CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
John Spencer
Executive Director, Urban Warfare Institute; Chair of Urban Warfare Studies, Modern War Institute at West Point, Urban Warfare Institute

Lessons In Urban Warfare, From Syria to Taiwan | John Spencer

📅 Dec 16, 2024 Dan Crenshaw 62 MIN 3016 VIEWS 119 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
John Spencer is the Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point. He joined Rep. Crenshaw to explore the historical evolution of urban combat and analyze modern strategies for conquering and defending cities. John discusses how urban warfare is playing out in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Ukraine. And he envisions the most likely scenarios for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, along with potential U.S.-Mexico counterinsurgency efforts against the cartels. • The evolution of urban warfare • Regime change and chaos in Syria • Why willpower often trumps raw numbers • Hezbolla...

Questions asked in this interview

12
  1. 4:51... maneuver warfare, maybe the historical — if you're giving somebody a quick intro to Urban Warfare 101, like how do you talk to somebody about the history and progression of warfare over time and into what we study now in urban warfare?
  2. 8:56I mean, this was kind of a lightning blitz of an operation by, what is it, HTS?
  3. 12:12And now how does that translate into fighters on the ground?
  4. 15:43Can we explain what those are about? What are we striking exactly?
  5. 20:34... of that old time, and how they justified such a — what I view in hindsight is such a strange way to do warfare, if the goal is to, you know, sustain as much of your own soldiers' lives as possible and kill as many of the enemy as possible?
  6. 30:37... in an urban area — you know, it's a big bomb, it's a small, compacted area with a lot of buildings and civilian infrastructure around it — you argue that a ban on such weapons would lead eventually to more destruction. So how so?
  7. 40:43Why do you call it the vampire fallacy?
  8. 41:58Um, that's, you know, that's when people ask like, why does this matter?
  9. 48:15so they have the idea, like, are they doing anything?
  10. 51:47Um, how much have you looked at Mexico?
  11. 54:37And now we have all of these groups again, because why?
  12. 1:00:20Anything we didn't, anything we missed?
Dan Kinsaw 0:00 ↗
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created... As a member of Congress, I get to have a lot of really interesting people in the office, experts on what they're talking about. This is the podcast for insights into the issues: China, bioterrorism, Medicare for All — in-depth discussions, breaking it down into simple terms. We hold, we hold, we hold these truths. We hold these truths with Dan Kinsaw.
Has landed. Should be no secret: war has changed. Every single war is different. We learn different lessons, there's different tactics, there's different methods of killing one another — that's obvious. The one constant is there's some level of destruction, and you see this across the history of the world, from Crusaders in the Middle East to the trenches and blast craters along with World War I's Western Front, to damage and broken schools and apartment blocks in Ukrainian cities.
Contemporary warfare has been unique in that maybe it's diversified way more than in the past. We have jungle warfare in Colombia, we have forests like the Ardennes, we have islands of Iwo Jima and the jungles of Vietnam, and of course urban warfare environments like Fallujah, Marjah, Mosul, Baghdad, and of course, you know, where I was blown up in the more rural farm areas of Afghanistan, where urban warfare wasn't really a thing for anyone who is familiar with the Afghan war.
And urban warfare is what we're going to talk about today, and the shift toward that in recent history. How defenders, usually insurgents, use civilian populations to hide from attackers, using civilians as shields — inadvertently, on purpose, or not. And of course that's the case with Israel's war in Gaza, where Hamas hides among, behind, and under civilians, forcing Israel to take the risk of killing civilians to achieve their military objectives, or just letting them go.
That's the difficult situation Israel continues to find itself in, and of course Hamas takes advantage of that with its complicit global media and activists throughout the world. They've been doing this not just since the October 7th atrocity, but long before then as well. We've actually had this conversation with our guest today, John Spencer, back in August, and then my computer was wiped, so we had to re-record it.
John's a guy who can really speak to this. He's done a lot of interesting research on this. He's the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, co-director of MWI's Urban Warfare Project, host of the Urban Warfare Project podcast, and served for 25 years as an infantry soldier, including two combat tours in Iraq. Author of the Mini Manual for the Urban Defender, Connected: Soldiers' Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War, and co-author of Understanding Urban Warfare. He's on X at @SpencerGuard. So John, thanks for being on.
John Spencer 2:53 ↗
Dan, thanks for having me. And I don't mind the retraining and doing it twice.
