My guest today is John Spencer. Today, John and I talk about the evolution of urban warfare in Ukraine. Okay, let's go.
Conflict, politics, military industrial complex, technology, war, the Flash Traffic Podcast.
Okay. Yeah, last time it was great. Um, how you been?
Good, you know, busy, busy, like all of us. But the travel schedule hasn't gotten any lighter.
Yeah. Last time I saw you was on a plane to — you were going to Europe. I think we were both going to Germany and then we're going to our separate ways. But yeah, I just saw you on the plane when I was loading.
Yeah. I think you were headed to Ukraine. I was headed to Azerbaijan.
Yep. What a small world. Small little plane from Denver. I think that's right, this is the hub.
Yes. Um, you must be really busy now with the Middle East stuff. Everybody wants to talk to you about Israel or something about the Middle East.
Yeah, it's — I mean, on top of keeping track of current events, as you know, research. So we just finished that book on Azerbaijan, Armenia. So we did six trips to Azerbaijan, one to Armenia, but the book's done, going into peer review now. But yeah, keeping current on all things Middle East is another project.
Yeah, there's probably like six or seven little tiny wars erupting right now because people are being opportunist. I think I read somewhere where Azerbaijan is — it might have been, yeah, Azerbaijan was starting a little tiny war on the border there. Um, I think that was yesterday, but...
They got attacked by Iran. Nakhchivan, which is one of their — it's an Azerbaijani territory, was attacked by Iran. So the president said there will be accountability for it. And having been on that border, I mean, it's literally a river that separates the two, and you drive on the road and you can see it. I think it was a mistake. Um, but yeah, so they got drawn into the war by Iran.
Yeah. Um, somebody was making the analogy that, um, yeah, Iran is getting picked on at the bar, uh, so you start a fight with everybody in the bar. I can't remember who said that.
It was Jon Stewart. He said, 'Yeah, that's right.' I loved it, and I agree with this. I've been in a bunch of bar fights, and I think the worst strategy is, um, to start slapping everybody around you to have more people hitting you.
Yeah. Yeah. It's terrible. Like, it's just terrible. But, um, yeah, uh, I don't know. Have you been — did you watch the thing about, uh, the video footage of the school, uh, that apparently the United States or Israel bombed the school in Hormuz, right on the coast of the Strait of Hormuz, apparently killed 165 roughly students?
I've seen the — I saw the CNN reporting basically saying that the US did it. Um, it's still an open investigation. There's no public statement on it whether it was what happened. Um, the vicinity there means there's some part of the article about vicinity to the IRGC headquarters inside of a compound, all these things. But as you and I know, first report's always wrong. I'll wait for the investigation and official report. But I definitely saw the CNN report, and of course Iran is trying to capitalize on it. Um, I'm not saying mistakes don't happen, didn't happen, but I'll wait to the public statements and investigation.
Yeah. And it is just like Iran to blow it out of proportion. If a couple of people die, then, you know, that's a couple hundred people died. You know, we'll never know the truth, uh, probably. Um, but it definitely looks like a significant event. So, we'll see.
Yeah, we'll see. Um, but yeah, I just got back, as I told you, we talked about it a little bit before, I just got back from Ukraine, uh, probably two and a half weeks now. I was in Kherson, uh, and Mykolaiv. Uh, I've been going to — for the last three research trips, this was my ninth research trip since the beginning of the war. Uh, the last three I've been going in the south. Uh, I've been, uh, hanging out with the Marines over the summer, uh, some artillery guys last time. This time I was in Kherson for the second time, uh, since the summer. Uh, it's a different environment than the north and then the Donbas and even Zaporizhia, which is just north of Kherson. Uh, it's a different kind of theater of war. They're doing things differently. But like all the cities in Ukraine, they were under — you know, they're under air raid attack constantly.
