CEOInterviews.AI
Start App
Get an email when Kenneth Rogoff gives a new interview
One email per new interview. Unsubscribe in one click.
Kenneth Rogoff
Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard University): "The dollar will always be there, but it will be less."

📅 Apr 22, 2025 Prague Finance Institute 47 MIN 14412 VIEWS 29 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Kenneth Rogoff is Maurits C. Boas Professor at Harvard University, and former chief economist at the IMF. His influential 2009 book with Carmen Reinhart, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, shows the remarkable quantitative similarities across time and countries in the roots and aftermath of debt and financial crises. Rogoff is also known for his pioneering work on central bank independence, and on exchange rates. He is co-author of the widely-used graduate text, Foundations of International Macroeconomics. His 2016 book The Curse of Cash looks at the past, present an...

Questions asked in this interview

9
  1. 0:48So was that fear like really based on something relevant at that time, or was it just a lack of data that were not really forthcoming from the Soviet Union when it comes to just basic statistics?
  2. 5:27Wasn't there a chance for them to elevate the convertible ruble to a sort of like a proper, at least regionally dominant currency?
  3. 7:22... and its current status, given what's going on with the tariffs that we are sort of like going through and not really understanding, as that situation seems to be changing every day, I mean, isn't then, isn't that a sort of a tipping point?
  4. 14:13But can you tell us a little more about the story of the title and maybe a little about John Connally?
  5. 25:01And is it actually really replicable under the current circumstances with like what has happened to the US economy since then, and given the Chinese opposition to actually appreciate RMB?
  6. 31:41And was that the reason why you decided to write this book?
  7. 36:13Could it be some basket currency? Could it be crypto?
  8. 40:10Isn't it just losing the pros, or are there any other sort of disadvantages to being, you know, having the dominant currency other than losing the advantages?
  9. 44:27Would that be a sort of another tipping point if, like, a lot more crude is traded in renminbi or other currencies?
Leoš Rousek 0:11 ↗
Hello and welcome to PFI Talks, brought to you by Prague Finance Institute, an affiliate of the leading Czech economics research center, CERGE-EI. My name is Leoš Rousek. I'm the head of communications at PPF Group and the host of this podcast. I'm pleased to welcome Kenneth Rogoff, distinguished professor of economics at Harvard and the former IMF chief economist. Mr. Rogoff is an accomplished chess player and author of many books on economics. His latest, "Our Dollar, Your Problem," is a sweeping history of the world's dominant currencies and where the dollar may be headed. Hello, professor.
Kenneth Rogoff 0:46 ↗
Greetings.
Leoš Rousek 0:48 ↗
Well, since we are talking about your book, and let me just sort of do a little sort of product placement here, or reading placement. You talk about, in the initial part of the book, various different other-than-dollar currencies that have tried to become dominant currencies of global trade and everything. And for someone coming with an experience from the Soviet bloc, ex-Soviet bloc like myself, I have to admit that it was very interesting to read how you, as a chess player, were looking in the '70s, '80s, or maybe '60s even, were looking at the potential dominance of the so-called convertible ruble. Yes, of course it was used for settling trades within the COMECON countries, but you know, inside we were all sort of like laughing at it. That was just a sort of a fig leaf that everybody wanted a greenback. I'll just put it this way. So was that fear like really based on something relevant at that time, or was it just a lack of data that were not really forthcoming from the Soviet Union when it comes to just basic statistics?
Kenneth Rogoff 2:09 ↗
Well, first of all, as a teenager traveling around Eastern Europe, and I certainly interacted with a lot of Russians, I wasn't thinking about, boy, I want your currency. Can we swap dollars for rubles? No, I wasn't thinking about that. It was really only when I was an undergraduate at Yale. I went, I missed a lot of my latter high school years, but then went to Yale where I was reading in my introductory course. I took Russian economics where there was quite a debate about that. So the most famous economist of the 20th century, one of the two or three most famous, Paul Samuelson, and his textbook, which was read by everybody, predicted that the dollar would, not that the ruble would catch up with the dollar, but that Russia was going to catch up as an economy with the United States. And you know exactly what