Dan Kinsaw 3:00 ↗
Yeah, yeah, it's good. Yeah, yeah, you just train, you train harder and better. You know, I had to do Hell Week twice, so I wish I could have done it a third time.
John Spencer 3:08 ↗
Three times, right?
Dan Kinsaw 3:11 ↗
That might not be the only, like, brain fart of a word salad that I give today, because I've been sick for like two weeks, so here we go. Let's start more general. We'll obviously get into some specifics on Gaza. This was a bit more of an obvious subject at the time when we recorded this in August. It's died off a little since then, but urban warfare isn't going anywhere. It continues to be a hallmark of Ukraine, although we can talk about how it's shifted to more of like a trench warfare in Ukraine, but they definitely had their share of some serious urban combat in certain times in the war.
There's of course the American experience with urban warfare in Iraq, especially, and I think we've, you know, our TTPs — sorry for that, that's just military language for people, but tactics, techniques, and procedures — what does that actually stand for? I think that's basically what it... our TTPs changed a lot, you know, from the beginning of that war, and you can see in our training and how the lessons we learned. And you know, we didn't have entire cities built as training structures throughout the US back then the way we do now.
I mean, now they're everywhere. Now it's like we have entire towns that we've created because we know how badly we need to train for urban warfare. We built all that in the last 20 years. It was not something our military had a great grasp on before that, and a lot of amazing tactics have come out of that — hopefully ones we don't forget over time, like we did say. I think we forgot about a lot of tactics that we gained over Vietnam and the lessons there, but didn't write them down so well.
But maybe taking a long step back from that, I mean, talking about traditional military Western maneuver warfare, maybe the historical — if you're giving somebody a quick intro to Urban Warfare 101, like how do you talk to somebody about the history and progression of warfare over time and into what we study now in urban warfare?
John Spencer 5:15 ↗
Sure, I can do that. And I taught strategy at West Point, so if I have to dip into like the military theory of the greats, I will. I mean, the history of warfare is the history of urban warfare. If you think back to the Peloponnesian Wars, I mean, usually the city is the center of gravity, the political seat of power, the economic engine for whatever the nation is. Back to Athens and Sparta, you name it. If you talk about World War I, World War II, you know, all the major cities — you start to mention names of cities.
I mean, going back to Sun Tzu, I mean, he had four main strategies for defeating your enemy: number one, you know, defeat your enemy's strategy; number two, defeat his allies; three, defeat his military; and four, last resort, attack besieged cities. It's always been there in warfare, but we have a long history of fighting for cities, not in cities. But really in the modern era, that's, you know, really where my academic study of urban warfare started back in 2014 when I was in the Pentagon working for the Chief of Staff of the Army, who said, 'Go look at something I'm not looking at' — that the world rapidly urbanized.
We had an explosion of population growth in the world in general. It took us the entire history of humankind to get to three billion in 1960, and then from 1960 till now we've doubled that, and the projections are just continuing to double on how many people live on the Earth. But we also urbanized. In 1950 we only had 83 cities over a million; today we have over 600 cities of a million. Anywhere where there's fighting going on now, there's probably been fighting there before, but in a different kind — especially, we can talk about Ukraine.
The world is more urbanized. You're not going to get to those battles you want to have, or the city is the objective, and you don't have the military to fight these major fronts that people used to fight. So I have a lot of job security, is because for a whole list of reasons, for just where the Earth is urbanized. I mean, now we're over 50% urbanized; most of the developed nations are over 80% urbanized. It's hard to find somewhere that somebody's going to fight that isn't urban.
But we also have smaller militaries. Yes, they're more advanced and more capable, but that means that what they can do over different fronts, different areas of ground — doesn't matter where you're talking about in the world — is less. And like you mentioned, we also have the rise of, you know, non-state actors. In my wording, all warfare is asymmetric. So you have non-state actors, especially if we talk about the Middle East, but in other places, that pull militaries into urban areas so they can use all the advantages of power — political and military power.
Even guerrillas. Guerrillas used to have the advantage in the jungles and the woods, where they could have bases hidden from the militaries. Now, you know, starting in the modern era, they can move into cities and have the advantage of concealed, covered positions. All of this has really led us to where today, where we see anywhere you look — I mean, Syria, Ukraine, Gaza, even in southern Lebanon — it's about the urban areas, because that's where the enemy is. If you want to either remove his will to fight or take what he values, you have to be prepared to enter the urban areas where most militaries don't want to go.