My first — I'll tell you the story about, uh, Shahed drones because it's in the news right now a lot because we're trying to figure out how can we protect our assets from slow-moving Shahed one-way drones. But the first morning I woke up in Mykolaiv, which is a city between Odesa and Kherson on the Black Sea, and I woke up to the sounds of explosions and machine gun fire because we were fairly close to a strategic asset in the city that the Russians were trying to blow up with Shahed drones. And the curious thing was there was no — it was a treva, which is the air alert, but there was no alert because it's going on so frequently now, the Shahed attacks, that sometimes they don't even sound the air alert, uh, unless it's cruise missile or ballistic missile attacks, because there's so much Shahed activity occasionally they don't even sound the alarm. But this thing, uh, woke me up. And definitely obviously not the first time I've been in an air raid. Not the first time I've been around Shaheds really closely. When I was in Sumy, I had two of them circling overhead the first time I was in Sumy. So I was familiar with the whole situation.
But this one was a little bit different because they were coming in at like 30-minute intervals, the Shaheds, instead of swarming. Apparently, Zelensky, under pressure from his base or the people in general because the Russians are attacking the energy infrastructure, now Zelensky ordered the PPO, which is their air defense guys, he ordered them to now concentrate defense on these energy infrastructure things instead of protecting cities in general. So the weird thing is when these Shaheds come in, something I'd never heard in Ukraine during an air attack, instead of one source of, uh, machine gun fire, usually a GARD or a 50 cal technical, I heard three going off all at once. So Ukraine has now concentrated their air defenses to protect these energy infrastructure sites. And so I heard what I believed to be a 50 cal, a Gepard, and maybe a ZSU 23-millimeter air defense gun all going off at the same time. And you can tell they're different. You know, 50 cal is boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. And then a GARD's like... and then the ZSU is like... you know, and then, you know, in the background there's always that of the Shaheds. Um...
That's a great, uh, great audio representation.
That's audio of an air attack, a drone air attack in Ukraine. But, um, yeah, these things were — we were on the ninth floor, which is the top floor of a Soviet apartment building, pretty close to where they were attacking, maybe two miles away from where they're actually trying to get at. And we were right in the flight path, and these drones kept going over, the Shaheds kept going over, and every time I'd hear it off in the distance I'd rush to the window and I would try to get a video of the Shahed. And after about two hours of that I was just tired and I stopped doing it. And as soon as I went back into my bunk, uh, lied back down, then one went straight over us, right over the window, and I probably could have hit it with a rock, and, uh, I didn't get a video of it. But, um, you know, you probably shouldn't be looking out the window, uh, during an air attack, but you listen for Shaheds.
Another sound. If you've watched videos of Shaheds when they attack, uh, they go — because they go into a dive-bomb mode when they go into their final descent. So you listen for that if you're lucky. And you're supposed to get two walls between you and the Shahed. Um, but I don't know if that's a good TTP. Uh, but I was trying to get a video of the Shaheds flying around, and most of the time I could hear them explode maybe two miles away. You can hear them boom, boom. Uh, but one came in really close, shook the whole building, and you could feel the blast wave come through the apartment. I was like, 'Oh, that must have been 400 meters away.' It was really close. Uh, there was no targets. It might have been just an, you know, errant, uh, guidance issue with those things. It's hard to tell because some Shaheds — I think the majority of Shaheds now are still guided by GLONASS GPS and, uh, their LTE phone system. Uh, but now we're seeing more, uh, real-time guidance either through a mesh network or — prior to about two weeks ago, uh, Starlink was starting to become prevalent on the Shaheds. You could see Shaheds with those little Starlink, uh, receivers on top. Obviously after Elon shut that down a couple weeks ago, uh, I don't think we're going to be seeing much of those. But the problem with real-time, even a mesh — uh, sorry, a mesh network of the Shaheds, is it allows them to attack moving targets, and that's why we've seen them start to attack the, uh, train system in Ukraine, which is disturbing for people like me who enjoy taking the train. You know, I fall asleep in Lviv and I wake up in Kyiv. It's awesome. I mean, the train system has been...
Yeah, it's, you know, it's one of the miracles of this war is how you can take a train across a country that's wider than Texas, you know, and...
It seems to be, Tony, and I know this is hard with, you know, two war podcasters walking to a bar. Um, there seems to be two really simultaneous wars going on. This technological competition war involving the drones, and of course there's the long-range strikes and the missile, um, AI-enabled targeting. But even this evolution that you're talking about — of course drones, but even the Shahed — I called it a different name when I first started talking about it because I couldn't say it. Um, I won't say it on your podcast, I can't say it on my podcast either. But, um, and in the evolutions of — because I remember when they first hit, and you talked about machine guns being used because they are really slow, like a moped motor, really loud, and if you are ahead of it you can shoot them down by putting lead in front of them. Um, but that has continued to evolve as you're talking about, and that's just crazy.
