The number one thing that could have saved thousands of lives would have been the world's greatest expert on urban warfare. Colonel John Spencer, award-winning scholar and military analyst, considered one of the world's leading experts on urban warfare.
It's a political organization with an army that invaded on the morning of October 7th in a scale unseen really in modern times. They had studied every location that they were going to attack. Hamas military planning was very credible. The underground is more important surface to the enemy strategy. That is where their fighters are. That's where the hostages are. That's where their leadership are.
They were manufacturing in Gaza. Manufacturing in Gaza. But as I walked through that equipment, you saw everything from Russian, North Korean, Chinese. You have basically a highway going from Egypt into Gaza.
When you have to vaccinate the entire Gazan population from polio that was starting to spike, and Israel did that. There's never been a war where the attacking military feeds the enemy's population during the battle. Not World War I, Two, Vietnam, Korea, none of them.
To say that it was intentional that you're just trying to scorch the earth, you're trying to destroy everything, it's not true. One of the biggest killers in Gaza has been...
I wondered if we might actually finish on the peace plan. The 20-point plan as written is a...
Colonel Spencer, thank you so much for taking time to speak with me here in Israel. It is October 7th as we're talking now, and we've, I think, just heard that Hamas have accepted the Trump 20-point plan. But by the time this interview is released, who knows what could happen.
We're still in war, I would say, to some extent, and you, throughout this two years of the Israel-Hamas war, which started, of course, on October 7th, have been in and out of Gaza. You are one of the world's preeminent, if not the preeminent, expert on urban warfare.
Perhaps embarrassingly, I'm not sure, Prime Minister Netanyahu referenced you in his UN General Assembly speech two weeks ago, and you have been speaking about the realities of war throughout this conflict. Now, of course, this is a conflict on several fronts. We've got southern Lebanon in the north, Syria, Iran, there's Gaza, and there's the propaganda war as, I guess, another front. But I wanted to, if possible, speak with you about specifically the conflict in Gaza.
Now, just last point on the framing of this conversation. It seems to me that from the very beginning of the war there's been a total asymmetry when it comes to information. Let's say at the Al-Ahli hospital it blows up or there's a bomb. Suddenly there's a lot of hoo-ha about what happened. Accusations it's the IDF that have targeted, later transpires that it's Islamic Jihad, one of their missiles has gone astray.
And what you end up with is a lot of the media is taken up with accusations of famine, accusations of genocide, accusations of all of these misdoings by Israel, whether or not they're true. But the reality of the conflict itself seems to be lost. So we don't ever really hear about what are the objectives, what are the strategies and tactics, not least because the IDF are not going to say all of those things. They can't say everything because they can't reveal their strategy against Hamas.
So I'm not sure if you appreciate how I've just framed this conversation, but what I'm hoping to get from you is a picture of the conflict in strategic military terms from October 7th. Now I appreciate that that's quite a lot to get through, but it still would be useful to understand that side of it. I certainly, that's what I want to understand.
So if you're okay with that, and unless you object to any of the framing there, perhaps we can start with October 7 itself, the launch from Gaza by Hamas into Israel of what they called the Al-Aqsa Flood mission. Am I right in understanding that was supposed to be part of a joint effort from all of the neighbors of Israel, including Hezbollah in the north, Iran, the Houthis, and a joint attack which Hamas were too early on and got ahead on? Or how should... what do we know about the Al-Aqsa Flood now, two years later?
Sure, and thanks for having me on, Winston. Big fan of this show. So, we are on the two-year, I guess you could say, anniversary of the attack. And I have now been back. This is my seventh trip. I wanted to get here immediately after October 7th to understand from a military analysis, October 7th. Some people call it a terrorist attack. It was a terrorist attack. It'll go down in history as one of the largest terrorist attacks, but it was more than that. It was, like you said, an invasion. From every military definition, it was an invasion by another entity which happened to be a terror military, but it's more than an insurgent or terrorist force like ISIS, al-Qaeda, anything like that.
I mean, Israel left Gaza in 2005, 2006 they're elected, 2007 they seize power. It's a political organization with an army, and it built an army that invaded on the morning of October 7th in a scale unseen really in modern times. You're right though that it was a coordinated attack with other entities, mainly Hezbollah in the north, which is a much larger military with vastly more resources on the northern border of Israel, which had already set up all the equipment.
And they discovered this after the fact, that the mopeds, the GoPros, all the equipment ready to go just on the other side of the border to launch onto the Golan Heights and other areas in October 7th from that direction. And you have to think of, there's Hamas in other places other than Gaza, right? There's Hamas in Judea and Samaria. There's Hamas in Lebanon. There were other entities even within what's called the West Bank that were supposed to rise up.
You're right, because of the military necessity even for Hamas to have secrecy on their operation, and they also had trust issues. So Hamas and Hezbollah are not the same in any way, even religious sect. You have a Shia-Sunni kind of divide, but they were aligned in their... just like the Islamic regime in Iran aligns all of its proxies with the unified goal of the destruction of Israel and then the Western way of living, part of that.
So like you said, it's pretty much known information now. One, that this was an Islamic regime in Iran-backed operation. So intelligence found in Gaza since October 7th shows that direct connection to Hezbollah or to Hamas, right? But the same thing with Hezbollah is that there is now intelligence showing that Hamas didn't necessarily jump the gun because it made its decisions on why it launched on this holiday morning.
There were protests going on against the Israeli government beforehand. They felt that there was a lot of division in society. They just felt it was the right time. They didn't trust Nasrallah and Hezbollah. So it wasn't that they didn't just not send the message, they didn't trust them. So they were hoping that once they invaded, that flag would go up and then people would join them. They were supposed to.
How do you know they didn't trust Nasrallah?
Again, more intelligence found in Gaza since October 7th. So they found like the intelligence about Iran, but also that the Hezbollah mistrust. So like Yahya Sinwar's personal messages and things, and the way they communicated to Hezbollah. That's really why we pretty much know that as a fact, that there is a trust issue. And if you just know the differences in the two organizations, like there's no reason even why they should work together other than for the unified destruction.
And to be clear, Hezbollah did join the fight on October 8th. It just didn't send the October 7th wave because Nasrallah made another calculation, which he made multiple since October 7th, that are somewhat unusual. Even when Israel invaded southern Lebanon or attacked into it, Hezbollah pulled back its Radwan forces because it didn't want them destroyed. It always... everybody's always thinking the strategy, the long-term strategy.
Doesn't that suggest that Hezbollah weren't nearly as prepared as they should have been if they really genuinely thought it was a good idea to invade Israel?
