Thank you very much, Seth. Thank you to everyone who's here. Thank you to McMillan and Yale University Press for inviting me to give this lecture. If you're just entering, don't hesitate to sit in the front. So, and I have many friends. John, sitting in the front row, is one of my longest-time friends. We met when I don't know, you were 16, I think, years old, and we were roommates in graduate school, and I've known him for a long time. And I also have former colleagues, co-authors, and others in the room. And I was an undergraduate at Yale, as Seth alluded, and it's always amazing to be back. I don't know that I've been in this building, and I don't want to sound senile in case I have, but I don't think so. So it's really, it's really quite, quite remarkable. Um, here's, okay.
That didn't go well. There we go. Now it's happy. This is the cover of the book, and I'm actually very grateful to Yale University Press for suggesting the basic design of this. I learned from interviewing with Charlie Rose a long time ago that sort of 90% of doing a book is the title and the cover, and then you know, after that. And this was a great suggestion. They were also helpful with the title, suggesting adding something a little bit longer in case people didn't quite know what it was going to be about. So this phrase, 'our dollar, your problem,' it's very familiar to people who have been in international economics, was actually a famous quote from the US Treasury Secretary in 1971, John Connally. Nixon was president, and this was the summer of 1971, and it was a momentous period in the global history of the global financial system because the US and the world definitively went off gold.
Now, you may think that you learned that we went off gold in the early 1930s when Franklin Roosevelt abrogated the gold clauses in our debt, and that was a default. We, yes, we have defaulted, and I'll come back to that. And by the way, the Supreme Court ruled that it was a default, but Franklin Roosevelt bullied them into not awarding any money for it. But it was a big event because although individuals couldn't get gold for their dollars, governments still could. If you held treasury bills, you could cash them in for dollars — I'm sorry, for gold. And you know, it was originally $35 an ounce. It moved a little bit later, but we fixed it. That system was by design after World War II.
And there, I'll come to it later, but it really wasn't sustainable because our gold supply was fixed and wasn't growing very fast. But the world was growing very fast, and the demand for dollars — and we were very good at printing the dollars, but not as good at getting the gold to back the dollars. And eventually it had to blow up. And I think many people thought it would still take another decade or two before it did. But Nixon proactively went off of it, and everyone in the rest of the world was furious, or particularly Europe, Japan, Canada, because they were holding lots of dollars, not so different than the Asian central banks are in particular today, some other countries in the Middle East and Latin America also. They're holding, you know, the equivalent of a trillion adjusted for inflation and the size of the global economy, holding many trillions of dollars, and you said, 'What are we supposed to do with these?' And they saw the inflation coming, which was already heating up at that time. It got much worse, but they didn't want their dollars to be worthless. And Connally said, 'Well, it's our dollar. It's your problem.'
And I think what spoke to me about that phrase was, first of all, the arrogance. I don't like that side of American policy, and I don't really think it serves us well in the long run. I think we need allies, and bullying them around's not such a great idea. But equally importantly, it was ironic because we actually didn't have a plan for how we would control inflation. What would be the check on inflation if we didn't have this threat that countries would get gold? And the irony is that it was our problem.
So, needless to say, there's a lot of echoes of that today. And I finished the book actually before I knew who would win the election. Otherwise, I might have called it 'Our Donald, Your Problem.' But the parallels are really quite striking because actually at the same time Nixon went off the gold standard, he announced 10% tariffs. I mean, Nixon's clearly the closest president — not that he's really a total parallel — to Trump in so many ways. The book aims to be a history, but also an intellectual history of thinking about the dollar, thinking about the global exchange rate system, how both have evolved. I do weave in tidbits of my personal history, often standing in places where I was at least seeing what was going on, if not causing what was going on. And so you'd have to read it to get that. It's very hard to bring out fully in a lecture.