shape the ruble would have taken, but it would have certainly had a big footprint in the global economy. So I think I was a freshman, as embarrassing, I'm so old, but I was a freshman in taking this course in 1972, and he was predicting the catch-up sometime between, I think, '87 and '94. You just looking at extrapolation like people do today. But it wasn't just him. Oh my goodness. There were leading economists, Walter Rostow was a superstar, you know, one of the major players in development, predicted that, he was very influential with several presidential administrations. And back then when you were at Yale, the clever papers were not about why Russia worked so badly, but why it worked, why it worked. I know it was, I know people who are younger, I even have an extremely bright, brilliant Russian colleague, I don't want to say more, you know, who says no, nobody could have ever thought that. Well, we did. We didn't have the data. I mean, there were people like Milton Friedman who were skeptical, and I was skeptical when I was being taught about this. But no, we didn't have the data. First of all, the Russians didn't make it easy to get. Second of all, if you're not a market economy where you can aggregate prices, that's how we measure income. You take the computers and you add the meat and steel and you add it all up at market prices to form what your GDP is. Well, they didn't have market prices, which left a lot of room for creative accounting. But it wasn't just that. I mean, you know, visibly Russia, you know, put a man in space ahead of the United States. They were very good in physics and many other math, many other fields. They had a lot, to the outside eye, they had a lot of spectacular accomplishments. But yes, now it seems laughable. But when I was, you know, when I was a teenager watching my neighbor build a bomb shelter, it didn't seem laughable.
Leoš Rousek 5:27 ↗
Well, but still, you know, one of the underpinnings of the dollar's current dominance is that it is a main currency for settling, you know, crude oil trades. And the ruble, thanks to building now underused gas pipeline going to then-West Germany, you know, the Soviets became sort of a dominant, very dominant players in the trades of hydrocarbons with Western Europe. Wasn't there a chance for them to elevate the convertible ruble to a sort of like a proper, at least regionally dominant currency?
Kenneth Rogoff 6:07 ↗
I mean, by the time the Soviet Union fell, it became apparent that the whole economy was smoke and mirrors, and, you know, they were producing, as you say, hydrocarbons. Today the Soviet economy is, I don't know, you know, 15th the size of the United States. So this is sort of old history. I don't think anyone was thinking about it in the 1990s, but there was a time, you know, people don't know, had Russia adopted reforms like China did, and you're much more expert on this than I am, so I'm embarrassed to talk about it, but you know, like the Kosygin-Brezhnev reforms that they tried, had it had some flavor of what Deng Xiaoping, you know, did in China. Had it made some things market and done a few sensible things, it would have done a lot better. And I don't know about a convertible ruble, but they would have, I don't know if it ever would have retreated from Eastern Europe. I don't know, you know, how its footprint would have expanded in Africa and Asia. Look at China today. And Russia wasn't programmed to fail the way it did. It made some bad mistakes along the way.
Leoš Rousek 7:22 ↗
Okay, we'll get back to the ruble a little later. But when it comes to the dominance of the dollar and its current status, given what's going on with the tariffs that we are sort of like going through and not really understanding, as that situation seems to be changing every day, I mean, isn't then, isn't that a sort of a tipping point? For in your book you describe the dollar as a, correct me if I'm wrong, late middle-age currency.
Kenneth Rogoff 7:56 ↗
Given, so my view, looking at a historical perspective post-World War II and also thinking about the economics underlying it, is that the dollar peaked maybe 10 years ago in terms of its global footprint. And just to think about that, Asia's 50% of the dollar bloc by the measure I use with Ethan Ilzetzki and Carmen Reinhart. It's not the only one, but I think it's a pretty good one about what countries are trying to stabilize their exchange rate around. I think that's a portmanteau measure of dollar dominance. Well, China sort of has been moving away from that since 2015. And as China moves away, it is the world, you know, the biggest exporter, importer for many, many countries. So others are moving away. So I don't think people should, you know, when the currencies change, it doesn't happen overnight. It could happen over a couple decades. It doesn't take a century, but it doesn't happen overnight. But another