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Kenneth Rogoff
Professor of Economics, Harvard University

The US Dollar And International Economics With Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff | Capitalism And Freedom

📅 May 22, 2025 Hoover Institution 60 MIN 32694 VIEWS 47 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Jon Hartley and Harvard University's Kenneth Rogoff, discuss Ken’s career as an academic economist, his time in international economic policy, rising sovereign debt burdens, monetary policy, the legacy of quantitative easing, exchange rate theories, tariffs, and the US dollar's status as the world reserve currency. ABOUT THE PODCAST Capitalism and Freedom in the 21st Century is a video podcast series, and the official podcast of the Hoover Economic Policy Working Group, that focuses on getting into the weeds of economics, finance, and public policy on important current topics through one-on...

Questions asked in this interview

8
  1. 0:35How did this sort of pivot happen from chess grandmaster to grand economist?
  2. 2:20So how did you fall into economics?
  3. 11:40How do you think about those results in light of ever increasing public debt today and what's your outlook for the US and global fiscal situation?
  4. 20:47What about the people who say, you know, the ability to have cash on hand, whether it's under a mattress or whatever, sort of a fundamental freedom meant to sort of check the power of governments?
  5. 29:52I mean, how useful is forward guidance now when, you know, we're no longer at the zero lower bound?
  6. 34:43And what are your general thoughts on the dollar reserve currency status?
  7. 46:31Have we made any progress in international economics in your mind or is it slowed in some way?
  8. 58:09You don't think it's maybe like, I guess, a policy uncertainty thing or, or just, I guess maybe some reallocation out of the US?
Jon Hartley 0:09 ↗
The Capitalism and Freedom in the 21st Century podcast, an official podcast of the Hoover Institution Economic Policy Working Group, where we talk about economics, markets, and public policy. I'm Jon Hartley, your host today. My guest is Ken Rogoff, who is an economics professor at Harvard University, one of the great international economists of our time. He's also a former IMF chief economist and a chess grandmaster. Welcome, Ken.
Kenneth Rogoff 0:30 ↗
Thank you for having me, Jon. Congratulations on the success of this podcast.
Jon Hartley 0:35 ↗
Well, it's a real honor to have you on. As someone who does international economics in my own work, it's a huge honor and just so excited to have you on and to have this conversation. I just want to start with your early life. And I know you were born in Rochester. You're an undergrad at Yale. You're a chess prodigy and chess grandmaster. I think a lot of people know this. How did you come to find economics? Make your way to grad school doing a PhD in economics at MIT, where you studied under Rudy Dornbusch. I know your first job was at the Fed board. What was the path from there to Harvard? I'm curious. How did this sort of pivot happen from chess grandmaster to grand economist?
Kenneth Rogoff 1:25 ↗
Well, short version, I decided to go to college, which was unusual. I had more or less dropped out of high school and was living on my own in Europe. I was doing very well as a chess player. I was rising fast. I was earning plenty of money. I actually earned more as a chess player in real terms than I did as an economist till quite a bit later in life. Although, of course, I think, as you probably know, that says something about the pay of academic economists as much as chess. And it was much worse when I was starting out. So I just decided to go. I just decided not to be a chess pro. Very unusual decision. I am still quite famous in chess for having stopped playing chess and better known for that than you might imagine. How I fell into economics was, I just didn't know what I wanted to do.
Jon Hartley 2:20 ↗
So how did you fall into economics? I took a high school class, and that sort of did it for me. And that was kind of it.
Kenneth Rogoff 2:27 ↗
So you were a prodigy. You were inspired in high school and knew you wanted to do economics in college already when you arrived?
Jon Hartley 2:36 ↗
Well, it took... I always knew I wanted to do it, but for me, it took a long time, I guess, just in the sense that I knew I always wanted to do it, to get a PhD and so forth. But you know, I spent five years working at Goldman Sachs. I did a couple master's degrees as well. So it took some time to get there. But yeah, for me, I also wanted to spend some time sort of in the private sector seeing how things in the real world worked. And it's worked out great in the sense that it's informed some research well. But I take it it's a slightly different path for you.
