The question of what is your civilian to combatant ratio has never been asked of any nation in any war in history. And there are so many we could do a whole podcast about why. Why is it? Because the idea that you could have a casualty count in the moment, the idea that who is the person saying that was a combatant or that is a non-combatant, because in my world there's no civilians. There's either you're a part of the fight, you're a named member of an organization, or you're partaking in the fight. And there are many ways to partake in hostilities, like holding hostages, providing intelligence, bringing you — there's lots of reasons. But the idea that anybody in a modern war could go point at a body and go, 'That was a non-combatant innocent civilian,' is basically anti-intellectual. And that wouldn't mean just legal, moral, anything. If you have to understand the law of proportionality, like all these things, it's just never been asked because it's not the question that needs to be asked. The question is, has, you know, whatever, if we're using Israel, has Israel followed the laws of war, taken all precautions to protect civilians, like all these things. And the answer is overwhelming yes.
Hi culminators. Thank you once again for joining us on our adventure into thinking about what the heck's going on in this crazy world. And it has gotten crazier. One of the people who I have consistently found useful in helping me understand the craziness, especially with respect to contemporary events involving the military, is John Spencer, known on X as Spencer Guard. John Spencer is an award-winning scholar, professor, author, combat veteran, national security and military analyst. He has written the book literally on understanding urban warfare. And to a large extent, almost all the warfare we're talking about these days is urban warfare one way or another. He's got so much going on. I'm going to just tell you to go to johnspenceronline.io bio, because don't you hate it when you go to a seminar and you pay money for the seminar and they spend 10 minutes talking about all the qualifications, and you know it's great for someone's, you know, for your mom. But John, welcome to the program. Thanks so much for joining us.
Well, thanks for having me, and I agree. My statement should be the record, not necessarily what I've done in the past.
Very, very good. John, you've had apparently a really interesting career. So I want to hear in your own words — I don't know what other words you might use — but like if you would explain how you got to where you are, which I assume is something that you are passionate about and enjoy doing. It certainly seems that way. And you seem to have a very strong desire to spread the understanding that you have in public fora, which is a very long distance from going into consulting for a defense contractor, which is, you know, obviously where the money is for former military. But what's the story? What's the John Spencer story? Where are you from in the first place?
Originally from Indiana, southeast Richmond, Indiana. Grew up pretty low income. Mom working three jobs to raise three kids. I joined the US Army at the age of 17 before I even graduated high school because that's basically the only path out — there wasn't going to be college or anything like that for me. And I got everything that the Army says it would give me. I drank the Kool-Aid, as we say. But I got the adventure, I got the profession, education, I got college, I got character, I got service, duty, I got it all. My first duty station was Panama City, Panama. So I was thrust into the military and was in many ways reformed in the military. I served for 25 years on active duty. Had an amazing career of opportunity and mentorship, and just amazing all the way up to achieving my master's at Georgetown, working in the Pentagon. At one point I was a part of a small think tank for the top four-star of the US Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army. Really, that's where my academic kind of direction started to happen. Before that I was focused on soldiering, being the best soldier leader I could be. I had served two tours in Iraq, both as a platoon leader and a company commander. But once I got into this higher form of looking at the military, geopolitics, everything — for a year I worked on a project for that four-star and all he said was, 'Look at, you go look at something that I'm not looking at.' So I learned about research methods. I learned about how the Army and military runs, from acquisitions to everything. And for a year we looked at megacities, so cities over 10 million people in population. There's over 30 of them around the world, but they're exponentially growing because there's such rapid urbanization and population growth around the world. Looked at megacities for a year, finished our study, did a report. Then I moved to West Point where I was basically teaching both military tactics and I was actually teaching military strategy there, but also still had a love for research, helped create the Modern War Institute that I work for now at West Point while teaching, but also getting more involved in