Um, and Mykolaiv — and I bring it to another theater. Of course these are greatly expanded. They started in Iran, transferred to Russia. Russia is adapting them. Iran is currently deploying them during the battle. Then we find out that the Americans took the Shahed, re-engineered it, and then sent them back at Iran, um, part of this war. Uh, so I think they're a staple, but they both have vulnerabilities, and, um, they are evolving rapidly. Like, um, even you said, like, to do a moving target — before I thought you couldn't. I mean, they were just straight, one way, one path from, you know, from whatever they were launched from to the target they hit.
Yeah. I mean, it's anything in war, it's a technological back and forth. The difference with this war, and now the Iran war might be, depending on how long that goes on, is just the rate of change is so much quicker now. It's the rate of adaptation is just outrageously fast. Uh, the technological cycle for an FPV drone, for example, is about three weeks, uh, you know, to obsolescence, to where, uh, they get FPV drones in from the government, let's say, and they're already obsolete technologically, so they have to just basically cannibalize those drones for parts and try to make them useful. But yeah, I guess there is sort of a dichotomy in this war, and it's been like that since after Bakhmut, is where this is — at the same time it's a very technological war, very high-tech in terms of commercial technology, uh, but also I guess you could say, you know, you consider things like HIMARS and advanced radars on the F-16s, stuff like that, uh, it's a conventional technological war as well. But from a commercial standpoint, um, we have reached that point where, uh, commercial technology is enabling military attacks, and we've never seen anything like that. We've never seen — we've passed a computing power slash propeller magnet threshold in FPVs, for example. And yeah, it's a technological war. And on the other side of it, a lot of it is really basic. A lot of it is concertina wire, trenches, um, you know, machine guns to counter Shaheds. And yes, now they're using Stinger and Octopus drones that are like these...
I'd love to hear more about that.
Yeah, I'm not really familiar with that because, I mean, the last time when I was in Kyiv and I was with the PPO and they were doing, uh, anti-Shahed operations and I was out in the field with them, uh, that was before they started using the Stinger drones. But I know a little bit about it, just like you do, just from reading about it. At $3,000, uh, they're small, kind of FPV, look like little rocket quadcopter drones, uh, that go up. Now the fastest one now, uh, the top speed of that type of drone is now over 400 miles an hour. So it's, uh...
And designed to do just air-to-air combat against these things, right?
Yeah. Just designed to hit something moving in the air. That's it. Uh, it doesn't have a lot of range, obviously. Uh, but you know, the strength with the Ukrainians is their distributed air defense picture that allows hundreds and hundreds of groups to go out with their technicals and their small drones like these Stinger drones and just interdict these Shaheds because they can see them coming from way off. They have acoustic sensors. They have radar sensors. They have other sensors that pick these up. And then those flight paths are distributed to everybody in Ukraine, and they can just see it: 'Here it comes. Let's get out and shoot it down with a machine gun.' Uh, and that's — uh, I talked about it on my podcast a couple of days ago with a guy that was in Jordan, uh, doing air defense right after Tower 22, and he said, 'Look, every US base in the Middle East, uh, has a different way of doing air defense, and it's not a best-practice type thing.' And that's why we see, you know, it's really popular in the news this week that, yeah, Ukrainians are sending advisors to the Middle East to help the US out.
Okay, that's great. That plays well in the news, but, uh, how many advisers? What equipment? What are they actually going to do? Because I think the long pole in the tent is that distributed intelligence picture that is not at IC level, you know, for the US. It's not a high-level IC, intelligence community, satellite, radar, giant radars. It's small acoustic networks. It's small radar networks that are all distributed. So, uh, it takes time to develop those, uh, TTPs and those, uh, networks in theater.