currency moves and, you know, takes some of the space. I think the dollar, so my book views there being many weaknesses in the dollar at its peak. Some of them coming from the rest of the world doesn't like it. The title of the book captures our arrogance about it. But also coming from the fact that we have a lot of internal problems. Even before Trump, there's a lot of pressures to undermine the Federal Reserve, pressures on protectionism, pressures on the rule of law coming from both sides. So I think that was going to lead to losing some of the footprint of the dollar. The renminbi. Yes. You know, if the euro ever, you could ask me about this later, but if the euro ever became some kind of geopolitical force, Europe, which it isn't at the moment, the euro could expand also. So it's not that the dollar disappears, but it suddenly has less of a lead. That matters a lot. Okay. The obvious thing is it affects our interest rates. We get a lower interest rate for sure, controlling for how much debt we issue. By the way, I mean, we issue, the United States, I'm an American, we issue a ton of debt, and our interest rate on 10-year bonds actually really isn't lower than other countries now, controlling for, you know, various ways of trying to hedge. But we have a ton of debt out. If we had Germany's debt level, our interest rates would be a lot lower. So if you take away some of the demand, and the tariffs are going to take away some of the demand, my six puzzles paper with Maurice Obstfeld 25 years ago is all about that. Take away some of the demand that pushes up interest rates. But it also affects our ability to see everything. If you are the uber-dominant currency, if you're the uber-dominant military power, you have a lot of control over the rules of the game. What are the rules of the IMF? How does SWIFT work? How does market clearing work? That's, I think, a thing very few people understand when they talk about dominant currency. They're just thinking about convenience. No, we make rules so that it favors us a lot, and we have a lot of control over that because both of the dominance of the dollar and the military dominance. And, you know, China is going to move some of that away. It's not going to happen overnight, and Europe is going to move some of that away. So I think we've seen the peak, and we're in decline just on the footprint of the dollar, and that there are further issues. I won't, you know, I'll go back to you, and there's much more to say about it.
Leoš Rousek 11:57 ↗
Well, of course, I mean, it's, we can go on about that. And it's true that especially for Europe, the sort of the realization of what the dominance of the dollar brings came when sanctions were actually weaponized, when the currency reserves were weaponized after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Although there were, as you mentioned, there are some other nations around the world who have not been happy with the dollar's dominance because they faced sanctions for other reasons elsewhere, just, you know, an example of Iran, for example, and everything.
Kenneth Rogoff 12:37 ↗
Well, the Europeans were quite upset about Iran when we put sanctions on Iran, and the Europeans didn't agree with it, and, you know, back 10 years ago, and we bullied the Europeans into going along with it. We said, okay, you know, if you play with Iran, you can't use our financial system. But there are other ways. Everyone's very unhappy. The sharing of information, Donald Trump can see more than you can possibly imagine if he wants to about, you know, a gift you bought, you know, for somebody. Just the incredible information. I would say a significant part of our spying comes through our financial dominance and able to see all the transactions. There are many dimensions to dollar dominance, and believe me, the Europeans are well aware of this. I had the head of one of the major central banks come into my office at Harvard once, and I want to say 10 years ago, 8 years ago, and they were very upset that they had just bought something for their spouse, and it was a transaction between two European countries, but somehow crossed the dollar. And he realized, and knows all about this, that Donald Trump was president, he could see the transaction, and that just made him so mad. And so, yeah, it's much deeper than that, and especially if you don't trust us, and why should you?
Leoš Rousek 14:13 ↗
Well, this is a great segue to what I raised in the intro, and it's the title of the book because it's actually pretty amazing. When I read that this book was forthcoming, and then I saw the title, I was like, what a great title. And then you actually downplay because you immediately at the very intro, and I'm not actually like, you know, it's not a showstopper of me saying that because you are very open about it at the very beginning that it is not your statement, that it's actually, you know, it's something that John Connally, a US politician, that, but when he became the Secretary of State. But can you tell us a little more about the story of the title and maybe a little about John Connally? I'd like to let you sort of retell your book.
