I'm here now with Ken Rogoff. Ken is former chief economist at the IMF, professor at Harvard, world-renowned economist, I think it's fair to say, and he gave a talk here for lunch at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium. I'm going to characterize this talk, Ken, and welcome, by the way. Welcome.
You've been on this podcast before, and you're a great guest. But I'm going to characterize this talk as: I was right. So, tell us how you were right and give us the context.
Yeah, I mean, so during the 2010s, well into the pandemic, there was this very prevalent view on Wall Street and central banks, and absolutely emanating out of academic economics, that interest rates were not only low, real interest rates, they were going to be low forever, and actually nothing to worry about. They were going to get lower still. And the most famous person who espoused this was Larry Summers. And he's a great mind. I try to criticize him in every way. But to his credit he eventually reversed course, although he certainly didn't indicate that.
Not with the same forcefulness as that initial forcefulness.
And initial views, yeah, we did debates on it, and I... Anyway, we'll come back to that.
You had a good line at your speech that I lost every debate, but I think I was right.
No, no, absolutely. And... And then Paul Krugman was having a positive rate disingenuous, and yeah, what he was doing of claiming we had mistakes, and you know, it was just nonsense. But there was a lot of good, very smart young economists. It was an interesting problem. How can you write a model so that interest rates will go down and down? And they wrote very nice models about demographics, inequality, productivity. And they were science. It was good. But when you come to Jackson Hole, which they did, you're talking about policy. Can we rely on these things? And I would look at history. That's what a lot of my work is. Right. And if you look at history, real interest rates are sometimes high, they're sometimes low, until they're not. And the idea that we're going to create a new theory of the world, forgive me, this time is different, that interest rates are always below, was such nonsense. But it was so politicized.
It was very hard to push back.
So two points there. When you talk about history, you've got a paper with others in, thanks to the AEAR.
Goes back centuries. So you're looking at a very long span on real interest rates on long-term government debt.
What you need to do because it's not enough to say exactly today they were the same as in 2003. That's not really use statistical data. But if you look at really long periods, there's regression to mean, if that's not too jargonistic a word, things go back to normal.
But I thought the more fundamental point is just that real interest rates are volatile.
And they're very volatile.
Can move around. They have moved around.
They moved around. And by the way, that goes to the Fed. Well, you know, I was talking about fiscal policy there. But the Fed had all this science of R star, what should our load star, what should our target be? And I mean, I hate to pick on the Taylor rule, but I'm going to. You need to have some kind of interest rate met that's there. A real interest rate is critical to constructing it. And it's incredibly volatile. It collapsed during the financial crisis. It's way higher now. One of the struggles Kevin Warsh has is not only does he have to think about raising the Fed funds rate relative to what it started getting cut from, but where does it land? And we're probably in a world where interest rates are higher. So, yeah, I mean, this conference is a great conference, but definitely there were 10 or 12 papers about this.
Over the years. Over the years.
And then they had papers on debt.
Where debt is a zero issue. No one should ever think about that. Barry Eichengreen, he's a great scholar, had this paper that debt is very, very high.
Mark, it's probably okay for advanced countries, and I'd worry about Nigeria. And I'm sorry, you know, that's overblown.
So, well, let me, I want to underscore this point which you've made in a couple different ways this way. That the most interesting science, the things that gets published in the top economics journals, it's often interesting, not necessarily the right basis for robust policy making.
Exactly. It advances science.
It advances science. We learn something. Gets us excited as a profession.
I mean, in particular, you have a theory of one, the one thing that causes this thing. So, demographics leads to the interest rate. There are some brilliant young economists, like a paper they gave, I think it was last year here about this. Or inequality leads the interest rate to be really low or whatever. The fact is when you try to explain these financial variables, even real variables, it's very, very hard. And people have tried to do it. I think Tom Sargent, early in his career, wrote a paper about, you know, what the real interest rate is, a random walk. And Jim Hamilton, who's a great econometrician, did some papers, I want to say 10 or 12 years ago at least, where he said, I've looked at productivity, it just doesn't work. Now, that may be wrong, but it's not easy to do. So, I basically say to extrapolate taking 10 or 15 years of data 100 years in the future, right? You're kidding yourself.
So, another way to make the fundamental point here is, and you did use this word if I remember right, humility. You know, our knowledge of the economy, especially the macroeconomy, the broad sweep of the macroeconomy, it's primitive. We know some things, we have insights from economic theory, but we don't really know where the real interest rate's going to be in 5 years.
It's incredibly important as an economist to have humility in delivering your results.