research and understanding that there really wasn't research on wars that were going on now. One of the mentors that we had there was a, you know, former New York Times editorial board, everything. He basically taught me how to write and I fell in love with writing and communicating it, because you mentioned it, which I think is a passion of mine, communicating the military complexity in a basic format, in an easily understood format. And I still to this day, you know, trying to help people understand, because I was teaching like all those military theories of like Sun Tzu and all that stuff and translating all that to things that are happening on the ground. I retired in 2018. I continued working with the Modern War Institute, but more as we had started developing a very unique thing, which is going into recently concluded wars or battles and doing field research. We called them contemporary battlefield assessments. So I started, but I actually came out and I was writing about urban warfare. So that's where the love of urban warfare — one, I had working in the Pentagon, knew there was a gap, knew it was the future of warfare, just the present and future of warfare. Then I became kind of this war researcher though, where I was going into combat zones, going into Ukraine. I had a moment there where I was able to help the Ukrainians by writing a book on how to defend your cities based on like a decade of looking at urban warfare, successful defenses and things. Then October 7th, and so the path has been very unique and I've followed it. But you asked about the passions. Of course I have a passion for writing. I have a passion for research because I think there's many reasons why we don't have people in the US apparatus that go into active war zones. We used to do it, used to be called combat observers. We don't do it anymore. That's a separate topic. But you know, when you're in a field where there is no — because the purpose of like a PhD is to expand the body of knowledge, whatever study you're in, field you're in, and you'll do this board where they say, 'Are you doing something new?' Well, I fell into a category of urban warfare where for many reasons nobody covers it. So I was like, it's like a pot of gold in an academic study. Like, what do you mean nobody's doing this? Very few people doing it. So I just became, you know, strongly writing about it. Then to do something after I retired that nobody else is really doing either, which is going into active zones, not as a reporter. I'm not a reporter, I'm a researcher. And to do that, and then, you know, of course as you know, on October 7th I had all this information after years and years of study that was found to be very useful for people to understand what was going on, what they were seeing in front of their eyes. And then it became a question of character, right? So I immediately saw, which I'm sure we'll talk about, misinformation immediately coming out, and I was the guy in the room going, 'That's not right.' You also have to have the courage to stand up and say that, where there's lots of people who have information but they're for whatever reason not willing to stand up. Those 25 years of the US military, being a father now, if anything the military gives you character, and it's the right thing to do to stand up for the truth, and that's another passion I have.
You took the words right out of my mouth, because you're obviously motivated by spreading the truth, because it is. Truth is — I don't think I have — no one made this up. The first casualty of war, as you picked up. I'm an amateur student of war like a lot of people my age, old warriors. You know, guys who grew up when the World War II veterans were all over the place. And the use of disinformation amplified by social media is mind-boggling. And well, I do want to get to that in more detail, but before we get into that, a couple of things about your career and you. For example, you mentioned this focus on urban warfare. And as you described it, it occurred to me that you are building on the focus on counterinsurgency that was so big in the 80s and 90s after the terrible experiences of Vietnam, where we learned that being bigger, better, faster, and deadlier doesn't necessarily win. But Vietnam, of course, was not an urban environment at all. Quite to the contrary, it was a jungle. We nonetheless saw a counterinsurgency becoming a really relevant issue in Iraq, not a jungle, not an urban environment either. To a large extent, my amateur observation was that increasingly, notwithstanding the political and the asymmetric pressure that was put on the military toward the end of that engagement, tremendous adaptation and lessons were learned. Nonetheless, it still ends up being, I think, considered to be an unsuccessful, you know, engagement. But where we are now is in this world of urban warfare, which Gaza in many ways, I guess, typifies. We're not moving that. That's where the action is. Nations, advanced nations don't fight each other anymore. They have to engage in these really problematic, unromantic and, how shall I put it, unsatisfying kinds of disputes. Anything I say make any sense?