I've sometimes been asked why I wrote it, and I think there were a lot of reasons, but one of them was I felt that within the profession there had been just a complete lack of perspective on the importance of looking at long time frames, looking at prior experiences, looking at other countries to try to think about what would happen. And Seth, in his introductory remarks, alluded to my book with Carmen Reinhart, This Time Is Different, which came out just as the financial crisis was unfolding. We had worked on it for seven years. And that title also is intended to be ironic because things aren't different. And everybody thought we'd never have a financial crisis. How can that happen? We're too smart. And of course, we did. But you go on after that, I mean, everybody thought we'd never have inflation again. And I would teach it to my students, and they would — including undergraduates and graduate students — and it was like I was trying to teach them Frank Sinatra or something that was totally irrelevant to them, the music of another generation. The idea that real interest rates might not always be super low and debt might not be free was anathema when I was debating that with Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, Olivier Blanchard, and many others around the world 10 or 12 years ago. And I, you know, I'll come to something, but if you look at a longer sweep of history, you wouldn't be so sure that the recent trends, even if they've been for five or 10 years, are going to last. The rise of China, the role of the dollar, and certainly I'll come to the end of it, to debt.
So the rise of the dollar is the organizing principle of the book. It's really far from the only thing it's about. I look at the whole financial system, and one should understand that the dominant currency does not change hands very often. There are many — there's a lot of inertia, network effects, and then simply the dominant power doesn't change very often. So the book gives some history. I start with Spain in the 1500s, which completely dominated the world. They had discovered silver in Mexico and in Latin America and were very, very rich and powerful until they weren't. There's the famous invincible Spanish Armada, which led to the beginning of the end. Although it's worth bearing in mind that the peso didn't just die right away. It was still used very widely for a couple hundred years because it was very high quality. The Dutch guilder took over after that. That was really financial innovation. They had the idea of bills of exchange, basically having bank promissory notes circulate in place of cash. They were very innovative. It was a small country, but they were very, very powerful militarily because they could hire a lot of people with all their money and many other things.
And then there was Great Britain, particularly after the Napoleonic War, when really it was the only country fully standing in the West, and they really ruled up until World War I. Although Britain won World War I, they lost a lot, and the United States was rising. There was a cohabitation between World War I and World War II. And then at the end of World War II, not only was the United States by far the dominant country — this is starting from 1950. And by the way, these are very rough measures because GDP, gross domestic product, our measure of output, didn't really exist in most countries until much after this period. It was very primitive. So these are the early years or historians' estimates. There are two. One is the market exchange rates, the market exchange rate. The other one's an attempt to control for purchasing power. And I would say the market exchange rate is the more useful one. If you're thinking of global power, you can't buy Patriot missiles with purchasing power parity dollars. You need real dollars to buy them. And you can see the US was close to 40% of global GDP. The UK again won World War II, but the US, by virtue of its geographical isolation and other things, had much more left than anybody else did. It was clearly going to be dominant.
And the US was actually put at the center of the system. It was by design the dominant currency. Other currencies, if they wanted to be fully in the so-called Bretton Woods system — that was our fixed exchange rate system — needed to peg their exchange rate to the dollar, which they sort of did. There were times they fell off the wagon but got back on, and the United States was supposed to pay in gold if anyone wanted it. Now, it's a little deceptive to think of the whole world as revolving around the dollar. There are many measures of currency dominance, and you'll see them in the literature. Share of reserves — it's really easy. Well, it's relatively easy to measure. It's actually not really easy to measure because many countries are very secretive about their reserves. But central banks hold the assets of other countries, the debt of other countries, which they use in emergencies, they use in crisis. China, by a student of mine who graduated last year, probably holds around $2 trillion in euros. They hold more than $2 trillion in reserves, but $2 trillion in euros in their reserves.
And so you look at the percentages of how people hold reserves. There are many other measures. For example, how is oil priced? How is trade priced? And each of these metrics is actually very indirect and captures something about what's going on, but not everything. I give a long list in the book. The one I like the best is one based on a series of papers I did with Carmen Reinhart, and then Carmen Reinhart and Ethan Ilzetzki, where we look at how central banks calibrate their exchange rate regimes: who's fixing to the dollar, almost fixing to the dollar, who's fixing to the euro, almost fixing to the euro. And you know, we regard that as something of a portmanteau measure of dollar dominance. I would say, you know, looking at the other one, which you will see all the time in the newspapers, it's really a little bit like — and maybe I'm not allowed to use this analogy anymore, but I'm still going to — the old story of the seven blind men touching an elephant, and they each come to a completely different — they're touching in different places and come to a different conclusion about what it is. And I think that's a lot of these other measures.
