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John Spencer
Executive Director, Urban Warfare Institute; Chair of Urban Warfare Studies, Modern War Institute at West Point, Urban Warfare Institute

The Reality of Urban Warfare: Maj John Spencer Part 1 | Ep039 Frontlines & Faultlines

📅 Jan 01, 2026 Frontlines & Faultlines 36 MIN 615 VIEWS 12 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
In this episode of Frontlines & Faultlines, Dr Mike Kelly is joined by one of the world’s leading authorities on modern urban warfare, John Spencer. A combat veteran, former US Army infantry officer, and award-winning military scholar, Spencer brings rare credibility to a debate that is often dominated by ideology rather than experience. Currently Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute, his work spans tactical decision-making on the ground through to strategic, legal, and political consequences at the highest levels of command. The conversation begins with a hard reality:...

Questions asked in this interview

4
  1. 0:18What does it traditionally kind of look like in terms of the types of civilian casualties, the types of challenges the military faces in that environment?
  2. 10:00So, you know, is there anything else, too, that you've noted that's evolving in, you know, the enemies and the threats we face and how they use that urban environment?
  3. 17:51But it's such a mythology still today, isn't it, John?
  4. 22:05And what I've learned now, visiting multiple times, is that in many cases the tunnel was built first and then the school was put on top of it. Right?
Mike Kelly 0:18 ↗
Well, welcome back to Front Lines and Fault Lines with Mike Kelly, everyone. It's great to have you back with us. And today we've got a very special treat in that we got someone I admire extremely, John Spencer, who's had an incredible career, and this is a guy that not only is an expert in the academic realm of analyzing military affairs, military issues, current issues in that space, but also was in the field himself. And so, you know, he's an award-winning scholar, author, combat veteran, national security and military analyst, and he's internationally recognized for his expertise, particularly in urban warfare, and at the strategic and tactical level as well, which is pretty rare, too, to be able to straddle those spheres. And so, he's now kind of considered as a leading expert on urban warfare, and he certainly advised a lot of senior leadership in the US, senior commanders, but also at the Pentagon and at West Point, the United States Military Academy. And at present, he currently serves as the chair of the Urban Warfare Studies Center at the Modern War Institute at West Point. So, you know, he's really focused in and analyzed this particularly challenging environment. For anybody who has ever had to deal with urban warfare or serve in it, they will know what I'm talking about here. There's no more challenging environment, both from a strategic and tactical point of view. And for those in that environment, it is intensely stressful. We just don't know when your next threat is going to strike from any given direction or even beneath you. So really appreciate all the work you've done there, mate, but also your 25 years of active service in the army as an infanteer. You're in the elite 75th Ranger Regiment, and interestingly, the 173rd Airborne was the formation that Australian battalions were attached to in the early days of Vietnam before we formed our own task force. So there's that connection, and also I know you served with the 4th Infantry Division, which Ray Odierno was commanding when I was in Iraq. And they were on a steep learning curve on counterinsurgency at the time, which we can come back to, but it's a stellar sort of career, mate, and it's a lot of scar tissue to be drawing on. [laughter] So really grateful to be able to plug in and talk to you today. I guess to kick off a discussion, we've had a lot of commentary around what's lawful targeting, you know, this lawfare engagement that you've had. A lot of academics have had a lot of pressure to adopt a certain point of view from their colleagues on the campuses where there's been an attempt to deny free speech a lot of the time, or they feel under pressure to toe a certain line. But you've had to deal with these specifics, the targeting processes and all the weaponry that goes along with that, all the elements you take into account in selecting a target. So can we just start first with the challenge of urban warfare and the history of it? What does it traditionally kind of look like in terms of the types of civilian casualties, the types of challenges the military faces in that environment?
John Spencer 3:45 ↗
Yeah. So, there's a lot of job security there, and why I've been studying it for so long is that, you know, no two urban battles are the same, but the complexity and the uniqueness to fighting in urbanized terrain — and a lot of people believe that, you know, just a lot of buildings is an urban fight. Urban by definition means that there's a population present, there's the infrastructure to support the population, and that unique dense physical terrain, right? So that is concrete and steel, that is three dimensions, and it is the political and the information environment, because even in, you know, there's a lot of warfare that's hard, like fighting in the mountains of Kashmir, fighting in the jungles, it's really hard, but there's no place where, you know, every rock has a cell phone, every, you know, tree is international media in the urban environment. There are many reasons why it's been what we, you know, the great equalizer, for one thing, because it equalizes not only severe material superior military technologies, like we all like to say, like as you know and I know you know, militaries like to imagine war in the future and all these superior technologies. Well, the urban terrain is where that will meet reality, and a lot of superior technologies from weapons to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to even ideals of maneuver are put to the test, depending on the density of the terrain and the presence of civilians. Unique, though, really post-World War II, because the laws of war that you mentioned do change. Even information access changes, where we live in a world today where people have to fight wars in basically a fishbowl, where people can see into the fishbowl, but