Kenneth Rogoff 3:09 ↗
Yeah. So when I went to college, I had missed quite a bit, frankly. My high school was very weak academically. It's since gone into receivership, don't go there. But I mean, I'm not sure what I would have learned at my high school either. But I lagged a lot at Yale and I was doing Russian studies. That, and I was thinking about the environment was an idea. This was in, gosh, you know, the early 70s that I was an undergraduate at Yale. But I had a friend, Jeremy Bulow, he's actually, I think you know him, he's at Stanford, who, like you, knew he wanted to do economics from high school. I think he saw Milton Friedman speak when he was 12 years old or something and just knew he wanted to be an economist and was making all the right moves. And he's a great economist, but he was evangelical and he brought myself, John Geanakoplos, who's the Kohl's professor at Yale today, he just roped us both into economics and said, this is something you should do. And I think what I liked about economics was I felt like it was very flexible in what part of your brain you could use. At least in the courses, you know, you could have stuff that was very mathematical. Not that I consider myself great at stuff that's very mathematical, but, you know, I was solid and at the same time you could be doing history, which I liked a lot, and on and on. I mean, one of the wonderful things about economics is you can kind of pick what you're interested in. So I like that. But during the summers I played chess. I stopped playing chess, but I didn't play during the school year, not at all, but I played during the summers and actually kept getting better. But that wasn't helping me as an economist because at some point it's very helpful over the summers to do something that relates to what your thesis might be, what you're thinking about. So I would say I was sort of a mile wide and an inch deep as an economist. I was a very good test taker. I don't think I understood anything that I was taking tests on, but if I just had to memorize something, I could do it. But playing chess in the summers was exciting and fun and I was doing well, but it wasn't maturing. And then I went to graduate school and I didn't even know what being an economist was. I knew that if you went to law school, you had to work at a law firm in the summers. And I was thinking, I could go to graduate school and I could keep playing chess in the summers. Boy, was I wrong about that. So when I got to MIT, I happened to be in a great class with people like Ben Bernanke and Maurice Obstfeld and Jeremy Bulow and many others. These people lived their whole 24 hours doing economics and it gave them a depth of understanding. And it wasn't just about doing the homework. It was about really knowing what you're about. I didn't, you know, I sort of moved along. I actually dropped out of graduate school because I qualified to represent the United States in the World Championships, which was only every three years. And I played. I didn't do as well as I should have. I think I finished 11th, but I hadn't prepared a lot for that. I was trying to do graduate school. I was trying to chase. I sort of, okay, I can't do both. So I made a decision. I would just do economics. But it still took me a long time to sort of mature to really be an economist. I had Rudy Dornbusch as my advisor, as many people did. So inspiring. What a larger-than-life person. We compare him to Orson Welles or something. His love of pies, you know, his love of thinking, his love of debate. And he drew. He was very exciting. I'd say Larry Summers was very influenced by him. Many of the people I named, he was amazing. Stan Fischer was also his buddy. And I think they went running together and did everything together. They wrote a textbook together, and he was on my thesis committee too. But I still wasn't an economist. And I think I was only in graduate school basically three years, and I just wanted to leave. And I remember Stan Fischer looking at my thesis and saying, 'Ken, do you really want me to sign this?' And I said, 'Yeah, I want to leave.' And he did. And I left and I got to the Federal Reserve, which back then was a bit of a backwater compared to what it is today. Now the Federal Reserve research department is just amazing. I mean, you know, particularly in macroeconomics, but also in many other things. But back then, it's not something people wanted to do. And actually Bob Solow and Paul Samuelson both said, 'What are you doing going to the Federal Reserve?' I had some pretty good academic offers, not that I had a thing to offer, but they knew I was a really good chess player, and they were sort of willing to make me an offer because of that. So I got to the Federal Reserve and I was at sea. I frankly would... They give you a lot of time to do your research when you're a new staff member. And I would like lie on the floor in my office. And I had no idea what to do. It's very hard as a young researcher to figure out what to do. And it took a while, I think. I wrote one paper that was clearly a huge hit about why it was difficult to understand exchange rates. That surprised people a lot with Richard Meese that I would say stood up for many, many decades and even to today. But the paper that really changed my life was people were worried about inflation in the 70s and what to do about it. Kydland and Prescott had written this very influential paper that Barro and Gordon extended, which was trying to explain it as a game theory problem, saying that you'd always be tempted to inflate. And since the central bank moves second, they're always going to inflate and try to fool people. And the general conclusion was that the only solution, that's what Kydland and Prescott said, was to have a rule. But that really begs the question of if you have a powerful, not just Trump, but a Nixon, Reagan, Lyndon Johnson, you think that's going to stop them if the Federal Reserve has a rule? No, they have a lot of say. And so because I was in the Fed and I didn't go to a university, I think I got an idea I don't think I ever would have got at a university, which was creating an institution that was independent. That was a radical thought at the time. It became, I think it's still my most famous paper. I couldn't get it published. I sent it to the JPE, for example, and Barro said, 'Well, nice math, interesting, but the Fed would just be a veil. If the government wants to take it over, who cares? This is meaningless.' And I got different levels of reactions at different places. It got rejected at the AER, it got rejected at the QJE. And to make a long, this is already a long story shorter, Larry Summers heard of the paper and he loved it and he had become an editor at the QJE and he said, 'I know we rejected this, but please resubmit it.' And so, but that paper I worked on really hard. I'd be up in the middle of the night working on it, you know, thinking about things. And on chess I did that a lot, but I hadn't done that as an economist. And I mean, I think since then I've been like that. That was, you know, I think that's the moment, it was about three years in, that I really became an economist.