So what's going on here? Well, one thing to note: the red is the dollar. There also in blue, light blue, is the French franc. Europe is the dollar — that's if I did it on an income-weighted basis, Europe is most of it. Japan hadn't really gotten big again yet. It comes later. It grew very, very fast. And Latin America wasn't wealthy either. So we're looking at geographic size. But the thing — and we have in green the British pound. The empire was falling, but it hadn't fallen yet. But the one I particularly want to draw your attention to is the one in orange. That was the ruble block, and that has the former Soviet bloc countries, you know, which is not just Russia but Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, etc., and of course also China. And you can see it's very big, and actually economically it was very big. Russia was — the Soviet Union was the second biggest country by almost any measure. And I sort of — you know, there's some — I can't explain to you every detail of this map, but for example, Egypt and Ethiopia were in the dollar block. Argentina and Bolivia down there in Latin America, they were just in free fall, and so we don't — if your inflation rate's really high, we just don't classify you, we classify you as freely falling. But orange was a big part of the global economy.
And when I was an undergraduate at Yale, John may have had a different experience, but the textbook we were using, which was by the great Paul Samuelson, said that in his opinion the Soviet Union was going to catch up with the United States. And you had many other leading thinkers: Walter Rostow, who was one of the great development thinkers; Abram Bergson, who was the giant in Soviet economics at the time. That was very common. And Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he later became senator from New York, he wrote about this and was noting that in the White House, that's what everyone thought, in the CIA, the White House, everyone thought into the 60s, way into the 70s, that Russia was going to catch up. It wasn't so obvious. I had — I was taught this at Yale. I had some great professors there: Michael Montus and Marty Weitzman, who both at that time were doing work in Soviet bloc economics. Montus later went on to become one of the giants in art economics. He did a very famous book, and Marty Weitzman, of course, was a pioneer in environmental economics. But at the time they were writing about this.
And I had lived in the former Yugoslavia for quite some time and traveled around, and I knew, because that's what I was also taught at Yale, that they were better off than the Soviet Union because it was a looser version of capitalism. And it didn't feel like they were about to catch up. I mean, I stayed in the dorms in Zagreb where they didn't have indoor plumbing. I traveled around the countryside where no one seemed to be working. It just seemed weird. And I tell about in the book how I was so sad I didn't get a Rhodes Scholarship. And I couldn't tell if the reason was that I was wearing a completely inappropriate suit because I'd never owned a suit before, and I thought electric blue was just a great color for a suit, or that I answered this question that really irritated them when they said, 'Well, is the Soviet Union going to overtake the United States or catch up?' And I said, 'No.' And they said, 'Well, don't you read Samuelson? Don't you know anything?' But I only say that in that it could have been different. It's the first point in which we were lucky: the Soviet Union didn't go the way of China. I talk about in the book some episodes where it might have.
So fast forward to 2015, which, using my work with Ilzetzki and Reinhart, I mark as the peak of the dollar, peak dollar dominance. Red denotes the dollar block by our measure. If you're in light red, you're loosely affiliated with the dollar. Canada is dollar-centric but has a very free flow, as do a number of Latin American countries. This was, you know, this is really the most dominant any currency's ever been. Now, there are a number of reasons that that was the peak and that it's been going down since. This is before Trump, before Trump too certainly. And one of the reasons, of course, is that yes, it's efficient to have one currency if that's the only thing you care about is doing trade and network effects. But if you care about, for example, stabilizing the Chinese economy, if you care about things like protecting privacy from, you know, American eyes, you don't necessarily want to have that. And I think one of the reasons that we were in decline — and you can look at reserves come down. I think we peaked at some point at 80% of reserves, and we're today 56% of reserves. You know, a big reason was we had sanctions on 20 countries at one point, and many individuals and entities, and the Chinese were looking at what we did to Russia.
I don't know if they're going to blockade Taiwan or not, but they'd sure like to, and they're thinking about it, and they don't want to have financial sanctions, and the Europeans don't like it either. It lets us dictate foreign policy in a number of ways that they don't like. Now, the fact that the dollar is so powerful isn't just because people are holding dollars. It's that we have a lot of control over the global financial system. That control partly comes from we're big, partly comes from the dollar's used a lot, but it also comes from basically our using our muscle to force things the way we want them. The way SWIFT, the International Messaging System, runs, the way the International Monetary Fund works. And some of that comes from military power. It's not just from your economic power. I'll come back to that.