Well, it makes sense. You know, of course, the professor, scholar in me, you know, the Socratic connection of the dots, right? So, you're right, Vietnam, jungle warfare, although it was punctuated by like the Tet Offensive, which was all urban-centric, and you had the Battle of Hue that I've written the case study about. You also mentioned about the lessons that were learned. So coming out of that war which had left a lot of scar tissue, and we could even the aspect like you said about social media, you know, what's called the Cronkite effect, which was a big part of the Vietnam War, when he comes out of the Tet Offensive, just happened to be on the ground, comes back, tells a trusted — which we could get into as well — a trusted source of information, tells the world he doesn't see a victory here. The president says, 'Well, if we lost Cronkite, we've lost the war,' which was really a strategic basically turning point for the war. War is a contest of will. We won every battle in Vietnam, but we lost the war because you lose the population, who doesn't view the American interest there to fight a counterinsurgency for a government that's struggling for its own legitimacy. South Vietnam had many issues with corruption, things like that. So there's the complexity there. But something that interested me was the knowledge, right? So the IDF, the US military, they are schools of thought from their beginning to their evolutions and the way they think about things. I've talked many times to General David Petraeus, who was really one of the warrior scholars, still is, who had to rail against the institution because after Vietnam, of course, the US military is like, 'We never want this again,' and just threw away their lessons from the history of counterinsurgency. And General Petraeus put together a team to write, to really dust off the counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, which is kind of the way we do things, and he had to fight amazing uphill battles between the military to even say that there is history here, that was where it worked, why it worked, what is it needed to work, and was the successful things like the surge and aspects of that. You're right on the urban aspect though. It is — I mean, urban warfare has always been here. Like we have a global history of really the reason you have military is that you would send them out of your castle or out of your city-state to go fight the army that was coming to besiege you, so you didn't have to have siege warfare. We have the history of military are about cities, fighting for cities for many reasons, population growth. I mean, you don't have vast expanses of open areas to have battles anymore. I mean, you're going to hit a city. Where what are the, you know, the political objectives? Like you said, we have this, you know, Westphalian, post-World War II, very geopolitically connected world where cities are the economic engines, the political engines of nations under this global international order. So if there is going to be a war, and this is why again why I was so ready for the Ukraine wars, because if Russia wants to take a nation, you got to take its capital, you got to take its source of power, we call center of gravity. So many elements of what you said are like, you know, multi-hour conversations in different directions.
And I appreciate that. I mean, there's no question that if given the opportunity, I would pick your brain for hours. But at a certain point, we lose people and you lose income. There is a — you know, I think one of the most useful things I can talk about, because it's something that I'm actually part of, whereas I've never been part of any military organization, is the social media aspect of modern war, because as you know, Vietnam being this great paradigm for that, not only did we lose the Vietnamese population, we lost the domestic population. That took years. That took years. Yes, you use Walter Cronkite's unilateral surrender as a tipping point, but it was a multi-year process. Today the disinformation starts not immediately. It's coordinated ahead of time. And in fact, we saw it with the United States government doing it, doing a deception almost as good as the First US Army Group, you know, level of high-level deception on social media on the eve of the US deployment of B-2 bombers over Iran. There's obviously two battlefields, right? There's the battlefield, the one where you get killed or killed, and then there's a political battlefield. One thing I guess we still haven't learned, and tell me if I'm wrong, I'd love to hear that I am, is how to deal with all right, the paradigm — I've used the word twice within one paragraph — of terror, of insurgency or terrorism, is: I have nothing to lose. I'm outmatched, I have nothing to lose, you have institutions, you have infrastructure, and you value what you have more than highly. So therefore, I'm going to destroy those things. I'm going to give you the impression that I'm essentially desperate and that my life means nothing to me. And in the process, I'm going to also put — I'm going to use all kinds of campaigns, whether it's traditional media or social media, to undermine the political willpower for you to destroy me. Because if you were a dictatorship or a monarchy, you could destroy me just based on the scorecard, based just, you know. Yes, it's true. It doesn't always work. Look at how poorly the United Kingdom executed its imperial military obligations in the 20th century. But all things being equal, none of these troublemakers would stand a chance. So what do they do? They find allies. They establish allies among American institutions and all right, blah blah blah. This is like I said, same playing book. I was a kid growing up and I saw this happening. It was so obvious to me. I was watching Walter Cronkite. Have we learned anything about how to deal with that other than to some extent deploying it ourselves? The way — I mean, I think what Trump and Netanyahu have done so far, if I can be forgiven. You're taking notes, you're scaring the hell out of me by the fact that you're taking notes. Strikes me as more of a tactical than a strategic bluff. By which I mean they got cover for a major strategic operation. But as far as we know right now, and folks, we're recording this June 25th. Okay. I don't — by the time this goes, I don't know what we're going to have learned, but as far as I know they haven't really changed the big strategic picture of insurgency/terrorism that I was referring to before. And Iran — I'm treating Iran as essentially an extension of Hamas. Fighting them is more like fighting a terrorist entity than the traditional state actors. My question is ridiculous. It's like I'm giving the lecture here and I don't know what I'm talking about. You see what I'm getting at, right?
