Thank you. Thank you for having me. So it's hard to go back in time, but I think it's necessary to have a discussion on the war in Gaza, Israel's war against Hamas in Gaza, however the framework you want to use, which started on October 7th. From an analytical perspective of the war, on October 7th, roughly 3,000 Hamas militants, Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists, and Gazan civilians invaded southern Israel and killed over 1,000 Israelis, kidnapped over 250 from multiple nationalities, and then murdered, raped, burned, killed civilians. Lots of details on that day and the scale of it, the number of penetrations on Israel's border wall with Gaza. But from an analytical perspective of the war, it begun the war, and on October 8th, Israel declared war, a war of self-defense against Hamas in Gaza. Hamas being the political apparatus with a military wing in a military of Gaza, a self-governed area of terrain, which really plays into effect of analysis of the war and what were the challenges, the actions of the IDF against Hamas in the war. Once Hamas and those who joined Hamas withdrew into Gaza with the 250-plus hostages, it became one of the greatest military challenges of the modern era, where it's very hard, if not inappropriate, to compare it to anything else, just on the variables that I will discuss on the context of the war.
So in the war, Israel's war against Hamas, with three stated goals: return the illegally taken hostages, destroy Hamas's military capabilities, remove Hamas as a government authority of Gaza, and secure Israel's borders and prevent, you know, Hamas or any other group from Gaza from being able to do another attack against Israel and into Israel territory. The actual technical, or I would say, contextual information is very important to be able to do comparisons. So within Gaza, on the opening moments of October 7th, there were also 4,000 rockets in the opening hours launched from Gaza towards Israeli civilian sites, all of them being inaccurate, as in not able to actually determine where they're going, but there were thousands of more rockets. So you had rockets emanating out of enemy territory at this point. You had the 250-plus hostages. Gaza is a very dense piece of terrain, 25 miles long, 5 to 7 miles wide, with 24 cities, 10 cities of over 100,000, Gaza City over 600,000, highly dense portions of Gaza, highly dense populated areas. But from a military context, and why it's really hard to compare in the history of urban warfare, is that Hamas, the governing authority of Gaza since 2005, also spent over a billion dollars just in their tunnel complex, a range of over 350 miles, some estimates are higher, of military-only purposed tunnels underneath the urban areas of Gaza, ranging from just underneath buildings to over 200 feet underground. It was not just that investment, but every aspect of the environment of Gaza was prepared by Hamas for war for over 20 years, basically since they seized power in 2007, but before then as well, even during Israel's occupation of Gaza, Hamas was building tunnels and preparing. From a military analysis, that's something very unique and really hard to compare in history, is when the enemy is in the urban terrain and has prepared it for defense. Matter of fact, most of the urban battles of history are where the defender has had little amount of time, and the more amount of time that they've had to prepare the defense, the greater the battle, the more protracted, the more destructive it is. And many of the biggest battles of urban warfare history, like Stalingrad or Fallujah or others, were essentially meeting engagements where two militaries met in the urban terrain. Unique to, let's say, where somebody might say the 21st century, which is really trying to dramatize the history of war. Even in the past 20 years, some of the biggest battles were because of that nature of the defender having time to prepare. The biggest battle for the US military in the entire Iraq War was the Second Battle of Fallujah over this small city of 300,000, but where the enemy was given about six months to prepare for the battle that would ensue. The biggest battle since World War II, before the invasion of Ukraine, was the Battle of Mosul, which was a nine-month battle to take back the city from ISIS of 3 to 5,000 ISIS fighters. And the reason it was the biggest battle since World War II, with over 100,000 security forces, Iraqi security forces used to take the city back, is because ISIS had two years and prepared it for defense. So when you extrapolate that out to the conditions of the cities of Gaza, especially those bigger ones like Gaza City, you have 20 years of preparation where you have every step you take, there's a tunnel underneath you. Every house essentially has been militarized, or most houses, where they have caches or house-borne IEDs or sniper positions. The amount of preparation can't be discounted when trying to compare this to other situations. Also, the enemy's context really matters. So not just what Hamas did on October 7th, but how does it fight, how does it prepare for defending urban terrain and fighting the IDF, and what strategies does it use. Hamas's strategy was, is not to fight the IDF, but to cause what is historical in Israel's wars for the international community to halt Israel before achieving a victory, even after the horrific crimes of October 7th. So Hamas historically even has been, an example that I teach in classes, of using a human shield strategy where it violates the laws of war and uses protected populations like civilians and protected sites, hospitals, schools, mosques, UN buildings, and uses them for military purposes, trying to use the protections afforded to those buildings or populations so that the attacker cannot attack them and must use other methods and complicates the operations. It's a