So there's been a debate. It started after I finished the book because I mean, the other side's so stupid, I don't know what I would have done with it. But there's been a debate about is it actually a privilege to be the global currency. And Stephen Miran, who got a Harvard PhD, I think you know, 2010-ish, is the head of Trump 2's Council of Economic Advisors and also is now on the Federal Reserve Board. He wrote a very provocative paper in November 2020 called the Mar-a-Lago Accord. I'll tell you what it's named after in a second. It was brilliant. First of all, calling it Mar-a-Lago brought it to Trump's attention. And then, you know, it just said they're using us. It's terrible being — you know, being the dollar is just the worst thing. We need to make them pay for the privilege of using the dollar. And he has all sorts of things like tariffs, but also default. His proposal — some of you know this, but you know, if you're not in the weeds you might not. His proposal is: China, you have $2 trillion in reserves, okay, we're going to honor it, but not exactly right now. You're holding six-month Treasury bills and three-year bonds.
We're going to take that, and you're going to get hundred-year Treasury bills, bonds, and you're not going to get any interest in the interim. You get it all at the end of 100 years. We'll give you a fair interest rate. You'll love it. And he was proposing to do that to the world, which is of course a form of default. And so there's, you know, he argued it's not good. So why isn't it good? So the argument was that it makes the dollar strong, and that's hollowed out our manufacturing. And there's a little bit of truth to that. It's clever. Scott Bessent, who's the Treasury Secretary, who typically says, to my mind, very sensible things in the scheme of things, he was really enthusiastic about this, like he was going around pushing the idea. Yeah, we ought to do it.
And so why don't I think it makes sense? I mean, there are a lot of reasons. The dollar is high, the dollar is low. The dollar has gone in huge swings over time. It's very high right now, but it was, you know, very low 15 years ago before the global financial crisis. It goes up. In 1985 and 2002 it was a similar value to today in purchasing power, and it fell by 40% both times. We've run deficits for a long time. That's true. But we've also been the dominant currency in the 50s and the 60s and the early 70s, and we were running surpluses that whole time. And there are lots of other reasons the dollar is strong. We're good in technology. We're good in biotech. We're good in engineering. I think we're pretty good in education. Lots of things make the dollar more expensive.
I was one of the early podcasts I did on this book, and I'd never done podcasts before, but I was told by my younger colleagues that that's where it's at. I did a podcast with the New York Times, Ezra Klein, and I didn't know what to expect, and he just wanted me to tell him, 'What would Miran think? Why is this a good idea?' And I think I'd never given it two seconds' thought because I said it just sounds like demagoguery to me. I mean, what, you know, and you know, he kept pushing. He wasn't going to let go. And I finally came up with, you know, you're much younger than me, but back in the 70s, you would see ads for agriculture just like you see for manufacturing. Everything was protecting the American farmer. Got to save the American farmer. And now we're actually an agricultural superpower, but we don't employ anyone in farming except for illegal immigrants, which we're not allowing in. And we have to bail out the farming sector. But the actual number of jobs in the farming sector, even counting the immigrants that we bring in, is very small. It's been replaced by mechanization. And of course that's happening with manufacturing. It's going to be the same thing.
What are the reasons, if it's not a bad thing, what are the reasons it's good? Well, one of the reasons it's good is we pay a lower interest rate on our debt. There are various estimates of this, but I think the literature's coalesced around something like 1%. Now that's controlling for how much you borrow. So for those of you that are economists or economics graduate students, you face a demand curve, and the more you try to push onto the market, you are going to pay a higher interest rate. It's not an accident that the US pays probably a roughly similar, controlling for exchange rates, to Germany, but Germany has half the debt of the United States. And so that's one privilege, and that extends to everyone, to your home mortgage, to your car loan, the fact that the dollar's very, very widely used.
A second advantage, which is less obvious, is that, as I mentioned, we've made ourselves the back office to the world. An incredible percentage of the world's trades goes through the United States. I've been in PayPal, I've been in banks, seeing they have these — almost looks like you're in the Houston space command, looking at these maps that they have of what's going on, of just everything through the whole world they're seeing. And I mentioned, you know, we sort of work things that way. There's a tremendous amount of information that we get, and of course Donald Trump would never look at it, but he could. He could know what you're — the prime minister of France, or you're about to be the prime minister of France because they just resigned, but you're something like the prime minister of France. He can look at a lot of stuff about what you know, what you're paying your mistress and stuff like that if he's so inclined. And also we put sanctions on everyone, and you know, these are a big deal to the rest of the world. So I think overall it's a privilege.