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I mean, they had prepared everything. So if you understand the way that Hezbollah was arrayed in southern Lebanon, is that they weren't always there. They had tunnels and pre-positioned positions in the wood lines and things that were... all of the people disguised as civilians that were Hezbollah would come and then go into the environment and grab their equipment pre-positioned. So they had found multiple bunkers full of that equipment ready to go.
But you're right, they weren't in the bunkers on the morning of October 7th ready to go. And to send them afterwards, you're right, to send them immediately after October 7th happened, then they would be visible to the Israelis who were launching towards the north, because that was a big fear of theirs. So Israel had to make a big decision, and I've talked to the, you know, General Golani and the prime minister about that decision, whether to reinforce the north where the largest threat could come from, or the south.
And if Nasrallah had sent the Radwan after October 7th, not been a part of the surprise attack when Israel was basically blind for multiple reasons, then they would have confronted a lot less than had they gone. So then you make a decision, well, if we go now, we'll lose a lot more soldiers. So they decided on the easy card, Hezbollah did, and just started launching rockets on October 8th.
When you say Israel were blind for multiple reasons, what do you mean by that?
So the way that you have to give credit, and this is, and I've written about this, the way that Hamas did the operation. Not only did they... there were signals that on the night of October 6, you know, something really bad was getting ready to happen, right? So one of the biggest things was the SIM cards in Gaza were switched to Israeli SIM cards so they could operate in Israel, and that was a big thing throughout the night, like, is this a rehearsal? Because they had done it before.
Hamas had done this before?
Yes, and they've done the SIM card thing before. Yes. And they've done basically a readiness drill like this, like get everybody up and ready and get all the people in, the fighters. They're a military. So they rehearsed the attack, and the Israeli intelligence and military people on the night of October 6th were like, 'Is this a test or a rehearsal again, or is it the real thing?' And they had, you know, there's a lot of history there on making that wrong decision.
But after they launched, the way that Hamas launched is that they had studied every location that they were going to attack. So all the 20-plus urban sites, you know, Kfar Aza, all of them, they had studied them in detail, but they'd also studied Israeli responses. Even you go back to the test of the wall, like Hamas did its work in analyzing what Israel might do.
So when they entered, they knocked out all the cameras immediately. So they sent quadcopters and other things and knocked out all the cameras that Israel relies on as early warning and to be able to see what's going on in the border. They tried to bring down cell phone towers. So they went immediately to the cell phone towers and tried to bring down the cell phone towers. They went to locations where anybody might come and discover what's going on or come as a reinforcement.
So I know you've driven down there, the 232. They sent platoons of Hamas special forces, the Nukhba fighters, to the locations to set up ambushes so nobody could come into southern Israel. And then you have the last element of blinding Israel was the EMS system. And I've discovered this in other terrorist attacks like the Mumbai attacks of 26/11, is that, you know, 911, you know, here it's 112, but when you call it, it can only receive so many calls.
So now you have this massive invasion and everybody's dialing 911 basically, and you overload the emergency system to the point where they start diverting calls to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and then in the chaos of that, just that nobody can communicate. Nobody understands what's going on. And this is, as I analyze, even the morning of October 7th till the mid-afternoon, there's people who fight terrorists and think that it's done because they don't know that there's 20-plus breaches of the perimeter wall, that there's thousands of Hamas and then waves of Palestinians that are coming in.
It's just not only the chaos, but they were very deliberate in how they blinded not just Israel's defense forces, its security forces, but even the nation to not know what's going on. That's why we, like from the outside world on X, are seeing videos and like we know as much as the Israeli authorities do at that point.
And that chaos was enough to hinder the IDF in a quick response.
Well, that blinding and the deliberate... and I taught this and I wrote this, actually I reposted the Time magazine article. I taught at our US Army Ranger School. I taught militaries how to attack other enemy areas, and Hamas military planning was very credible. So they sent these ambush locations not just to the entire envelope, what they call it, southern Israel, like the 232, let's say, where the black aerial monument is, to lock it down.
So you want to lock down your objective. Their objective was all of southern Israel. They locked that down, but they also locked down any location they were attacking, like Kfar Aza, Re'im, all of them. And then they would put out sniper positions and ambush positions to lock it down. So that way the fighters inside could do what they wanted to do with no worry of anybody coming to save other people.
So there's an argument that's been made quite regularly, which is that Hamas, after choosing to invade Israel, then chose to have the theater of war be Gaza itself, because there they are able to fight a type of war where they can hide behind their own civilians and thus create a furor and create propaganda and down the line accuse Israel of genocide and win on the propaganda war on the world stage.
Did they believe on October 7th they were actually going to have a successful multi-front invasion of Israel and succeed in destroying Israel?
I agree, and I've heard these conversations, like I don't give Hamas that much credit that everything that's unfolded since October 7th was their plan. I agree that there was definitely deliberate planning, and this is even evidence of the fighters. They brought in food with them, medicine. They planned to stay. They had maps to other sites like the nuclear site in the south, but they planned to stay, or they planned to stay there as long as they could to cause as much trouble as they could to eventually bring everything back to Gaza.
What, I mean, seeing as we know a bit, you've already suggested we know a bit about strategy, what was in the leadership of Hamas at that point? What do we know?
So since the taking of hostages was such a deliberate strategy, although there is some chaos there where you have civilians taking hostages, you have other fighters. Since we know that was a deliberate part there, that was definitely part of the plan of Yahya Sinwar, is to capture the hostages as their ultimate, as they know from recent history of any hostage taking, that that will, no matter what happens, garner immense amounts of credit, basically, or ability to negotiate things.
But no, I do believe there, like you said, that there are many courses of action here, and their primary course of action was to stay as long as they could and destroy as much of Israel as they could, and they were sacrificing the fighters in that effort. Right? Because they have this, we have this thing called rational actor theory, and people think that it applies to everybody, and where you see rationality in their strategy, there's also irrationality of their strategy, of it doesn't matter if all their fighters die, their goal is in the afterlife of achieving martyrdom and, you know, the destruction of Israel eventually, right?
But since we know so much about their first phase of the invasion was to stay as long as they could, to have other people rise up and join them, and to create as much destruction... I don't... So it is a little bit of yes and no. Yes, that they had multiple phases of the operation to include taking the hostages back into Gaza, since that's... and I just wrote a case study on the first Gaza war in 2008 and knowing that they could survive immense amounts of attack, and they did it back then in 2008 too.
The international media, the numbers game, the tunnel network to defend themselves, all of this. But that doesn't mean they didn't have a primary plan of destroying as much and doing as much as this as possible with everybody else joining them and having that be the primary plan.
It's almost like this is a backup plan.
