Thank you. Thank you so much. I think I'm supposed to turn this on. Um, there we go. That looks like it. It seemed... No. Yes, that worked. Anyway, thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. I'm embarrassed to say I don't know if I've spoken at Rice before. I'm old enough I might have forgotten, but I did — I looked it up on my calendar, which I keep back, you know, 30 years, and I don't think I have. I've of course known many of you. So, you know, I don't know why that's possible that I haven't, but I'm really glad to get the chance. And thank you very much, Doyle and Flavio, for inviting me.
I'm very excited to talk about this topic. I'm not just going to talk about my book, but it builds on my book. Oh gosh, I took — yeah, so I have the cover here. And as Doyle said, the phrase 'our dollar, your problem' comes from this famous episode when Nixon suspended gold. Now, it wasn't technically a default, but it kind of was a default back in the 1930s when everyone could get gold for dollars. It actually said on your dollar bill — you can go look at an old one — payable in gold. And you could take it, at least if you had a big enough pile, you could take it to a bank or the Federal Reserve window and actually get gold.
And Franklin Roosevelt famously suspended that and eventually eliminated it. And that of course was a default. People who think the United States has never defaulted have never looked at history. I mean, of course, we defaulted after the revolution. You've seen Hamilton, but we defaulted in 1930. And that's, of course, economically, it's very clear it's a default. You promised to pay in gold and we had a lot of inflation then and it was worthless. But the Supreme Court actually ruled that it was a default. There's a book by Sebastian Edwards about this which shows this, and Franklin Roosevelt bullied the Supreme Court into sort of doing a decision which really had no bite. They said it's a default but no harm, no foul, and they basically awarded next to nothing.
Of course, if you were the United Kingdom, which held lots of dollars thinking it was gold, if you were India, it was a default. It felt like a default. It was a default. And, uh, 19 — I mean, when Argentina promised to pay one peso, you know, one peso is one dollar back when I was chief economist at the IMF, and they said, 'Just kidding, it'll be two pesos, $1.' That was a default. Now, their Supreme Court ruled it was legal, but, you know, it's the same thing. But now, what happened in 1970 was after World War II, we went into an exchange rate system where the dollar was convertible to gold and everything else was convertible to dollars. But the dollar was only convertible to gold for officials. But gold was still very important as an anchor in the system. There's a very important moment in 1971 when Nixon decided to go off the gold standard.
Needless to say, my book talks a bunch about it. And in many ways, I might say Nixon is probably the closest analogy we have to Donald Trump. I'm not trying to insult or compliment Nixon, but I think you can look at what Nixon says in private on the Watergate tapes and he sounds a lot more like the unfiltered Donald Trump when he's talking on TV, that he says things like, 'I don't give a flying f about the Italian lira,' you know, in one discussion. So one of the reasons the title spoke to me was the arrogance of Connally saying to people when they're complaining, 'What are we going to do with our dollars? You're inflating. You're making them worthless.' And he said, 'Well, it's our dollar. It's your problem.' I didn't like the arrogance of it.
Now, we Americans are very arrogant. You Texans are probably even more arrogant. But, you know, I still didn't like it. I actually had been a professional chess player in my youth. I more or less dropped out of high school, and that was a very difficult time to be an American living abroad. Vietnam was going on. We had a lot of race riots going on around our cities, and so everyone would say, 'You're American, you're racist, you're a warmonger, and your food is terrible.' Our food has improved a lot. But, you know, I didn't like the feeling of our arrogance.
But the other thing that spoke to me about it was the irony that it was actually our problem. We didn't have a game plan for how to manage our own currency once we had gone off the gold standard. And I think that's part of what led to the inflation of the 1970s. So it's important to understand that the United States dollar was set up to be on top after World War II, but it's actually a very narrow base of countries that were following it. A lot of the world wasn't globalized at that time. Obviously, China and the former Soviet bloc, they weren't part of the system. A lot of Latin America, Asia, a lot of countries weren't.
If you did it by an income-weighted basis, the dollar was very big. But in terms of a global basis, it wasn't. And one of the things my book goes over in this history is going through the ups and downs of this. We've had ups and we've had downs. The 1970s was not kind to the dollar. We lost a lot of market share during the 1970s. It took a long time to recover it. And, you know, I'll show you in a second later reaching a similar peak. And I only point that out because there are so many people who just say, 'Well, of course the dollar is on top and of course nobody uses anything else. Why would they?' First of all, that's not quite true. But also, it has this lack of understanding of history and nuances of trying to understand where things might be going.
I should say also I finished this book before I knew who would win the election. It was basically done in late summer of 2024, and I, you know, had some rounds from a copy editor, but by October 2024, it was ready to go to press. I was allowed to add a few sentences at the end the day after the election, but nothing else changed. And I'm very proud of the book creatively. It was anchored in research over 10 years that I did, and especially the last part of the book and many other things. It takes a very unusual approach to the writing. You can decide. I hope you enjoy it. But I felt I had something I wanted to say and I had to say it in a way that might engage people.