No, they're all fascinating topics. And I love to help people — not you, but like audiences — try to work through them. I mean, I wrote a piece on like, stop calling Hamas just terrorist. Because in my world of when it gets to, you know, there's war — war is the pursuit of political goals. You know, some people say like war on drugs and things like that. You know, from my perspective, when you're talking about the use of force by a nation state, declaring war, waging war, act of war, those all have important — same thing for terrorism. You know, terrorism, the use of violence against civilians to invoke fear to achieve political goals, it's highly debated in academic circles, like just the definition of terrorism, even non-state actor, right? So you have a — which is unique when we're talking about Israel, is that you have some very unique cases of, okay, what is Hamas? It's a non-state actor, it's in an autonomous area, it's not an internationally armed conflict because it's not a nation, Palestine is not a nation. You talk about Iran though, Iran deploys proxy warfare, which you kind of mentioned, which is, you know, basically it's historic as well. A nation using proxies to achieve their goal, not fight that nation directly because it would be, you know, an act of war, you know, international armed conflict. You know, the Cold War aspect of this from the, you know, go watch Charlie Wilson's War, our use of terrorists to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan through the use of proxies, right? So there's so many nuances there to the terms and looking at it when you talk about Iran though, right? Because I do believe in the post-World War II global, you know, international order, basically sovereign borders, when force can be used, when it cannot be used, you know, wars of aggression are war crimes, things like that, preemptive strikes, the Caroline doctrine, things. Iran is a nation state, but also the biggest global exporter of terrorism through proxy warfare, like acknowledged, doesn't deny it, does it, has a whole force called the Quds Force whose only job is to do that. I wrote so many things down because there are just so many nuances of even what you call deception, right? So deception, military deception, one term. You at the strategic level though, you have a political leader kind of being involved because the world has changed. I'm not a historian where like a lot of my historian friends will be like, 'That's not new,' you know, etc. You know, it's always it was here, here, and here. And even when I do that, I'm like, I'm not a historian because you're right, you know, the Cronkite moment is what we called it. Eventually it was called the CNN effect. Then it was called TikTok Wars and then it, you know, it's evolved. You know, where you were watching TV on a nightly basis to get your information about Vietnam, it was on your TV every night. Now you have the social media aspect, which is an algorithm driving you to the most negative parts about war. And I argue because that cognitive warfare, right, that cognitive plane, some people like other European armies sometimes will say like there's a physical domain and there's a cognitive domain. You're fighting for both in the warfare. That's not the way the US military kind of separates it. We call it information operations. It's part of all warfare. Where it comes into my world is the urban warfare. Like why is it so hard there? One of the reasons is that the sensors, right? So every citizen has a cell phone. There's more cell phones than there are humans on the planet, right? So there's like five per person in places all around the world. So the idea that you could have surprise, right? So this is where deception meets sensors, right? In the urban environments as we have seen, right, where there's so much open-source intelligence and the military is using it, and then like you send in a B-2 bomber, a stealth bomber, because there's somebody outside that base with a cell phone going, 'Look, I just saw some B-2s headed this direction,' right? So you have to get really inventive on your deception operations to achieve surprise in warfare, and same thing with Israel even after October 7th in Gaza. The other aspect is there's differences between deception, propaganda, information operations. There's like all these have different nuances. Influence operations is one of the terms that we use. So you're right that people like, you know, Goebbels and Russian and Chinese saying, 'I can't defeat this power, the Western alliance, the American government directly, but I'll erode their civilizations through the use of their citizens who are collecting information,' right? So that's why it's such a danger if, you know, Chinese government has access to all of our citizens' information on TikTok, although that's a very influential app. So there's so many elements of this when it comes down to, for my world though, in the urban environment, why is it so hard to achieve a military goal? And you're right, in conjunction with the growth of urban warfare across the spectrum of conflict, right? Because you have, you know, a Russian military force trying to take Kyiv and having a basically a whole-of-government defense is different than all of these non-state actors