Kenneth Rogoff 15:04 ↗
Yeah. I mean, John Connally was a Texan, very colorful character. He'd been governor of Texas. He was actually in the car with John F. Kennedy the day he was shot, and he was badly injured on that day. He recovered, and 10, almost 10 years later, had become Nixon's, he was the president from '68 through the early '70s, he was Nixon's Treasury secretary. And Nixon, what our exchange rate system was back then, and I think even many of your finance students really wouldn't know this, the dollar used to be good as gold. You used to be able to trade the dollar for gold if you were a government. So people couldn't, after the early 1930s, that Franklin Roosevelt got rid of that. But governments could. The whole system was built around that. Your Germany or France, you would stabilize your currency to the dollar, and you held a lot of dollar treasury bills, not cash, to do that. And, you know, it had its problems, but let's face it, Europe grew like gangbusters during that period. It was a successful period, but the US decided to expand our social programs, invade, you know, have the Vietnam War, many other things. And we were starting to get inflation. And if you want to fix your currency to gold and have inflation, it's not consistent because gold's not inflating. So Nixon at some point said, 'Sorry everyone, forget it. You can't trade your dollars for gold.' And everyone, not just the Europeans, Canadians, Japanese, everybody were just, you know, apoplectic about it. So he sent John Connally there, and he said, they said, 'What are we supposed to do?' And he said, 'It's our dollar. It's your problem.' And what's I like about the title, I've always felt Americans are incredibly arrogant. And so I like to point to that. I disagree with some of our policies expressing our arrogance. We'll come to that. But also, the inflation was a disaster for the United States. It was our problem. There's an irony in it. And it is at the beginning of the book, but if you notice, I come back to it at the end of the book when I find out at the, just as I'm putting the, you know, last touches, the last day on the page proofs, oh my gosh, Donald Trump's been elected. And what a great title, you know, because it expresses the same arrogance and irony that, I mean, I think a lot of things he's doing are going to be our problem.
Leoš Rousek 17:54 ↗
But also, you know, I mean, that's what's amazing about your book, that at first it may seem like, you know, oh my god, this is just another economics book about, you know, the role of currencies, you know, exchange rate systems and everything else, but because you've been present at many of these meetings, or you saw it through the prism of the IMF, you bring a, you bring, you know, very personal touch to all this. And at the end of the day, currencies and money are personal because it actually touches all of us in many ways. And what, there was an interesting anecdote when you mentioned when there was this sort of fear in the US about Japanese yen and Japan becoming the, you know, and briefly it did become the world's largest economy, you know, for a certain period of time, it overtook by GDP measures in the purchasing power parity per capita, per capita, per capita over GDP, sorry. And so there was this push of like, okay, you guys are, you know, doing a, you know, you've enjoyed this very weak yen, you know, relative to dollar, you know, you should actually make your currency appreciate. And they, and it was sort of like you say that they were bullied at some, you know, at some meeting that the Japanese representative of the, you know, and, but at the same time there was this undertone, and correct me if I was reading too much in between the lines, that, you know, the Americans at that meeting actually didn't really know whether they could actually achieve that. They didn't know. They were not sure that the Japanese could do what they were asked to do. And then everyone was shocked that they actually did manage to strengthen the yen incredibly quickly, relatively speaking.
Kenneth Rogoff 19:43 ↗
