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Barry Ritholtz
Co-founder, Chairman & Chief Investment Officer, Ritholtz Wealth Management

How to Get Rich Slowly | Barry Ritholtz on Why Market Forecasts Fail

📅 Sep 10, 2026 Founders & Friends 41 MIN 110385 VIEWS 77 SEGMENTS · 2 SPEAKERS
Barry Ritholtz explains why getting rich through investing is simpler than most people think, why market forecasts are so often wrong, and why your own behavior may be the biggest threat to long-term investment success. Michael Monaghan sits down with Barry Ritholtz, Chairman and Chief Investment Officer of Ritholtz Wealth Management, host of Masters in Business, and author of How Not to Invest, for a wide-ranging conversation on stock market investing, compounding, index funds, active management, investor psychology, financial media, market predictions, and building wealth over time. Barry...

What Barry Ritholtz said

Written from the verified transcript and checked against it. Every figure links to the moment it was said.

Barry Ritholtz argues that getting rich slowly is easy if you are patient, requiring neither large sums nor high intelligence, and that most people fail because they are not built for long-term investing, driven by fight-or-flight instincts and media noise. He emphasizes that market forecasts are unreliable, citing that less than half of active managers beat benchmarks in any year, dropping to 10% over 10 years, and that specific forecasts are less likely to be correct. He discusses his evolution from a trading desk to a long-term horizon, deferring to experts, and softening on alternatives. He highlights the influence of Ray Dalio, Howard Marks, and behavioral psychologists, and describes his firm's focus on financial planning, behavior management, and direct indexing for tax-loss harvesting. He advises keeping a core index portfolio, allowing a small 'stink' for enthusiasm, and firewalling speculative bets.

Key takeaways

  1. Less than half of active managers beat their benchmark in any year; over 10 years, only 10% do.
  2. The stock market fell 34% in 17 trading days during the pandemic, but the stock market is undefeated.
  3. Keep 95% of your portfolio in a simple compounding core; use 3-5% for speculative bets.

Numbers and commitments

FigureWhat it refers toTypeAt
20% Active managers beating benchmark over 5 years metric 0:12
10% Active managers beating benchmark over 10 years metric 0:12
22% Single-day market crash in 1987 metric 9:58
$18 billion Facebook settlement cost other 9:58
34% Stock market decline in 17 trading days during pandemic metric 14:17
650 Number of Masters of Business interviews metric 22:42
19% a year for five years Return of Howard Marks' distressed fund metric 22:53
3 to 5% Liquid net worth for speculative account guidance 26:09
50, 60, 70% Core portfolio in broad market index guidance 26:09

Chapters

  1. 0:00Getting rich slowly
  2. 0:12Why people fail to execute
  3. 1:09Writing and investing
  4. 3:41Simple but hard investing
  5. 5:08Media noise and control
  6. 11:27Nobody knows anything
  7. 14:17Forecasters and specificity
  8. 18:12Evolution of investing style
  9. 22:53Influential thinkers
  10. 26:09Portfolio construction and advice