It's certainly written to a broader audience, but I was very much also writing to the profession. I'd been during that 10-year period pretty successful in publishing my work in top journals, but I felt I was very much a minority in a lot of debates about issues like the future of real interest rates, China, the exchange rate system, and a number of other topics. And I wanted to engage the profession as well as this broader audience. I have an academic publisher. I actually had many bids from commercial publishers, but I had been very happy with how This Time Is Different had done, and my editor — I'll come back to that at the very end — and I followed my editor. He had moved from Princeton University Press to Yale University Press, and I'm happy I did.
But universities — maybe not Rice, but most universities — university presses are not very economically motivated. So they're just sitting on it, and somehow they thought it would look pretty in their spring edition of their catalog, and they sat on it, and it came out instead of coming out in like January of 2026. And I was very creatively proud. I hoped a lot of people would be interested. It came out right after Liberation Day, and, you know, sort of became the book of the moment, and probably sold literally, you know, 10 or 50 times more copies than it would have otherwise. And more importantly, the message I think resonated more.
Because when I'd shown people — a lot of the book is really history, intellectual history, and again I try to make it interesting, but a lot of the book is about that — but the end of it ends in a rather out-of-the-box place where I argue you have to think about political economy factors and not just these usual dry macroeconomic factors that central banks look at. And if you look at those things, whichever party is in power, we're probably going to be in for a very rocky period. The world's going to be in for a rocky period. And I showed it to colleagues in international finance. Not the whole thing. I would tell them about it. I showed it to — I told people in finance, I told business people, and they basically said, 'No, you know, this is — you're nuts. You know, this is wrong.'
And then of course when it came out, eventually came out, people said, 'Why are you so calm? You know, why didn't you say something more extreme than you said?' Part of the answer to that is I want to be around for 20 years and you want to be a little careful what you say. Certainly Donald Trump's been great for my book. Maybe not for the world, but he's been great for my book and he's been the gift that keeps on giving, you know, as far as making it interesting. I actually think Kamala Harris would have been great for my book also. I was rooting for her. I mean, publicly I supported her. I'm at Harvard. If I didn't, no one would take my classes. But I write a lot about the progressives and ideas I think that were just nuts that they had, of basically we can just make everything free and issue debt and we don't have to worry about it.
And those of you that are economists are at least aware, maybe others, that Donald Trump's complained about the independence of the central bank, right? We can come back to that. Believe me, the progressives don't like it either. Elizabeth Warren is my neighbor in Cambridge. I mean, she lives a block away. She's my neighbor in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I respect her enormously. I strongly agree with three out of every 10 things she says. But I've had the opportunity to speak to some of her staff and people, her advisers, who by the way make her look like Ronald Reagan by comparison. But the progressives don't like central bank independence. They don't even like banks.
And I discuss this. I discuss it — not I discuss the literature of what people are writing and what the leading thinkers are saying. And I actually think obviously we'd have lived in a very different world if that had happened. But the macro issues that I talk about having to do with where our deficits are somewhat very careless. I think I discuss in the book that I think we'll eventually have a fiscal crisis. Not because we have to, but because the American public's not ready to compromise until that's happened. Central bank independence is likely to be under assault. We're likely to have volatility, and I think it would have happened either way.
Somebody quoted back to me something, or somebody told me, you know, about something Donald Trump had said. This must have been played recently. I don't watch the internet, but somebody saw it where, you know, this person said — shows Donald Trump saying, 'We can't vote for Harris. If we vote for Harris, we're going to end up with big government, inflation, and we're going to be in a war.' Well, I voted for Harris, but, you know, there's a tendency to say it's all about Donald Trump, and I think that's completely wrong. I think there are underlying political economy factors which would dictate where things were going regardless.
And one thing I've emphasized in my distant past work, especially, and also my recent work — Hassan Ozsoy is here, my co-author — we have a paper coming out in the AER also about political economy of central banking. I think it's a thing economists need to pay more attention to. Okay, this is a graph of the dollar. Okay, I made — I didn't capture it, appreciate it a little bit the last couple days, but it's an index I like a lot. You can look at it, get it off the FRED website, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. It's a measure of the purchasing power of the dollar.
There are a lot of different ways to measure that, but it's a particular way using price indices where you're looking at the trading partners of the dollar and you're looking at how much it can buy. And you can see from this, higher means the dollar's richer, it's more valuable. The dollar has been on this incredible 15-year run where it's just going up, and actually, you know what, it came down a little bit during the Trump presidency, but not that much yet. I don't have a figure here extending it back in time. There are different ways to do it, and it's like a little bit of a technical exercise to do it. I didn't do it for you here, but the dollar's basically been this high twice before in modern times.
1985 during the Reagan era, it was similar and fell by close to a third. Depends on how you measure it, which index you use, even as much as 40%. It did it again in 2002. That's when I was chief economist at the IMF, and I was pointing to 1985 and saying it was very high, and it came down by a similar amount, and I wouldn't be at all surprised if it ends up coming down a similar amount. Now, it's not necessarily because of our policies. We have a very hard time explaining this. But one of the very few things we understand about exchange rates is when it's way out of line on what you can buy.