Dan Kinsaw 8:56 ↗
Maybe we should bring up Syria. I mean, the last week or so, the situation in Syria has drastically changed, and you know, I don't — I'm still waiting for a good briefing on that, so this is pretty fresh. I'm not sure we saw it coming. If we did, it wasn't really — it wasn't highlighted to us in Congress. So do you want to take a stab at that real quick, and how this applies to urban warfare? I mean, this was kind of a lightning blitz of an operation by, what is it, HTS?
John Spencer 9:30 ↗
HTS, yeah, whatever the heck they are. Sort of a rebranded Sunni opposition group, I guess is the only way I can describe it — a rebranded Sunni opposition group to Assad in Syria, and took him out. He's in Moscow now. It happened very, very quickly.
Dan Kinsaw 9:47 ↗
Was this even because — I mean, obviously there's elements of urban warfare here. The taking these cities in Syria — Homs and Aleppo and things — these are critical from just a basic geopolitical perspective of taking control, but they did it really quick. Not even sure how much fighting there really was. How much information do you have on this?
John Spencer 10:08 ↗
Sure, I've been tracking it. It's kind of my — you know, I work for the Modern War Institute at West Point, so our job is to track modern war. So nobody saw it coming, because, you know, understanding the power structure that was Assad, where he maintained power, where he did not — you know, there's, you know, six different military factions that were opposing him at that time. HTS, you know, being one of the bigger ones, who made this rapid attack, which it wouldn't have done had there not been this opening created by the war in the Middle East.
So Hezbollah, you know, the backers of Assad in his urban areas, to include in maintaining power — again, where the urban areas come into play is that he held strength in Damascus and Homs and Idlib and Aleppo and all these, in some way backed by Russian air power, backed by Hezbollah fighters, backed by IRGC fighters. When all of that started to crumble because of Hezbollah's destruction by Israel in a matter of a month, the weakening of Russian capabilities because of its fight in Ukraine, it created an opening.
Which even I don't know if HTS — there's some, you know, involvement here of Turkey as well — thought it knew it could do it, but it did what I call an ISIS-style pickup truck raid into urban areas and didn't face any opposition. Yeah, some of that being, you know, again, this is about power. How could this happen? You know, Syria's military is massive, the Syrian military's capabilities. But I just published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal this week about it isn't always about numbers, it's about the will to fight.
So this group has a lot of will, and Syrian generals and leaders, based on this whole picture of power, decided not to really resist. And you saw city after city rapidly falling just by momentum, not really — like you said, there wasn't that much fighting going on, because one side had the will to resist, the other side didn't, for a whole list of reasons.
Dan Kinsaw 12:12 ↗
Yeah, the rug had kind of been taken out from under them over the course of a few months. And I guess I don't have a good sense of, you know, okay, so Hezbollah was decapitated in many ways by Israelis recently, and everybody remembers the pagers going off, then that kind of epic asymmetric warfare operation. And now how does that translate into fighters on the ground? I mean, I just don't have a clear understanding of how many Hezbollah fighters are literally manning posts in, you know, in Aleppo or Damascus.
Or is it more of just like a general sense of backup? I don't have a sense of like how much Russian aircraft has been diverted to Ukraine. I just don't know. Do you guys track any of that?
John Spencer 13:01 ↗
I don't know if there's any one individual that — I mean, there, you know, the Institute for the Study of War has a pretty good team on that. I, with my focus on urban warfare — although I was in southern Lebanon last week, actually, and one thing that's not there is Hezbollah fighters. So what I was tracking very deeply, and I actually sat down with the Prime Minister as well, how damaging the Israeli operation against Hezbollah was — not just a pager operation, but the complete erasing of the entire hierarchy of Hezbollah that you don't replace quickly.
80% of their missile supplies, lots of their terrain actually taken where their stockpiles — Hezbollah had basically arrayed their stockpiles in southern Lebanon, hidden in civilian homes and underground, ready for war against an invasion, but Israel seized that.
So the number of fighters — yeah, if you look at just the numbers, again going back to like it isn't just numbers — military capabilities, military combat power analysis that we do, it'll count your number of troops, it'll count your leadership, your training, your weapon supplies. Hezbollah had lost thousands of fighters in Syria, fighting for Assad against all these different groups that are competing against Assad, and it wasn't just HTS. You had, you know, SDF, the Free Syrian Army, you had the Kurds backed by us.
