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Kenneth Rogoff
Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Keynote: Kenneth Rogoff - Our Dollar, Your Problem (Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances Conference)

📅 Mar 06, 2026 JRCPPF 59 MIN 902 VIEWS 74 SEGMENTS · 7 SPEAKERS
Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances 15th Annual JRCPPF Conference at Princeton University February 19-20, 2026 Conference program & slides: https://jrc.princeton.edu/conferences... Keynote: Kenneth Rogoff, Maurits C. Boas Professor, Harvard University Moderator: Layna Mosley, Princeton University For fifteen years, the Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy & Finance has fostered research and dialogue at the intersection of macroeconomics, finance, and public policy. This 15th anniversary conference brought together leading scholars and policymakers to examine the evolving challenges faci...

Questions asked in this interview

2
  1. 3:11Okay, someone knows what that is, right?
  2. 40:15And is that also then kind of a way of insulating or sort of no longer needing the US dollar?
Layna Mosley 0:06 ↗
I want to offer a warm welcome to students, faculty, members of the broader Princeton community, members of the JRC Advisory Board, to our opening keynote at the 15th Annual Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy and Finance Conference. It's my pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker, who's hidden behind the screen for this afternoon, and to moderate this session. Kenneth Rogoff is the Maurits C. Boas Professor at Harvard University. Many of you will be familiar with and have read his 2009 book with Carmen Reinhart, "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly." Others of you will be familiar with Rogoff's academic work on exchange rates and central bank independence, among many other things. And students in the audience may have read Rogoff's textbook on international macroeconomics.
From 2001 to 2003, Rogoff was the chief economist and director of research at the International Monetary Fund. He's been elected to both the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. And today, Professor Rogoff is going to offer some remarks on his 2025 book, which many of you have copies of on your desk or in your hands: "Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider's View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance and the Road Ahead." So for those of you who haven't yet had the chance to read the book, it offers both an accounting of Professor Rogoff's own professional experiences as well as an analysis of the evolution of the international monetary order. The book discusses the future possibility of a less dollar-centric world, with lessons from other points in 20th and early 21st century history as a guide to how such a world might emerge and function. And in considering Professor Rogoff's book, I was struck by three ideas which might reveal the occupational hazard I face of being a political scientist, and on which I hope to hear Professor Rogoff's views this afternoon.
So first, as the book nicely illustrates, while these alternatives are still in short supply, we certainly are witnessing demand for dollar substitutes. And this demand suggests that the US could be a victim of its own success. The benefits to the US of the dollar's global role went far beyond easy access to sovereign credit. The US became central to the global banking, financial, and payment systems. And this gave the US government leverage. It could threaten to exclude countries from these systems for political reasons. It could collect detailed information about cross-border transactions.
But using this leverage, for instance, for financial sanctions sets off a deeper search for alternatives, as some countries then aim to insulate themselves from future US weaponization of monetary interdependence. So the shorter-term exercise of leverage can erode the longer-term dominance of the US and the US dollar.
Second, the current political environment inside the United States is intensifying the search for alternatives to the dollar. The erosion of the rule of law, of democratic accountability, of transparency reduces the willingness of investors and firms to hold dollar-denominated assets. Undermining the liberal international order and its associated material benefits is making this problem worse. And while an outright default on US debt is a distant possibility, a very distant possibility, it isn't hard to imagine that debt being inflated away. Threats to the independence of the US Federal Reserve seem to exacerbate this problem. Indeed, we're already seeing an increase in US debt servicing costs, the result of elevated political as well as financial risk. The last time debt servicing accounted for such a significant share of the federal budget, Nirvana's "Nevermind" had just been released. Okay, someone knows what that is, right? So now, okay, so maybe that joke didn't land. And George Bush, and that is George H. W. Bush, was president. So this debt servicing burden is going to constrain future spending on all sorts of other things, infrastructure, social policy, and the like, unless the US government is willing to enact politically unpopular tax increases.