Think of what a Big Mac or a Starbucks costs or anything you want to pick. And if you go to almost any other country now, the dollar seems really expensive. I've lived long enough, traveled long enough, I've been in all versions of this cycle. I was just in Japan and it's just crazy how low the yen is. I was there in the early 1990s, which I write about in the Bank of Japan there, and it was just the opposite. I mean, it was unimaginably expensive. And looking not just at the dollar but lots of exchange rates, lots of different periods, there's something you can say. My book talks about this a little, but it's not what the book is about.
The book is rather about the dollar as the lingua franca of the global financial system: how it's used in trade, how it's used in finance, and also, I'll come to it, how we dominate the back office of the global financial system, the banking system, the so-called rails — that's the jargon of when you make a transaction, how does it get from A to B? That's where the dollar's absolutely, you know, been dominant, and where there's, I think, a lot of incentive to try to change that. Now, one of the reasons it's been dominant is the US is very big.
Now this is a graph where I only talk about the dashed top line, which I think is more meaningful. The bottom line uses some measure of purchasing power parity, which the fact that China can feed a lot of people makes it seem much richer if you use US prices. Same for India. But I think the dashed lines in terms of global economic power is more meaningful, and it's the US share of global GDP converted at market exchange rates. If the dollar falls, say, 20%, that'll drop quite a bit. I mean, it's sensitive to that. That's one of the reasons for many things we prefer the lower line, which is not sensitive to that.
But after World War II, the US was just unbelievably dominant. I mean, we had 50% of global manufacturing, believe it or not, after World War II. I don't even know what the number is now, but I want to say 2% or something like that. It's very hard to compare global GDPs back then because actually the concept of national product was only invented in the 30s and most countries hadn't implemented it. So the figures we use — this is also in my earlier book, This Time Is Different — they come from things economic historians have done and trying to backcast things. But I think any way you did it, the US was huge relative to the rest of the world.
I give it there hitting 37%, but maybe it was higher. It's come down, but not nearly as fast as everyone thought it would. I mean, the rest of the world was in rubble. Germany rebuilt, Japan rebuilt, and don't forget how China's come up, India's come up, and the fact that the United States still accounts for a quarter of global GDP by market measures — it's incredible. It's very surprising. I think it's something I want to say even 20 years ago, no one would have predicted.
You think today — I again sound like an arrogant American, but if you think today, who cares about Europe, you know, they're compared to the United States. You know, who cares about other countries. Europe was the same size as the United States at the beginning of the century. Its GDP per capita was getting there. It wasn't quite as — it was bigger, more people, but it was the same size. Its stock market was worth the same thing as the United States. It is now half the United States. And I think a lot of this had to do with the rise of tech and networking, which has affected many things, the geography of cities, many other things. But it's been very, very good to the United States.
We are the first mover in a lot of things, and the ability to catch up ain't worth what it used to be right now, so far, could change. So this fact that we live in this world where network effects are very, very big, I think is very, very important. Maybe I'll say something at the end about today, but I'm just looking at this, the sweep of history here. If you had looked in 1950 at the dollar and who was using the dollar back then, it was actually pretty darn narrow compared to today. So this is from a Quarterly Journal of Economics paper in 2019, except we couldn't afford to pay for color printing. So this is how we would have liked it to look. This is the dollar areas in red.
There are many ways to measure how influential the dollar is, but Carmen Reinhart and our co-author Ethan Ilzetzki and I argue that a good summary measure is what are central banks choosing to do? How are they managing their exchange rates? Are they following the dollar closely? Are they not following the dollar closely? Are they following someone else? There are other measures: how much of trade is in dollars, how much financial instruments are in dollars, how much foreign exchange transactions are in dollars. All of these things are kind of superficial, though, compared to, I think, to this measure, and it lines up pretty well with the broader measures when you look at it.
So obviously the Soviet Union and China, the former Soviet bloc and China are in orange. They were off in their own world, which by the way everyone at the time thought was catching up with the United States. I was an undergraduate at Yale in the early 1970s, and the book I used, Samuelson, which everyone was using, confidently predicted that the Soviet Union would catch up. The White House believed that, the CIA believed that, many economists did, many of the leading economists believed that, wrote about that. Obviously, we didn't know.
But I think also there's a sense in which you can say, well, it didn't happen doesn't mean that it couldn't have happened there. China showed a way later how you could adopt a communist system to do better. There were actually some reforms that came close to happening in the mid-60s in Russia that didn't happen that might have led to a different path. But they were certainly a competitor of ours. But in fact, oh notice Europe is in red because they were using the dollar. This is 2015. This is also from that paper where it's a sea of red except in blue is Europe. They parted. They're not in the dollar bloc anymore. China, Russia become very dollar-centric.
Yellow represents countries which are — their exchange rate moves so wildly we can't classify them. You notice some blue in Africa. That's the French, former French franc zone, which stuck with the euro. And I would just — and light red is countries that are sort of kind of loosely pegged to the dollar, as much as they follow the — not pegged to the dollar, but use the dollar as a reference currency more than anything else.
I just emphasize how the red — what had been the anchor, Europe — if we did a trade-weighted thing, Europe would be huge on that map, and now it's gone. And that's worth bearing in mind: things change. Now I know what you're thinking looking at this map: where's Greenland? We forgot it in our paper. I put it in the book. It would make Europe look a lot better because it's really — it has like, you know, 50,000 people and no income, but it's really big. So anyway, but obviously that's why we want it, you know, to keep red very big in the map.