Jon Hartley 11:40 ↗
That's amazing. And central bank independence especially, I guess newly relevant with, I guess, the question about whether or not Humphrey's Executor will be overturned or not and the implications for the Federal Reserve being an independent agency. It's an amazing career path and clearly that work propelled you to Harvard where you are now and where you've been for some time. I want to start going through some of your key results and big pieces of work. A lot of these sort of encapsulated in various books. And I want to start with talking about public debt, given that public debt is certainly topical right now. In your 2009 book you cover public debt a lot, This Time Is Different, with Carmen Reinhart. You also wrote a related sequence of papers, the American Economic Review papers and proceedings, 'Growth in a Time of Debt.' And there's a related JEP article as well with Vincent Reinhart. And you sort of argue that there's a cutoff for public debt to GDP that's maybe around 90 to 100% or so, after which once a country sort of goes beyond that level of debt as a fraction of GDP, economic growth gets really bad. And you do this with lots of history. Many countries now, today, many governments around the world, including the US, are passing that threshold of 100% of debt to GDP. How do you think about those results in light of ever increasing public debt today and what's your outlook for the US and global fiscal situation?
Kenneth Rogoff 13:30 ↗
So first of all, our 2009 book really didn't have anything about that. What it did have was the first historical data set on public debt. It was an archival discovery that you could do it there. Since then, we gave all our data sources and the IMF cloned it pretty quickly and some others have, so that was something just new. Nobody had longer-term data that might make your head explode to think that's true. But it was. The IMF didn't keep it. They didn't. And even having OECD countries, those are the richer countries, they didn't keep it going back very far. Long story. So the 2010 paper, which the first one was just a short weekend conference note, that was what the AEA papers and proceedings were back then. We looked, we didn't say that when debt hits 90%, your growth suddenly slows. We didn't have any statistical test. We just divided debt into buckets over 20 countries and just said the periods where your debt's really low, growth is on average higher than when your debt is really high, and between 90% and below 90%. It's about a 1% difference. But the stupid interpretation of that, which some people did, and I would say particularly people like Paul Krugman who would use it as a cudgel, made it sound like when you go from 89 to 90, your growth drops by 1%. And we actually very quickly wrote things. No, that doesn't mean when you go driving at 55 miles an hour and you go from 56 miles an hour, you're going to crash. But cars going really fast on average have more things. We use the example of cholesterol. When your cholesterol is 199 and goes to 201, it doesn't mean anything. But on average, if you take everybody with high cholesterol and everybody with low cholesterol... And so I think that result has held up very, very well. There's 15 years of research on it, but there was this whole, people just felt, well, that you must be in favor of austerity if you think debt is a problem. And of course, I should think it's a book by Ezra Klein, I don't know if you've seen it, Abundance, or read it, where he's progressive, but kind of comes to the realization that progressives don't understand trade-offs. If you want to protect some little dart fish, but it means Los Angeles is going to burn down because you don't get water there, you might think about it. And that actually this whole austerity narrative, stimulus good, we say that very clearly, owing a lot of debt bad. But they couldn't accept the trade-off. And so the argument was there is no trade-off. It's a free lunch. And that's been made by the modern monetary theory people that you probably mocked on your podcast at one time or another. But it's not that far from secular stagnation. Certainly not that far from what Blanchard said in his presidential address and many others where they were sort of arguing interest rates are just going to drop and drop. So why are we worrying about this if you never have to pay the piper, you don't care about debt. But of course, if you look at a longer history of interest rates, and that's a major theme of my book, and I have an