urban Warfare Institute. And your new book is 20 Times I Almost Died, aptly titled about 20 near-death experiences. Everything from killer bees to car accidents to encounters with IEDs. And we're going to get into all of that. Before we do, let's start with Iran. Obviously, the most front-of-mind conflict happening. I think we're two days out from being six months into the war. Yeah. As we tape this, the biggest debate right now, I think, is six months later, are we better or worse than we were on February 27th, the day before we got involved?
I guess we'd have to answer who are the we.
Yeah, Americans. I a thousand percent. I don't think anybody, depending on what metrics that you want to use, our interests are better served now than they were six months ago. And I think the war has validated that. If you look at why the war started on February 28th, the four reasons that the president gave to the country, I believe these things are worth fighting for. I would find it really hard to debate somebody to say that Iran is not set back on its ambitions, clear ambitions, even according to before even the 12-day war, IAEA saying that they are in violation of non-nuclear proliferation. So just from that fact, yes, we're safer, as in I believe non-nuclear proliferation is worth fighting for. We have nine countries that have nuclear weapons. We don't need a tenth one that is a terrorist state that says it wants one to destroy the United States.
Whether you believe in whether JCPOA was working or not, by fact that military action set them back, their scientists, their centrifuges, their sites buried these things. From the aspect of their missile collection, right? So that was their other ambition, and which is one of the four goals set by the president on February 28th was this missile shield it had. You can count the number of ones they've launched, the number ones they supposedly have unburied, whatever it is, their manufacturing sites. They were trying, on top of their nuclear program, to build this missile umbrella, which actually they implemented since the war. Like, okay, if you don't let us do what we want, then we'll just start attacking everybody, which is what we've seen, right? They have less missile capability. Their military-industrial complex to build more missiles is destroyed. So just by that fact, we're in a safer place. Our allies in the region, our bases, and they taught us where our weaknesses are, whether that's in our interceptor stockpile, whether it's low or not. Well, we're going to fix that. Whether it's our allies and our basing, well, we're going to fix that. So this is the aspect of war testing all assumptions, but you asked a very simple question. I do believe we're in a better place. Now, we'd have to talk about the Strait of Hormuz, and that's why it's not an easy question. It seems like a simple question, but it's not. The Strait of Hormuz, which was technically open before Operation Epic Fury even began, but it was open under the threat of closing. So like Secretary Rubio said, Iran played its economic nuclear card. It'll never be able to play it again the same way. We already have the pipelines, you know, whether it's Saudi Arabia's, Iraq's being restarted, the railroads that want to be made. And I wrote this for the Wall Street Journal. The Strait of Hormuz will never be played like that again because it won't be as relevant ever again.
What do you mean by that?
So, yes, 20% of the world's energy flow is flowing out. Actually, 80% of the Gulf States' imports were coming through there. But as war tests those choke points, then you develop alternatives, right? So, everyone will build pipelines.
Like they might try to pipeline their own oil out.
They could. It's a lot harder where they're trying to get it. Like who are their buyers? China.
To pipeline to China is difficult.
Difficult. India, difficult.
Yeah. These aspects of, but it'll become less relevant just by the fact that they played it, whether it's open or closed right now, which we were talking about right before we started. It's a great debate.
Well, what's your read on the situation?
The read is that it's both open and closed. Unless you physically go there and watch ships, you truly don't know. But we all thought that it was fully closed and that no ships were getting through, and come to find out on the basically friendly side of the Strait of Hormuz, there is a possibility. Of course, it's not the level, the free level that you need to be, and the cost of insurance and everything. But there, at one point, there was, you know, 20 million barrels a day at one it and flows. So it is open, but clearly not at the freedom that it needs to be. And this is the other aspect. As an American, I believe freedom of navigation of the seas is worth fighting for because if not, I know the consequences.
I want to just articulate the argument that I think a lot of critics are vocalizing on X and beyond, which is something along the lines of, you know, the strait is closed. It wasn't closed before. Iran has been to some extent successful in striking US allies in the Gulf, also our own bases. And there's this question of what to do about the remaining nuclear material. Dilute it, get it out of the country. How are we going to do that when we're dealing with the baseline issue of opening the strait? And so there's these other intractable things that aren't even top of mind that are, to your point, the most central problem is the nuclear program, right? What do you say to those critics who look at the picture very differently from the way you're looking at it and saying it doesn't seem worth it?