And even within that, I don't think they believed, even within their own strategic analysis, that Israel could continue the operation as long as they have, seeing what's happened in the last two years, like you said, on a seven-front war. And this is getting into again, Hezbollah. Hamas's strategy didn't calculate Hezbollah's actions, and Hezbollah was a big deterrent during the first phases of this war to what can, what should we do.
Because Hezbollah, if Hezbollah launched, even its rocket supplies, 100,000 rockets at that point, precision-guided munition, everything, immense amounts of destruction could be done to Israel, way farther than what was done on October 7th. And then you have the Iran card where if Hezbollah launched, because I was again interviewing all the senior leadership, the biggest concern about if Hezbollah launches is if Israel responds to Hezbollah, then Iran verbally states, 'If you touch Hezbollah, we're coming in.' And Iran has come in, right? So I don't give Hamas credit for all that.
Right. Okay. But then as you say that, it just goes to show what an incredible feat it has been for Israel in response to deal with that multi-front war, at the timing of each operation, each theater to be approached. It's like the ultimate game. It's 7D chess.
That's right. And resources, right? So this ends, ways, and means. We say you're right. Everybody outside of that doesn't visit here thinks Israel is this all-powerful despite its small size. And, you know, like the ridiculousness, well, if they can do that to Hezbollah with the pagers and the strategic strikes, why couldn't they do that with Hamas? Just the ignorance of warfare.
But most people don't look at it like you just said, as in Israel has resources, but a very minimum resource compared to the amount of threat they're facing. So to navigate not just the resource constraint of basically a citizen army that you need to mobilize, but then put back into the economy and mobilize, put back in and keep doing that.
Yes. I hadn't even considered that. So you don't have a standing army that can do all this at once.
And they couldn't. So they have to make these really bad decisions of where do you fight and navigate those strategic waters of all of the internationalness, you know, even the 12-day war. Like you got to give Israel credit for basically diminishing, dismantling, defanging, destroying their enemies one at a time over the last two years.
Yes. Yes. Quite. So before we come to the IDF invasion of Gaza, which began on October 27th, I would love to get a picture of what the munitions and weaponry of Hamas was in Gaza, or at least what we know. Well, of course, we know about their tremendous terror tunnels. But what did they have in stock? What would, presumably we must have some sense of, or they must have had some sense of their own capabilities.
Sure. And what you can say with anybody's intelligence is that there's a really good history of intelligence being wrong. So they mostly get it wrong, but they try to get as least wrong as possible. So the estimates of Hamas going after October 7th is 30 to 50,000. That's a pretty big... the infant terrorist fighters in Hamas's military.
But, and I think we were talking about this before the show, comes into play, is that in my world there isn't one terrorist and civilian. There is combatant and non-combatant. So after October 7th, Israel invokes self-defense and wages a war against Hamas, the political organization, its military. So the numbers I'm giving you are of its military, 30 to 50,000 fighters, five brigades, 24 battalions arrayed across the Gaza Strip in defensive positions that they've been working on for 20 years.
Which really matters that they prepared every ground of Gaza for war for over 20 years, which gets you to the tunnel network, but that's not the only thing. So 30 to 50,000 fighters, but then you have what is now believed to be over 20,000 short-range rockets, because they launched 4,000 rockets in the opening morning of October 7th, which was more than was launched in the entire Second Lebanon War in the opening hours. But they had 20,000 of these.
But these were not great rockets, right? These are pretty small warheads.
Small warheads with no precision capabilities, which really matters because when you're lobbing them towards, if everybody wants to talk about laws of war, if you lob missiles towards a city, a civilian area, you don't have the ability to distinguish, which is one of the principles of where it's going, then it's a war crime. So these, like you said, lower yield, but they're still very dangerous, especially in quantity, but even a single one will kill people.
20,000 of those, ranging in warhead size. Ranging in warhead size up to what? What's the largest warheads we have?
I don't know that actually. I'll say what I don't know because it's so varied. Because, you know, one of their manufacturing capabilities Israel didn't know about, like they just discovered one last week. They were manufacturing in Gaza. Manufacturing in Gaza. So that's the other kind of surprise that people thought this was all basically either kind of jerry-rigged or homemade stuff or imported and smuggled in. But it was a combination at all.
And actually they just found another one in northern Gaza last week, a weapons manufacturing plant underground, so with military lathes and everything. And we've seen the videos of them cutting up their water pipes to create rockets, but they had everything from militarized versions that they imported in to the ones they homemade. And we know that they use the munitions. So they've manufactured since October 7 because they use the unexploded ordnance of IDF bombs and artillery.
And they'll take the explosives out of that because that's usually your dependent variable of creating rockets is the explosives that you need, right? You need some propellant, but it's really the explosive. But they're really big on taking the unexploded ordnance that Israel has dropped or fired and using that to make the rockets in which they send.
But on October 7th, over 20,000 is what they believe at this point was available to the Hamas military. Then you have a whole range of the small arms capabilities. So the IED is probably one of, just like any asymmetric, as you were talking about, fighter, one of their biggest assets is the IEDs. So the IEDs in the roads, in the tunnels, in the walls, in the homes. Then they had the whole array of small arms, RPGs, AK-47s, you know, sniper rifles, all of those.
Very limited night vision goggles, some, but very limited, limited thermals, kind of a... But from a military perspective, 50,000 fighters just in their military, which gets you to the kind of the recruitment and other militaries in Gaza.
So you have like, and I know you know this, but when you start talking about, like you said, just what's in the environment as Israel is about to approach, is that people believe that you have Hamas and then everybody else and they're not involved.
Well, in my world, you have combatants and non-combatants. A non-combatant is a civilian who's not participating in the conflict. But as soon as the war begins, anybody who's in Hamas, a named card-carrying member of Hamas, can be killed. Doesn't matter what they're doing. Now, if they're somebody else like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or just a civilian, and they participate in the hostilities in any way, like shoot at the IDF, report intelligence on the IDF, hold a hostage. So a civilian who holds a hostage is now a member of the organization that is fighting in the war.
Would you include someone who knows where the hostages are but doesn't report on it?
And this isn't John Spencer's interpretation. The laws of war, which I'm a big advocate for, I think we've, people need to have war 101 classes really, and this war has really exposed it, but other ones have. It's very prescriptive on what is the definition of participating in the hostilities. And there's a whole list of them. You could be a guy who carries the ammo, or you know that person on the cell phone on a rooftop who's reporting on intelligence, or with a camera, which is, I know, very recent in history, a camera on the IDF, that's participating in the hostilities and can be targeted.
Right. Right. Do you think there's anything to the report that some of the weaponry left behind by America in Afghanistan in the 2021 Joe Biden pullout from Afghanistan made its way to Gaza?