Okay. And third and finally, the US government's cheap access to credit contributed as well to US military power. The US was able to achieve high levels of defense spending via low-cost borrowing, and hence the geopolitical and the financial leverage reinforced one another. And as the US's so-called exorbitant privilege recedes, so might US military power. If the US security umbrella then weakens, this could further encourage foreign governments to search elsewhere for alliance and economic partners. So, as Professor Rogoff's book suggests, and his talk will certainly suggest, the transition to a new international monetary order may well be a bumpy one. With apologies to John Connally, it might be that our dollar also becomes our problem. So, with that nice dose of pessimism, Professor Rogoff, we are so looking forward to your presentation this afternoon. Once you've finished your remarks, we'll have a bit of time for some questions from our audience. And in the meantime, I hope you will join me in welcoming Ken Rogoff to the podium.
Kenneth Rogoff 5:49 ↗
Thank you so much, Layna. What a pleasure it is to be back, excuse me, speaking at Princeton. Many of my former colleagues are here, certainly people I've known, and also it's great to be somewhere where the AV and electricity works. And I'm, you know, but I'll start, I guess, showing a picture of the cover of my book.
I was motivated to write the book, which is a somewhat suicidal and risky thing in the modern day, because I'll tell you a little story about it. It takes forever to put a book together and to get it published. But I was very excited about my research, I would say, of the 10-year period where I would self-describe myself as having a mini renaissance. And I'd worked on issues like digital currencies, exchange rates, China, real interest rates, and I think I've been very successful in publishing them in top journals, but I wanted to sort of... a lot of the things I was expressing were distant minority opinions. I'd also mentioned the importance of political economy is a big theme of my work, and so I was trying to put something together. Actually, although the book's written to a broader audience, I'm trying to reach the profession, where I think in many ways, particularly in macro, it's become very insular, somewhat politicized also, I'd say. And so anyway, that was the motivation.
It's written in a somewhat experimental style. You can see what you think. I had things I wanted to say, but I felt like if I didn't say them in a way that anyone would read, what would be the point? And so, you can decide. It's certainly not a memoir, but I give a number of incidents with students, policymakers, a couple from Princeton, things that happened at Princeton, in order to try to motivate some of the issues that I wanted to talk about. And a lot of the book's historical, looking at the intellectual development of the field, what happened, but there's certainly a part that's somewhat speculative and forward-looking, somewhat outside the box.
Layna's already said where the title came from, "Our Dollar, Your Problem," and I think actually also captured my punchline on it, which is it was one of the things that appealed to me about that is our problem when we went off the gold standard completely with the Nixon shock, we didn't have a plan for what we were going to do. And yeah, we didn't pay super close attention to, but it wasn't irrelevant either in what other countries were doing. It was a constraint. And when you took the constraint away, it incredibly helped Nixon get reelected in 1972. He was able to print money and have, you know, the political business cycle of all time. But it of course also led to the inflation that we subsequently had.
I will also say I finished the book before I knew who would win the election. I basically finished it around September of 2024. And I'll say already I wouldn't change much today. I have a paperback version coming out where I had a preface, but there's really not a lot I would change. And I didn't know who would win the election. Maybe you did, but I thought it was, you know, pretty close to even money. And however, I thought that both sides were very mediocre and had a lot of wrongheaded ideas which are fairly overlapping.
For example, you've all read about Donald Trump and central bank independence, but the progressives who were the dominant theme in the Democratic Party, and I think would have been in a Harris administration, they don't like central bank independence either. I, you know, colleagues with many. Elizabeth Warren's actually my neighbor. And by the way, I strongly agree with her on three out of every 10 things. And her, I've gotten to talk to her, you know, her chief economist and people who work with her who make her look like Ronald Reagan by comparison, and they have writings, you know, about this and, you know, the visions of central bank digital currency. You eliminate all the money from the banks, which they don't like either, and then the government will, you know, figure out where to put the money after. I write about that a lot in the book, I point to some of the literature. So I thought central bank independence was under assault, and also there's the mission creep that we're all aware of, where I think that came from political pressure, of course, and we can get into that. So that wasn't just Donald Trump.