violation of war, but it's called human shield strategy where you're putting something in front of you so the enemy can't attack you. Hamas did that and prepared basically every hospital, every school, and used it for military purposes in some way. But Hamas also uses a human sacrifice strategy, unlike again comparing this to even 20th century or World War II, World War I, where Hamas both states and acts that it needs its civilians to die, will put its civilians in harm's way, will not allow civilians into protective tunnels that they use. That's human sacrifice strategy, to where Hamas leaders will say, I need the death of my population, which is a very unique aspect to get to the conduct of. So that's all the variables on from day one, from October 7th, rockets coming in, and if anybody's ever been to Israel and Gaza, their proximity, rockets coming into Israel, hostages every second counting, the preparation of the environment from the enemy, the enemy strategy, its political strategy, which is to use international pressure to force Israel to stop before achieving its goals, to create these ideals. This is also a war being fought, unlike other wars of the past, in the global eye of algorithm-driven social media, which really changes things. Even if I take you to battles of modern history, if you're talking the 2017 Battle of Marawi, 2016 Battle of Mosul, 2000 Raqqa, Aleppo, the battles of Fallujah, Ramadi, others, where you have media coverage, but this is the first war of this scale and intensity where you have cell phone-driven, social media-driven, algorithm-driven condemnation or footage, and then all different experts, which really gets to, you know, all war is a contest of will. So when this war started, it was, you know, Hamas's will to believe that it could achieve its goal of conducting the October 7th attack and maintaining power and surviving as a political and military organization of the war. The contest of wills is fought both locally, of course, between Israel and Hamas, and Israel's population in a democratic society against Hamas and its population of being basically governed ruthlessly, but the influence through social media of the population of the world, where we've seen, to include people that we would consider experts, try to convince people on top of the social media-driven algorithm footage, photos, reports, studies, that Israel was from day one conducting some type of illegal operation. And this is where we get into basically the metrics. So the conditions that Israel had, the capabilities that Israel had to enter Gaza to retrieve its hostages, to remove Hamas's military capabilities, vast military capabilities. Hamas on October 6th was a political organization with a military of roughly 30, if not up to 50,000 militants spread across the Gaza Strip in 24 organized battalions with brigade leaders, battalion, company, with 20,000 rockets supplied, each battalion owning defensive terrain, a vast capability. The actual condemnation, though, when Israel had to enter that terrain, like historical examples, which would be a very destructive war based on just the nature of the complexity of dense urban warfare when the defender can't be convinced to surrender or flee or other examples. We've seen in this war people try to use the numbers to justify their opinions about the war and what's called effects-based condemnation. So the law of war, and I saw it from day one on analyzing this war, and I have now been to Gaza with observing the IDF operations across the spectrum of their operations, from interviewing the Prime Minister, the Chief of the IDF, all brigade commanders, battalion commanders, IDF soldiers in the field, assessing their performance, their capabilities, their actions in the war. No matter what I tell people on that, it absolutely is a moral, ethical, disciplined force achieving unique things in the most complex urban scenario that any military has faced in modern history, if not history, given, of course, wars are fought under the context of the times in which they are fought. That is also the laws of war, the geopolitical aspects, all of those elements, a challenge nobody to face, and still achieving incredible means in their pursuit of just execution of the war. Everybody agrees they had a just reason to defend themselves, well, most do, but we've become in this world where we believe that the numbers justify without an access to information. And this is where the law of war, especially things like proportionality, require any military to assess the military advantage, the concrete military advantage of their operations against the potential collateral damage, and then take all reasonable and feasible measures to limit that damage. That's called precaution. Since in this war we've seen everybody who has an opinion, who really hasn't done research, try to use numbers to say, I don't care what the law says, I don't care what the IDF have done, this number means that they're intentionally causing civilian harm and intentionally destroying civilian infrastructure when that's not true and that's not the way the law of war works. This is where I've been, I've said statements like Israel has done more and implemented more measures to prevent civilian harms than any military in the history of urban warfare, which is very controversial but factual because of the fact of when Israel entered Gaza, what are the known ways to limit civilian harms, both on strike policies, evacuating cities, limiting the use of force, handing out your MS to communicate with the civilians, all of these measures that maybe we'll talk about in questions. This effects-based condemnation or trying to convince the world what the laws of war say, how they're different in different contexts of rules of engagement has been really problematic in providing technical analysis of Israel's performance in Gaza.