Sure, but not at a scale that would have an impact. Not at a scale. And I actually toured a lot of the stuff that was left in after October 7th. So, you know, there's been some videos of it. And as I walk through this, which is very impressive equipment, even the thermobaric grenades they made homemade, which is a, you know, thermobaric is a very lethal way of sucking the oxygen out of an environment, a room, and then replacing it with fire, the vacuum bombs, everything.
But as I walked through that equipment, you saw everything from Russian, North Korean, Chinese, American.
I've heard that in the beginning, but it wasn't like it was like troves of it, really.
I mean, if you think about the post-Benghazi, the more of those weapons would have made it into Gaza than stuff that was left in Afghanistan just by terrain-wise.
Right. Okay. So when you say, let's say, like you mentioned China, you're not suggesting that China have it, it's just it's made its way there perhaps over the decades, right? Some of this will be old weapons.
And now that we know, and not that we didn't know, although there's a history there between the Egypt-Gaza border, right, in the tunnels. So they found over a hundred, not saying a hundred were used after October 7th, between Egypt and Gaza that you could drive trucks through. So it isn't hard to think about how weapons got into Gaza.
And you have basically a highway going from Egypt into Gaza, and if you just know the right people to pay, even though in 2017 Egypt went through a whole campaign, very little international attention, where they eradicated the population on their side of the fence. So there used to be a Rafah on the Egypt side of Gaza that they told them all to go somewhere else. They don't care where they went, and they knocked down thousands of houses. They filled the tunnels with sewage and seawater, and they tried to eliminate the... because they were having a problem with terrorism, right? The cross-borderness between Gaza and Egypt.
So I had British military expert Andrew Fox on the show, and I came away from that conversation under the impression that the IEDs, as you mentioned, have been pretty crucial in shaping how the war played out in Gaza. And I'd love your opinion on this. The way he described it to me was these were IEDs that had cameras, camera-operated. So Hamas can leave the IEDs wherever they want, with cameras looking at them. They're not tripwires, and they don't need to be detonated with someone nearby.
Well, obviously they wouldn't be, but in trying to deal with that, the IDF, they come in, as soon as they walk into the building, Hamas know, trigger and set off the IED. So as a consequence, the IDF have tried to evacuate civilians and or non-combatants, as you'd say, and then send in airstrikes to flatten certain areas, as that's the easiest way to get rid of all of these IEDs without themselves falling prey to the IEDs.
And as a consequence of that is we see this total sort of desolation and wipeout of Gaza. Do you sort of agree with... have I understood that correctly? And is this a sort of IED war?
So yes and no. Again, as somebody, as the academic in me likes to put the, we call the yes and absolutely that's a factor. Definitely not an IED war. If anything, it's a tunnel war. This is the first war that I've ever studied, and I'm currently studying multiple wars right now in Ukraine, writing a book about the Azerbaijan war 2020. Unlike any other even urban-centric warfare that I ever studied, the underground is more important than the surface to the enemy strategy.
So for Hamas, that is where their fighters are, that's where the hostages are, that's where their leadership are. That's where the IEDs are as well. But in explaining some of the surface damage in high-intensity urban conflict, you absolutely have to discuss the other component of Hamas's terrain denial, which is this use of the IEDs, pervasive IEDs, unlike other people can comprehend.
So it's right to just talk about it. That's not the only tactic that the IDF does to deal with these, but we've seen, I mean, IEDs go, I mean, it's kind of like urban, like it's hard to talk about, like, okay, when did it start? Even the IEDs that we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan are an offshoot of things like the Lebanon, I mean, what we call EFPs came out of Lebanon. They're a Hezbollah Shia militia kind of asset that the Islamic regime in Iran then pushed into Iraq and later into Afghanistan.
The use of IEDs is just an asymmetric guerrilla warfare tactic in Gaza. It's very useful to talk about because people believe that all the damage is just Israel bombing against targets that they see. Definitely a part of it. It's snipers, it's the close battle, but it's also the IED because they do things like not just... and it's hard to discuss an IED, those what Andrew was talking about with those, which is an evolution of the IED, right?
So there's always a game of if you're an IED implacer, how to get it to go off when you want it to. There's so many ways to do it. And one of the ways that Hezbollah started using was these wire control, as in cameras, fixed cameras that are sending a signal to somewhere else, usually hardwired, not Wi-Fi, because there's ways to deal with that.
And then also command detonating the explosive without electronic, because electronic, as the IED evolution has happened, you can, I can block all electronic signals in an area as I enter them so that nothing can blow up because of an electronic signal, like a car fob was really famous in Iraq and Afghanistan where they just hit their car fob and it sends a signal to... but if you hardwire it all, and again, if you've had 20 years, which is the difference here.
As somebody who studied urban warfare across time, the biggest difference that we're talking about here is that Hamas has prepared that ground for 20 years. And then if you have 20 years, you can be really creative on how you emplace IEDs, how you build tunnels, how you even set up kill zones. So many elements of it.
You know, I was online the other day and I stumbled across this video. It was from Chuck Norris and it left me a little shocked. He's in his 80s and says he feels like he's in his 50s. He had some pretty cool tips in there too on what he's doing, including these three foods that he avoids like the plague. Now, at first I was a bit skeptical, but he explained all the things he was doing, and it was super simple. If it's good enough for Chuck, then it's good enough for all of us.
But with any new method, of course, results can vary. The video is definitely worth checking out. And here is a special link just for you watchers of the Winston Marshall Show. Watch the video now at chuckdefense.com/win. That's chuckdefense, that's a defense with an S rather than a C, .com/win. To make it even easier, I linked it below the video and you can check it out yourself. It's pretty quick and seriously it's been a game changer. Now back to the interview.
When people see the destruction though, it is good to remind them about the IEDs because people think about IEDs. If they're thinking about Iraq, Afghanistan, you're thinking about roadside bombs, where in Gaza there are roadside bombs that are killing IDF soldiers, but an entire house has been marked as an explosive, as in the entire house is rigged to blow. So you enter it, it blows up, which is not new in urban warfare either.
But the street, the wall in the street, I mean, it's just pervasive that once you have evacuated civilians, like you said, and the IDF have been very successful at evacuating civilians, especially before the close fight when you would face an IED. But of course, if you know there's an IED in a building, then you can of course bomb that building. Same thing if there's a sniper in that building or an enemy in that building, you can bomb it.
But there's also ways of an entire street is embedded with IEDs, but you know you have to go into it. So one of the, I think the prime minister mentioned it in a briefing, so it's not classified, where they'll take an old armored personnel carrier, fill that armored personnel carrier full of explosives, and then drive it down the street and then blow the vehicle. So then it blows all the IEDs that are along that street. There are many ways.