Yeah. This is the problem of explaining this simply to people when war is even the simple is complex. That the nuclear is related to the Strait of Hormuz because why does Iran want nuclear capabilities besides what it says it wants it to do? It wants to rise as a regional power. It wants to control the Strait of Hormuz. It wants to have these proxies that can do its bidding and has enacted all of its proxies during this war. Iran wanted the nuclear weapon to not just have it as a deterrence and threatening tool, but to do all that it wanted to do in the Middle East, which directly impacts every household in the United States, is if they can cut off the Strait of Hormuz, if they can attack any ally they want, when any desalination plant, gas, whatever, because there's so many variables and it's really hard to say simply is that it's just not a reality that before February 28th, all things were because we were kicking this can down the road just like the nuclear program. I had, you know, Mossad Yossi Cohen on my podcast talking about the 2008 Turram raid where they went in and had to physically take a million pieces of paper and bring them out to show the United Nations they still have a nuclear weapons program. And even I talked to some of these people you're talking about like, yeah, yeah, but they didn't. But they did. This is the alternatives to use of force, right? And this is the kind of the anti-war. There's never a reason to go to war. I believe it should be a last resort, but there are things worth fighting for. And we had kicked this can down the road almost like a foreign policy insanity just trying the same thing over and over again while Iran, according to them, because this is the boasting that they did to, you know, like Steve Witkoff and others like, yeah, we have enough for 11 nuclear bombs and they're supposed to have enough for zero nuclear bombs, but we kicked the can on the nuclear, we watched them build this missile, and China helped them build this missile arsenal, the proxy program, I mean, the terror armies that they built in other countries and destabilize the Middle East. All of these things weren't going to just go away with diplomacy.
So, those are the naysayers. If they want to have a simple conversation, I can try to do it rapidly, but it's not a simple conversation. It's all interconnected. And there is always great power competition. So, this is the China investing in Iran heavily. 90% of its oil it was buying, but they were also building gas fields, railroads, ports, not just in our own backyard like in Panama and Venezuela and others, but they were doing it in the Middle East. Even if you're an American first, our interest globally, like freedom and navigation of the seas, we're greatly at risk and we're continuing to be. And finally, despite all the rhetoric, this administration took action because it was getting to a point where it'd be too late. Right? That's the North Korea scenario.
Do you think the Marjorie Taylor Greenes and the Joe Kents and the Tucker Carlsons and the Tom Massies, you know, this cohort of American commentators, do you think they know all this, that they know what you're saying and are saying another thing for, you know, political opportunism? Or do you think they genuinely believe that it was a bad idea?
Yeah. Well, I think that's for political reasons. But it is interesting that we all have access to some of the same facts, but we, you know, push it through the paradigm of our own lens. And if it comes out as something in some cases like crazy like I just, you know, Jewish space lasers according to you are the reason according to Marjorie Taylor Greene, they're powering these lights, you didn't know. That's right. If you put it through this prism, which is so interesting to me, as in, you know, like the genocide claim when the overwhelming body of evidence, and I have young kids, so for me it's like critical thinking, like how did you get to the point you believe what you believe when we all have access to the same information? You just push it through a filter that makes it come out as googly gawk. I mean, it's just, I believe they know, but I also don't, understanding, you know, psychology, I don't push off that they truly believe some of the things that they say about the cabal and the conspiracy and the, you know, all these evils that allow them not to deal with the complexity because we want people that can just, you know, nobody has the time to do this amount of study. They just want somebody to tell them simply. And there is some psychology to believing the conspiracy is easier than believing the complexity of the truth.
At this point in the war, what do you think gets us closer to the most fundamental goals? I mean, there's a cohort of people that would say we need to go full throttle on, you know, the military side. Other people that say there's only negotiation that will get the remaining nuclear material out of the country and open this trade and so forth. Of course, you know, we've tried maximum sanctions in the past. It seems like that has been reupped with the economic D-Day plan as presented by Scott Bessent. All of these options on the menu, like what's the path?
So, I really try to stay out of the crystal ball theory of where are we going because I know the uncertainty of war. I guess the question is not where are we going, but where should we be going? I believe that where we should go is we have to accomplish the objectives not just because of the reasons of that pushing the can down the road aspect and not just letting the smoke clear and then they rebuild it with billions of dollars of investments or in some deal where they get billions of dollars, which was presented. In studying active wars, there's probably four people that truly have all the information.
Who are those four people?