Now there's this phrase, exorbitant privilege, that the French prime minister, later president, Giscard d'Estaing introduced, where he was talking about more than that. He was talking about Americans were just investing in everything. They were buying up Europe. We were having to hold dollars. They were buying up our factories, our land. And that is absolutely true. We did that for a very long time and got tremendous benefits from that.
This is my aunt Henrietta, actually, who wanted to design shoes and was able to make them in Italy during this period. That's a picture of her shoes. I couldn't use it in the book. I didn't even ask Seth. It's an Andy Warhol that she had commissioned. I wish she had bought that instead of sold her factory. She would have left my cousin a lot more money, but so be it.
So, you know, just sort of skirting through our various competitors. One was Japan. Japan was coming at us like a ton of, you know, like a steam engine, super fast. They looked like they were going to take us and beat us. And you say, well, that's ridiculous. That could never happen. Okay. Japan was half the size of the United States. It was an island. Yeah. But the United Kingdom kind of did that. The UK, I don't think, ever had more than a quarter of the population of France and was obviously being incredibly dominant. The Netherlands had half the population of the United States. They were the dominant currency. So there was a period, I think some of you may know this, where Japan — what I have here...
is a chart of the value of household real estate in Japan actually exceeded that in the United States. That's at market prices. This is well accepted. This isn't, you know, some far-flung thing. Japan's, I think, about 90% the land mass of California. And I could put up a similar thing for the stock market. The Japanese stock market had a higher value than the United States in the mid-80s. That's the world appraising what Japan Inc. is worth versus the US.
And one of the most important moments after Nixon in the global economy evolution of the world financial system was when we forced the Plaza Accord on them. That's named after the Mar-a-Lago accord. And to make a long story short, we forced them to appreciate their exchange rate to make the yen less competitive. And it was very successful. James Baker explained to me, he was the Treasury Secretary, explained to me that the idea was to make it 10% more. But this is a picture of what happened to the yen over the year following the Plaza Accord. The yen doubled in value. In other words, it cost half as many yen to buy a dollar as it did. And for a little while, that worked for Japan. But I think that together with a number of other things that they did that I think we pressured them to do led to them having the mother of all financial crises, which maybe they're coming out of today and maybe they're not, 30, 35 years later, certainly 30 years later from when they had their financial crisis. So the yen never challenged.
Then there was the euro, and the euro's very interesting, a lot to be said about it. Europe was catching up and catching up with the United States. And then I think there are a variety. This is a measure of purchasing power per capita income. If we were to look at markets, Europe doesn't look as good, but this is one measure where you see they're catching up. But most of the countries except Germany flattened out. They stopped catching up to the United States. And one of the remarkable things of the 21st century is the United States has just left Europe in the dust. The European stock market, I'm not showing it to you here, it was worth the same as the US stock market in 2000. And I don't know the number off the top of my head now, but it's about half today of what the United States is worth. I mean, a lot of that's tech. It's many things. I think the euro still occupies a significant share of global reserves, but it had been much higher at one point. And I think one of the signal mistakes they made, sorry, John, was admitting Greece prematurely into the Euro. John's father was a famous scholar in Greek history among other things here. And that's where we met actually was in Greece when he was in Greece. And,
All right. I like the World Junior Championship. And, you know, if they had been a little more patient in building up the euro, it might be doing better. And I argue in the book that if Europe is ever forced to remilitarize, we've already seen Trump won, the euro will gain market share. It's not that it's going to replace the dollar, but it'll gain market share. I should mention I have a great former student, TK Hassan, who just gave a paper at Brookings with a very provocative thesis based on his model of what makes a reserve currency. He argues that if you put a big enough tariff wall around the United States, suddenly the euro becomes more attractive because in general equilibrium, you need to get your money in and out. And if there are very high tariffs, it shrinks international globalization and can ultimately make the euro more attractive. And I had a paper a long time ago on this general issue with Maurice Obstfeld about how frictions in international trade actually boomerang on finance. So you're Trump and you're putting in trade, trade bad, finance good, we're going to keep the finance, you can't trade as much with us anymore. It doesn't work like that. In general equilibrium, the two things are closely related. So maybe it will happen for Europe, maybe it won't. I'll, this is a Stefan Zweig novel. I talk about it in the book. You can read it.