that have popped up around the world who can gain immense military advantages by getting inside of the urban area and using their population as a shield. It's called human shielding. Using the laws of war against the actual legitimate fight for whatever the just reason is. So many aspects. Definitely the world has changed and fighting a war has changed as we just saw. This was a, you know, this was two nations fighting a war just like we have Ukraine, Russia. But then you have Israel engaged in seven wars, some of them with non-state actors which are proxies to the Iranian Islamic regime. But when you look at it from the nuances of the context, it's no, that's a — okay, that's what we consider a non-internationally armed conflict because it's a non-state actor. The proxy element, it's acknowledged, but there's also all these nuances to definitions, laws, everything.
But these are real things. And a lot of people on social media, God bless them, tend to dismiss, 'Well, there's really no war.' Or you hear things like the victors write the history books, as if, you know, there is a slide towards nihilism — nothing matters and there is no truth and everything is a false flag. I mean, are there all these new tropes that everyone now is an expert on, on false flags and, you know, deception, you know, again, deception? The amazing thing is that to me, the Israeli political scene is every bit as vicious and aggressive as anything you see in the United States. In fact, I maintain that the Democrats — and I'm not pinning my partisanship on you — that the Democrats in the United States learned criminalization of political dissent from the Israelis who've been prosecuting criminal political threats since the 50s. They, on the other hand, when it came to this, to the operation that they laid out beginning in mid-June against the Iranians, the multiple levels of planning and execution, infiltration — that's one, I mean, that's one they're going to teach in the war colleges for quite some time to come, I assume.
All of it. I mean, just the fact that notwithstanding what we were talking about, which is that democracies have this vulnerability — that non-democracies have less of. It's a fall to say they don't have it, but they have much less of it. And Israel is a very noisy and very, you know, there are many, many things on which they do not agree, but they got their act together in executing this operation against Iran in such a phenomenal way. It seems to be a magic, a special sauce here that we didn't know existed.
Absolutely. And you're right. This will be taught in war colleges around the world for a very long time. Many elements of it, from the operational level, which is, you know, what we say is kind of the theater level, like this operation, down to the tactical, like the use of low — you know, the low-tech and deep intelligence, infiltration, drones, all of this, to that political level. Because I agree, like when I can see something that what right looks like, right? We're not in a world where you can't communicate, right? What Israel has struggled in communicating — kidding, right? So, Times of Israel chief editor says Israel is not bad at PR. Israel doesn't do PR, as an editor. He's like, 'We want information.' In this sense though, on communicating the objectives daily, on giving updates of the war daily, what's happening, what are you doing? In a ubiquitous instant information world that we live in, that's the level of communication that has to be done during a war, not just for your population, which is critical, but for all populations. And you saw that. So although this is just 12 days, and I believe the ceasefire will hold, 12 days, it was that level of information. You had multimedia presentations. I mean, it was amazing. And that's really important going forward because if you're not telling the story, other people are, right? So why did you do this? What's the goal? Right? You know how many times the senior political leaders had to say this is not about regime change. You know, regime change happens, but that's not the goal. And that was so important, especially with the United States, but I think in Israel as well. Now, if you transfer that though to like, why weren't you doing it in other areas? I have learned, and one of the books I want to write is The Israeli Standard. You know, I've been studying war — like I'll be in India next week. I was in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, you name it. There's something very unique to what the world thinks is allowed or what they think Israel's hidden agendas are. The standards of like rules of war that only are applicable to Israel. And this is again why I've been so vocal, not just because it's the right thing to do, because I had the information, and like your thing says about knowledge, I believe with great knowledge comes great responsibility, and I had a responsibility to communicate, to identify, like look what you just said, like the question of what's your civilian to combatant ratio, which I fought back against, is one — like if we're going to do this, lies, damn lies and statistics, let's be truthful about any comparable example. But that's never been a question to any nation in any war ever. And you know why? Because it's fraud.