AER paper from August 2024 with Barbara Rossi and Paul Schmelzing. If you look at a long period, you have these periods where the rates are high, you have these periods where the rates are low. But there's quite a bit of reversion to mean, you always should have expected that. And if you don't mind my just going off on this a second lot longer, this whole notion stimulus is wonderful. We have to have more and more. Anytime you're not doing stimulus is austerity, and debt, you shouldn't care if it's high or low. And it's like I've said to some of them, okay, let's say you think that it's stimulus. They think it's fantastic that you know the Keynesian multipliers too. I mean, depending on when you use it. And I understand, you know, use it, you need to use it at the right times. Unlike when Biden used a lot of stimulus during a boom. But on average it's high. It's very good to have ammunition. So I said, well, okay, suppose there's a debt fairy and they wave a magic wand and our debt in the United States, instead of being 121% of GDP, is 60% of GDP. Just suppose, and the debt fairy says for the next 30 years, knock yourself out, you can do stimulus, an extra 2% a year for the next 30 years. And of course their progressive heads explode because it's so wonderful to be able to do the stimulus. And of course, you know, if they step back a second, what it is is they think it doesn't matter if the debt was 500% or 1000%. But I mean, I think a lot of research shows that's wrong, that the debt interest rate does rise as your debt goes up. So I think this sort of perverse era where everybody thought it was a free lunch has now passed. At least you were Goldman on Wall Street. I don't know about in academics. It's still, there are a lot of people who think this is an aberration, it's going to go back down. But I mean, I think that's sort of the central question around US debt today. If you believe that this is an aberration, that real interest rates are high, and you're not persuaded by the argument that as debt grows the interest rate goes up, as the world needs, it's an unfortunate position of needing to remilitarize, the interest rate goes up. Populism makes the interest rate go up, a lot of factors. If you're not persuaded by that and you think demographics is destiny, although Ross Schmelzing and I look at demographics over longer periods and it just doesn't work for explaining the real interest rate, then you shouldn't care. But I think we've arrived at this moment where the interest rate has normalized after a long period of a radically declining post-Volcker, I mean, the Reagan-Volcker period had this huge interest rate rise. So I see the US fiscal situation as very precarious at the moment. Even if we had a normal deficit of 2% of GDP instead of 7 or 8% wherever we're headed.
Jon Hartley 20:47 ↗
I want to talk a little bit more about interest rates and monetary policy. So maybe a little bit more about short-term interest rates for a moment. You wrote a book in 2016, The Curse of Cash. You advocated for abolishing paper currency in part. One of the reasons you gave is that it tended to be used in criminal activity or at least higher denominations of banknotes. And you sort of argued that, you know, it also makes sense in terms of implementing negative interest rates. It makes that easier to do because if there's always this option that you can put money in cash, you can lock in a 0% interest rate. And so I think, I know Sweden sort of largely abandoned paper currency, but I think that's one of the few cases. I'm just curious, does the recent, also maybe the recent backlash against central bank digital currencies not sort of cut against the idea that paper currency maybe should be banned? One of the reasons why I think central bank digital currencies are generally very unpopular. If you look at some of these surveys, people don't want this idea that there's some digital currency. That's the only option that can sort of be maybe taken away from them. If you had some sort of a malevolent government or dictatorial government. What about, you know, the, I guess, you know, to just sort of make the counter argument in favor of maybe, you know, keeping cash legal? What about the people who say, you know, the ability to have cash on hand, whether it's under a mattress or whatever, sort of a fundamental freedom meant to sort of check the power of governments? I'm curious what you say to sort of those, some of those counterarguments to those that are sort of in favor of getting rid of cash.