And this is when you get people who look at the photos and say, you know, why did this happen? And there's not one reason that that destruction is there. There's like a whole list of reasons. And the number one reason though is Hamas. And to say that it was intentional, that you're just trying to scorch the earth, you're trying to destroy everything, it's not true. And there's so many of these things that are happening, like the IEDs, like the tunnel networks, like the buildings rigged to blow, caches in them, that are part of the explanation.
You've said, and this is a quote I have from Jake Wallis Simons's book, that since the IDF have been giving warnings and conducting evacuations before having to do what you've just described, this has helped Hamas survive and ultimately prolonged the war and with it the devastation.
So tactically it doesn't sound like... Why did the IDF decide to make that tradeoff? Was it for their own, to appear to be doing the right thing? Was it for noble reasons? Or if it has indeed backfired, why was that a mistake? Do you think they would have done it differently now knowing that? Or how do you explain it?
It's not easy to explain quickly, unfortunately, because even in that statement, which gets into, which is I'm quoted and I'll stand by this, again, people can have their own opinion, they can't have their own facts. As somebody who studied urban warfare for over a decade, written on almost every major urban battle that a Western military has been a part of, Israel has done more, has implemented more measures to prevent civilian harm than any military in history. The notifications is a big part of it.
Now you are like the statement that the notifications have protracted the... There are many things that have protracted this war and prevented the IDF from achieving their goals or even Israel. The number one thing that has happened, which is very ahistorical in none of the urban battles or wars I've ever studied, is the fact that the civilians are trapped in a very small area.
So Gaza is, you know, 25 miles long, 5 to 7 miles wide, 2.2 million people. Although that's a lot. I fought in a neighborhood of Baghdad that was 2.2 million. It's a 6 million person city. But in this case of Gaza is that there's never been a case like this where one country, Egypt, has said, 'I don't care who you are, civilians cannot come out of Gaza into my country.' I have no other example of that.
So that leads you to the idea of being faced with impossible conditions of figuring out a way to get to the enemy while getting his or her population out of the harm's way, which is kind of embedded in all of the laws of war. If you look at all the laws of war, they're pretty much all directed towards preventing harm against those not involved in the war.
But if you're telling them to evacuate, presumably Hamas then just evacuate, and so they themselves will just follow the civilians. Is that what's happened?
If Hamas followed the civilian population around Gaza, wherever they've been moved to throughout the last two years, it's been a big part of it. And again, that one's not as easy to answer as you think as well. Definitely in the beginning when the focus was on northern Gaza, and to focus on northern Gaza because that was where the center of gravity of the Hamas military was, Israel said everybody evacuate to south of the Wadi Gaza, which is almost a repeat of what we're seeing now, although it's been successful, is that you're right, Hamas just moved, not to say, but some stayed.
So that's also been the uniqueness that yes, Hamas moved, you told them you're coming, you told them exactly where you're... which is crazy that the IDF isn't giving credit for trying to prevent civilian harm by giving up all elements of surprise. They started handing out their maps, like literally telling them even in a neighborhood, like today I'll be in this area of the map, if you're a civilian get out of there, if you're or stay away from this area, which also tells the enemy.
Yes. Right. But by the way, as a side, this answers the question is why is it that Israel can be so precise when it comes to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon or Iran in the 12-day war, but it's such a different story when it comes to...
The goals are different. So this is the apples to oranges, every element of the comparative, even that comparison, right. So what happened in southern Lebanon before Israel did that is that it gave notification, an entire population of southern Lebanon left. Yes. They had somewhere to go. Right.
I will say though, in response, I was just in southern Lebanon about a month ago, and the stories I was being told was like, oh yeah, I was driving around here and on the radio, Israel came on the radio and said, back off away from that car. So they were able to tell other civilians to back away from his bullet targets in real time.
So then I guess the question would be why then were they not able to do that in Gaza?
It's a huge ask, and I don't imagine any other military in history has been asked why it won't warn individuals around, but it has, right? So it does. So if you even the practice of roof knocking, and we're seeing it even now in Gaza City, the battle of Gaza City, there's a building that the IDF identify has military purpose for it, whether it's holding Hamas fighters, used for communication, whatever, they call everybody in that building, say, please evacuate this building, you have an hour.
It's something they've done in the past, so they actually do it in Gaza as well, but there are so many differences on the density of the population, the notification, the types of targets, the intelligence variables. So they're actually doing it in Gaza as well, but the contexts are also massively different.
You have to give the IDF credit for the way they notify civilians, and not just the flyers that they dropped, but the same thing with the TV, social media, radio, direct calls. And they've aired some of these where they'll call a family in Gaza, they did it in Rafah where they had a very high percentage of evacuation, where they'll call a father of a family and say, 'Is this so-and-so?' 'Yes, this is so-and-so. This is the IDF. How many people do you have in your home?' 'This many. Please evacuate.' 'I'd rather die,' is what the person says on the other end.
It's just crazy to say that the IDF haven't gone above and beyond what anybody's ever done in the past. So nobody's ever done these phone calls, voice messages, drones, handing out their maps, none of that. But, and they keep it up because all warfare is always a balance between the military objective and the humanitarian imperatives.
So even when the law says you can and can't do this, there's always a factor of you still need to do everything reasonable and feasible to limit civilian harm. And Israel has done that in spades in a condition that no other military has ever faced, especially in Gaza with the civilians being trapped and creating this problem of even the enemy going into the safest areas like Al-Mawasi.
Where was Mohammed Deif, who is the commander, the ghost of Gaza, the number one commander of Hamas for three decades? He was killed near Al-Mawasi, the humanitarian zone, where he was using the one area that's supposed to be safe for civilians as a shield to hide himself.
Right. Right. Is there anything I've missed in this conversation so far on Hamas's military capability? So we've talked a decent amount about their missiles, IED use, and then they will have had some artillery presumably and some...
Yeah, mortars. Not artillery, they have mortars, medium to light mortars. The sniper threat is really big there. So the sniper threat is as big as they are snipers. They are snipers. Every time that I've gone in, it's been a very high threat. The IED threat is always evolving and it is a faceless, really hard to combat threat.
Although again, Israel is very creative in how they lead with the bulldozer, things like that, that help minimize, but you always have to look at...
What do you mean they lead with a bulldozer?
So Israel, unlike any military outside of the few high-intensity fights that the Western military have been involved in, like the Battle of Fallujah or even Mosul, Mari, Israel is the only military in the world that by design leads with this very large bulldozer, a D9 bulldozer, in front of their formation going into a contested urban environment, because not only can it take the hit of any IED, doesn't matter what it is, it can take the hit of any RPG or anything that the enemy wants to stop it. You can't stop it.