And fiscal policy in the United States. Neither, you just can't run for office with any kind of idea that you're going to raise taxes. Well, the Democrats will raise it on the top 1%, which isn't going to raise nearly enough money, much less cut spending. So there were common themes. I finished the book then, but I did it with a university press. I published with Princeton University Press, which is fantastic, but I followed my editor to Yale University Press, and the book was done and the page proofs were done, but I just sat on it and it didn't get published for six months. But had it been published a few months earlier, I'm very happy with it creatively of what I did, but you know, I think it would have done okay. But they waited till after Liberation Day to publish it.
And suddenly, you know, where I had initially gotten these reactions, why are you being, you know, so dark, you know, why are you saying that anything could get wrong, to why are you so calm about it? I'm glad I wasn't able to change the title, which I'm happy with, because I would have been sorely tempted to change it to "Our Donald, Your Problem," which might be my next book.
So I first want to say that the book is not about really the value of the dollar. This is a graph you can easily recreate from the St. Louis website, giving one measure of the purchasing power value of the dollar. This is against a basket of goods. And the dollar had basically, before Trump, on this 15-year march upwards. And it's done that twice before, in 1985 and 2002, and both times fallen sharply. But actually, that's just two data points. There's a huge literature on what happens when purchasing power is way out of line, which say the yen's very much on the low side, the dollar on the high side. And the book talks about that a little bit, but it's not what it's about. It's much more about the dollar as the lingua franca, the fact that it's, you know, there are many benefits it has.
Now, exactly how you measure how dollar-centric we are, there are many indirect measures. The one that I, and I give them all in the book, but the one I prefer to focus on is what I consider a portmanteau, a broad measure, which is how much do central banks feel obligated to stabilize against the dollar on their exchange rate policy. I have a couple papers with Carmen Reinhart and Ethan Ilzetzki about this. This is from the 2019 QJE paper, and red represents dollar-centric. Europe was dollar-centric. In fact, I will come mention this again. Europe was the dollar block back then because most of the world was not globalized. Fast forward to 2015, and again red is the dollar. China rotated around the dollar. Russia did. The lighter shades represent looser associations.
I know what you're thinking. Where's Greenland? And we forgot to put it. We forgot to put it in this. I have it in the book. My great RA Sam Ross noticed that and I fixed it. And when you see that, you can see why Donald Trump wants it. It's like, it's huge. And so a question is, who cares? Like, why does it matter so much? What's it worth to us? And there are many dimensions to it. I mean, the obvious dimensions, you pay a lower interest rate. I think there are an awful lot of papers using finance methods, using macro methods, which have a pretty common estimate of around 1%.
That's actually 1% for everyone, mortgages, car loans. And since I have mostly economists here, you're actually looking at a shift in the demand curve. It's not that the US pays a lower interest rate than Germany. It's that given how much we borrow, we pay 1% less. But there are many other advantages. So one of the advantages, which Layna again talked about, is our ability to impose sanctions. And we've done that very promiscuously. That has been a major motivator of why certainly countries that were traditionally our enemies, now I don't know if Canada's our enemy, but the ones that were traditionally our enemies, they've been looking hard to do something about not just using the dollar to price things. And China's gone from zero to 50% roughly in the last 15 years.
But building the plumbing, the back office, that's really the essence of this, where a disproportionate, wildly disproportionate share of market clearing goes through the United States. And what does that mean? It doesn't just mean we can impose sanctions. It means we have, we see information. And you may do a transaction that seems to you entirely in Europe or, you know, between Europe and Latin America, but it flashes through the dollar in swap lines that give us information. And the Europeans already were very unhappy about that, and believe me, you know, they're a lot more unhappy about it now. There are other ways you can weaponize the dollar, for example, swap lines. And when I hear Donald Trump want to have control of the Fed, and everybody's thinking about interest rates, that's a very important thing.