really not — they see through a straw, because they see through clips and images that they get fed, not even — and nobody's feeding to them. The algorithm or social media feeds it to them. All these things clash for the military person on the ground who, you know, is facing complexities that are hard to train for. Not only the fact that if you're fighting in an environment like many of us have, where the enemy purposely uses the protections that are in urban terrain. So like the civilian population, which is protected. Non-combatants are protected. So we've fought enemies — you and I have fought — we see people today fighting enemies who are purposely trying to blend in with the civilians. So targeting becomes really hard because people believe that, you know, you target that military guy in the uniform shooting at you. It's not that clear. It is actually not that prescriptive in who is the combatant, who is the legal target, who is the protected population. That becomes extremely more difficult when you are fighting an enemy who's using that on purpose, using the protected sites, the hospitals, the schools, the cultural buildings, all these things that are protected. And we can talk about the evolutions of urban warfare from the ways it used to be done, World War II, and the evolutions even before, you know, Vietnam War, and evolutions to today in the global war on terrorism, which has left what we call the counterinsurgency hangover. For me, it has left what's called the urban legends of urban warfare. And this is what I see every day, is where people believe there are things that can or can't be done in urban terrain, based on not what they experienced but what they heard, what there are opposing forces who have tried to make war in urban areas illegal — like legitimately there are groups who have tried to make it illegal. And in the world where information is the game, is to get the fastest story out as quick as possible, you see these myths, these lies, and even political positions of urban warfare colliding. So like you mentioned, I study it from the tactical level. How the fact that your weapons don't get — how that urban terrain, if you get there first, gives you a huge advantage, right? You can't build bunkers as powerful as some of the urban structures that are in urban environments. And we've seen this even in Mosul, where General Townsend said that I couldn't build a military bunker as good as a flattened, you know, 10-story building where you still can get inside of it and shoot from it. There's that aspect with the tactical, but at that strategic level where now you've gotten to a point where people try to convince you that, well, you can't fight in urban terrain. It's just — it's illegal. You can't use munitions. You can't use large diameter bombs. Which is not true. But really we get to the position where a perception becomes reality, and the perception of the use of force — and I've always said this going back to the first battle of Fallujah, where — or even Vietnam, where the perception of the use of force matters more than the actual use of force that's happening, because if people believe something is happening different, like that you're targeting civilians even if you're not, then strategic consequences can happen. In that compression we see it all. It's a lot of information to say that I have a lot of job security because it's really hard. But it's also the present, right? People believe — I don't say it's the future. It's here and now. We've seen it. I've traveled now to war zones in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, Israel, Gaza, Lebanon. I just got back from India. All roads lead to urban. It's really hard to find pieces of the earth — it's not impossible — where different forces are going to clash and it's not in the urban terrain, urban areas. We have a long history of fighting for cities, but not necessarily a long history of fighting in cities. Well, that's changed. The world has changed: global population growth, global urbanization. Even in areas where we had massive battles in World War II, like Ukraine, like Kyiv, Kursk and other areas, there wasn't all that urban terrain there, just 40, 50, 70 years ago.
Mike Kelly 10:00 ↗
Right? And I think the key, too, for organizations that we face that are non-state actors, or at least who prioritize asymmetry, and the urban environment really offers them that chance to neutralize some of the advantages that a sophisticated Western military might have. But what really annoys me is you see conversations around proportionality. Nobody really understands that rule who hasn't studied it. But part of the equation there is your own force protection. And I'll run off a quick list of the sort of things that you might find in that urban environment designed to cause those casualties, like channelizing your forces into killing zones, the spider holes, the IEDs, the reserved demolitions in buildings — all of these things designed to actually cause casualties to you that will put pressure back on your domestic front and internationally, etc. So, it's legitimate for you as a military to actually conduct your campaign in a way you're not going to get chewed up, you know, like the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, for example. I mean, those casualties could potentially be massive on you. So, it's legitimate for you to try and minimize that by not following the channelized routes and using breaching materials. And so it's like a combined arms team that goes through these environments now with your combat engineers and your armored bulldozers, etc. But still get casualties. So, you know, is there anything else, too, that you've noted that's evolving in, you know, the enemies and the threats we face and how they use that urban environment?
John Spencer 11:39 ↗