I'm sure if you're a neighbor, um, a neighbor of Iran, that might help you. Said country, um, maybe that's where the advisers are going to as well, some of the different countries that would welcome, um, advancing their integrated air defense. Saudi Arabia seems to be doing pretty well, but some of the other countries, not so much. Well, the interesting thing about Saudi Arabia is, uh, you know, they had that oil field attack that used not Shahed but pre-Shahed drones. Um, and that was — I'm trying to think, 2019, uh, when Iran and maybe the Houthis attacked that oil field. Uh, really they, uh, stopped about half of Saudi's oil production. Uh, and those weren't Shaheds, but they were like pre-Shahed drones. And then we see it again now. Uh, so it doesn't seem like maybe Saudi Arabia is too reliant on larger air defense systems for counter-ballistic missiles like the Patriot, and has not done well in developing small, uh, commercial, uh, you know, systems or networks to defeat the small drones.
Yeah. So, are we — you know, I'm the urban guy. Um, and there are these two wars, right? The technological war and then the static attritional ground war. Um, and I know we talked about — I'd love to talk to you about what you've seen over your visits relating to the urban nature of that, because for me all roads lead to urban. Well, I know the battlefield for Ukraine is on the road. I mean, their logistical hubs, you know, uh, Kherson and the river, which reminds me of like all of the major battles of warfare history, whether it's the Volga River, whether it's the Dnipro, whether it's, you know, even the Battle of... which is in the news lately, how important that is in the river fight and everything.
Yeah, we can. Yeah, let's talk about the river fight because it's an interesting thing that's going on in Kherson specifically. But you're right. Uh, cities are important, as you know, most people live in cities. Yeah, they're decisive. Capitals are in cities. Um, and most cities have a river because that's where cities are developed, at the mouths or sides of rivers. So cities with rivers and urban warfare has to take into account these rivers. Uh, you're right, there's tons of historical examples. Budapest has, uh, the Danube, I think, right there. So the Soviets had to cross that to take over Budapest. Uh, Fallujah more recently. Fallujah has a river. Uh, I think we were controlling bridges. I mean, that was decisive. I just did my last podcast, it's the 2003 Battle of Baghdad and how critical, once they passed through the Karbala gap, the objective to seize, um, the one river over the Euphrates that was vital, uh, vital to the operation. And they actually blew it — so the Iraqis blew it, but half of the lanes were open, so they were still able to pass tanks over it, but it could have been like a complete — the history would have been rewritten had that bridge fallen.
Yeah, and you know from studying military history, uh, you know how hard it is to destroy a bridge. Like, until we got laser-guided bombs, we couldn't even hit bridges from the air, right? You had to send in a bunch of sappers with cutting charges to blow up the pillars. And even then, you know, 'Bridge over the River Kwai' type scenarios, uh, even then it's hard because you can hit it. You can hit it with a cluster bomb, right? Still going to be holes. There's going to be holes in that bridge. But okay, we just drive around them. You know, you go real slow, but you can still get a tank across.
That's really from my — you know, all that work, the four trips I did in the east, I was so impressed, like, how do you drop all these bridges so rapidly and so effectively? Nobody knows. But it's one thing if it's pre-positioned explosives. Like, that's a different thing. If you're ready to do...
The defender, if you're the defender. Yeah.
Right. If you're ready, you can take out a bridge. But if you're trying to do it from the air, or you're trying to assault a bridge, or do cluster bombs, I mean, just what a pain in the butt. It's not like you can use FPV drones to take out a bridge.
That's not going to — there's a really important bridge in Ukraine that they keep attacking, and the Russians still keep repairing it, right?
Yeah. Yeah. There's tons of bridges. I mean, we tried that near Sudzha. There were like five bridges in Kursk that the Ukrainians tried to isolate the Russians out of the Sudzha area. Uh, they just couldn't do it. They kept cluster bombing them. Uh, it wasn't completely successful. It's just a hard thing. But, uh, Kherson — so let's talk about Kherson because I just got back from there, and I think other than, uh, you know, a city with a river, uh, this is a pretty unique situation. Um, let me pull up a map real quick. I think I have a map, a DeepState map, and I'll just show that and we can try and...
Not that you're a member of the deep state, but the actual...
No, the DeepState Ukraine map. Okay. So here's — Kherson is in the Kherson oblast, and it is in the southeast of Ukraine, right near Crimea, and it's on the Black Sea. And the Russians had taken over the city, uh, in 2022, and they were moving towards Mykolaiv, and they almost got to the outskirts of Mykolaiv, and then they were pushed back in the counteroffensive, and the city was liberated. And the Antonovsky Bridge, which is the main bridge across the Dnipro River, uh, was blown up by the Russians as they did retrograde operations out of the city.