Say that again, John. Say it again. Say that again, because that's something that never even occurred to me. Say it again.
The question of what is your civilian to combatant ratio has never been asked of any nation in any war in history. And there are so many we could do a whole podcast about why. Why is it? Because the idea that you could have a casualty count in the moment, the idea that who is the person saying that was a combatant or that is a non-combatant, because in my world there's no civilians. There's either you're a part of the fight, you're a named member of an organization, or you're partaking in the fight. And there are many ways to partake in hostilities, like holding hostages, providing intelligence, bringing you — there's lots of reasons. But the idea that anybody in a modern war could go point at a body and go, 'That was a non-combatant innocent civilian,' is basically anti-intellectual. And that wouldn't mean just legal, moral, anything. If you have to understand the law of proportionality, like all these things, it's just never been asked because it's not the question that needs to be asked. The question is, has, you know, whatever, if we're using Israel, has Israel followed the laws of war, taken all precautions to protect civilians, like all these things. And the answer is overwhelming yes. So when that wasn't working, I think Hamas and their backers saw that numbers were working. So they just doubled down on you the number, right? So the actual terrorist organization started putting out numbers daily that has been viewed as highly questionable. And I've thought that route, but you know, like I try to give other people comparisons because everybody wants this is a mental model, like how does this compare, like John, 10,000 or 50,000, this or that or whatever. You know, then I can run the numbers because I study war for a living, right? So the one example post-World War II that I like to give people is like the Korean War, right? Most people view it as a just war fought for real reasons. If they want to get into the specifics, they can. But there were 2 million civilians that died during that war. It was a 37-month war. That would be 54,000 civilians a month dying every month of the war. And but nobody was saying, 'Well, that means you have to — that's a genocide. That means you're doing things illegal. That's an unjust —' like all these things, like that's not the way that any of this works, right? War is hell. War is death and destruction. And we have evolved as societies, and I fight these groups as well, the anti-war groups. We have evolved as a society. We don't do things that we used to in like World War II. We would bomb civilian populations and military targets, but trying to convince them to give up the war goals and all these things. We had the Geneva Conventions and like all these things, customary law, all these things. The number one thing you don't do though is the primary what we call fundamentals of the laws of war, which are meant to put limits on the brutality of war. It isn't meant to make war illegal. Like you can never target a civilian, period, a non-combatant, like you're not — like that's been universally accepted. But since October 7th, this is why I've been so vocal, because if they're saying all these things about this is the way that war has to be, like your civilian to combatant ratio has to be this, like you're taking away even democracies, because we do have an issue with some nation states that just said like, 'I don't care about the laws of war. I have a nuclear weapon. What are you going to do to me?' Those, you have that conversation. But you have democracies like Israel and what they were saying about the United States, who are following the laws of war against combatants who are using the law of war against the world. And to say that they can't defend themselves would be insane. That's the level we were going towards.
And it's interesting that you're — this is another example of asymmetric, you know, tactics. You use the past tense. 'That's the level we were going toward.' Do you think we averted getting to that point?