Questions asked in this interview

8
  1. 0:08What do you think holds people up on executing the long-term plan?
  2. 0:50Which one of those has influenced you the most in your investing style?
  3. 3:14If you meet a 19-year-old priest who's trying to change his life through investing, or a 35-year-old firefighter or teacher, what's the one thing you tell them to keep it really simple?
  4. 17:52It sure seems like it. What do you think?
  5. 18:00How has your view on investing — then I'm going to have a follow-up question — how's your view on investing changed from 30 years ago to now?
  6. 22:42Either your worldview or your investing worldview?
  7. 25:53Did any of them give you simple takeaways on how to improve — you know, for a viewer to improve their investing behavior or insulate themselves from that outside noise?
  8. 38:50How do we balance really listening to ourselves but also leaning on others?
Barry Ritholtz 0:00 ↗
It's really easy to get rich as long as you're patient. Doesn't take a lot of money. Doesn't take a lot of smarts.
Michael Monaghan 0:08 ↗
What do you think holds people up on executing the long-term plan?
Barry Ritholtz 0:12 ↗
That's easy. You are not built for this. None of us are built for this. In any given year, less than half of active managers beat their benchmark. You take that to five years, it's 20%, 10 years, it's 10%.
The more specific a guy on TV or girl on TV is, the more likely they are to be believed by the viewer and the less likely they are to be correct.
Michael Monaghan 0:40 ↗
I'm Michael Monaghan. Today on Founders and Friends, we have a great guest who happens to usually be a host, Barry Ritholtz.
Barry Ritholtz 0:48 ↗
Thank you so much for having me, Michael.
Michael Monaghan 0:50 ↗
Barry, it's really good to have you here, and I've been thinking a lot about our conversation. We've had some great conversations as we got to know each other. And I want to just kick it off. You know, you've been writing about markets, you've been investing in markets, you're a founder of your own company. Which one of those has influenced you the most in your investing style?
Barry Ritholtz 1:09 ↗
Huh, that's an interesting question. It's rare I get a question I haven't heard before. Really, the best answer is it's sort of a holistic jumble, and each aspect of those things — writing, working in, and founding — they all very much reinforce each other. The purpose of writing isn't necessarily to crank out, look, here's a blog post, here's a column, here's a magazine article. You write to figure out what you think, to sort out all your jumbled thoughts until you have it in a structured written product. You may not really understand all the nuances and framing of an idea or concept, and so writing is really helpful to figure out exactly what you understand. You create a public record. You're timestamping. I hate Nvidia or I love Nvidia, whatever it is, you're creating something about that. So that's useful to your own understanding. It's certainly useful to the process of investing.
And then understanding what your value proposition is as an entity, as an organization. Listen, nobody needs another book on investing, and nobody needs another investment manager. There's plenty of both, and most of them are, you know, so-so. Being able to form a coherent explanation of what your value add is, why you should found a firm, why your investment strategy makes sense — they're all so intimately tied to writing.
Michael Monaghan 2:51 ↗
And you are kind of the first on this. I mean, there's a lot of people that write, but you've been writing for a very long time. And I should remind people, you've got an incredible book out, How Not to Invest. And I think at the back of the podcast, for people who stay the whole time, I'm going to tell them a way to get a free copy or two. And I'll bet you if I ask nicely, you'll sign it for them.
Barry Ritholtz 3:13 ↗
Sure.
Michael Monaghan 3:14 ↗
We really believe, and I know you believe in reading, you keep investing very simple. You've even given everything away between your books, your podcast, your blog. One of the things you say is everything you're doing at Ritholtz Wealth, if someone wants to do it themselves, it's there. So, what's the one takeaway? If you meet a 19-year-old priest who's trying to change his life through investing, or a 35-year-old firefighter or teacher, what's the one thing you tell them to keep it really simple?
Barry Ritholtz 3:41 ↗
So, your plan should be to get rich slowly. Everybody that gets into trouble in the world of finance — every Bernie Madoff, every Enron, every nonsensical insider trading, whatever trouble people get into — is because they're trying to get rich quick. And this is kind of a shock when I say this: it's really easy to get rich as long as you're patient. Doesn't take a lot of money. Doesn't take a lot of smarts. Warren Buffett famously said, 'If your IQ is 160, you're better off selling 30 points. As an investor, you don't need them.' A simple portfolio that you allow to compound over decades will eventually be millions and tens of millions of dollars. And so all you have to do is understand the combination of time and compounding and just staying out of your own way. It's — investing is simple but hard, and that sort of seems like a conflict to a lot of people.