Hezbollah had lost a lot of fighters. So when it came time, Assad wasn't going to call Hezbollah, who had just been decimated — sheer numbers, but literally broken apart as a military, both in Beirut and southern Lebanon, and their supplies coming, which is really what Syria was for. Hezbollah was just a highway from the Islamic regime in Iran to them, and their rocket supplies and their money and everything. So it's almost a colossal fracturing of every element.
But one thing that Assad wasn't going to be able to do was to call for any reinforcements from Hezbollah, because they're so unorganized right now.
Dan Kinsaw 15:14 ↗
Yeah, I mean, there's a couple weeks there where somebody would say, 'I'm the new Hezbollah leader,' and then he would die in an airstrike, because they can't even assign a new guy. Yeah, I mean, it's pretty amazing how the chess pieces shed. And then, you know, I assume some Russian capabilities have had to be moved to Ukraine over time, and so they're just not patrolling the airspace as much as they can, and Iran can only do so much remotely. And then you have this situation.
And then, you know, immediately following that, you see reports of US airstrikes on multiple targets in Syria. Can we explain what those are about? What are we striking exactly?
John Spencer 15:56 ↗
So from what I can tell, it's striking either ISIS positions, because ISIS still exists — yeah, ISIS positions — but also the Israelis have released a very line-item list of what they've been destroying. So it's Syrian Army chemical weapon supplies or chemical supplies, things they don't want anybody to control, nobody to touch, or their SAM missiles and their complete missile arsenal, the naval arsenal.
So I think the US strikes have been really focused on ISIS capabilities and keeping certain capabilities out. But Israel just launched a 48-hour decimation campaign of about 60% of Syria's air capabilities, both their missile and rocket and airplane and all their supplies, just to prevent it from falling into — right, like you said, HTS, who, if they are the power that — because now you could have a Syrian civil war. It's kind of like ISIS getting onto a military weapons supply. Who knows what they would do with it.
Dan Kinsaw 17:01 ↗
Yeah, we're just — because we don't like Assad, but we're not really — HTS feels like a rebranded ISIS.
John Spencer 17:07 ↗
Absolutely. Although they worked with ISIS, it's Al-Qaeda 2.0.
Dan Kinsaw 17:13 ↗
I just saw right before we started talking — slightly more conventional ISIS. Yeah, yeah, they try to rename themselves, but they're like Sharia law and morality police already being implemented.
John Spencer 17:25 ↗
But all the strikes are really to take this military-grade supplies away from — I mean, we designated, the United States designated HTS as a terrorist organization, so we're taking weapons away from terrorists. Yeah, although they can, you know, self-determination all they want, but they shouldn't have chemical weapons.
Dan Kinsaw 17:41 ↗
Yeah, yeah, yeah, build them yourselves if you want to, you know, create an industrial base, and then we'll talk.
John Spencer 17:47 ↗
Yeah, they're a long ways off that. I think, Dan, from my research, what is interesting is that people think that the only way to take a city is to surround it and empty it of civilians and work your way block by block. No, the way you take a city is psychologically, with the overwhelming force, speed, and surprise, so that whoever is defending it believes that they don't have a chance.
Yeah, invasion of even Afghanistan — you talked about Afghanistan, you know, backing the Northern Alliance. You know, the special guys worked with the Northern Alliance to take cities rapidly, and the opposition folded away. There's a lot of airstrikes going on, but I've tried to push back against these ideas what people have about urban warfare, and that really came to a head in Gaza, and what people thought was possible in Gaza.
Dan Kinsaw 18:37 ↗
Yeah, what's interesting, just going back to again the broad historical analysis of this, interesting to think about warfare in the old days. You know, think about Napoleon invading countries in Europe, and it's this very gentlemanly type of warfare, you know, where we all line up and we agree on a place, and whoever wins, there'll be maybe something signed or some kind of handshake, and then you get to roll into the city as a conqueror. Doesn't always turn out that way. Maybe you just roll up to the city, and then the city defends itself.
Or, you know, Crusades-type warfare, that's, you know, they're very medieval, medieval castles and whatnot. But, you know, even in our own Revolution, when by all means, just as a tactician, we would be thinking you're going up against the superior British force — like, why the hell are you going to meet him on the battlefield? You know, you should be entirely working a sort of guerrilla warfare, insurgency type of operation against them to win.