So I argue in the book already that 2015 was a peak of dollar dominance, where if you draw this graph later — I draw it for 2019 in the book, was the most recent I could do our algorithm — these things take a long time to do, and a number of things have happened. One thing is Asia, on an income-weighted basis, is half the dollar block today. Half. It's not all China, but a lot of Asia looks at the United States, but it also looks at China. China's the biggest trading partner for more than half the countries in the world. It's the biggest trading partner for many of the economies in Asia.
And so, China's decision to follow the dollar was very, very important. They needn't have. I actually — I have six chapters about China in the book. They needn't have. I think it was probably not — they stuck with it much too long. And I think some of the problems they have today actually derive from that. But they started figuring out in 2015 to slowly move away from that. They're moving away from it a lot faster now. I'll come back to how you can move away from it, but they're doing that. Just a statistic to throw out there is in 2010, 0% of their trade was in RMB, their currency. Now 50% is, and it's something rising sharply. They're developing their own transaction systems that are completely outside anything we can see. So that's changing.
And Europe has long been very unhappy about having the dollar be so central. The problem isn't that, you know, just that, well, we don't like it that people in Latin America are using the dollar more than they use the euro. That's not it. It's that by being the dominant currency, we control the back office of the global financial system. We control a lot of the clearing mechanisms. You never see it. You know, you make a purchase from somewhere. But even if you do it in Europe between two European countries, many of the mechanisms — obviously Mastercard and Visa, like two-thirds of consumer purchases, something, electronic purchases in Europe.
We see it even sometimes when you're going between two exchange rates in Europe, believe it or not, it gets swapped through dollars. It turns out the dollar markets are very efficient, and we see it. And the Europeans have known about this for a long time. I discuss it in the book. They've known we could sanction them. We've done it. We did it in 2014 when they wouldn't play ball back then with what we wanted to do with Iran. And so we threatened them, cut their banks off from our dollar clearing, which is basically cutting you off from everything. So the Europeans are very, very keen on moving away from it.
Also, I just came back from Brussels where I'd been invited to give a book talk to a very unusual group, the finance ministers of Europe. And maybe they wouldn't have invited me two months ago, but after Trump said he was going to take Greenland, they've suddenly got a lot more energized on this general topic. And I can't, you know, talk more about it, but they have — they're much more energized on things that they could do. So there are reasons from the outside why the dollar may not preserve this 2015 level that we have.
It's efficient to just have one currency. Bob Mundell, a Nobel Prize winner — he was Rudy Dornbusch, my thesis advisor, so I would describe him as my intellectual grandfather. He would say to me, 'The optimal number of currencies is an odd number less than three.' And he insisted on that. But that's in a world where, you know, it's some sort of Star Trek future world government peace kind of thing. There's reasons the Chinese don't want that. There are reasons the Europeans don't want it. And there are even reasons Latin Americans and Asians want other options because they had worried theoretically and now very practically about getting bullied by the United States.
If the dollar controls everything, they control you. We've been using tariffs. We can also use financial sanctions. And the Europeans are keenly aware of that. And there are many dimensions to this, but there are also problems on the inside. That's what I was talking about at the beginning. Back when we went off the gold standard, it took us 10 years to kind of figure out what to do. And only gradually did we figure out what to do. Really when Paul Volcker was appointed to be chair of the Federal Reserve and started figuring out how to prioritize lowering inflation, and that morphed into many things. It was really about central bank independence.
I think I wrote the first paper about this. I was working for Paul Volcker. There weren't any independent central banks besides maybe the Fed, maybe the Bundesbank at the time. Some say the Bank of Thailand, I don't know. And we developed this device, but that's something that's very important and, you know, is under challenge, but also fiscal policy, which I'll come to in a little bit. So before I move on, who cares? Why is it good being the dominant currency? I mean, it's kind of cool. Everybody's talking dollars and it feels good and it can be convenient, but why is it so good for us?
Okay, well, I mentioned one reason which is actually maybe the most important, is that we control the global financial system. And I want to emphasize, and I talk about this quite a bit in the book, we don't just control it because we're so big. We don't just control it because the dollar is dominant. We control it because our military is dominant. And that's something that economists have just ignored. It's become a popular topic the last couple years, but for a long time, and you can read Paul Krugman again and again saying it's just irrelevant. It's not irrelevant.
Because it's not that being a military power means nobody can invade you and steal your money. It's that that gives you a lot of leverage in global negotiations over everything, where the — how the IMF is organized, how SWIFT, that's the international clearing system, how that's organized, how everything is done. That's something that is very apparent today because Trump, again, he's unfiltered, just says it: you do it our way or we're not going to defend you. That's a lot of what's going on with the tariffs.
But believe me, I guess Doyle worked for Ronald Reagan, and I think he's a wonderful president, a wonderful person, but I bet he could be pretty tough when he needed to be in foreign negotiations. Lyndon Johnson, you know, the president in the 60s, was certainly — he's a Texan and he could be very tough, as everyone knows, and there are many books showing how tough he was. And I think many other American leaders have. We, you know, have these polite negotiations where I'm going to be a little sarcastic and I apologize to Europeans in the audience: we kind of pretend we sort of care what they think about the way the global financial system should be organized, but then we say no.