Michael Monaghan 4:55 ↗
I think simple but easy — excuse me, simple but not easy is the concept. The concept is simple but the execution is hard. What do you think holds people up on executing the long-term plan?
Barry Ritholtz 5:08 ↗
That's easy. You are not built for this. None of us are built for this. Listen, modern capital markets have existed, you could say a century or two, but really the modern version is a post-1980s sort of thing. And modern humans have been around in some form or another — recent humans — for a few million years. But you go back three or four hundred thousand years and take a human's brain and compare it to today's, they're effectively identical. So we have a few million years of education, a few hundred thousand years of adapting to what is a short, brutish, and nasty environment to survive. And we've done a pretty good job of surviving. Our bodies are built for fight or flight. Your limbic system — you're confronted with something and you have to make a snap decision: run away or pick up a rock and defend myself. In markets, you don't have to make those sort of decisions, and yet that's how we're built and that's how we behave.
And I think it also collides with incentive systems, where financial news, they want to talk about what's happening now, what should we do about it? And unlike the Serengeti where you need to do something about it, maybe sometimes the best thing is to do nothing and sit. Well, the daily beast that must be fed is the line about millions of column inches that have to be cranked out every day, 24 hours of television, 24 hours of radio, endless, endless tweets and TikToks and Instagrams, saying nothing about every website in the world — effectively unlimited, infinite space. So there's a massive amount of competition for your attention and your time. And so how do we grab people's attention and time? We frighten them, we engage them, we force them, we tickle their bias to action. And all these things take place in modern media, both traditional broadcast, print, and then social media.
But stop and think about it. There is a universe of things that are within your control, and then there's a whole much bigger universe way outside of your control. And you would think the focus is on what can you control? What can you do? How do you have a positive impact on your portfolio? That's not really what the media covers. What is in your control? Well, your savings rate, how you organize your portfolio, what's your asset allocation like, how much risk assets do you own, how much riskless assets do you own, how much cash do you have, how do you manage your own behavior, how disciplined are you, what is your media consumption — the things within your control that are going to have a much, much bigger impact on what your portfolio looks like 10, 20, 30 years from now than whether the Fed cuts or raises in the fourth quarter of 2026 or what Nvidia's earnings were in the third quarter of this year, non-farm payroll for September. Those things will be long forgotten, but the decisions you make, your savings rate, your financial plan, how often you freak out, how disciplined you are at managing your own body's fight-or-flight response — the things within your control are really important.
The stuff that's out of your control, that's what the media focuses on because they need content, they need filler, they need constant attention-grabbing noise to sell to their viewers and listeners. Maybe sell is the wrong word — to present to their viewers and listeners. Their product is an audience. They sell an audience to advertisers. They don't sell the news to you. You're the product.
Michael Monaghan 9:25 ↗
Yeah. And people forget that. Yeah. I mean, I think what you're really saying — the simple, going back to your simple but not easy — what you're saying is you can control what you save, you can control buying high-quality assets, and ignore all the things you can't control because they probably don't affect the long-term performance of your portfolio anyway. I mean, that's one of the things I say is what the Fed's doing, what war is going on — when you zoom out two years, five years, ten years from now, you'll forget it even happened. You won't even see it in the stock chart.
Barry Ritholtz 9:58 ↗
You can look at a long-term chart and you barely see the '87 crash. It was 22% in a single day. What the Fed does at any one of the eight meetings they hold a year, it's far less consequential. And besides, what can you do about it? Are you going to position your portfolio to guess whether the Fed raises, cuts, or stays pat? Are you going to guess all the company's earnings? You know, and very often there's a second-order-of-magnitude effect. It doesn't matter if a company beats or disappoints; it's how well they do to expectations. The consensus might have been a dollar, but the whisper was $1.10. And if they do $1.18, you would think that's a big win, but no, it's a disappointment to the whisper. And it happens on the other side: 'Oh, these guys are going to just crap the bet. It's going to be — we thought it was going to be a dollar, but now it's going to be 80 cents.' And they come in at 90 cents and the stock rallies.