Another challenger to the United States, clearly a very relevant one today, is China. China's gotten very big, although, you know, still if you use market exchange rates it's only two-thirds the size of the United States. If you use purchasing power parity it's gotten bigger. It's hard to feed 1.44 billion people and so if you use US prices it seems very big, but China is definitely the coming power. And I have six chapters in the book about it, I can't go over here, but one theme that I had for a long time was I was very suspicious of their growth model, that it overemphasized building real estate and infrastructure, which we'd seen in the Soviet Union, we had seen in Japan and actually Germany and parts of Europe, and as Marty Weitzman and many others showed, but originally Bob Solow, that runs into decreasing returns, you can't do that forever. And so I had argued that for a long time, but without really being able to back it up with data. And I was very fortunate that there was this brilliant young Chinese economist and also somewhat rebellious, Yuwen Chen Yang, she's now at the IMF, and she came to me saying, I know you've been saying this, but I have data, I can actually, you know, put this into something coherent. And she was certainly the lead force in a series of papers we did, and she just was awarded the, I guess, equivalent of the Clark Medal in China, which I say because originally they wouldn't allow our work. They wouldn't talk about the work because it was talking about how China would have a problem, and now I think it's become something of a consensus.
So this shows a measure of direct and indirect expenditure on real estate in China. China's in red. It's very big compared to certainly advanced countries.
More significantly, this is per capita housing in China. And if you've been around rural China, they built real estate and housing and high-speed rail everywhere. I mean, it all looks identical. I'm being a maybe they have a few part of how they make it so cheap and build it so fast. They don't have the diversity, for example, you have on the Yale campus. It's very expensive to do. That by the way is McKinsey's recommendation to everybody when they're asked how to build housing is to do it in a standardized way. Their per capita housing space is bigger than the UK or France and it's not nearly as rich. At the same time, housing is a huge part of China's wealth. So this gives a measure comparing to the United States. It's from a Journal of International Economics paper. The light bar is 2022 and the red is 2023 because prices started falling. And there's no question that the reason China is having a growth recession, a consumption collapse, is everybody has all their money in housing and there's no social security. There's very poor medical care. You often have to pay for your education. The one child policy means many people have to take care of two parents in addition to their children. And so I don't think this is getting astray a little bit, but I mean, I don't think China is going to grow a lot faster than the United States over the next decade, maybe a percent a year more. I think it has very deep problems. That said, they still want to blockade Taiwan and take Taiwan. They still want to develop their own back office, their own rails, their own way of doing things. And I think it will happen.
I won't skip over this picture. This is the Pudong Executive Leadership Center. I talk about a talk I gave there in 2005. Back in the old days when China used to look for excellence in its administrators in order to be promoted, that's much less true today. And I didn't go over it because one of the things that shocked me when I gave a talk there was people were asking these questions that I couldn't believe they were asking that addressed policies you weren't allowed to talk about, things like the exchange rate. And I was told here you're free to talk about anything. And needless to say, the irony of that being at Yale or Harvard over the last decade is certainly not lost on me. And I hope for, you know, it's, but it's much worse in China too.
Another challenger to the dollar, which is quite significant, are cryptocurrencies. And I'm running out of time so I can't talk about this extensively, but cryptocurrencies are used in the global underground economy. That's mostly tax evasion, regulatory evasion. It also includes drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trade, and what have you. And the dollar used to rule and now much less. And the global underground economy, the World Bank has estimates where conservatively it's 20% of global GDP and other estimates it's 20 to 22 trillion. I have a paper that I talk about with Papidia that's in the Journal of the European Economic Association, where we think we find a really elegant way using value-added tax reported and other surveys to find how big, we call it evade, this share of the economy is. And it lines up pretty well with things people have done with more seat-of-the-pants measures. Although my wonderful colleague, Stephanie Stancheva, who just won the US Clark Medal, she's a French Bulgarian, and she says those numbers from Bulgaria just can't be right. You see it's 20% of the economy, it should be much bigger for Bulgaria. So, but it's a big deal, that part of the economy, and cryptocurrencies capture that. It's also used in, you know, all kinds of illegal stuff.