I relate something in the book. This relates to another Texan, James Baker. It's a story I heard from a classmate of mine at MIT who I can't name, who was in a meeting in the 80s where I think it was the Dutch finance minister. James Baker became our finance minister — that was Treasury Secretary. That's what John Connally was. He was also Secretary of State, and by the way, I think a great man overall. He's a Texan. And in one of the meetings, the Dutch central banker was upset at what the US was doing and said, 'If you don't agree to it, we're going to dump all our dollar reserves.'
And Baker repeatedly said — I heard this right after the meeting — repeatedly said something along the lines of, 'My daddy taught me when you pull a gun on someone, you better be prepared to use it.' And, you know, we exercise this power, and it has many dimensions, but it's also crude interest rates. We pay a lower interest rate than we would otherwise. Not just Uncle Sam, everybody: your home mortgage, your car loan. I want to be careful to say we pay a lower interest rate given the amount we borrow.
I know a lot of you are economists and I can say it shifts our demand curve compared to the demand curve for dollars compared to what it would be. So our interest rates are not lower than Germany's. In fact, there are a lot of papers now saying if you look at 10-year interest rates, where's the exorbitant privilege in the dollar? It doesn't look like it's any lower anymore. But in fact, you have to think about it as the demand curve. If there wasn't this big foreign demand for dollars that comes from our dominance, we'd pay a higher interest rate. So that's certainly something important.
And if we were to go to a more multipolar system, it would hurt. So first of all, demand for dollars would go down. It wouldn't be eliminated. It would go down. It would raise our interest rates. And I'm going to come to it towards the end of my comments, but we're already suffering from our fiscal problems and we'll suffer more. But it, you know, it would also make it much harder to use sanctions because right now, think of it as you only had Mastercard, and Mastercard cuts you off, you're in trouble. But if you have Visa and American Express and Diners Club and you can do things that Mastercard can't see and can't control — I'm not trying to pick on Mastercard particularly — but it's going to make our sanctions less effective.
And actually, one of my former students, Jesse Schreger, together with Matteo Maggiori, Chris Clayton and some other — another couple former students have a paper arguing that the ability to use sanctions falls off very fast when your market share starts falling. They, I think, have some back-of-the-envelope calculation when it goes from 85% to 70%, you know, you lose a lot of the power that it might have.
So there's a further advantage that's often pointed to that's a little fuzzed but interesting. It's called exorbitant privilege, and you see this phrase used all the time. There are about 10 different definitions of it. I try to be coherent in my book. So this was first proposed by the French president, Giscard d'Estaing — apologies if I'm not saying his name correctly — he was prime minister at the time, but he said, 'I don't like it that the dollar gets to be on top because we have to hold these dollars which don't pay a very high interest rate, and Americans get to take that money and invest it in Europe, buy factories, buy land, buy all sorts of stuff, and they get a big return. I don't like it.' And that's absolutely true.
And I think people, you know, still that's a very central meaning of exorbitant privilege. I shouldn't take a tangent here, but I'm going to. A lot of people, including evidently a lot of the president's economists, think being the center currency means you run big deficits because people need to hold your money. That's just so wrong. The UK, it was the dominant currency for 200 years. They ran surpluses the whole time. We ran surpluses in the 50s, 60s and 70s. We were the dominant currency, but we ran surpluses because of course you can get dollars by selling land or selling buildings or selling something. You don't need to run deficits. That's just completely wrong.
But it's certainly true that was the engine, and it was great. And I have a brief story about my great-aunt Henrietta, who grew up in a very poor New York family. It was always her dream to make shoes. And during the 1950s she was able to build — make shoes in Italy and get financing because she was going to be selling them back in the United States for dollars. And these are pictures of her shoes, and she did, you know, pretty well. She would have done a lot better if she bought this picture. This is an Andy Warhol, and this is from McCall's. Those of you may know he got his idea for drawing soup cans and stuff because he was drawing advertisements. That was the thing he first did.
We've tried to find this since but have not found the owner. Unfortunately she didn't buy it, but anyway, there's this broader idea of exorbitant privilege, but I won't go too far afield. So we've had a number of countries come at us for not just for market share but even for dominance, and I would say the one which came really close to kicking our ass, so to speak — sorry, I'm in Texas — was Japan. Japan was killing it in the mid-1980s.
Now, their population was only half of ours, but England's population was only a quarter of France's, and they were the dominant currency. Actually, as the book discusses, the Netherlands were the dominant currency in the 1600s, and their population's half of England's. It's not all about how big your population is. So Japan had a higher per capita income by — depends on which measure you use, but at market exchange rates much higher, at purchasing power parity rates pretty darn close.
This is a graph showing the value of land, of real estate, household real estate in Japan relative to the United States, and it was way above the United States. This is at market prices, even though Japan is actually slightly smaller than California. You can say, okay, real estate, it's illiquid. What does the market mean? I could show you the same graph — it's in the book — for the stock market. You take Japanese stock markets, compare it to the value of all the US stock markets. It was more. This is market traded. The world valued Japan Inc. more than US Inc. by at least that measure.