Kenneth Rogoff 22:29 ↗
Well, so my book's a little more subtle than abolishing cash. It is phasing out large notes and then over a long, long period and seeing where you stand then. And you know, a huge percentage of all cash is held in large denomination notes. In the case of the United States, about 80%. It's $100 bills. And of course that's compared to when I wrote the book. The $100 bill is like a $75 bill now thanks to all the inflation. So that's good. I argue that a huge percentage of this is used to evade taxes. And I think that's true. And a lot of the people that are really angry about it want to evade taxes. They think they shouldn't have to pay. And okay, I don't want to have, you know, infinitely high taxes, but when some people aren't paying taxes, people with the same income who don't have a cash business do have to pay taxes. I think that, you know, we absolutely, the privacy issue is absolutely an issue. But I think into the foreseeable future, if you had tens and twenties, like, what are you planning on doing that requires you to have $100,000 in cash? And I think we can debate that, but it's like, you know, there's again a trade-off in the privacy question. I was criticizing progressives before. I think I'm criticizing conservatives now. Privacy is a right up to what point? Like, is it your right not to pay taxes? Is it your right to do major, you know, violations of the law and a few thousand dollars, who cares? And you know, I think it is a question of whether we arrive at some kind of digital currency that people can use that provides some privacy. And crypto is definitely expensive for the government to trace. And crypto competes heavily in the underground economy. Now I have papers on this and I talk about it a lot in my book. In fact, you know, the dollar, the underground economy is probably 20% of global GDP. Again, I have another paper on that and again do surveys of it. And that's a big part of the dollar. The paper currency dollar market is the underground economy. And the dollar is losing in that already, that there are ways crypto is more efficient. So you know, the privacy issue, it's a question of balance. Where do you want to strike things? So on the negative interest rates is a different topic. You actually don't need to abolish cash. You don't even need to change anything to have net negative interest rates. And the Europeans and the Swedes didn't go this route. They didn't do it the right way. And you can have very negative interest rates by having an exchange rate between cash and bank money and having the exchange rate depreciate over time. So if you're holding cash, the value of it when you take it to the bank, the bank, meaning the Federal Reserve, goes down over time, whereas your bank money where you're getting a negative interest rate doesn't go down. So that idea has actually been around since the 1930s. I discuss it in the book. But in general, if interest rates, we are getting at the zero bound and we were to get in another situation where we really wanted to use monetary policy to stimulate the economy. But I think negative interest rates have just not been tried. You have to have the legal changes. But we have very negative real interest rates obviously. I mean, that happens all the time. German bonds have had negative interest rates more from the market than ECB policy. So I think it's an open question. In fact, we have a review coming up now of the Federal Reserve. After every five years it does a monetary strategy review. I don't know if you're, are you following that by the way?
Jon Hartley 26:45 ↗
So absolutely, absolutely. It's talking about at length at the Hoover Monetary Policy Conference just last week.
Kenneth Rogoff 26:51 ↗
And so what do you think about what they did in 2020, the asymmetric policy?
Jon Hartley 26:57 ↗
Yeah, the flexible average inflation targeting thing is, in my mind, it was built for the prior 10 years, in the era of being at the zero lower bound. And the biggest struggle in the minds of, I think, some central bankers was trying to get inflation above 2%. And at the time that was seen as a huge issue. Now with sort of a few years of way higher than 2% inflation, I feel like maybe there's going to be some calibration away from that. And it was asymmetric, and there's Bernanke's sort of temporary price level targeting idea. Yeah, I mean, all very interesting questions, but yeah, I think, I guess there's a good question about, I mean, it's very interesting that the Fed never went negative. And my understanding is that Bernanke did so not to disrupt money market in general, money market funds, but the ECB did go very negative and I mean to a point in the sense that they were constrained by, I guess, this fact that there's still...
Kenneth Rogoff 28:01 ↗
They hadn't dealt with cash, they hadn't dealt with preventing people from hoarding cash, which the ideas I have and the other ideas I talk about would. So they never. And because they hadn't dealt with it, it made the negative interest rates less effective because everybody knew they couldn't. There still was a lower bound. It just wasn't the same. Well, I mean, I think if we run in that situation again and at least a lot of people your age doing research don't agree with me and think interest rates are just going to go down and down and down and we haven't seen anything yet. I mean, I think you have to think about negative interest rates and we have to rethink that. It would involve making some, I think, fairly minor institutional changes to be able to accommodate it. So if they don't do that, if you don't do that, it causes all kinds of distortions. But if you do that, it's seamless at least. I mean, I, in my, and so I was a discussant at the 2020 and they didn't, I actually spoke at your Hoover Monetary Conference and they let, they welcomed having me talk about negative rates. But the Fed was like, please don't, you know, like. But what the policy they came up with was a disaster in the end. And I think they were influenced by it because they didn't feel they had a tool for what happens if interest rates fell low. So we can come back to that. But I regard that as a very live issue, not near term. Because I agree the inflation we've had the last few years has sort of disabused anybody of the idea that inflation's always zero. But it certainly could come back.