And I, you know, I'm not an expert on the Revolution, but I think that happened to an extent, but for the most part it was very much traditional warfare. And how much do you study the psychology of that? Like, nobody just thinks to themselves, like, 'Guys, this is stupid, we should be doing more unconventional warfare tactics to nip at these guys.' You know, because as we left this era of sort of like the board game Risk, right, where it's like army versus army kind of confrontations, to like this one non-state actor confrontations, which sort of, you know, that's a totally different category, but it necessitates this.
But even in World War II, it wasn't like this army versus army on the battlefield type of war. It was very much a mix of urban warfare and Germans just falling back after holding a position, falling back after holding a position. That position could be a town. So there was a ton of urban warfare in World War II, and that's — and ever since then, I think it's been like that. We've completely gone away from the armies meeting armies on battlefields, Risk board game type of warfare, I guess.
I don't know if there's a question in there. I guess I'm trying to get at is like, did that just evolve naturally? How much do you study the psychology of generals and military leaders of that old time, and how they justified such a — what I view in hindsight is such a strange way to do warfare, if the goal is to, you know, sustain as much of your own soldiers' lives as possible and kill as many of the enemy as possible?
John Spencer 21:03 ↗
Absolutely, a lot. And that's really, again, when I worked in the Pentagon, our group was actually trying to get you to think separately, because I'm sure you've been to, especially at your level, giant war games where militaries imagine what the future of war will look like. And really what you just mentioned was what happened to me in the Ukraine war. You know, in February when Russia invaded Ukraine, I knew that they needed to take the capital city. If you want to take a country, you take the capital city. The drive to Baghdad, you know, Kabul — really the history of warfare.
If you can take the capital, it doesn't mean you've won, but you've definitely achieved your strategic goal, and you'll fight it if they want a counterinsurgency. I was sitting here in my home, having studied the history of urban warfare, and I wrote out some tweets that went viral on what I would do — John Spencer — in an urban area. You know, I know that we popularized Red Dawn, but this idea that war is just, you know, two militaries fighting each other is not the history of war. It's just not.
I mean, the people that live in those urban areas, those millions of people that live in there, they get a vote. So I started tweeting out what I would do, that went viral, it became a manual that Ukrainians translated rapidly, put up on their website for resisters, and they were slowing the Russians down. From their small military — I mean, 200,000 in an area, even in Kyiv, but let alone they attack seven cities — is a minimal force that assumes away the population.
Like, oh, the Ukrainian military is only 100,000 and they're all in the East, and it's — we'll see. This is where you got military generals, to include in the United States, saying now Ukraine will fall in 72 hours. I'm like, okay, how's that going to work out for this small Russian force that is also thinking narrowly on who is resistance, what do we need to do to achieve our goal? And you saw the Ukrainian people, really veterans and civilians, setting up roadblocks all over the place and slowing the Russians down.
They faced urban warfare at a level that most people don't think about.
Dan Kinsaw 23:14 ↗
Yeah, no, I heard about it when I went and visited. They had a very strong plan ahead of time for like this sort of civilian self-protection kind of unit — I don't know what they call it, but like militia.
John Spencer 23:29 ↗
It's militia. And they were handing out AK-47s and like — probably 25,000 AK-47s in the city of Kyiv in just one day.
Yeah, because people forget — my definition, I have to define people urban all the time. Urban is, you know, the buildings, but it's also the population and the infrastructure. And in Ukraine you saw it all. And I actually traveled there four times since the war just to study the Battle of Kyiv and a couple of the others, like Mariupol, Bakhmut, and others. But when militaries kind of wish away the urban terrain, it really goes badly for them.
Dan Kinsaw 24:07 ↗
No, that's interesting. And now going back to Gaza, let's hit that real quick, and then I want to ask about — and don't let me forget to ask about two maybe future wars that I think it might be interesting to think about. One is how Taiwan thinks about this in defense of Taiwan. I don't think we talked about that when we recorded this the first time. And also Mexico. I think we've got a lot of opportunity to think about the next year or two with the new Mexican administration, the Trump administration, and I think a growing sense that there's a common enemy in the cartels, and that it indeed operates like an insurgency operates.
I wonder if that's something you guys look at. But just to wrap up Gaza, and again, this was more of a topic when we did this in early August, but real quick: how does the situation in Gaza differ from so many others? How do these — again, the common theme, especially among kind of left-wing activists who don't like the way Israel is doing anything, is that, you know, they're just haphazardly killing civilians at every turn. What's some of the truth in there, and how Israel's actually been operating in Gaza?