And Japan was coming on very strong. And there's this episode of the Plaza Accord, and I talk about it in the book, and I was a researcher at the Federal Reserve Board working on it, but not knowing that's what I was doing.
And I met James Baker, who was the architect — I've talked about him already — of it later. You can read the book about it — in the Plaza Accord. We basically pushed Japan to make their exchange rate stronger so they'd be a little less competitive. We thought they were holding their exchange rate down. And I have to say, for years I thought that was nonsense. We were manifest destiny. The United States was going to do way better than Japan. Japan was never going to succeed all that well. And I would say — and I should say — many Chinese leaders and financial leaders have told me that at various times: 'We will not let you do that to us. The US forced Japan to appreciate its currency. It was a disaster. That will not happen.'
Well, part of the problem is when they went to appreciate their currency by 10%, which is what they agreed to, they didn't know how to stop it. And actually, instead of going up 10% — this is just look at 1985 — it went in, it doubled. So if there are half as many yen, the yen's worth twice as much. And they did some other — it wasn't all about that — they did some other policies. It was a disaster. So this is often called the Plaza Accord after the New York hotel where it was agreed to.
Now, you've probably forgotten about this, but the Trump administration was very seriously pushing this idea of the Mar-a-Lago Accord because Steve Miran, who was the first chief economist for Donald Trump at the CEA and later went to the Federal Reserve Board, he wrote a paper early on, just before the administration, that everybody loved. Scott Bessent, the Treasury Secretary, was advertising it everywhere for a long time, that said, you know, what we did to Japan, we do that to everybody, not just Japan. That was what the concept was. So I think that was actually — had — I think had Japan gone slower on liberalizing its economy, on moving — it wouldn't be the United States, but it would be doing a lot better. They have gone from being about equal per capita income to basically being lower than Mississippi today. Mississippi is the poorest state in the United States. And part of that is how they responded. There are a lot of people who say, 'Oh, Japan has a lot of debt. That proves debt's not a problem.' Well, sure, if you don't care about, you know, your income or anything like that, it's — that's — So, anyway, Japan didn't match us.
Europe. I don't have time here to talk about at length, but in brief, I think if you hadn't put Greece in the euro prematurely, they'd be doing a lot better. And I know it's fun to kick around the Europeans and all their crazy regulations and everything, but the euro debt — the euro crisis was a disaster for the euro. They had grown to 25% of global reserves. They had grown to doing very well. It fell to, I think, 15, 14% after the euro crisis, is climbing back. The euro might have done better, and I think could do much better in the future. I'm going to skip it.
China is sort of our current competitor, and views about China have changed a lot. I talk a lot in the book about China, where on the one hand I do think China's going to break free of the dollar. I've already explained to you why I think that's going to happen. On the other hand, this idea that many people had that China was going to surpass the United States, which I would say was conventional wisdom, just way overblown.
I had some intuition about this from my book on financial crisis with Carmen Reinhart, where often financial crises start in real estate. I had some, I would say, aggregate limited data on China that I saw in prices, and I started talking about it really 10 years ago. And I — because I had some notoriety from 'This Time Is Different', it got some prominence, people saying it, but, you know, not taken seriously. But the Chinese invited me to speak, and I actually got an opportunity to speak to this thing called the China Development Forum, where you speak to literally 3,000 people. You have all the leaders of the Communist Party except for the president, all the leaders of the West, banking, tech, business in the audience. I spoke at the opening plenary to this group. I was told to give — I was supposed to write my remarks, but I never do that, as you see now. I spoke impromptu, and, you know, I sort of gave the reasons why I think you're in trouble. And I pointed to demographics. I pointed to many — overbuilding, but particularly in real estate, where I said this has been the source of a problem for many countries, and you have all the red lights blinking. You're going to have a problem.
I got off the stage and I was greeted by the deputy premier who said, 'Professor Rogoff, we very much appreciate your remarks.' And I was thinking, 'Oh, is that what they say just before they arrest you?' But I got out of the country, and based on that, I was very lucky to meet this brilliant young Chinese woman who was very rebellious and independent, from Tsinghua, who was visiting Harvard. She was still a graduate student at Tsinghua, and she introduced herself to me and said, 'I, you know, have worked with a lot of the statistical agencies, and I know something that can be done to make it much more concrete.' And so we produced a number of papers in various journals.
This is just an aggregate paper that sort of captures one thing we did, which we constructed how much housing per capita China had. This is just a very crude measure. It's per capita housing space. You know, it's not adjusting for quality, although actually in China it's not bad. It's a lot of it's very new. It's very standardized and uniform, but it's pretty new, and it's more than the UK and France. And this is — we have a lot of statistics and figures in our book, but this is the one that blew our minds. And how were we able to do it? Because China's so secretive about its data. If you want to know vacancy rates — that's what an economist would want to know if there's overbuilding — that's a state secret. If you want to know youth unemployment, state secret. But they were so proud of how much infrastructure they built, how much housing they built. You could find it block by block digitized on the internet, which we used over a long period to construct these data, and they've since been checked by many people in many ways.