This is a picture I had, I was given permission to use in the book, but ultimately I didn't. It's from my co-author on a paper about detecting crypto transactions in the JME. My very young co-author, Clemens Graf von Luckner, he's by the way on the market this year, was in Lebanon and ran out of money and the banks weren't functioning and he had to get cash but he had Bitcoin and he tried to find out where can I trade cash for Bitcoin and he finds this place in an incredibly seedy dangerous part of Beirut and trades and gets cash and does it a couple times, gets to be friends with the person who runs it. And of course, in order to do it, he knew at least one of their wallets. And he looked at it and he was seeing $100,000, million dollars going in and out of this place. They were handling millions of dollars of cash in this little hole in the wall. There was one armed guard outside. The license plate numbers have been scratched out and all identifying marks because it dawned on him this is a Hezbollah bank. This is how they're doing all sending all their money around the world. And I had eliminated all those things because although I'm very pro-Israel, I did not want to give them a bombing target. So I ultimately still didn't put this in the book, but it's certainly very widely used.
So let me just conclude with, you know, their competitors. I didn't get to talk about world currencies and stuff, which is lots of people like to write about, but it's a little bit nonsense. The biggest threats to dollar dominance, in other words, to our share of the market coming down more towards like it looked like even in 2010 when it was much smaller, much less 1950 when it was much smaller. The biggest threats come from within. The threat of central bank independence, the threat of a budget which is out of control. And I'm sure you've read a lot about central bank independence and I think I wrote the first paper about it 40 years ago. This is a later paper by Larry Summers and Alberto Alesina showing the relation between central bank independence and inflation.
And just one thing you might not think of, if Trump gets his claws on this, which is he's using tariffs, we're already using financial sanctions. Another thing which most people don't know anything about is something called swap lines, where a lot of parts of the world where they are using dollars, every once in a while there's a pandemic, there's a global financial crisis, everything freezes up and suddenly they aren't able to clear trades that are in dollars because their central bank can't print it. And we've introduced this idea, it came from the 60s, but Ben Bernanke really went big time on it and then Jay Powell did again, where we basically temporarily lend the central bank dollars. They give us their currency. It's actually a little risky. We don't, the Federal Reserve says there's zero risk, which is just ridiculous. Of course there's risk, but it's a very important part of dollar dominance because countries believe they can rely on it. What if we say, 'Well, you know, we don't like your DEI policy and therefore you can't have a swap line,' or, you know, whatever, you have somebody Trump likes in jail and you can't have a swap line. It's potentially something you could weaponize, and I think serious people think that when we're talking about taking over the Federal Reserve, see that as a real problem.
So the one last thing I want to cover is lower forever interest rates and the US debt trajectory. This is a picture of my friend the magician David Blaine. The young people here may not know who he is. This is him. He went up to some ridiculous altitude by helium balloon. I work him a little bit into the book in another context. It's not here and it's a real question of, you know, how long we'll be able to keep things up. This is, you've seen many pictures of US government debt. This is marketable debt. This is from the Congressional Budget Office, which interestingly has not produced a new one in Trump 2. They're scared to. I promise you that's the reason that they'll be told they're scared to. And we see things they're talking about making all sorts of concessions to magical growth and everything to not have to worry about that.
So US debt, now this originally comes from a paper, another paper, a Brookings paper of mine with Eichengreen and Reinhart, it's updated, shows US debt outstanding to the rest of the world compared to everybody else, and basically we're half of it, half of all the public debt is US dollar debt. Now some people say, well, that's just a great advantage, it makes it so easy to get US debt. But again, you know, those of you that are economists, that, you know, the higher it is, the higher the interest rate you probably have to pay.
Going back to one more Yale professor, Robert Triffin, he was there when I was at Yale and I didn't take his course. I probably didn't either. He was sort of really famous for one thing, but he was really right about it, which was that if we keep printing dollars and our gold supply is fixed, something has to give. And he gave this famous congressional testimony. It happened more than a decade, Nixon came more than a decade later. There's a view that there might be a modern-day Triffin paradox that a number of economists have advanced, where you have on the left axis the US share of global GDP, on the right axis how much US debt is held abroad as a share of US GDP, and, you know, there are issues around that.
But I think the big thing that I would, I actually have written about debt over the years, but never about US debt. I didn't really have any concerns about it. But I'm starting to. And one of the reasons everybody said you shouldn't look at it is because interest rates are so low. Why are you worried? There's no interest payments. There's nothing to worry about. This is a graph of the market yield on US Treasury securities at a 10-year constant maturity. And I circle this period where actually at average zero, and you know, you're paying a zero real interest rate. So it means you're growing enough to pay off the interest. Who cares? You know, you just don't pay attention.