So, swap lines are, they're large dollar markets in the rest of the world, and they can run short locally of the dollars. And this particularly happens in a global crisis, and we've offered countries quick loans to their central banks to try to deal with that. It is not riskless, contrary to official Fed speak. You're making the loan in a time of global crisis, and something can go wrong. But you know, it's a risk that's probably a good risk that we've taken. But I mean, if Donald Trump really controlled the Fed, and somehow the Supreme Court rules tomorrow against him, and he, you know, loses on that, he can take over the swap lines potentially and say, 'Well, next time there's a crisis, not giving Mexico a swap line.' I mean, he'll have to think of some language that people understand, which he will, and that could cause a crisis in Mexico right away, you know, someone saying that. So there's definitely fear of weaponizing the dollar.
If I look at, since I, I'll get to it a little, get to it, but I want to just make sure I say it. There are these forces from the outside. What I drew in this graph was what I regard as peak dollar. And I think the dollar's actually been in decline by a lot of measures over the last 10 years, with China separating and some other things going on. And you see that in my work with Carmen and Ethan. There's a question of whether Trump is an accelerant. I believe he will be. I mean, one can debate that. But the big problems come from within. The big problems obviously are if you undermine the credibility of the Federal Reserve, which is what we have instead of gold. If our fiscal policy appears not sustainable, if we are weakening the rule of law, which foreigners rely on, those things also can undermine dollar dominance.
And I certainly don't envision having a world where suddenly everyone's using the renminbi to, you know, buy stuff at the Princeton cafeteria, but rather a loss of market share. There's an interest rate consequence, but more importantly, the ability to impose sanctions, to collect information, just goes away. There's actually an interesting field of geoeconomics, and there are papers by Matteo Maggiori and co-authors Brent Neiman and others about this, where it's a little bit like if you can only pay with Amex, and Amex tells you they're going to cut you off, that's really bad. But if you have Mastercard and Visa, Diners Club, and other things you can use, you just having, in their work, the threshold just falling to 70% would suddenly be very dramatic.
So that's, so it issues whether we'll go to a more multilateral currency system, which by the way everyone thought 15 years ago. The euro had a higher stock, as high a stock market almost as the US, as high cap per capita GDP. There was more debt in Europe than in the United States, which someone proudly announced at a conference once. People were expecting the euro to do better. No one thought the RMB would take so long to detach from the dollar. The technocrats have wanted to change that forever. It would be logical for a thousand reasons. The people at the very top have not allowed that. My book talks about that. That has changed. And actually, President Xi just gave a speech about that recently where he says this is now a goal of his, and I suspect everyone up and down the line will change.
There are other advantages that are fuzzier to being the dominant currency that maybe have more to do with our banking sector and other things that go under the word exorbitant privilege, which has about 10 different definitions. But it was actually originally put forth by Giscard d'Estaing, who plays a little role in my book for a seminar he gave at Princeton, which I attended. And he argued, you know, we're forced to hold all your debt, and you can buy our factories and our land and everything, and you're making a lot of money, and that's terrible. And he called that exorbitant privilege.
And by the way, you don't have to run deficits to be the dominant currency. Britain didn't. Most countries didn't. We didn't until starting in the 70s. In the late 70s even we started doing that. We weren't in the 50s, 60s. I mean, that's just simple accounting that you don't need to run deficits. That's a confusion.
This is not in the book, but I'm going to show it anyway because it's fun. So an example of someone taking advantage of our exorbitant privilege was my great aunt Henrietta, who grew up in a poor family in New York, and her dream was to make shoes, and these are her shoes. She made them in an Italian factory, and she did okay. Now this picture is actually Andy Warhol. She had hired him to do her ad in McCall's, if you know that's where he got the idea to do soup cans and stuff. He drew advertisements originally. Unfortunately, she did not buy this print, which would have been worth much more than what she made from her shoes. But that's just like a small example.
So what were the rivals to the US? And I talk about Russia in the book, which was more than you think. When I was an undergraduate at Yale, it was in Samuelson, many of what I was taught, that Russia was going to catch up with us, and I'll skip over that. But Japan in the 1980s is, excuse my French, kicking our ass. I mean, this is a picture of land, the value of land in Japan at market prices, which was far in excess of the United States, the value of real estate. Sorry, you can argue, okay, maybe the market prices aren't real and, you know, they're not measured properly, but you could look at the stock market and it was the same thing that was internationally traded. The difference isn't as big, but the Japanese stock market exceeded the value of the US stock market.