And they had built all this housing, and we started talking about — again visiting this theme — they might be about to have a crisis. We were told this was nonsense by leading China scholars in the United States. In China, I'm told that the leadership was aware of the work, but you were not supposed to talk about it. And it wasn't published, you know, not discussed in the Chinese press. They just published these things that everything was great. And to make a long story short, they've had — they've been, you know, it's been a — they can't hide it anymore. They've had bankruptcy after bankruptcy, disaster after disaster. It is casting a huge cloud over the Chinese economy. The prices are in freefall. Everybody knows that prices in China, which again are kind of a state secret, but by our data, have fallen at least as much as they did in the United States in the financial crisis.
And it's a problem in China because this is — this is from a paper of ours in the Journal of International Economics where it shows the value of household wealth. It gives it for two years, 2022 and 2023. The reason red is lower in China is housing prices fell, and to the extent we can capture it. But you can see housing's really important in China as a source of household wealth. If I threw bonds in here, it wouldn't change things. We have in another paper, it wouldn't change things very much. So the fact prices are falling so much — that's why they're in deflation in China. That's why China has a problem. That's why no one wants to consume. That's why no matter what stimulus they try to do, it's not very easy. It's quite challenging for them. But again, I still think they're eventually going to do something about it. I'll skip this.
Another competitor for sure is cryptocurrencies. In fact, maybe Marco and I can talk about this more because I should wrap up soon. But cryptocurrencies, I don't think, will ever replace the dollar in the legal economy. We can discuss that. But there's a big global underground economy. The World Bank did a meta survey of studies, which are all pretty seat-of-the-pants estimates, that in advanced economies about 17% is underground, not taxed, not measured by the government, and in developing economies it's twice that, basically.
This is from a kind of cool paper I published with Francesco Patacchiola last year in the Journal of the European Economic Association. It's also — this table's from the book, where we used value-added tax data to try to figure out how much taxes people are avoiding, and we used how much value-added taxes were being collected across Europe, and then using survey data, large-scale surveys that were being done to form completely different indices by the European Commission, we compared it to what people said they were buying. And these are the shortfalls we found. They look amazingly like the meta survey that the World Bank did for European countries.
My co-author — not co-author, my colleague Stefanie Stantcheva, who some of you may know won the Clark Medal in the US this year. She's a French-Bulgarian economist, looked at this. Stefanie's done papers on the so-called shadow underground economy. And she looked at Bulgaria and she said, 'You know, I really like your methodology. I like your paper, but Bulgaria is wrong. This just can't be.' I said, 'What do you mean?' She said, 'Well, you know, I go to Sofia all the time. There's no way it's just 20% in Bulgaria. I mean, everything's underground.' So cryptocurrencies can be used here. And I don't want to get into the weeds of what cryptocurrencies, why and when, but they're certainly important. I'll skip this too. I'll skip this one.
Central bank independence — Marco and I can talk about — obviously is one cornerstone. And I just don't want to get into it. It's obviously a problem. Everybody's concerned about it. But I also think debt — this, by the way, is my friend David Blaine, who the younger of you may not know who he is, but he's an amazing magician who once held the world breath-holding record, and he's like a few miles up there. And I'm making an analogy to the US debt. The US has as much debt as all the advanced countries together. It's a little exaggerated by the fact the dollar is so strong, and I've converted everything to dollars, so it wouldn't be quite so much.
Another graph I don't have here is if you looked at global trade deficits — current — I'm going to use the word trade deficits, I really mean current account deficits, but those of you that are in the weeds will forgive me the slight difference. If you looked at global trade deficits, it's just the United States. Yeah, there are other countries running trade deficits, but they're tiny. So you look at a graph of the world's surplus countries and the world's deficit countries, it is 90% the United States. We are a big borrowing country. So for a long time, people said, 'No problem. You don't have to worry about it. Debt is a free lunch.' And I went around the world in the 2010s debating Paul Krugman, Larry Summers — remember secular stagnation? He doesn't want to remember it, but you should remember it. Olivier Blanchard still sticks by debt as a free lunch. I debated Peter Thiel, actually, believe it or not, at the Oxford Union, and I said, if you look at history, we're in a period where interest rates are low. Real interest rates are low. We've had it before. They're low until they're not low. And you just — why would you think this goes on forever? And all these stories about productivity — I'm going to come back to that — stories about demographics, and they're just going to stay low forever.
And the fact is that real interest rates are very hard to explain. This is a graph of the 10-year inflation-indexed Treasury bond, which has been moving up the last few days because somehow people aren't seeing the dollar as quite the flight to safety that they used to in the current war episode. So what is this? This is — you can buy this — about 10% of our debt is inflation-indexed. So you get a much lower interest rate. It can be even actually negative because you get compensated for inflation. So it's not perfect. There are tax issues, but it's a measure of what we economists call the real interest rate. And that's the interest rate that, you know, sort of very dependent on investment demand. And you can see it actually averaged zero from roughly 2010 through 2022. And now it kind of looks like it did in 2024.
So I had worked on this paper for a long time. Oh, I'm missing something here. Didn't show up, but I'll try to — if I have a laser with this. If I do, I'm not figuring it out. And I hope I didn't just do anything. This is a paper from — this is a graph from an August 2024 American Economic Review paper with two former students of mine who have far surpassed me. I don't want to pretend they were working for me in this paper. Quite the contrary, Paul Schmelzing and Barbara Rossi, where we put together very long-run real interest rate data. This is a very grandiose one where it looks at a global average of countries over eight centuries, but you could look at just the UK, just the United States, and you'd get a similar picture.