And Larry Summers gave his famous secular stagnation speech in 2013 arguing, I think, that it would go on forever. And I did a couple, several debates with him after that saying that nobody's going to be talking about this in 10 years. This is just not going to be forever. And it may prove to be right again. I think it's actually very hard to call these things, but real interest rates are quite a bit up. This is an AER paper of mine from a year ago where I've drawn what I call the Rachel Summers secular stagnation period. He has a Brookings paper giving 1980 to maybe it was 2019 or something like that of what the real interest, and he goes, because look, it's just in steady decline. But if you look at a longer period, and this is a global rate, but you could look at the US rates, you could look at UK rates, it's very volatile, sometimes it's high, sometimes it's low, until it's not. There's a fair amount of evidence of reversion to mean. And I will just mention, and it was actually remarkably hard to get this paper published because the answer is not politically correct, which is I think a lot of progressives want everything to be free, and if the interest rate is zero, you can make everything free. And we eventually did get it published. But it was more of a battle, I think, than it should have been.
There are people today who say, well, demographics means it's going to go back to zero, and they're really brilliant young and older economists. They might be right. But the thing is the real interest rates have been coming down for a long time. And the demographic decline. Oh, I actually have the growth rate here. I meant to have that. It looks the same. The demographic, it's the same as that other chart. It's very, very recent. It's difficult to extrapolate. And we have other expenditure needs on the world war. Olivier Blanchard famously gave a presidential address where he said we shouldn't think 2019, we don't need to think about this because the interest rate is below the growth rate. And I think that's been true over a lot of history, but it doesn't always work out well. And there's a nice paper by Mauro and Jiao about that.
Now I say the biggest pushback that there's nothing to worry about and we'll stay on top forever is AI. AI is going to produce so much growth. Why do you care? Who's talking about the interest payments? I had this brilliant young podcaster come to my Harvard office. You probably won't know who he is if you're not in tech. His name's Dwarkesh Patel. He's 23 years old and sort of a podcast prodigy. And he came to my office and he said, you know, in 10 years there's going to be AGI, artificial general intelligence. It will grow at 10% a year. You know, why are you even thinking about this? And I said, 'Well, it's great to have you in my office because almost everyone else who comes here tells me about how the world's going to be dystopian and the environment's going to ruin our lives and whatever.' But if you believe that, then it's possible growth will solve the problems.
But I'd leave you with this thought. Aside from all the limitations on electricity and things like that, good luck taxing the money that AI is earning. It's not as easy to tax capital as it is to tax labor. We're going to be having the share of capital almost certainly rise. In my view, that's a significant contributor to why stock prices are so high. Not just that growth is going to be high, but that capital share will rise. And anyway, he may turn out to be right. It may turn out we just should have been borrowing more. We're the very poor cousins of our future generations. We're just, why are we worrying about it? And I mean, I think that's a very risky strategy to take if you want to be around indefinitely.
I have followed AI my whole life from my days as a chess player. This picture has nothing to do with anything, but I'm showing it to you. I played an exhibition game with Magnus Carlsen, who was then, in 2012, and now still by far the best player in the world, and I actually made a draw in this and hadn't played in a long time. It happened. That's why I'm showing it to you. But I mean, in following AI, I think one thing I learned was that it takes a long time. Things don't happen overnight.
Now, if we do run into trouble, what will happen? What will give? And what do we do? And I said, part of why I wrote the book was this 'this time is different' mentality. There'll never be inflation. There'll never be a financial crisis. China will grow forever, etc. People say we'll never have a debt problem. Now, we did default a little under a hundred years ago. We defaulted. And to say we could never have a debt problem is just a joke. It depends on what shock hits. How we'll choose to default depends on a lot of parameters. I talk about it in the book, in the last part of the book. It could be inflation, something called financial repression. We could actually raise taxes, neither side wants to do, but default, I think, and I have another paper outstanding about this, might be on the table and to be taken seriously.
And so this is an interview with Trump, you know, this is when he was a candidate in 2016, and do you think he wouldn't? I mean, you're kidding yourself, you know, to think that. Maybe he'd try to take both the Yale and the Harvard endowment first before he defaulted on the debt. So, anyway, I've gone way over time. This is my previous book that Seth edited, This Time Is Different. This book reached fourth on Amazon of all books for a little while. It was behind the three Girl with the Dragon Tattoo novels, which have sex and violence, and Seth's been trying to get us to write another version that might incorporate some of that. We'll see. Anyway, thank you.