Of course, the president.
Probably his chief of staff, national security adviser, Marco Rubio, I don't, so they all know more than anybody else. But if you take in the variables and really, as I travel the world to explain to people, I mean, who does get access to the level of information where you would know that National Security Council, very unique, right? So, we have the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War. I would think they would know more than anybody else, but like, okay, who are we talking to? Yeah, you add the CIA director into it. So, maybe those primaries. I understand enough about war and covered enough wars for enough years to know how much I don't know about what's the information and which decisions are being made from a combination of domestic concerns. I mean, whether it's the price of gas gets to a point and that's a decision point for us, the midterm elections and international concerns, all the allies calling in, the global market. There's so many variables that people want to again reductively or deductively, whichever that they're trying to do, just make it real simple like, hey, this is the one main element, the Strait of Hormuz is or isn't closed.
Like, but there's all these other variables. So I think that truly those National Security Council primaries, not the kind of staff, and they've done throughout the leaks a really good job, although you'll be like the meeting at, you know, Camp David or whatever, and somebody will get a leak, and then everybody who is mentioned will say that is absolutely not what happened, which is frustrating. You asked about going forward, American deterrence is at risk because if Iran's able to make it so that this didn't matter, because I believe in also the global international order, right? As much as you can't take global choke points and seize them and start charging tolls, as much as you can't invade countries, because you know this is the element that an anti-war person will push on you that it's never okay. Like if it's never okay, then evil regimes, men, people will take advantage of your pacifism, giving people what they want aspect in the pursuit of will lead to a much more violent world.
Do you think the nuclear material comes out though without diplomacy?
I think it is a possibility. I actually think if I try to red team, which there's an element of that, and I wrote this as well, like war is a contest of will, you have to put the Islamic regime's what it values most at risk. Does it value its nuclear dust more than its own survival? No. It'll trade time, right? Because they think long term. I know China, you know, 100-year plan. I think that you could absolutely negotiate that part away. But they know what's important to their survival. The economic aspect is more important to their survival. Although I don't know if they survived this war in general, which is the thing Iran's won. I mean, the reason they killed 30 to 50,000 of their own people wasn't because the United States was attacking, it's because their economy had collapsed. Their banks had collapsed. You think that they're going to come out of this stronger economically? They're going to want to do things. And this is why in this memorandum of understanding, they thought they were going to get billions of dollars immediately because they need it so desperately to survive. I think they could give the dust away and plan like they did in front of everybody, a bunch of nuclear programs, some that nobody had ever heard of, while they economically try to build back their survival. Because even in evil people, they want to survive. They want to maintain power. So they're going to make decisions. And this is why like economic epic fury or whatever it's called, economic outcast right now is attacking what they care about most, which is their survival, which is tied to their economic vitality.
Things we've learned that we might need to improve on. The missile stockpiles are allegedly low. As you've pointed out, we don't really know exactly. So tell us what do we know and what do we not know and what's your read of the situation?
Sure. So not glibly but very shortly, we don't know. So if somebody is pushing numbers, they're either leaking classified information, which I don't appreciate as a veteran, and putting, you know, US interest at risk, or they're lying based on, you know, it's probably legitimate analysis, like, you know, the fact that you're supposed to send two interceptors at one ballistic missile incoming, but some of the incoming ballistic missiles we actually let go by, so there's not two interceptors. And there's a bit of an element here on who's doing the analysis and how are they doing that analysis. Yeah. But it has exposed as much as the Ukraine war exposed massive weaknesses in the United States' military-industrial complex. We had one plant that was producing artillery shells when you need tens of thousands a day in a land war. We had one plant that we know creating these CAT 4 interceptors, right? The Patriot, the THAAD, other, we had one plant. In my line of work, one is none, two is one. But I will say not in the defense of anybody, I really try to stay out of politics, is that the US administration came into this administration already knowing thanks again to the Ukraine war because war tests all assumptions and actually having worked in that five-sided building of the Pentagon, you know, the idea like we weren't planning on the Strait of Hormuz, like there's been a task force planning the Strait of Hormuz for 20 years, there were just many variables. We have plans about war and the US maintains stockpile and maintains military-industrial complex capability, right, to ramp up things. This war, whether I believe it or not, I believe that we only have one plant that puts together Patriot missiles and that I don't like that.