Comparing per capita GDP is tricky, as you are economists who know, but if you do it at market exchange rates, it was way ahead of the United States in per capita income. And you say, 'Oh, well, Japan's tiny. They can't do that.' Well, they had half the population of the US. Back when the UK ruled the world, it had a quarter the population of France. The Netherlands was the dominant currency in the 1600s. They had half the population of England. It doesn't mean anything.
And there's a very important event, I talked about it in the book, called the Plaza Accord, where it's something where I feel like I changed my mind over the years. The Chinese leadership and policymakers that I talked to over the years always made the point when I would say, 'Why don't you have a more floating exchange rate?' they would say, 'We will never, never become Japan. We will never let the Americans do that to us.' Now, I don't have time to talk about it today, but I have a Brookings paper coming at the end of March, which compares Japan and China. And guess what? They're looking a lot like Japan in some ways. And they're interesting questions of why.
So this event, the Plaza Accord, there are many dimensions to this, but I think the United States used its leverage over security more than anything else to push Japan not just to appreciate their exchange rate, but probably do a number of liberalizing things prematurely. I won't say Japan, you know, would have surpassed the United States, but it could be doing a lot better than it did without the Plaza Accord.
I don't know how many of you have read about the Mar-a-Lago Accord, where Stephen Miran was the first head of the Council of Economic Advisers for Trump, and then he went to the Federal Reserve. And he sort of had this paper that, by the way, Scott Bessent loved for a long time, where he said the Mar-a-Lago Accord was, I'm sorry, the Plaza Accord was great, let's do it to everybody, and he had this idea of the Mar-a-Lago Accord. And anyway, I think it's, you know, it's an important event.
So I'll only stop at this graph, which I would normally skip because there's a Princeton story. I was, it's one of the amazing things about being a student or faculty here is just these incredible historical figures come through. I mentioned Dick Darman, James Baker came. He was, I think, one of the great Treasury secretaries we ever had. He came through, and I came up to him afterwards, and I said, you know, I was just a pawn, but I had a little role working at the Federal Reserve, working on background papers for the Plaza Accord. They didn't tell us what it was, but, you know, I was working on sterilized intervention. And he told me this story.
He said, and I said to him, I was surprised Japan could control their exchange rate as much as they did. And he said, 'No, no, no, no. That's not what happened. They said they were going to let the exchange rate appreciate by 10%.' And it didn't happen right away, but, you know, they had to have an agreement. And he said it was amazing. In two weeks it was 10%, then it was 20%, then it was 30%. It eventually doubled the exchange rate, and very painful.
Another competitor of ours is Europe. And I just came back from speaking to the finance ministers of Europe, who, along with all other Europeans, are very, very angry at us. I can't think of any time I've been in Europe since I was a teenager where they hated Americans so much. When I was there, I was a professional chess player traveling in Europe and met people from many walks of life. And if we had the Vietnam War, so they called you a warmonger, racist. They didn't like our food either. But in general, you know, it was not popular being an American. And we're getting there. Again, I think, you know, they're energized in terms of financial independence as well.
I'm going to skip talking about Europe beyond that in the interest of time, and I'll skip that too. So I started, I did this book, "This Time Is Different," which is very much about real estate crises as an important part of it, and I started looking at the numbers in China, although there weren't many numbers for China, and thinking, you know, the prices were going like that, this doesn't look good, and started talking about it. And I talked about it in the book, but I was very fortunate that I think it was in 2017, this brilliant young Chinese economist who was a student visiting from Tsinghua came to me. She was very courageous and said, 'I can give you numbers of what you're talking about, like there's actually numbers.' And I said, 'Well, what do you mean? I mean, everything's a state secret. You can't find vacancy rates, you can't find prices, what numbers?' And she said, 'Yes, but they're very proud of everything they built. You can find block by block every piece of infrastructure, everything they've ever done.'
So we put together a series of papers looking at this. I mean, it has honest-to-God regressions and stuff in it, but I'm not going to show you that. But this is one of the aggregate charts we have that...