We just got the settlement with Facebook. It's going to cost them $18 billion, and the stock rallied on it because now we have some certainty. It's not going to cost them 20, 30, $40 billion, and they get to put it behind them. And yet, stop and think about it — people were just talking about this so much for so long. Turns out not to matter.
Michael Monaghan 11:19 ↗
And this leads me to my next question. You have an entire chapter of the book called 'Nobody Knows,' or the theme is 'Nobody Knows,' but I mistitled the chapter, but...
Barry Ritholtz 11:27 ↗
William Goldman: 'Nobody knows anything.' Okay. He was the scriptwriter for Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, won an Oscar for that. Just a brilliant scriptwriter, been in Hollywood for 30, 40 years. And he wrote a book called Adventures in the Screen Trade, and he had a chapter called 'Nobody Knows Anything.' And it's not just film; it's whatever area you look at.
The film example I really love is John Wick, which is Keanu Reeves as an assassin who's upset that a bunch of guys try and kill him and they murder his puppy, and he comes out of retirement and just kills everybody, and they couldn't get it made. So he funded some of it and Eva Longoria funded some of it — probably the best investment either of them made. So now you have John Wick 1, 2, 3, 4. It's now a two- to three-billion-dollar franchise. Nobody in Hollywood knew, wanted to touch it. And so if those guys don't know what's going to happen in the future, what makes you think that anybody has any idea what stock is going to run up? I mean, somebody's going to get it right, right? There are enough people throwing darts at everything randomly, someone gets it right.
But we know it's random because in any given year, less than half of active managers beat their benchmark. You take that to five years, it's 20%; 10 years, it's 10%. And by the time you get out 20 years, you know the people and you can count them on one hand: it's Bill Miller, Peter Lynch, Warren Buffett, Will Danoff. There's, you know, you could look at D.E. Shaw, you could look at a bunch of the quants who have done pretty well, to say nothing of Renaissance Technologies, a bunch of venture capitalists. You know, I'm fond of saying I've softened my attitude towards alternatives. I used to be dismissive — they're underperforming and expensive — but the truth is, if you could get into the top decile of those, they're great. The problem is, you know, it's a half-a-billion-dollar cost of admission, and they don't want you. They want, you know, the Harvard endowment or the Ford Foundation. They don't want you or my money.
Michael Monaghan 14:02 ↗
That's a good point. It's not only that nobody knows anything. You've also talked about a concept in the book that sometimes once a big forecast has been made, people believe their next big forecast is going to be right, and it almost never is.
Barry Ritholtz 14:17 ↗
Yeah. The folks who make the big outlier forecasts and get them correct — two things happen after that. First, people very much believe whatever they say. Hey, they got the big one right. Never mind that that was the 47th in a run of 50 forecasts and the first one they really nailed. People forget the other 46. But second, not only are people more likely to believe them, but statistically they're just much less likely to be correct. And part of the reason is, 'Oh, this outlier worked. Let me do more outliers.' And you know, those come along — financial crisis is a once-in-a-generation thing, the pandemic is once-in-a-century. So it's very rare for people to get more than one of those.
And then the corollary to that is — and this is so revealing of human psychology — the more specific a guy on TV or girl on TV is, the more likely they are to be believed by the viewer and the less likely they are to be correct. So when you have two people on a show, 'Hey, where's the Dow going to be in a year?' 'Well, we're about 48,000, and the Dow averages about 10% a year, so let's assume next year is, I don't know, 53,000, something like that, plus or minus 10,000. The future is unknown and unknowable. Let's just throw that out there.' And the second person says, '57,863, driven primarily by falling energy costs and rising semiconductors.' Everybody hates what the first guy says. Everybody loves what the second guy said. The second guy is a total binary forecast and probably a specific price level and a date. The odds are very much against that being correct. But the person who's saying, 'Ah, extrapolate 10%. Maybe it's this, maybe it's that. Nobody knows.' People hate that, even though it tends to be much more accurate, much closer to the truth.
Think back to the financial crisis. Do you remember in October of '08, like a month past Lehman Brothers, Ben Bernanke is testifying on a Monday in Congress about, 'Hey, we're in charge of trying to keep inflation low and employment high. We're not in charge of the credit markets or unfreezing the economy or liquidity. We don't have that authority. You guys need to give us the authority for that and a budget for that, and then we can try and fix this.' And they voted it down, and the market immediately sells off. By Friday, it's down 13, 15%, something like that, and they bring Bernanke back: 'Please make it stop.' And he's like, 'I told you what you have to do. I need permission to do this. Only Congress can authorize this, and I need a budget. Here, take whatever you want.' And the market started to stabilize and recover.