In my line of work, it is really fascinating because I do all this war research around the world that we were talking about. Whether it's in India, Pakistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, of course, the Middle East. It tests countries' assumptions about the future of war that they bet on, right? You know, like Israel, they shrunk their military, relied on technology. October 7th taught them that all those decisions were wrong. As much as ours, even being the world's most powerful military, we have ideals about, we actually have what we call defense planning scenarios, which are the ones that we will really argue about and then take to Congress to say, 'Here's our worst case, most plausible scenarios. We need to maintain a certain size of military and advanced capabilities.' What happens is that the futurist comes in and it's called the vampire fallacy that McMaster talked about. It was like, 'Look, that F-35, if you just spend a couple trillion dollars into that, it'll make war simple, fast, bloodless.' This is the idea of like 38 days into a war against a massive country. Like, why aren't you done?
But that would be, would you say that's fundamentally flawed given that our big expensive things are getting taken out by their cheap, like, you know, quick to make, like one-tenth of a cost drones?
Yeah, the economics of that is important. And we saw this come and go again. Why did I invest so much time studying the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war? Because it was dubbed as the drone war, as in the drones would solve all your problems. And actually that's the opposite of what happened on the ground. They needed infantry, tanks, artillery. They needed the traditional stuff. They needed, all warfare is a combination of the old and the new. The problem is when people convince our military, our political leaders that you don't need all that old stuff. And that's how you get to one plant doing artillery, one plant doing anti-tank guided munitions. There are technologies that are important to have like drones. If you don't have them on the modern battlefield, you'll be found wanting. You do have to solve this cost differentiation that you just talked about where, you know, if not, this is why Iran's so important, right? This is why if maybe I don't want us to have a low stockpile, but if it was true, then not quitting now isn't the solution, right? This is where people say, 'Gosh, stockpiles. We have to quit. We have to wrap this up quickly,' is what I hear in the news. Like that's the conclusion you get from war testing an assumption about the number of missiles we need. That's a road map for any enemy of the United States. China, North Korea, Iran, Russia. I just need to make as many ballistic missiles as I can and not attack the United States. Attack anybody related to, you know, that they have a connection to. Overwhelm them. Yeah, they won't be able to produce interceptors at the right pace. There has to be a solution to fix that cost differentiation, but I don't take the same conclusion, right? I'm not thankful, but look, if we all agreed there's a low stockpile, we used a lot during the war. Maybe we did, maybe we didn't.
But what is your take? Do you think it's low? I mean, you're saying you don't know, but...
I think from what we do know, I think it is low again for us. Iran stopped attacking Israel.
Why did they stop attacking Israel? Because it wasn't having any success. So then it started attacking all these other countries who have less of our interceptors, right?
So is it a problem that we had less or we just didn't have the right air?
We weren't prepared in the places that they were.
Right, and they took advantage of.
Which is maybe a critique.
Why weren't we, why wasn't there more interceptors in the place where they ended up attacking?
Yeah. Let's say I will agree that it is low, those CAT 4s. So the big issue is these CAT 4 interceptors that cost millions of dollars, one plant that puts them together. I also follow this stuff. So I knew that the administration came in and said, 'This is our military-industrial complex, the ability to make things at scale is wrong.' They started allocating billions of dollars against that before the Iran war. So, and since this was not even leaked information, there was, you know, all the primes actually locked and all those were brought into the White House and said, 'Look, we want you to increase production four times what you're currently doing.' So even those that are predicting that it will take three years to reset our stockpile, if it is according to their analysis, this number, 50%, whatever it is, even before that was all, there was this meeting to increase it times four, isn't like that we know it, we're not doing anything about it. Yes, just knowing that there's one plant, you're right, like that's wrong. So fix it. So this is where Congress says, 'Yeah, but I'm not going to give you your seven, your trillion Department of War budget to fix this. I just want you to stop the war.' Like that's what you're taking from a sure an assumption being identified from the United States that we made the wrong assumptions about the requirements of war. And there is an element of allies. When you have military bases or equipment, we discovered that our allies were not investing in their own defense, which is a part of our bases, right? Whether that was in Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, you name it. And some of these places I've been to based on my past career, fix it all. I want to acknowledge the successes, even how the war opened, like I was as a military analyst, acknowledge the way the war opened has never been done in war before. The ability to penetrate so deeply into an enemy nation, eliminate its entire political and military higher echelon to start the war.
Can I ask you a question about this?