Really blew our mind, which was per capita housing in China, which this is in square feet — square meters, sorry — where it's less than the US but it's more than the UK and France, and that sort of lent support to the idea there was overbuilding. And what you're able to do with their yearbooks, their statistical yearbooks, is you can see into the corners of China. And I had traveled a little bit to what they call tier three cities, but I mean you can't visit everywhere. And I'd seen a few journalistic comments about this, where somebody would go find some empty apartment buildings and ask what was going on, and the Chinese would just say, well, it's going to get filled. And you know, so we started writing about this. We had a hard time getting it published because the people, scholars working on it, said this can't be true. You know, so but then a couple years after we wrote our first paper, there was this big default in China, the Evergrande default, and our work became very well known in the West and eventually very well known in China. Um, Yueran Ma actually brought her parents over and her husband's parents over because she was a little nervous about it, at least that's my interpretation. And certainly our work wasn't taught. But she just last September won the Pushan Award, which is their equivalent of the Clark Medal, which is official. So it's something that's now recognized.
If you want to know why China has a problem now, it's because housing is most of wealth in China. This compares China and the US. It's got two years in it, 2022 and 2023. The red is a little lower because prices have been coming down. But you can see China, it's not very balanced. Housing is kind of like everything. And in the United States, it's more balanced. And so housing prices, by all our estimates, which are hard to do for China, but everything I read, are in freefall in China. I think they've fallen on a weighted average by a similar amount to the Case-Shiller index happened during our housing crisis, and you can see that the potential wealth effect is very large.
Um, just a word about cryptocurrencies. That's another topic I go into a lot in the book, and I've already run out of the time I was given. So I'm not going to be able to talk about it long, but this is from a paper that was just published this year with Francesco Papadia, where we try to form estimates of the size of the underground economy in Europe using value-added tax data — what did they collect and what do surveys say they should have collected? I don't have time to explain details, but the results are actually remarkably similar to what people have gotten from seat-of-the-pants estimates from electricity use and stuff. I will say my colleague Stefanie Stantcheva, who won the Clark Medal this year, she's worked on this topic for Greece, and she's French-Bulgarian, as you may know, and she looked at this. She was very nice about the paper. She looked at it, she said, Bulgaria can't be right, I go to Bulgaria all the time, that is way too low for Bulgaria. And I mention that because that is where I think cryptocurrencies are competing right now. It's stablecoins. It was Bitcoin, now it's stablecoins. When they finally regulate stablecoins in an intelligent way, which the Genius Act does not, then I think it'll again be Bitcoin.
So, I've completely run out of time again, but I'll finish with a couple thoughts on fiscal policy. Let me say this. First of all, I went around the world debating Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, Olivier Blanchard. Actually, I did a debate with Peter Thiel at Oxford Union, you can find, where they were kind of arguing nothing was going to ever change, and I had looked at long histories of real interest rates, and there's things change, but there's a lot of reversion to mean, and I argued that. And this is the 10-year inflation-indexed Treasury, and I have a paper with Barbara Rossi and Paul Schmelzing that was in the August 2024 AER, where we look at very long measures of real interest rates, eight centuries. Now, the US and Britain haven't issued that long, but even if you look at just the last couple hundred years, you get similar results. At one point, real interest rates are spectacularly volatile, so you shouldn't expect them to stay the same. And also, although over the long term there's been a downward trend for reasons of liquidity, safety, there really hasn't been since 1900. If you look at a longer period, anyway, I don't have left time really to talk about this. I think there are reasons interest rates can come down, but there are reasons they can go up.
Let me last say something about artificial intelligence. And this slide may seem to have nothing to do with it, but I just wanted to show you. So I had been a professional chess player, stopped playing in 1980 was my last tournament, and I literally didn't play at all, although I think about chess all the time. And this was an exhibition game from 2012 with Magnus Carlsen, who then and now is by far the best player in the world, and I miraculously made a draw. I'm never playing again. However, through chess I've followed artificial intelligence from the earliest days. Chess has been the sandbox, and I certainly do think it's possible that artificial intelligence will just pay for everything. So we have actually a lot more to spend.