So if the IDF are going into an area, any neighborhood, they're usually leading with that bulldozer just as a protective element to clear the way and protect the tank that's behind it, with the infantry personnel carrier that's behind that, with the ground infantry on the ground behind that. That bulldozer becomes the critical piece of equipment.
And it really became important during this war when, like, the US administration said, 'I'm not going to send you Caterpillar bulldozer replacement parts,' and everybody's like, 'Oh, that doesn't matter.' No, no, they're saying they're going to take away one of the most critical things that protects the IDF in Gaza.
So October 27th, yeah, 20 days after, we've only done 20 days of the war so far. October 27th, the IDF launched their full-scale ground invasion of Gaza.
I've read it was 100,000 troops. Is that accurate or is that an overstatement?
No, it's an understatement.
Oh, right. Yeah, because then you had...
How do you measure tooth versus tail? What divisions are actually penetrating versus fighter versus logistics. So there are over 300,000 that were mobilized on October 8th. Probably about 300,000 arrayed around Gaza. When you get into pushing into Gaza, so the four divisions that are pushing in, if you counted those, you get to about 100,000, yeah. But it's way more than that.
And that's into northern Gaza. They went into, they each, they attacked every element. Some people argue they should have attacked greater into southern. But if you look at the array of divisions, it's three divisions in northern Gaza and then one division central Gaza and one division towards southern. What their goal is isn't the same as the three divisions since northern Gaza was the main effort.
And when they had one division that punched their way all the way to the coast through the middle along where the Netzar corridor is now, and then you had the two divisions that come, unlike, I'm sure there's a question, unlike Hamas wanted you to, which is one of the principles of warfare is never fight the way the enemy wants you to fight. So Israel went around the 20 years of defensive lines that Hamas had built, which were arrayed towards Israel.
So Israel's three divisions, one punched all the way to the coast, the other two hit northwest Gaza and came down the shoreline and punched in behind them.
Okay. But do they choose to do northern Gaza because that's where they believe the hostages were? What was the tactical decision to go there specifically?
It's a combination of factors. Some being where hostages were, right? Shifa Hospital, hostage taken there. Northern Gaza though was the center of gravity, the Hamas military. Militaries like to fight militaries. So the IDF knew that was the strongest place of the Hamas military, which is a capability, right?
So would that have been in Gaza City or where in northern Gaza would it have been?
All over the whole, the whole... so you have Beit Hanoun, Sa'ad, Jabalia, all of those places, and it also set the conditions to open the entire northern area. But that was again, you have to think about too, as in what's the closest location to Israel, right? So if you look...
Northern Gaza, that's a threat. What's the easiest place to move civilians? Southern Gaza. So if you sweep, and which they did, there's two roads they told them to go along. Go to the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone, which is a coastal area, the only place where there's the least amount of Hamas infrastructure. So there are many variables that identify why go into northern Gaza.
Yes, hostages. Yes, the strength of the Hamas military is there. But also proximity to Israel, how to get the civilians out of harm's way. And at the time it wasn't known that Egypt would lock its gate and build a new gate and send an armored division there, say no civilians coming out.
Again, the number one thing that could have sped this war up, so we talk about protracted the war or prevented civilian harm, saved thousands of lives, would have been to move civilians into a displaced person camp in the Sinai desert, and every international agency would have access to them, and there would not have been a problem.
But you say that, but wouldn't Hamas have just followed with them?
So, no. So it's actually historical in urban warfare to do this, to evacuate everybody. But you search them on the way up. And Israel started to do it later. You asked me about northern, later they start doing facial recognition stands where they're scanning the crowds.
And Al-Nasr Hospital in Khan Yunis, when I'm there, they're very effective at identifying Hamas terrorists in the crowd that are trying to blend in, even in what we call call-outs of hospitals. Now, Al-Nasr Hospital in February of 2024, the IDF encircled it. They evacuate everybody out, use facial recognition. They pick out 700 Nukhba fighters that are hiding in the hospital dressed as patients or doctors, and they use that facial recognition.
So it's historical that if they would have gone into Egypt, that they would have been searched on the way out, right? Now, not saying that if you're somebody who, I guess if you're on the Hamas cause, if you understand warfare, it isn't that these people get killed. There is a reconciliation process that happens after wars.
So there's an echelon of Hamas, right? You have Hamas political bureau, you have Hamas's military. But I don't think the Hamas military would have been foolish enough to try to do that, try to cross the border and to go that way without being identified as that and being grabbed, right? And it's not that they all leave either.
So this is going back to, doesn't Hamas just move? Israel has been very effective at destroying Hamas's military despite the constraints that we've been talking about for the last, you know, whatever hour or whatever. Israel's military fights a certain way too that isn't like others. Their raiding method, it's a raiding military. It's designed to raid into enemy and come back out.
But the way they've done that and still destroyed all five of those brigades, all 24 of those battalions. Then you get to, but John, there's still just as many fighters. Yes. I mean, it's a very radicalized population. That's a fact as well. So the average age of a new Hamas fighter is 16 right now because they have a radicalized population they've radicalized since birth, who is once they think they're of age, and all of a sudden now you're, Hamas is the only way to make money in Gaza.
But the entire Hamas's military, as in all the named commanders, have been eliminated. Doesn't mean you've won the war because you still have a fighting population that believes that they can win. But Israel's military, again going back to give it credit where it can, has been very effective at destroying Hamas's military while protecting civilians.
Just back to the point of Egypt. So they decided not to go ahead with these early plans specifically because they thought they would be helping the quote-unquote Palestinian cause. Is that right? By not letting Gazans into Egypt. But not only that, didn't they also agree with Israel to close the Rafah crossing and allow aid to go in via the Kerem Shalom crossing on the Israel side? Have I understood that? So why would they even close the Rafah crossing then?
Out of fear of things coming in, I'm sure. There's different time periods because it opened back up. There's definitely lots of humanitarian aid that's flowed through Egypt's border. Okay. It didn't close this entire two years. There was a period in the beginning, of course, where it was closed in order to control it. Then there is the issue of the Rafah-Philadelphia corridor that caused a lot of tension because that was around the ceasefire negotiations at the beginning of 2025.
Is that... No, before that, the whole 'all eyes on Rafah'.
Oh, that's the Rafah offensive. The Rafah offensive was also, but also before that is the Philadelphia corridor offensive, and that caused a lot of problems with Egypt. So during that time, the Egypt crossing was closed because some people argue that Egypt didn't want the world to discover the tunnels that were between here.
I personally don't believe that they knew the extent of the tunnel network even of themselves. And again, people think that just on the other side of this border is Egypt. Well, while that's true, there's the giant Sinai desert, and you have tribes that live along that area. You have a very small Egyptian military.