Absolutely. And this is one of the problems with Western mindsets, is in most of our urban scenarios we're always the attacker. So, we look at the challenge to the attacker. We're never the defenders. This is really where I played a small part in the Ukraine war in the beginning days, where I wrote a little manual on how to do exactly what you just said, Mike. How to turn every street into a battle. How to canalize the forces, how to separate them so they can't even maneuver, let alone do combined arms maneuver. And the principles are really not that hard to do if you're defending urban terrain, and there's a lot of big problems with Western militaries believing they're always the attacker and the disadvantages there. But you're right, but this is where we live, and why we have this thing called the urban triad, which militaries used to understand the urban terrain, which is, like I said, the physical terrain, the population and the infrastructure. NATO and others are trying to get to a quad, factoring in that information environment. So unlike any other terrain for the military operating in that environment, one side who values legitimacy — and we haven't, you know, it's really hard to talk that, but we're seeing it in the world today where legitimacy is very important. The US military added as one of our principles of joint operations, which I prefer to call principles of war. Well, in the urban environment, it's really hard to maintain legitimacy where the world will criticize every clip of every military action that's happening. So that soldier on that street corner who has, you know, an enemy sniper attacking him, that level of visibility onto every action, every mistake, every legitimate action, but viewed through a different lens and a different clip, will be scrutinized at a level unlike we've ever seen in war. Now that can be both a positive and a huge negative. That's a challenge in urban environments because you have all those sensors there. That makes it really hard again to plan operations. But the presence of the populations — one of the things that people try to wish away is the population. And in most urban environments, even from Stalingrad where some of the civilians were trapped, but in plenty of other urban battles where they were trapped, but in most urban battles, especially the ones that last 20 or 30 years, the attacking force will go through great strides to remove the population as much as possible to make that job, that requirement, like you said, proportionality. But there's also a distinction where you have to distinguish between a combatant and a non-combatant. Usually you have to mark yourself, and I like to point out to people in Ukraine — on all my visits, I don't know where they got so much yellow and blue tape, but every civilian that was joining in the fighting, no matter what they were doing, wrapped a piece of tape around their arm because that's required in the laws of war in the urban environment. That primary function is really hard to do, and some enemies do this lawfare, and this is what we're seeing as well. So right, if it's hard to remove the population, which is kind of a standard protocol, and there's other aspects of time that you want to — you know, the ultimate level of warfare that most people talk about is this, you know, joint combined arms maneuver, which relies on speed and surprise. It's really hard to surprise people in the urban terrain, but it's possible, but also to get civilians out of harm's way. Okay, so there's a time variable here on how do you get all the civilians out of harm's way while you're depending on what the operation is, and not all operations are the same. That all adds up, like you mentioned, there's the great equalizer, which is really famous, there's the three-block war that's required. So you send soldiers into an urban environment, of course their job is to destroy the enemy who's defending, who's fighting, but they're also going to be required to provide humanitarian aid, to do peacekeeping, law enforcement, all these other tasks. It's just inherent in the complexity of this urban terrain. All these things have been coming. This level of lawfare, though, that we're seeing, I've seen been building, and it's not just the enemies that do the lawfare. Now we have other actors like non-government organizations who view themselves as credible arbitrators of the laws of war who are part of using lawfare. Like I said, they're trying to convince governments that something is right or something is wrong, something is legal or something is illegal. And I've seen it, and I'll call people out like Amnesty International, Air Wars, the Red Cross, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, who are actually practicing lawfare, trying to convince nations trying to follow the law of war, trying to convince populations around the world that there's something illegal happening, and try to convince people there's another way. And there's always in my work this fictional, like you could do this in another way. Like, okay, I study war for a living. Show me what historical example that is the case that you're showing that in this case they did it in a different way. It was less destructive. It was less costly. It was all of these things. And there's so much that the individual soldier wants to do his assigned task, but then you have this echelons of understanding. And you and I, you have studied the first and second battle of Fallujah, and I've interviewed like the very top commanders like General Abizaid and others, and like what's the biggest difference? One of the biggest differences was explaining to the political environment how the operation would unfold. It would be heavily destructive, but you're taking these steps to follow, like you said, proportionality, which doesn't say you have to — it's not quantitative. You have to take all reasonable, feasible steps to limit collateral damage. We're living in a world right now where some groups are trying to convince governments that the correct number of collateral damage or civilian casualties in an urban fight is zero.
Mike Kelly 17:48 ↗
Yes.

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APA

Spencer, J. (2026, January 1). The Reality of Urban Warfare: Maj John Spencer Part 1 | Ep039 Frontlines & Faultlines [Interview transcript]. Frontlines & Faultlines. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140398/

MLA

John Spencer. "The Reality of Urban Warfare: Maj John Spencer Part 1 | Ep039 Frontlines & Faultlines." Frontlines & Faultlines, 1 Jan. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140398/.

BibTeX
@misc{spencer2026_3140398,
  author       = {John Spencer},
  title        = {The Reality of Urban Warfare: Maj John Spencer Part 1 | Ep039 Frontlines \& Faultlines},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Frontlines \& Faultlines. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {jan},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140398/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}