The same thing happened during the pandemic. The market plummets 34% in 17 trading days. So you have this just massive, massive response — some people would say over-response. And the reason for it was the stock market fell 34% in 17 days. To me, that sounds much more powerful than the bond market. The stock market is undefeated.
Michael Monaghan 17:52 ↗
It sure seems like it. What do you think? You've been a market participant for a long time.
Barry Ritholtz 17:59 ↗
30 years.
Michael Monaghan 18:00 ↗
30 years. How has your view on investing — then I'm going to have a follow-up question — how's your view on investing changed from 30 years ago to now? I know how mine has, but I want to learn how yours has, and then I have a follow-up question.
Barry Ritholtz 18:12 ↗
So, in a couple of ways, and basically from a lot of mistakes I made and have adapted from. So I mentioned I started out on a trading desk where you don't realize that time is your ally. Like you have a certain amount of a credit line — here's how much the firm gives you to spend — and you want to go home relatively flat. You're looking to take advantage of volatility, so you kind of have to have a feel of a flow of what's happening that day. And there's no compounding. You're just looking for outside moves where somebody else is wrong or where somebody else is right and you jump on top of it. So in the early days, I was very focused on whatever could be scratched out midday.
As time goes on, you start to learn, you know, there's nothing worse than selling something at 3:59 and seeing it the next morning at 9:30, 20% higher. And in fact, there have been studies that have shown the lion's share of market gains take place after hours. You get earnings reports, you get other releases, you get all sorts of news when the market is closed, and you get these big gaps up and down. And so that's more than half of market action. It's really kind of fascinating. So if you're not a long-term investor, you don't participate in that. So the first major change has been my investment horizon has expanded dramatically. That's number one.
Number two, I've learned how to defer to experts. I'm not an expert in venture capital. I've had a couple lucky investments in startups and things like that, but I wouldn't pretend I have any great insight. I meet someone I think is really interesting and smart, I know I like their idea, I'll throw a couple of bucks into that. And the assumption is I hope it works — meaning I hope whatever they're trying to build gets built. I immediately assume my return on investment is going to be zero. I invest in people, not technology or investments or ideas. So that's a change. So I've learned to defer to people. So the first thing is time horizon, and the second is deferring to people who clearly have an expertise in the space. And I don't mean past performance — I mean, oh, they really understand the space, they know the players, they have a good insight. I don't know who's going to get this right, but Howard probably is going to be more likely than me. So let me throw a couple of bucks to Howard. And so that was a big shift.
And then the last shift was I mentioned I was very skeptical on high-priced hedge funds and private equity and venture capital, and I've since moderated that to, hey, if you have a chance to get in the top 10, maybe even 15% of the funds in that space, you're probably going to do better than average. Again, no guarantee. It's hard to get. You know, the old Groucho Marx line is, 'I wouldn't want to be a member of any club that would have me.' You probably don't want to give money to any alternative that's willing to take your cash. The best-performing funds tend to have all the capital they need. But I've softened up on that over the years as well.
Michael Monaghan 21:49 ↗
I think we're crossing each other on that line because at the beginning of my career I started on that side of the business. Those were all...
Barry Ritholtz 21:57 ↗
Hedge funds or venture?

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APA

Ritholtz, B. (2026, September 10). How to Get Rich Slowly | Barry Ritholtz on Why Market Forecasts Fail [Interview transcript]. Founders & Friends. CEOInterviews.AI. https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3122324/

MLA

Barry Ritholtz. "How to Get Rich Slowly | Barry Ritholtz on Why Market Forecasts Fail." Founders & Friends, 10 Sep. 2026. Transcript, CEOInterviews.AI, https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3122324/.

BibTeX
@misc{ritholtz2026_3122324,
  author       = {Barry Ritholtz},
  title        = {How to Get Rich Slowly | Barry Ritholtz on Why Market Forecasts Fail},
  howpublished = {Interview transcript, Founders \& Friends. CEOInterviews.AI},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = {sep},
  url          = {https://ceointerviews.ai/interview/3122324/},
  note         = {Speaker-attributed transcript with timestamps}
}