Looking at the reasons on why Egypt closed its borders, it was this, of course, that political element, but domestically they're not as strong as people believe as well. I mean, the Sisi government, the Muslim Brotherhood, the threats to their survival are legitimate, and they have to attend to that as a primary initiative.
Okay. So they might say it was for the Palestinian cause, but more obvious is that if you have a bunch of people sympathetic to Hamas, which is a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot, that's going to agitate.
And again, history. If that was their reason, why did they eradicate 50,000 Palestinian people living in Egypt, Rafah, in 2017? They eradicated them.
Well, as in displaced, which is a difference between temporarily displaced into the rest of Egypt, who knows where they all went, or back into Gaza.
Or back into Gaza. But that's a fact. And the UN did report on it, although it didn't, you know, wasn't there weren't protests in the United States about it, where the UN reported that they were doing this out of counter-terror is what they called it. They destroyed thousands and thousands of homes on their side and displaced that entire Palestinian population on their side of the border.
I'd also say I met and had dinner with a refugee from Gaza who had paid an extremely high fee.
To evacuate via the Rafah crossing via the south, and he ended up in Egypt and then eventually went up to Greece.
So the estimate is 100,000 Gazans have left through Egypt if they pay anywhere from $22 to $10,000.
Okay. And so, and that money is going to the Egyptian government?
Correct. Oh, to the Egyptians. To the Egyptians. Because you have Egyptian military. Again, this is, we have a Western way of thinking about things sometimes, like I understand enough about the Middle East going, just because that went to somebody on the Egyptian border doesn't mean it was going to the government. You have military commanders doing their thing. You have the tribes that have been there for a very long time that are experts at smuggling in and out. There's so many elements that profit from this.
Can we... So obviously it's, we haven't got the time to go into, we've already gone into so much detail, but by the time that the war has moved from the north back down to the south, as we've talked about, we then get to this sort of period, the beginning of this year with the two-month truce.
And I just wanted to get your sort of take on how we, I guess I'm kind of interested in the kind of the Colonel Spencer history of how we get to that period, and just in terms of getting from, I want to say, unpick that with you so that we can see where we get from there to where we are now. What's your sort of understanding of how the war had progressed by the time the IDF were coming down the south?
So again, two years is hard to summarize. You rightfully said we started on the first phase where the IDF targeted northern Gaza because it's the heart of the military. Going back to what we talked about, the three goals, the three goals for the war haven't changed since October 8th: return the hostages, destroy Hamas's military and its political power, and but also prevent any threat from coming.
Militaries are very comfortable per se attacking other militaries and destroying other militaries. Now, the hostage situation, which is very complex even for the military, where do they go? Right? There's been areas in Gaza that to this day have been untouched for two years because of the density and sensitivity of where the hostages are. The likelihood that you could get them without them being killed is very low just based on the location.
As the war progresses, the IDF is putting pressure in destroying Hamas's military, targeting its leadership, as in from the, you know, Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Mohammed Sinwar on down, but also targeting all the brigade, battalion commanders, destroying them in and out, right, these raids.
So even when we say they transitioned from northern Gaza, now they're shifting into central Gaza, like Khan Yunis, they didn't finish northern Gaza. They were doing, like they raided to Al-Shifa to remove that as a military headquarters and searched it, and then left and went back to operating capability. The way they've approached it has been on doing targeted objectives into the environment to target the military locations that are there, not clear every inch of it.
There is a way that other militaries might have done it using the clear, hold, and build status of clearing an area, holding it, never leaving that area as you progress forward to get to the enemy in other locations. But the IDF, for many reasons like the seven-front war and having to shift almost all forces to the north when that starts, don't hold areas in Gaza.
And if they do hold them, they hold them for a short amount of time and then they pull back and rotate out and they shift to other areas because it's too exhausting, it's too expensive, or it's not a good use of resources. One, it's a rotational military. So they have to rotate the reserves back and they have minimum amount of divisions that they had to then put in other areas like in the north or just doing other things or they're rotating and recouping and everything.
There is an element here of them also not wanting to occupy and govern Gaza. So to hold an area, right?
So as soon as the sort of conflict zone moves, they're now in, it's a different kind of game altogether.
So as we show this evolution, I know you want to do the evolution, is that they piece by piece target the Hamas military and start, then they went to Khan Yunis and attack the Khan Yunis battalion. Then they go to Rafah and the two Rafah battalions, and they are very successful at destroying Hamas's coherent military capability.
And by that I mean their ability to hold ground as a coherent formation and do operations at that scale, whether it's battalion, company, or even platoon level operations. You still have a guerrilla force all across because, like you said, many elements are saying, 'I ain't staying to die,' and they just move and they try to reform and do operations in other areas.
So they went to northern Gaza, went to Khan Yunis, went to Rafah, and then target back to northern Gaza in different areas, wherever the Hamas military they're trying to destroy, while they have to stop at times, right? So of the two major ceasefires, they have to pull 100% of everything out to allow for hostage exchanges. So Hamas asked for thousands of prisoners that are replacements as well to leadership and everything, as you have to pull out and then deal with everything. Then you have the humanitarian aid delivery situation.
The prisoners, by the way, is another way in which Israeli, their behavior, i.e., instead of killing various Hamas people and taking them prisoner and holding them, they then have to send them back. Whereas if they'd eliminated them, that wouldn't be in that situation where they're vulnerable of giving back leadership. Have I understood that correctly? Or is that a bit...
It's a little macabre. Sorry. You can kill somebody if they're trying to kill you. I mean, there's like, there's reasons on when you can use lethal force versus capturing somebody.
I don't think killing... killing Hamas high command.
Yeah. Look, killing is terrible. War is terrible. I think that goes without saying. I mean, I guess we haven't said it in this conversation, but it does go without saying. We both want the war to end and etc.
But in order to do that, if you kill the high command, then the war comes to an end much quicker, hypothetically.
Hypothetically, although that's not always the case, right? This is the ideal. So I've heard somebody say that, you know, Israel should have declared victory after they killed Yahya Sinwar. And I think that's ridiculous because they hadn't achieved any of the three goals, right?
So what they declared, which would have been July of 2024 when they got Yahya Sinwar, if they would have just, oh, victory, good enough, we're leaving, and they would have left 50-plus hostages, living hostages, behind, would have left Hamas in power to do what it says it's going to do. Would have, I mean, it literally would have created such a terrible condition for Israel. Yeah. In general, it wouldn't have been any type of a victory in achievement of military goals.
That's, I dealt with this a lot as a professor of strategy, is like, what does winning look like? Well, a military analyst is, did one side achieve their goal or not? And there are mediums of like they achieved their goal of surviving and got you whatever it is, and there's land exchanges, there's all this stuff.