But I'm very concerned about many things going on in the world today. But I'm very concerned about what we've done with throwing out regulation of artificial intelligence. So very early on, Trump gave an executive order saying don't worry about copyright, don't worry about intellectual property rights, nobody is going to sue you. And by the way, don't worry about the environment, you know, we'll take care of that. And I think this is going to be viewed as a historic mistake, taking the guardrails off. I think you can think of social media — that's one of the three out of ten things I agree with Elizabeth Warren about. I think if you look at social media, we should have put massive restrictions on it ages ago. AI is going to be times 50. I've watched the debates between Daron Acemoglu and David Autor, and I think to me it's very clear that in the short run we're going to see massive, massive job losses and other potential problems by not attending to AI safety.
And even if you don't talk about AI, which is pretty tough for us to understand, I kind of do think there's a science of the environment and that you kind of ought to pay a little attention to it. So if I said to Europe today, hey, forget about those bottles where you can't take the cap off if you've ever been there, just forget about everything you're doing, just pollute to your heart's content. There'll be global warming, but there are huge externalities, everybody else will pay a lot of the costs. I guarantee you Europe will get a productivity boom. I mean, so you know, if you're asking why are the numbers so good, I mean, or why might they be so good for the next few years, the question maybe we won't have a fiscal problem, but maybe it will morph into something else.
And then lastly, this is my 2009 book, This Time Is Different. This book has done crazy well because of Trump. I mean, I just — my publisher held it up totally randomly for six months. It came out in April, right after Liberation Day, and you know, and as far as my current book goes, Trump has just been the gift that keeps on giving. Like every crazy thing, you know, I've mentioned in the book, you know, has kind of happened. This book is much less readable than the newer book, at least I think so. I mean, I'm happy with how it's written, but it's very much a research book. But we nevertheless reached fourth on Amazon of all books for several days, almost a week. At one point, Alan Blinder actually gave me the ultimate compliment on this book, as he says, 'You have reached the status of a classic where everyone knows it and no one's read it.' And but we were behind the three girls with the dragon tattoo novels, which had sex and violence in them, but we may have another edition with more of that. Thank you.
Layna Mosley 39:42 ↗
So we have about 20 minutes for some questions and hopefully some answers from Ken. I'm thinking about when Our Dollar, Your Problem is published and then when This Time Is Different is published, and what I've worked out is the Rogoff rule: when his book is published, something bad either has just happened or is about to happen. Global financial crisis, 2024 election. But so maybe don't just be careful.
Kenneth Rogoff 40:09 ↗
My 1996 book with Obstfeld was just before the Asian crisis. So there you go.
Layna Mosley 40:15 ↗
Okay. So, before I open it up, I just have kind of one quick question, and it relates to your work on crisis. And you know, we in 2008 with the global financial crisis, you saw the US not as the flight to safety, right, but instead as a source of crisis. And we know there's lots of transmission from the US then to other countries in crisis times and in more normal times. And so I wonder, do you think that foreign governments view diversifying away from the dollar as a means of insulating themselves from this potential source of risk? And then the second part is that we also see in a lot of low- and middle-income countries this shift from external foreign currency denominated, often dollar denominated borrowing, to domestic currency borrowing. It's often made possible by financial repression. And is that also then kind of a way of insulating or sort of no longer needing the US dollar?
Kenneth Rogoff 41:10 ↗
Well, that's a couple big questions wrapped in one. I think for sure the major driver for diversification, if you talk about the policy, not what economists say but the policy, is seeing what the US is prepared to do and weaponizing the dollar. So there are countless papers, I'd say in top five journals or quite a few, showing it's efficient to have one currency. I mean, there's network effects, and I think it's like a two-line proof of you know you should want one currency, but that doesn't mean that it's politically what other regions should want to have. And I started — I forgot to mention it. My book talks about gold as another thing, and I'm pretty neutral on it. I don't say buy gold, don't buy gold, although I've long suggested to central banks to buy more gold. But somehow my books become embraced by gold nuts — let me say gold enthusiasts. And you know, there are a couple gold — I don't know what they sell exactly — but companies that have bought on the order of 10,000 copies each. And one of my co-authors saw — she first had to give an excuse for why she was watching Fox News, but said she was watching Fox News, and usually where an ad comes up for Mike — you know, what is it, that guy who says MyPillow, or Mike Huckabee selling some magic pill that cures everything with some gold thing, and there, you know, and if you write to us now we will send you a free copy of Our Dollar, Your Problem.