John Spencer 25:21 ↗
Yeah, yeah, I've been really busy kind of pushing back on this, just objectively. Plus, I don't — you know, I'm a war researcher, so I go into war zones to study them on the ground, which I think we had a lack of, even globally, of criticizing the idea but nobody actually going there and watching them in operations. I wrote a lot of pieces in the beginning, one to recognize what the IDF faced in Gaza. No military had ever faced, literally, the history of urban warfare.
Like you said, you go to like Stalingrad and other battles where their militaries are meeting in the urban terrain, or even Kyiv, even others where, you know, the defenders had a very minimum amount of time. You know, First Battle of Fallujah, Second Battle of Fallujah, Ramadi — it isn't Gaza, where they actually built the cities for war and they spent 20 years preparing for war. I can't find any other similar case where a military is attacking an urban defender who is prepared for 20 years for that battle.
Yeah, 300 to 400 miles of underground tunnels, military purpose only. Plus, like you, the human shield strategy that ISIS and al-Qaeda and others did, but Hamas being the governing authority of this area for 15 years actually built that military infrastructure underneath the civilians to use them as human shields.
All this led — plus you had the hostages situation, which kind of hearkens back to the 1945 Battle of Manila, when we had hostages in Manila, and the United States went to the city to take it back, and it was one of the most destructive urban battles of definitely modern history. 100,000 civilians were killed during that operation, even though we were trying to save the city and not destroy it.
To criticize the IDF in this challenge that nobody's ever faced, but also doing everything that anybody's ever thought of to get civilians out of harm's way when they're trapped by their government, Hamas, and trapped by Egypt and others won't let them out. The IDF started evacuating the city, started dropping the pamphlets, started making phone calls, started restricting their use of force.
Did what most people think is the humane thing to do, which is encircle the city, empty it of all the civilians, give like weeks for the civilians to leave, and then start the operation, letting the enemy know you're coming and exactly where you're coming from. It's just been a really wild year of misinformation on all the experts who said that, well, Israel could have done it a different way.
General Mark Milley, love him, hate him, has said twice, like, if this would have happened to the United States, we would have done it differently. Absolutely, we would have used a lot more combat power to achieve the goal quickly, so the war doesn't protract into what we've seen. This misinformation campaign, social media algorithm-driven, or you had political leaders saying, you know, you could achieve your goals just use special forces and strategic bombing. No history to show that that would return hostages, remove an enemy power.
You know, the more appropriate analogies would be like the Japanese — that's how radicalized Hamas is, and the scale of this enemy. Most of those urban battles that I might mention to you — Ramadi, Fallujah, Marjah, all those — you're talking 3,000 defenders, 5,000 defenders. Hamas was a military of over 40,000, and they're not the only terrorist in Gaza. You had Palestinian Islamic Jihad, you had Lion's Den.
The realm of what people thought impossible in urban warfare, for me as a researcher, is really problematic because we, the international community, the evolution of warfare drove Hamas to build this world where under every school, every hospital — because those are protected objects — they really try to get their civilian population killed, and then they report numbers, which is not new either.
And then the world, to include Western political leaders, parrot the number being given by the terrorist government daily. Yeah, there's never been a war or a battle where you could ever know how many civilians are dying on a day-to-day basis to the single digit, and never will be. That's not — but you know, I also combat the law of war people on what the laws of war actually say, and they're very clear, and nowhere does it say that there's a number, well, if you've killed this many civilians, that means you're not following the laws. Like, no, it has nothing to do with it.
Unfortunately, war is hell, war is killing, war is death. But that isn't to mean that — the idea from my research on the ground with them in Gaza, walking literally with division commanders and others in the battle, that they're not doing everything anybody's ever imagined, and then created new ones to protect civilians when the enemy is trying to get its own population killed.
Dan Kinsaw 30:37 ↗
Yeah, you've also argued that despite the popular narrative that we should ban bombs and missiles and artillery and mortars in urban areas because it's destructive in an urban area — you know, it's a big bomb, it's a small, compacted area with a lot of buildings and civilian infrastructure around it — you argue that a ban on such weapons would lead eventually to more destruction. So how so?