Because there's two ways people are looking at this. Some are saying these 40 top political, let's actually focus on just the political ones, it was good to take them out because now it's hard to strategize if you took out the top slate of commanders. The other side is looking at this saying, well, you potentially take out 40 people that would come to the negotiation table and the people who slot in are maybe more hardline. I mean, that's the way people are looking at the situation.
Yeah, of course the response is, well, there's no distinction between hardline and moderate.
I'm curious how you fall in this debate of were the assassinations as fruitful as I think, you know, the Trump team wants to convey there.
Yeah, I believe I'm as objective as I can be and, you know, what was done at the opening of this, nobody could have imagined, Napoleon couldn't have imagined it. Eisenhower, you just imagine what war you want to talk about, we could push, it's not that easy, but could eliminate because that's what war is, a contest of will. If I can convince you that I can, you know, they all say they all want to die. Like, no, they don't want to die. They want power. And I do believe one of the reasons that we stopped, I think I do believe if we would have kept going, but I don't know all the variables. It's like concerns of a nation who relies 90% on desalination plants. He just got his, you know, just got hit and is begging for the operation to stop. All these variables that I don't know if they did or didn't happen. I think it was very effective. It did put them into chaos. All the things you would want to do in a war. And I do believe this is the other point is that in order to believe some of these things, you have to think that everything that comes out of the administration is a lie. Like I don't, I'm not there. I do believe in, you know, that deception is important in war. I do believe, you know, markets and all of these things. But I truly believe there were voices from within the Islamic regime in Iran that were crying uncle saying they were willing to negotiate. And they have acknowledged that and they came to negotiations. So if they are such hardliners and so strong and so safe that the 13,000 targets that we destroyed had no impact on them and all we did was make them stronger, they wouldn't have come to the negotiation table and started talking. Of course, they came with demands that were not acceptable to us. So I actually give you, whether you, the administration, full credit on, okay, you said you wanted to have a talk, okay, you're not willing to do what we do, then it's all off because the worst thing would be to make a bad deal. So militarily and from a strategic, everybody says it's about tactics, no, that was a strategic action to start the war and demonstrate a capability to eliminate an entire political-military structure that it did send the message and that it was a limited war. Right? So this is the argument that people have is that it was a regime change. My personal opinion, by everything that was used, threatened to be used, this was not a regime change war. If it happened as a byproduct, great. And they actually said that this was a limited objective war trying to force whoever gets left. And you could have continued. Well, you call them assassinations, targeting, different words. They do have.
Do you think assassination is the wrong word?
I believe words have meaning. And in war, if I'm targeting an enemy leadership, I'm eliminating. But if they targeted Donald Trump, which they have, they have, God forbid, but if they were successful, we would call that an assassination. No, we would call that a...
I guess I want to understand why it's different.
Yeah, because once the war starts, then I think you're in war. So if you reversed it, yeah, it's a great question. Would it be an attempted assassination? Yeah.
To them, it would be a target of killing.
So where you stand is where you sit.
I understand. I'm crossing enemy lines by calling it assassination.
No, I just use a different word in the opening of a war. Right. So,
I didn't think that deeply about the word choice is my like honest explanation here.
But you're right. It is. If you looked it up in Webster, I'm sure it means to target and kill an individual. I'm happy to use your word. I'll say targeted killing.
Yeah.
Okay. I have another subsequent question, which is, is this a breakdown of an old norm or an establishment of a new norm? You know, obviously there was these very alarming reports about, well, let me take a step back. Even at the NATO summit in Ankara, the whole series of events, I guess I'll call it potential threat on Air Force One where Trump was then put into a bar cart and taken off. I mean, the threat was allegedly like threat to his life. There was the videos of threatening Barron Trump, right? And so I guess I worry about the slippery slope of it all of does it make it just more common across the world, the targeted killings?
I think it's always been a norm, but going back to that deterrence theory, there's only two countries I believe have this current capability once a war starts, Israel and the United States. And I actually wrote this paper that I believe it is a new capability that should put fears in our enemy and we have to protect it. I think this was much more than a decapitation strike because of whom was targeted both during the 12-day war, like all 13 senior nuclear scientists, all the generals, and then we pushed it up to the political level because they had shown between the 12-day war and Operation Epic Fury that they weren't going, no matter what you did, they weren't willing to talk. Like, okay, let's eliminate echelon of political leadership and see if the next guy is sending a message that I'm willing to talk.
Whether you believe in, I'm a dad, yeah.