They blew that too, right? That was a big deal. They blew the dam too, that caused a big...
They did, the Nova Kakhovka dam eventually. They blew that, uh, which caused a big floodplain, and because they were worried that the Ukrainians were going to counterattack. And they did try to counterattack in 2023, but it was unsuccessful for a lot of reasons. Uh, we can talk about that some other time. But, um, so what we have, the situation is you have this large city which still has a population of like 100,000 people still live in the city, and right across the river — I was probably 400, maybe 500 meters away from where the Russian lines were, uh, this last trip, a couple weeks ago. Uh, and that's the same for everybody that lives in the city. I mean, they're really close. So it's very unique that the Russians are this close. The Ukrainians cannot go anywhere because they don't have the means, they don't have the resources to leave. So there's a huge population in this city. And the Russians are bombing Kherson daily with everything they got. They use FAB-500 glide bombs, these huge glide bombs that come in and take out half an apartment building. Uh, they're sending artillery, 152-millimeter artillery, uh, over the river, just hitting random targets. This is all wanton destruction. This is just complete random, uh, killing the civilians. There's no military significance here, uh, for the Russians. They're not trying to soften military defenses. Uh, they're basically just killing civilians. Uh, they're sending drones, FPV drones and Mavic drones with grenades, uh, all the time. It's been reported that they use it as a training ground, and they call it the 'human safari,' where they just fly these drones over and try to kill civilians. Uh, this summer when I was in Kherson the first time, uh, I was in basically a billiards parlor having coffee with a guy who was walking his dog one day, uh, and a grenade just fell out of the sky, a Russian grenade, and took his leg off, and he was like an 80-year-old guy walking his dog.
Uh, yeah, it's tragic. Um, I was, uh, this time I sat down with the provincial military governor, I guess, for lack of a better term, the governor of the oblast, uh, the military region. He said that about four to five people a day were being — civilians were being killed in Kherson. That's the rate. Um, it's tragic. And there's children there. Children can't go outside to play, obviously. I was in a — I call it a bunker, but it was actually a basement of an apartment building that they had changed to be a playground basically for children indoors. So there was trampolines and other gymnastics equipment. There was a table where people were doing crafts, kids were doing crafts. Uh, and I was sitting there, and it's all on generator power. Um, and the artillery is going off in the background, kind of just subtly shaking the building, you know how artillery does. And I'm just thinking, this has got to be — for a child, this has got to be about the worst way to grow up. Uh, next to literally being in a concentration camp, this is probably the second worst way to grow up as a child. Uh, just absolutely tragic.
Uh, but the military situation there I think is unique. Not like — like we talked about, every city under siege probably has a river, any large city. So it's not unique in the geography, but I think what is unique is that because of ubiquitous drone ISR and drone warfare, amphibious assaults on the city is not an option for the Russians. If they could muster enough — uh, they don't have any viable amphibious assault landing craft anymore, I think, in the Black Sea. If they do, they've moved them all the way to the east, uh, coast of the Black Sea. Um, but I don't think it's possible for them to mount an amphibious assault to take over the city again. Um, the Ukrainians, if you remember, a place called Krynky, uh, across from Kherson, the Ukrainians attempted — the Marines, I think the 36th and the 38th Marines, I think. I might have missed one of the brigades, but, um, they tried to get a beachhead across in 2023 and '24, uh, into the Russian territory, and that was not successful. That was pretty much just trying to survive at the end there. Uh, because of drone warfare, they can see everything. Everybody can see everything, and, uh, you can't do anything. You can't move, uh, without somebody seeing you and attacking you either with artillery or with a drone. So it's, uh, yeah, a unique situation.
Yeah, it's just like a lot of the front. It's just a stalemate. Um, yeah, the one interesting thing about Kherson when I was there was, in the summer there was no drone nets, and then I come back a couple weeks ago and there is a 10-kilometer drone tunnel inside, um, going into the city. Uh, it's four lanes wide and it's about 15 feet tall, and, uh, it covers the sides too. Uh, so they have created drone tunnels. Um, when I was first in Kherson this summer, the only place that I knew of drone tunnels was in Pivdenny. It just started them.