But in this case, it's pretty clear both sides have very clear goals, although Hamas is more intangible, like the destruction of Israel. But their victory for this war after October 7th was just to survive it. If they survived the war as an organization, not as a living fighter, but as an organization, then they were victorious. They attacked Israel like they did on October 7th, and they survived it as an organization.
We've assumed that, and I certainly would assume that. But do we have intel that that's actually what they were thinking?
We have to take their leadership's words. So we have access to leaders, and I'm talking about the Qatar leaders since October 7th, and what does victory look like for them? So same thing when, you know, Macron and others designate a state of Palestine, and the Hamas leadership then does an interview going, thank you very much, this is it.
He literally, so recently the Hamas leader just in a very long interview with Jared Diamond said, look at what we did because of October 7th, we got people to designate a Palestinian state. You literally call it the fruits of October.
That's right. That's right.
And their survival is the benefit of that as well. So they will survive as an organization. This gets to the current negotiations about Hamas not existing. The 20-point plan that's been proposed, very detailed, shows how Hamas cannot survive as an organization politically or militarily, but the Hamas leaders are trying to argue that their survival is a part of the Palestinian resistance and etc., etc.
Well, they're willing to give up political control. They want to exist and be a part of it. They probably want what's called the Hezbollah model, where they don't have political control, but they have military control, right? Which isn't acceptable as well. But the ideal that, well, they do have some political control. They do have some, but they had three, they're a military within, they're terrorists with a state within a state.
They do have some influence, although it's been definitely weakened since October 7th in the actual political apparatus, right, a political party. But their military controls terrain, and that's what Hamas would want in Gaza. Even they don't control all of Gaza, they would want parts where they'd rebuild their power.
According to them, again, like you said, documents or statements, they want to rebuild and do October 7th over and over. But this latest interview where they say that October 7th led to the designation of Palestinian state, led to Hamas being recognized as a leader of the Palestinian people, that's them articulating victory after October 7th.
Could be, but it could also be them trying to do their own PR and persuade themselves and the people that they govern that they've done a good job and the sacrifices were worth it.
A lot of people in the West, particularly in America, Britain, have the anti-Israel types, have shown great concern about the support from Western countries to Israel. I wondered whether you might explain. You've already mentioned the bulldozer parts. What actual weaponry from America and Britain specifically? I asked for those. I'm probably more interested in Britain given that I'm British, but what weaponry have we given to Israel and how was it used during the Hamas-Gaza war?
So I know more about the American because I'm an American than I do the British. It isn't just stuff, although there's some very critical things to include like Iron Dome interceptors that are mostly made in America products, but there's a whole list of just artillery ammunition, mortar ammunition, of course, the different bomb sizes.
The 2,000-pound bomb was one that was marked as some type of vicious weapon, and I wrote about that. The MK84, which is an American, or even the JDAM kit. There's a kit you put on a bomb that makes it more precise that is again a US-made product.
I think you could do this spectrum of what actual end item device, although Israel is a very big producer of military technologies, very advanced technologies that the US military benefits from — from like the Iron Dome interception or the Trophy active protection system, medical gear, all this stuff. But when you start to parse it down to what product is made, you can get to like Apache helicopter parts, the F-35, which was critical during this war as well, the F-35 and its parts, which you can put restrictions on how it's used and who is it used against.
So you have all the flying apparatuses that have some type of American, you have all the actual ground items like the Caterpillar, although they make their own systems, there's a lot of interchangeability. And one of the reasons — and this gets to like the disinformation agent or anti-American person that says they don't want their taxpayer dollars going to Israel. So from as an American, I can say like the amount of foreign military sales that the US gives to Israel. So we give Israel maybe a foreign military sales amount of money, but then tell them that 90% of that has to be used on buying American products.
So this is where the circle goes, as in we're giving Israel something. We didn't really give them anything. We gave them resources with which to buy a product that they need for their military, but that then drives the economy, our own economy, in the sales of that, and it creates the reliance of Israel on that product, whatever it be, whether it's the Caterpillar part or whatever.
Is it aid money or is it a loan? Do the Israelis have to pay it back?
There are different variations of it, but most of it's the foreign military sales where they get it, they don't have to give it back, but they have to use the product on American. So the Americans who are anti-Israel are somewhat justified in saying, why were we sure we're — it's fueling the American economy, but I don't want the American economy fueled this way. And then, you know, we're not even going to get our money back from Israel. If they're anti-war, anti-military establishment, yes, they could do that going, I don't want my — I don't want the military-industrial base that creates jobs for. So that sounds like a pretty sound argument. You don't even have to be anti-Israel. You could be anti-war, but then they had to do a line item of all the countries because Egypt's very high on that list on how much money goes to Egypt to buy. You'd have to look at this whole element of foreign military sales, and if they wanted to say, 'Sure, you want to cut the factories that create artillery rounds, whatever.' Same thing what's happening with Ukraine when they throw a dollar figure out, they say the United States is giving Ukraine — the United States is not giving Ukraine very little actually. The presidential drawdown was us giving them military equipment and then us restocking our equipment with newer stuff. So there are some people with some validity if they want to be isolationist and say I don't want any of my money going into the US economy then to support military sales to another country. That's I think a novice, naive position to have, but they could do that. That's different than saying I don't want my tax —
Why do you think it's novice and naive?
If the post-World War II global international order is backed by the American might, which includes the military-industrial base, the evolution of military technologies like Israel's partnership with the United States has whetted immense amounts of military capability which keeps us as a superpower in the United States. And the significance of America staying as a superpower is because if it isn't a superpower and it's a vacuum created, other superpowers will come in and they might not be so — or even for me, it's not even that, it's that the international order starts to unravel. Like this is where you have like the Russians and the China who say now that American influence and power is weakened, we'll start whetting you like they did with like Russia did with taking Ukraine. Like what are you going to do to me? I know it's against the UN charter that we set up and everything, but what powers are going to stop me? Nobody. And it's a sitting member of the only body that matters, which is the UN Security Council. So I guess that yes, you're right in what you just said, but for me it's much larger than that. Not only does another power fill the vacuum, and we see this right, China's influence in Pakistan and other locations, and where it's trying to go in Iran, all Russia — yes, there's always a great power competition is what we call it, but the actual backbone to the international order right now is backed by a Western — I wouldn't say just United States power alliance which relies on all of these systems, even the naval kind of free flow of goods and services which mattered. Again, why does the military East matter? Is that these — the Suez Canal, ton states, all these things matter in the whole system working, as we saw with Signalgate, and yes, we saw the Americans having to step in there to protect European shipping.