Why is he still alive? I mean, it's just like widely reported that he's open to, I mean, there was the New York Times article that he was considered as a successor in a regime change scenario.
Well, the problem is that I would love for the program of record.
Well, let me just clarify what I'm saying. Why is he alive at the hands of the Iran upper leadership? Not us, but...
I mean, this is the true, which is a great study of power in some of these places and who has power both touchable and untouchable.
Who has a, you know, even Putin, I mean, Putin is an individual we all talk about, but there are the oligarchs there, and even Saddam was great about maintaining powers even within his enemies, paying his enemies. So he is a powerful individual even when he gets sidelined and told, look, you're out of line, and they get put under house arrest, things like that. Clearly he's still a powerful man within the Islamic regime, and I think that's why. To just finish your question on, will this become the norm?
Political assassinations by nation states, which is different, right? So, you know, this gets to the terrorism aspect of a political assassination attempt because there have been attempts on, you know, US presidents by crazy individuals. Sometimes it becomes attributable to a nation, sometimes a lot of times it doesn't cross into the line of when does a war start. And this is, is this a war? Of course this is a war. So in Operation Epic Fury, what was done, that can't become the norm because I don't want other nations to have that capability. So I actually view it not as a, you know, I'm not a warmonger, but I view it as a capability that's never been displayed in the history of war because imagine, you know, starting World War II, being able to kill Hitler, his successor, Rommel, all his generals. Bam.
Yeah. They would keep fighting, but it would be different.
Yeah.
And China doesn't have that capability. Russia doesn't have that capability or where it would have done it already. It can't even get to Zelensky inside of Kyiv in the opening moments of a war, which they are so much, you know, on paper dominant. It's a special capability that we have demonstrated we have. We have to protect it. The solution can't be to stop pursuing the objective because Iran started attacking all of our allies. And it can't be because they figured out if they can develop more cruise missiles than we can cheaply knock down because that gives a road map and will cause more war. It will cause more violations of sovereign nations and all these things. This is what's really hard to convince the anti-war people is that your stance actually will cause more violence in the world than upholding international order at times. If we were pushovers.
Yeah, peace isn't a strategy.
Yeah. Though how many world wars do we need to convince us of that? Who do you think is running the country right now?
That's a great question. Whether Khamenei is even alive, I think some of the hardliners that we've seen are the power brokers, but they don't agree and there has been infighting. Again, this is when somebody has a theory about something but they want to not address any of the all accepted knowing that there are competing from the president to the speaker opinions and statements showing that there isn't unity and strength. And I truly believe I don't know who was reaching out to the US saying, please, we'd like to discuss, we'd like to stop this.
I think it's likely more in the side of the president's camp and not so much the IRGC generals who become political leaders, right? Because who are we talking about who wasn't a former IRGC general, head of intelligence, something like that? Those are what I would call a hardliner. Like you said, they're all hardliners. But there are others who I think care about their survival a little bit more and are more rational. And I think those are the people who are reaching out. Again, not having access to classified information, I know what I don't know.
One thing I'm just a point of curiosity is how do we have such granular intelligence on the ground that lets us take out these 40-odd people, obviously very well sourced in CIA and Mossad, but we don't know if Khamenei is in a coma or if he's not.
I wouldn't say that we don't know.
We don't know, but someone knows. It's a lot easier to collect intelligence out of war than in war because once the first round expired, then, you know, patterns of life change. You know, I don't, do you know how in the 12-day war Israel killed a whole meeting of generals?
They hacked into the bodyguards' cell phones. No.
So like none of the primaries had cell phones, but the bodyguards all had cell phones. Was it that one?
So Mossad texted all of the generals that there was a meeting at, and it was a Mossad text. They thought it was each other calling a meeting and they sent a missile into the meeting and killed like 20 of the senior leaders.
Okay. Maybe I'm thinking of something else. There was another thing where they were tracking the security guards.
Because no one was carrying cell phones, right? But their security guards were, you know, that's you track an individual as much as like they're, you know, you might say like somebody's ordering DoorDash, like the primary is not, but his bodyguards are.
Sure. This one though is so fascinating is that they were so penetrated into the IRGC system, as much as how did they kill Hamas's leader in the president's home?
You know, the combination of human intelligence with Israel, but the fact that they were able to send IRGC generals a text, believe, and they thought it was themselves to have a meeting, and they said have the capability as well, which isn't as easy as it sounds, to send a missile into that to start the war.