So it's, I play these numbers, or I don't play the numbers, I provide the numbers from a case study perspective. So yes, I can give you case studies of US-backed operations and the operations of Mosul, where again the problem is in the numbers. And this measure of what is your civilian-to-combatant ratio isn't how the laws of war or even analysis of individual military operations is done, but it became something that the media and advocates used to try to portray some type of legality and intentions that the number was higher. And no, it wasn't. One, the numbers are not true, especially from day one. The world started taking the numbers provided by the designated terrorist organization by 20 different countries, Hamas, the Gaza Health Ministry, started putting out numbers of this is our estimate of civilians, and they do not distinguish between civilians and combatants or non-combatants and combatants. And most people need a class on what is a non-combatant in war. That is somebody who is a protected person who is not partaking in the hostilities in any way. And then what is a combatant is definitely a member of Hamas's military wing, no matter what they're doing, but also anybody who's partaking in the hostilities. Yes, in certain parts of the war, if you compare to any like scenario, although I just went through a very long detail, there is no like scenario. Israel's civilian-to-combatant ratio is still historically low given any comparable context, whether it's high-intensity operations in the battles of Mosul, Fallujah, Raqqa, Aleppo, Marawi, Manila, all of these. But it's really essential that people understand that these are just forms of lies, damn lies, and statistics. These are people taking a number without context and saying, look, this proves, this proves it. Look how many combatants has the Gaza Health Ministry ever declared were killed? Zero. How many? It took Israel about six months to come up with a number, and that is very hard to do. I can tell you as an urban warfare researcher, there's never been a war or battle, because there's a big difference, where anybody could tell you daily down to the single digit how many civilians or combatants were dying. That is so ridiculous that somebody believed that Hamas, the Gaza Health Minister, could tell you every day and not ask the question, well, how did they develop that number? Is it from bodies coming into hospitals that started that way? Is it self-reported missing personnel? Is it this? Is it that? The numbers have been very analyzed, but I don't like, because it isn't the, it falls into that effects-based condemnation. Yes, if we took the numbers and compared it to any like scenario, it is historically low. But I don't want people, especially in the future of war, saying, look, I know you had the right to defend yourself, but what's your civilian-to-combatant ratio in this scenario? That's not the way the law of war works or war in general.
It's a really great question, and I've asked this multiple times just as an objective. And despite what people think, and I'm not Jewish, I'm not Israeli, I'm a war researcher as an objective observer, but also watching wars beyond the Israel-Gaza or Israel-Hamas war, watching the Ukraine war, watching other wars throughout history, watching these politicized organizations decide on which side they're going to advocate for. You're right, the United Nations, a whole host of United Nations-affiliated organizations do not condemn at all, not even barely from October 7th, but especially in the execution of the war, Hamas's use of human shield strategy, weaponization of all the hospitals, schools, their own population, what they do to their own population. I can't tell you why. I can point to many of the reasons. From a really, there are some good-intentioned human rights activists who have now authority and positions of some credibility. You have an anti-Israel cohort within that, you have an anti-Western cohort within that, you have an anti-war cohort, but this especially within the United Nations, which is a political organization by its very nature and its history of thoughts, opinions, statements, votes towards Israel, is very problematic. But within the objective context of Hamas, to say things only on one side, it needs to be called out. I can't answer why. Like when you say hospitals are off limits, which is not a true statement in war, and I've been vocal on that. Absolutely, hospitals, their staff, the wounded, everybody protected population, but for the enemy or anybody to use it for military purposes is the violation. The violation is not moving forward and removing military personnel and military equipment and all this from protected sites. But all these organizations, not one call for Hamas to surrender, to unilaterally, unconditionally give up the hostages, stop violating the law of war in the way it's executing its side of the war. I can't answer why, but I can definitely say it is 100% a valid question.