So one thing is it's really volatile. It's not as volatile as it looks here because it would sandwich all this data into a short period. If I stretched it out, it would look a little less extreme, but it's very volatile. You shouldn't just extrapolate whatever it's doing at the moment. It's very hard to predict. I've drawn a trend here, but actually if you start at 1900, it went down for a long time because governments became safer. They were less likely to lose a war. Markets became more liquid. But around 1900, that slowed down. There hasn't been an obvious trend. And what people like Larry Summers were pointing at was that the very end — I failed to circle it here — but the last few years there's a downward slope. There's a 30-year period where there's a downward slope. But of course, if you went back earlier, there's a 30-year period where there's an upward slope. You just can't extrapolate this.
And I will only say that the stuff like demographics, similarly, yeah, it works for a couple decades. There's a lot of papers on this that are theoretical papers, but there are other things that affect interest rates. One, again, I emphasize quite a bit in the book, is military spending. We had the peace dividend until we didn't. So this is a graph of spending on national defense as a share of GDP. I just took the graph from the book. It actually continued to fall down to 3% under Biden, or 3.1%. And it was twice that, more than twice that, when the Cold War ended just in 1989. It had been way higher in the Vietnam era. And that's not sustainable. And I'm not even looking at the Europeans who effectively spend next to nothing on defense, or the Canadians who spend even less than the Europeans. This is, you know, certainly an important thing that's changing. I think populism is going to make spending higher. The fact that global debt has grown so much is probably — most models suggest at least some effect from that.
So I think this idea that everybody had that debt was a free lunch was just overblown. And I will say progressives — I hit it both sides in the book, and they've both on the whole been very nice to me, thinking that I was mostly criticizing the other side and not their side, of choosing to selectively look at things. But the progressives who say anytime you scale back deficits, it's austerity — they're shooting themselves in the foot. If you want to redistribute income, tax people more. And, you know, that's — I don't think you can count on interest rates staying low.
I'm going to finish with AI. There's some people in the audience, at least one, who knows a lot more than I do about it. This is a 2012 — I was a professional, but had stopped playing completely in the late 1970s because I was afraid of computers. I had seen some of the early computer programs. I thought they would come faster and harder than they did. This is the only game I had played against a human, Magnus Carlsen, who's by far the best player in the world in my opinion even today, but this was 2012. I showed this picture just because I want to — I made a draw and I'm never going to play again. But I think people who point at AI as saving everything might be right. But it's a very complex — because there's a lot of volatility that goes into that.
Let me just pick one point about that. A few of you who are in the markets or, you know, read the newspaper — which you don't have time to do as a graduate student, I know — but there's all this talk: we have productivity coming, it's going to lead to disinflation. You hear that all the time. Well, that's kind of nonsense at one level because the central bank can make inflation anything it wants. A lot of countries have inflation around 2 or 3% now. Some of them have no growth. Some of them have fast growth. Some of them have a lot of productivity growth. Some of them have, you know, almost negative productivity growth. They all around the same — what the central bank can choose inflation anything it wants. What really productivity affects is it affects what interest rate do central banks need to choose in order to get it towards 2% inflation. That's a much more precise statement, and theoretically it is somewhat ambiguous, but not that ambiguous. Mostly we think periods of high productivity growth are associated with high real interest rates.
So remember, if you listen to Paul Krugman and Larry Summers, they were saying, 'We're going to have low interest rates forever because productivity is going to be really low.' And of course, we have Kevin Warsh, who's coming in, saying, 'I can bring interest rates down because productivity is disinflationary and so interest rates can come down.' He might be right. I mean, I will — there are many super brilliant people who can write down some model where that's true, but I wouldn't say it's the norm. I've gone way over. But finish with two things.
What happens when — I do think we'll run into trouble at some point, not because we have to, but because you can't get anybody to do anything until we will. And I think when it happens, all bets are off the table. I think the leading idea is inflation, financial repression, which means forced debt holdings. But the Mar-a-Lago plan — I didn't go into the tails — called for defaulting on our debt. It called for a default. And that's — he stopped, but was cheerleading this paper. He was advertising it. And Donald Trump is certainly willing to do heterodox policies. And by the way, defaulting is not always the wrong thing to do. We did it in the 1930s. I mean, Franklin Roosevelt's praised as one of our great presidents. All bets are off the table, and we'll see.
This is my book, which Doyle mentioned, 'This Time Is Different'. We worked on it for seven years, by the way. It came out in 2009. It's a massive database. It has a 200-page data appendix — not data appendix, but well, sort of a — it gives our data sources over 200 pages. Somehow a year into the book — not right away, but as the financial crisis unfolded in the early stages, people looked at things we were saying and said, 'That's nuts, you know, that's just not going to happen.' And then a year in, it actually reached fourth on Amazon of all books for about a week. We were behind the three 'Girl with a Dragon Tattoo' novels because we didn't have sex and violence in that version. But, you know, we'll see about the next edition. Anyway, I'm sorry to run so much over, but thank you.