And tunnels, Tony, you mean basically a net? Um, you know, 360 net over the road so you can drive on the road and not worry about getting hit.
Yeah, I'll just show you this video. Um, I did not take this video. It was just from Twitter, but, um, yeah, it's just a drone tunnel. So, actual net. Yeah, they put these large posts. Sometimes they're just sticks, and they're supposed to catch the drones.
Um, yeah, the FPV and maybe grenades. Uh, but they don't do very well against grenades, depending on the density of the actual plastic net. Uh, inside the city as well, there is a net ceiling that's not a tunnel per se, but it's a ceiling that goes through the downtown of Kherson, the center of the city. Uh, and that, uh, does an okay job. It gave me a sense of, uh, security. It might have been false security. Uh, but, uh, yeah, it doesn't do great at catching the grenades because, you know, they're dense and they'll go right through. But it does catch the FPV drones. And in fact, we were, um, we were right by downtown in Kherson where the road starts sinking down into the river. So there's kind of a — you can stand on the main road, and as you go towards the Antonovsky Bridge, the road starts to angle, incline down, and you know you're going towards the river, and that's when, uh, you know, it kind of gets hairy because there's a line of sight for any kind of snipers to shoot on that road. Uh, but I was right at the top of that road, and we had just interviewed a drone battalion commander, and I left — it was a pizza restaurant — and I stepped outside to walk into the car, and a Russian FPV drone flew right over my head, and it was carrying — I couldn't tell — it was carrying some kind of, like, looked like a satchel charge thing. It wasn't like an RPG round, but it just kept going. And that was the closest, uh, closest I had been to a Russian FPV drone. Uh, and I don't want to be any closer than that ever again. So...
It's a lot closer than I ever have or want to be. You mentioned the underground playground. Um, what else have you seen? As you know, I study urban, but I also do the underground. And we've talked — you've passed messages about that, you know, the gas pipe infiltration and things like that.
So I mentioned this before, and, uh, maybe not with you, but I was in Sudzha in Russia with the Ukrainians, and there is a gas pumping station.
Wait, wait, not many people can say that. I can't even say that. I was in Russia with the Ukrainians.
Well, I don't publicize it much. But yes, I was in Russia with the Ukrainians in Sudzha, and there's a large natural gas pumping station there. And so obviously there's big pipes, and one of the things the Russians did when they started their counter assault on the Ukrainians in Kursk is they sent a bunch of guys through these natural gas pipelines, and apparently they did not send them with the proper protective equipment. They just sent them in. The Russians seem really big on assaulting through any underground systems, especially pipelines.
They did it, they did it in Sudzha in the initial counter assault, and I think some of those guys just died like from exposure because there must be some nasty stuff. I don't know what liquefied natural gas is composed of or what kind of chemicals are in there, but they're just walking through there. There's videos that the guys took inside the tunnel.
You know, if they do survive the initial assault, when they pop out of there, you know, they're going to die of something eventually. It's nasty. And then I believe in Avdiivka they used a pipeline, like a sewage pipeline, to get behind Ukrainian lines at the, what was it, the silt plant or the, you know, I can't remember the exact name of that byproduct of steel making, but they got behind the Ukrainians. Then there's a recent video I think I just sent you of another pipeline, but the Ukrainians were all over that. They saw them going in, and yeah, they saw them coming out on thermal, and they just sent Mavics or Vampire drones and dropped a bunch of grenades and killed them all, because they were just on thermal. I mean, they were showing up like it was daylight.
You got to appreciate the naming of these things. I like the Baba Yaga.
Yeah, that's what the Russians call it.
I think the most popular one that the Ukrainians call it the Vampire, but yeah, it's pretty much the same thing. Urban warfare, I think as much as it's stayed the same, I think the introduction of the ISR component into it, if I had to say one thing that was most significant that has changed during this war, is just the ubiquitous ISR. They're surveying everything all the time. If it's not with drones, it's with these, I would say, very expensive, thousand, maybe tens of thousands of dollar Chinese high-powered, high-res cameras that they put on smoke stacks. And some of these can look out. One Ukrainian communications officer told me that they look out 30 kilometers with 1080p resolution. So if it's not drones, if it's not the, you know, the Shahed-type surveillance drones flying long, loitering out there, they can see you with these cameras. It's very hard to move.