John Spencer 31:06 ↗
Absolutely. And I argued — I knew where once that started hitting media, that 2,000-pound bomb kind of campaign, which really led to us withholding weapons to Israel. I knew that came because I had argued in front of the United Nations in Vienna, when this is called the Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas initiative, that became this idea of countries signing a basically a ban — they wanted it to be a ban originally, then they just said a restriction, as in US, Western, moral, law-abiding countries will agree not to use all bombs, missiles, or mortars in populated areas because of how destructive they are.
I argued through the history of urban warfare that you...
will drive war into populated areas because, like I wrote for Ukraine, I can teach you how to turn a single building into a weeks-long battle, if not months-long battle, like the famous one in Pavlov's house in Stalingrad, where this one hardcore non-commissioned officer and about 20 soldiers held a single building against division-level attacks for months. If you say that I know where the enemy is in that building but I can't drop a bomb on him, that I gotta put my soldiers at risk and try to get to the building even though I know where the enemy is — I have all the law of proportionality, discrimination, distinction, constant care, all that — but I still can't use this tool, you will drive... why wouldn't I, if I know you can't hit me, or if I put a tunnel under the ground? Because what does a 2,000-pound bomb do? It also penetrates the earth really good. If I build a bunker underneath a building and you can't touch me, I'll just build them. I'll create what Hamas created. It's so problematic. The idea that it actually leads to more civilian harm — this idea that if I just take these tools away from the military, that means they won't have their battles in the urban areas — like, that's crazy. You're going to drive war into urban areas. This is kind of a romantic idea of like, we'll just use special operations and do the special operations thing. Like, what? Yeah, that's not... that'd be nice. That's the article I published. We talked about it last time, but I actually published it this time in the Wall Street Journal. These fallacies, one of them being the Zero Dark Thirty fallacy, that your special forces can achieve all your war goals — they'll just ride in in the middle of the night, take out your enemy government for you, and then done. Yeah, it's like, yeah, just that — that wouldn't work. It's just a totally different situation, and it's not how it worked in the real urban battles, like in Fallujah, Battle of Ramadi. Like, there was obviously the use of special operations, but it was in conjunction with conventional forces as big blocking forces. You still need the big conventional operation, and you have, you know, maybe counter-sniper teams hold up as a special operation side of it, if there is a target to go after, maybe, but it's depending on a lot of factors, like can there be a block? Because it's more likely you end up like a Mogadishu, Black Hawk Down type of situation in a place like Gaza, because everyone just comes out of the woodworks all of a sudden. I don't care how good of a SEAL platoon you are, it just doesn't... that's not what we were expecting in the Osama bin Laden raid, and for good reason, like, you know, it's in Pakistan, so you can do that. But we're careful about how we assess when we can do that and when it doesn't make sense. And, you know, people just don't know, so they just kind of say things: 'use the special, do that thing, do the thing where they just go in and nobody sees it.' Oh, right, like Batman. You know what they never show in many Batman scenes is how the hell he got to, like, whatever the exit is. I always want to do like a parody video of Batman just kind of like walking around the streets of Gotham, just like he's not in the shadow. You can't be in the shadows the entire time. At some point you got to get in a cab or something. Like, what is he doing? Like Spider-Man just like going for the... what the hell? You know, it's like, no, at some point somebody's gonna be like, 'Is that Batman? Did I just see Batman?' Yeah, he's just... he just walked by. Like, what's he doing? It just doesn't work that way. You don't just show up. This is... which is problematic. I've gotten the same question about the pager operation, right, which was a historic intelligence operation with, you know, it's just historic. But like, well, if they can do that to Hezbollah, why can't they do that to Hamas? Like, well, let me tell you how intelligence operations work, and like human intelligence, signals intelligence, and do you think you have that in Gaza right now with this contested urban environment? Israel disengaged, wasn't there, it left in 2005, and yeah, it has signal intelligence, but there are limits to aerial and signal and all of that. If you think that they could do this and they did this destruction in Gaza on purpose, like, absolutely not. And this is, again, people run the numbers, like the lies, the damn lies, the statistics: 'well, this many dead.' Okay, where'd you get that number? 'Well, this many buildings destroyed.' Okay, in relation to what? To the enemy's defending every building. Every building is a bomb. Like, it gets really, for me, almost like anti-intellectual, just as an academic. Like, what are you saying? That you think that it could be a bloodless war? Or that, like, these bombs — you're actually saying that the next time an American soldier is fighting an urban battle, he can't use that tool that will save lives? Like, it's really problematic.