I don't know what I should think of that, but you know, I think over time the euro and the Chinese will do their homework more. Your other questions are deep questions. I'm not going to try to give a glib answer, but I'll give the IMF a little credit for that was what the IMF said that everybody should do. That's what particularly the Asian central bankers were saying they were going to do, that if you deepen your domestic markets, you have more tools for preventing the worst crisis outcome. And I think in some sense when people point at Japan and say, you know, it was great, it wasn't great. I mean, there are many problems Japan's had. I wouldn't say it was just that they had high debt and financial repression, but they've gone from being richer than the United States to poorer than Mississippi and a lot of problems. So it's a balance in these countries, but yes, no, it's been very surprising to me. We haven't had a big emerging market debt crisis. I certainly would have thought we would. I know we have Joyce Chang here who's a great expert on this, and she can probably tell you better, but it's been a surprise.
Layna Mosley 44:13 ↗
Okay, let's open it up for some questions. I think we'll collect — I'm guessing there are lots of questions about a very wide-ranging talk and book. So let's collect three. Start here with these three. Yeah, just right. Yep. Right. Get to your right. Yeah. Let's take these first three here, and then you can answer what you want, and then we'll go on for some more.
Maybe just everyone introduce themselves to the audience.
Audience Member 44:37 ↗
I'm Bing Shen. I'm a member of the advisory board of JRC, and I have worked for both the World Bank and Morgan Stanley, and I'm now sitting on the board of four public companies. And the question is this: that the replacement of the pound sterling by the US dollar as the dominant global currency went largely frictionlessly and with minimum spillover effects on the global economy. Now, assuming that the Chinese RMB is going to be the alternative — they may not surpass the US dollar, but they may reach some kind of parity with the US dollar — what recommendation would you give to the leadership of both the US and China to make sure this phenomenon happens as frictionlessly as possible?
Layna Mosley 45:38 ↗
Thanks. I'm going to pass that to Marcus.
Marcus Bernay 45:44 ↗
Hi, I'm Marcus Bernay, Princeton University. Great talk again. I wanted to ask you two questions. One is, you said the level of debt doesn't matter so much, but the debate in Europe right now is to create a common European-wide debt market in order to have this size to compete with US Treasury. Would you say that's misguided, whether it's a eurobond or SPS or some other common debt market? And my second question is, if you want to move to a multipolar world, how many poles do you want? There's some theory that you know five poles are more stable situations than having two or three, because then if people shift around it becomes very unstable.
Layna Mosley 46:23 ↗
Okay, we had one more up front, so we have to get a whole bunch of questions to answer.
Alan Blinder 46:27 ↗
Alan Blinder in the economics department at Princeton. Ken, you're obviously willing to speculate on a lot of things. I'd like to get you to speculate on the following question. As you know and as most of us here know, if you extrapolate under current policies, the debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States is heading towards infinity. We know it's not going to get to infinity, I'm pretty sure of that. I'd like to hear your speculation on what stops it and how. Not when, that's too much, but what.

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APA

Rogoff, K. (2026, March 6). Keynote: Kenneth Rogoff - Our Dollar, Your Problem (Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances Conference) [Interview transcript]. JRCPPF. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265849/

MLA

Kenneth Rogoff. "Keynote: Kenneth Rogoff - Our Dollar, Your Problem (Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances Conference)." JRCPPF, 6 Mar. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265849/.

BibTeX
@misc{rogoff2026_3265849,
  author       = {Kenneth Rogoff},
  title        = {Keynote: Kenneth Rogoff - Our Dollar, Your Problem (Debt, Deficits \& Global Imbalances Conference)},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, JRCPPF. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {mar},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3265849/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}