Jon Hartley 29:52 ↗
I agree. I mean, I do think that there's a lot of controversy and need for retrospection when it comes to flexible average inflation targeting or even forward guidance. I mean, how useful is forward guidance now when, you know, we're no longer at the zero lower bound? And so it's at least for now.
Kenneth Rogoff 30:12 ↗
But I thought everything they did at the Fed was kind of meaningless. So first of all, forward guidance. And Larry Summers has said that, I've said it too, but Larry Summers has said, I say in my book, but Larry Summers said it very eloquently, that the only people who are listening to the forward guidance is the Fed. And it ties their hands. The market pays zero attention. And the flat and the thing of average price level targeting, well, okay, but when the Fed overshoots with high inflation, where's the low inflation that makes up for it? I mean, they forgot about it the second it happened. It's not credible. Political economy matters at the Fed and it's not credible. I thought while we're at it, I thought quantitative easing after the financial, initial wave of the financial crisis ended was absolutely a bad idea. Like it's just smoke and mirrors because the Treasury owns the Fed. The Fed is buying the Treasury's debt with the one hand, it's issuing short-term debt with the other hand, which the Treasury owns. And it just gets really nonsense, and I think led just to some distortions in markets. But in some sense there was, you know, this feeling that they wanted to do something. And the Fed's still paying the price for that today.
Jon Hartley 31:39 ↗
Yeah, I mean, I guess there's some argument, you know, I've done some work a number of years ago just like an event study looking at, you know, the announcement effects at least of quantitative easing, announcements of regular, you know, Treasury MBS purchases and so forth and across countries when emerging market central banks aren't doing this during COVID too. And I think there is some case being made that means 20, 30, 40 basis points of an effect on the 10-year, which I guess is simulative and I totally agree with you that...
Kenneth Rogoff 32:13 ↗
So you would get the same effect by having the Treasury do what the Fed did. The Treasury could just issue more short-term debt and less long-term debt, it's not really a monetary policy.
Jon Hartley 32:25 ↗
Absolutely, in fact I have a separate debt management paper called 'Does Government Debt Management Matter?' And it kind of makes the case that maybe the Treasury should be issuing more short-term debt. If there's all this demand for short-term safe assets, maybe the Treasury should be doing that. Anyways, separate discussion, but I think the biggest challenge to me just, and I think it's maybe more of a political economy challenge, which is like the quantitative easing. It's just something that the Fed can't seem to get rid of in the sense that anytime basically potential markets and banks adapt to this new environment and then when they try and run down the balance sheet, you hit something like the repo crisis of 2019, suddenly they revert back. And so maybe if there was the right kind of communication and the right strategy, this could be done. I mean, maybe a Fed chair, Kevin Warsh would do something like that. He's been very critical, very consistently very critical of this sort of non-emergency lender of last resort type of quantitative easing and just buying Treasuries and remaining mortgage-backed securities as well. And so maybe, but I think it would require certainly an incredible amount of resolve in the face of, you know, pretty significant, you know, market disruptions to see it through. And maybe that will happen, but we'll see. I want to get to your...
Kenneth Rogoff 33:57 ↗
Just want to say that's an example of where your background at Goldman Sachs and I have students who work a couple years ago, it's very helpful to understand that kind of issue because you, it's really institutional and understanding markets. It's not just about, it's hard to express it with just math, you really need to have a textured understanding of markets.
Jon Hartley 34:18 ↗
Absolutely, and this adaptation thing that goes on too, it's very complicated in the sense that how markets sort of like certain things and latch onto them. And it's kind of how I guess some of these markets and the prices reflect that. I want to talk a little bit more about your new book that just came out this year in 2025 called Our Dollar, Your Problem. A lot of it's on...

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APA

Rogoff, K. (2025, May 22). The US Dollar And International Economics With Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff | Capitalism And Freedom [Interview transcript]. Hoover Institution. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265833/

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Kenneth Rogoff. "The US Dollar And International Economics With Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff | Capitalism And Freedom." Hoover Institution, 22 May. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265833/.

BibTeX
@misc{rogoff2025_3265833,
  author       = {Kenneth Rogoff},
  title        = {The US Dollar And International Economics With Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff | Capitalism And Freedom},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Hoover Institution. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {may},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265833/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}