Dan Kinsaw 36:38 ↗
Um, along the lines of that problematic, fallacious thinking, you just published an op-ed, I think like a couple days ago, the one you were talking about.
John Spencer 36:48 ↗
Yeah, but the 'Stopping the Endless Wars Is Easier Said Than Done' — it's a good article. Something I talk about a lot. Like, if somebody's... I generally say, look, if the words out of your mouth are things like 'neocon' and 'warmonger' and 'stopping endless wars,' I'm probably not listening to you at this point, because you've jumped the train. Like, you're just reciting words and sound bites. You're not trying to analyze a situation.
Dan Kinsaw 37:15 ↗
And you write about how, you know, ending endless wars is easier said than done. What the [__] does that even mean? So maybe talk about some of the fallacies that you talk about in that op-ed. The Abacus fallacy — why is it called the Abacus fallacy? That probably requires some knowledge of military history.
John Spencer 37:32 ↗
No, no, I mean the Abacus fallacy — you know, the Chinese calculating machine where you move the thing. So I try to be creative on how to call a fallacy, but it's this thing that war is just numbers, right? Which has come about in the Russia-Ukraine war, where, well, they have more soldiers, they have more artillery, they have more tanks, and that just means that they should just, you know, Ukraine should just give up. Or with that line of thinking, we should have easily won in Afghanistan, right? We had the best military in the world and far outnumbering the Taliban. Like, this... it became in the last two... and we had the capital cities the entire time. I mean, there was never an urban warfare history for us in Afghanistan. You know, we were never fighting in Kabul or... and I'm forgetting the name of some of these, but Kandahar. It just wasn't a thing. These were always safer. It wasn't like Iraq. And it's also history shows us that nobody's ever been able to conquer the more rural regions of Afghanistan. That's one case. But yeah, so that's the Abacus fallacy.
Dan Kinsaw 38:42 ↗
Sorry to interrupt.
John Spencer 38:44 ↗
Yeah, no, I mean, but it's been in the last year too. I've just seen it so much where, you know, like investment bankers somehow are experts in war now say like, 'Look, Ukraine should just give up. It can't compete with the production of Russia.' Like, you have no understanding how war works. It is a contest of wills that has an international context, has a domestic context. It's been a really bad fallacy in the last couple years. But the same thing with the next one, which is the vampire fallacy, that you're going to win, you just need better technology, you need more fifth-generation fighters, and you need more this or that, and you'll have these quick wars that are easily achieved. It's a curse in the Western way of thinking, and it actually — Russia saw it when it tried to invade Ukraine. It thought it would end it quickly with this advanced capability. And all this again — wars are not just about technologies, weapons, the evolutions of warfare. It is about, you know, political goals, and can you achieve those political goals within that contest, and who has the stronger will to resist, to fight. And not just the will of the fighters, right? This will is... and I, you know, it's kind of funny for me as a researcher of war teaching at West Point to have Clausewitz, this dead Prussian, be in a mainstream op-ed, but I got it in there: that war is a contest of wills, not just between the two militaries fighting, but the political apparatuses of both sides and the domestic populations of those two groups that are fighting. And we see that internationally, right? This is why a TikTok video can have as much impact in a war as the actual fighters on the ground. And that's what Gaza was like — people just believe things that aren't happening, and that Israel is doing things like genocide, which is just wild.
Dan Kinsaw 40:43 ↗
Why do you call it the vampire fallacy?
John Spencer 40:45 ↗
Because it's hard to kill. So McMaster — I stole two of these from General McMaster, who wrote in 2014 about these, the vampire fallacies, because no matter what you do, you can't kill it. Even in the U.S. apparatus of national security, we just think that we can end wars quickly just with more, you know, advanced capabilities. And like, look, every war has its own lexicon, has its own language, has its own context. And hopefully we get to talk about Taiwan at the end of this.

37 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Spencer, J. (2024, December 16). Lessons In Urban Warfare, From Syria to Taiwan | John Spencer [Interview transcript]. Dan Crenshaw. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140406/

MLA

John Spencer. "Lessons In Urban Warfare, From Syria to Taiwan | John Spencer." Dan Crenshaw, 16 Dec. 2024. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140406/.

BibTeX
@misc{spencer2024_3140406,
  author       = {John Spencer},
  title        = {Lessons In Urban Warfare, From Syria to Taiwan | John Spencer},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Dan Crenshaw. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2024},
  month        = {dec},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3140406/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}