Yeah. That's a very important event in global economics, and obviously very, the Plaza Accord, and very important to thinking about some of the things Donald Trump is thinking about today. So the Plaza Accord happened in the mid-'80s, and Japan was just killing it, the economy was, they had half the population of the US, but so what? I mean, the Netherlands was small when it was the dominant currency. The UK is just a little island with a quarter of the population of France, and, you know, ruled the world. So, of course, Japan, you know, could have emerged, and the US was trying to figure out what to do, and they tried, we tried various things, putting on, they had them do voluntary controls on their exports, and finally the Reagan administration decided, no, we've got to make, they're just too cheap, we can't compete with them. We've got to make their currency higher. And so this was another Texan was the Treasury Secretary then, Howard Baker. He was also quite a character. There, I mention that again, the US was starting to print a lot of dollars, and the Europeans were concerned, and that I think there, you know, at a meeting, one of my former MIT classmates attended repeatedly, one of the finance ministers, maybe the Netherlands, said to Baker, 'If you don't change your policies, we're going to stop holding dollars.' And Baker supposedly looked at him and said, you know, 'I grew up in Texas, and my daddy taught me if you pull a gun on somebody, you better be prepared to shoot.' And, you know, he was quite a powerful character. So I met him, you know, a few years later afterwards, and got a chance to speak to him one-on-one after Princeton. He gave a talk at Princeton, and I said, you know, 'You wouldn't know this, I was a pawn in this, but I actually worked on the Plaza Accord background stuff when I was at the Fed, and we were trying to ask ourselves, can currencies really be moved around through intervention? Is it really possible? How is it possible?' So we released a book. I have a paper, you know, back then. And I said, you know, we, I won't say we said they couldn't do it, but we had our doubts. And he said, yeah, you know, 'We weren't sure either what they were going to do, but the Japanese finance minister said to me, I can't make this decision myself.' And he mentioned, they always have to do things by consensus in Japan. I'm just using his words. So we had to, you know, fly back to Tokyo, and two weeks later they got the message, we're going to make it happen. And they did. And Baker told me they hit the nail on the head. Jean-Claude Trichet, the former head of the European Central Bank, showed me actually the whole agreement, the numbers they picked. They picked that they would appreciate, make their currency stronger by 10%. It doubled. It didn't just increase by 10%. So Baker was, you know, almost beside himself laughing when he's telling me about this, saying, 'Yeah, they could do it, but you know, once the cat got out of the bag, they didn't know how to control it.' And so the yen appreciated. And I try to pick some things in the book where I feel like I was wrong. And this is one of these episodes where I talk about that the Japanese, the Chinese talk about this all the time: 'You are not going to do this to us. We are not going to let you bully us.' And that's playing out before our eyes. And my initial reaction to that was, well, yeah, Japan did have a crisis, but it was like six years later, five years later, and in between it boomed, it grew, its stock market tripled, I think, in yen terms by a factor of, you know, five in dollar terms, housing even more. It, you know, it was the all-time boon time of all times. But I think as I reflected on it really over the years and in writing the book, I realized that we bullied them into doing something they weren't ready to do. They didn't have the regulatory infrastructure when they let all that capital flow in, which is really what they did. They built up a problem very similar to what we did in 2008, 2009. So, and I, you know, to just say, well, it didn't happen right away, was missing the whole point. These things take time. So it's a fascinating episode. I needless to say tell a lot more about it in the book.

15 more exchanges in this transcript

Sign in free to read the rest of this interview. No card required.

Sign in to read the full transcript

Cite this transcript

APA, MLA, BibTeX
APA

Rogoff, K. (2025, April 22). Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard University): "The dollar will always be there, but it will be less." [Interview transcript]. Prague Finance Institute. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3306865/

MLA

Kenneth Rogoff. "Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard University): "The dollar will always be there, but it will be less."." Prague Finance Institute, 22 Apr. 2025. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3306865/.

BibTeX
@misc{rogoff2025_3306865,
  author       = {Kenneth Rogoff},
  title        = {Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard University): "The dollar will always be there, but it will be less."},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Prague Finance Institute. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2025},
  month        = {apr},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3306865/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}